From 53944f171a89dff4e2a3d76f42e6eedb551bb861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Kitt Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2021 13:45:18 -0700 Subject: mm: remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK This has served its purpose and is no longer used. All usercopy violations appear to have been handled by now, any remaining instances (or new bugs) will cause copies to be rejected. This isn't a direct revert of commit 2d891fbc3bb6 ("usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists"); since usercopy_fallback is effectively 0, the fallback handling is removed too. This also removes the usercopy_fallback module parameter on slab_common. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/153 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210921061149.1091163-1-steve@sk2.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Kitt Suggested-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley [defconfig change] Acked-by: David Rientjes Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/powerpc/configs/skiroot_defconfig | 1 - include/linux/slab.h | 2 -- mm/slab.c | 13 ------------- mm/slab_common.c | 8 -------- mm/slub.c | 14 -------------- security/Kconfig | 14 -------------- 6 files changed, 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/configs/skiroot_defconfig b/arch/powerpc/configs/skiroot_defconfig index b806a5d3a695..c3ba614c973d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/configs/skiroot_defconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/configs/skiroot_defconfig @@ -275,7 +275,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y CONFIG_SECURITY=y CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y -# CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK is not set CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index 837cb16232ef..181045148b06 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -142,8 +142,6 @@ struct mem_cgroup; void __init kmem_cache_init(void); bool slab_is_available(void); -extern bool usercopy_fallback; - struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache_create(const char *name, unsigned int size, unsigned int align, slab_flags_t flags, void (*ctor)(void *)); diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index 64ec17a3bc2b..da132a9ae6f8 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -4204,19 +4204,6 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, n <= cachep->useroffset - offset + cachep->usersize) return; - /* - * If the copy is still within the allocated object, produce - * a warning instead of rejecting the copy. This is intended - * to be a temporary method to find any missing usercopy - * whitelists. - */ - if (usercopy_fallback && - offset <= cachep->object_size && - n <= cachep->object_size - offset) { - usercopy_warn("SLAB object", cachep->name, to_user, offset, n); - return; - } - usercopy_abort("SLAB object", cachep->name, to_user, offset, n); } #endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index ec2bb0beed75..e5d080a93009 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -37,14 +37,6 @@ LIST_HEAD(slab_caches); DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex); struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache; -#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY -bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init = - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK); -module_param(usercopy_fallback, bool, 0400); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(usercopy_fallback, - "WARN instead of reject usercopy whitelist violations"); -#endif - static LIST_HEAD(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy); static void slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_workfn(struct work_struct *work); static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work, diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index e9a51dcf8bf9..432145d7b4ec 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -4489,7 +4489,6 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, { struct kmem_cache *s; unsigned int offset; - size_t object_size; bool is_kfence = is_kfence_address(ptr); ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr); @@ -4522,19 +4521,6 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page, n <= s->useroffset - offset + s->usersize) return; - /* - * If the copy is still within the allocated object, produce - * a warning instead of rejecting the copy. This is intended - * to be a temporary method to find any missing usercopy - * whitelists. - */ - object_size = slab_ksize(s); - if (usercopy_fallback && - offset <= object_size && n <= object_size - offset) { - usercopy_warn("SLUB object", s->name, to_user, offset, n); - return; - } - usercopy_abort("SLUB object", s->name, to_user, offset, n); } #endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY */ diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 0ced7fd33e4d..d9698900c9b7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -163,20 +163,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. -config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK - bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size" - depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY - default y - help - This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists - to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of - rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened - usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the - whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like - all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed. - Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change - this setting. - config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY -- cgit