From 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 11:49:23 -0700 Subject: kallsyms: Refactor kallsyms_show_value() to take cred In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(), switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will be fixed in the coming patches. Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style function return. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/filter.h | 2 +- include/linux/kallsyms.h | 5 +++-- kernel/kallsyms.c | 17 +++++++++++------ kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++-- kernel/module.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 259377723603..55104f6c78e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(void) /* Reconstruction of call-sites is dependent on kallsyms, * thus make dump the same restriction. */ - return kallsyms_show_value() == 1; + return kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()); } struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, diff --git a/include/linux/kallsyms.h b/include/linux/kallsyms.h index 98338dc6b5d2..481273f0c72d 100644 --- a/include/linux/kallsyms.h +++ b/include/linux/kallsyms.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #define KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN (sizeof("%s+%#lx/%#lx [%s]") + (KSYM_NAME_LEN - 1) + \ 2*(BITS_PER_LONG*3/10) + (MODULE_NAME_LEN - 1) + 1) +struct cred; struct module; static inline int is_kernel_inittext(unsigned long addr) @@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ int lookup_symbol_name(unsigned long addr, char *symname); int lookup_symbol_attrs(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, unsigned long *offset, char *modname, char *name); /* How and when do we show kallsyms values? */ -extern int kallsyms_show_value(void); +extern bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred); #else /* !CONFIG_KALLSYMS */ @@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ static inline int lookup_symbol_attrs(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, u return -ERANGE; } -static inline int kallsyms_show_value(void) +static inline bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred) { return false; } diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c index 16c8c605f4b0..bb14e64f62a4 100644 --- a/kernel/kallsyms.c +++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c @@ -644,19 +644,20 @@ static inline int kallsyms_for_perf(void) * Otherwise, require CAP_SYSLOG (assuming kptr_restrict isn't set to * block even that). */ -int kallsyms_show_value(void) +bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred) { switch (kptr_restrict) { case 0: if (kallsyms_for_perf()) - return 1; + return true; /* fallthrough */ case 1: - if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG)) - return 1; + if (security_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYSLOG, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0) + return true; /* fallthrough */ default: - return 0; + return false; } } @@ -673,7 +674,11 @@ static int kallsyms_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; reset_iter(iter, 0); - iter->show_value = kallsyms_show_value(); + /* + * Instead of checking this on every s_show() call, cache + * the result here at open time. + */ + iter->show_value = kallsyms_show_value(file->f_cred); return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index 4a904cc56d68..d4de217e4a91 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ static void report_probe(struct seq_file *pi, struct kprobe *p, else kprobe_type = "k"; - if (!kallsyms_show_value()) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) addr = NULL; if (sym) @@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static int kprobe_blacklist_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * If /proc/kallsyms is not showing kernel address, we won't * show them here either. */ - if (!kallsyms_show_value()) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) seq_printf(m, "0x%px-0x%px\t%ps\n", NULL, NULL, (void *)ent->start_addr); else diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index e8a198588f26..a5022ae84e50 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -4377,7 +4377,7 @@ static int modules_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!err) { struct seq_file *m = file->private_data; - m->private = kallsyms_show_value() ? NULL : (void *)8ul; + m->private = kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()) ? NULL : (void *)8ul; } return err; -- cgit From ed66f991bb19d94cae5d38f77de81f96aac7813f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 13:47:20 -0700 Subject: module: Refactor section attr into bin attribute In order to gain access to the open file's f_cred for kallsym visibility permission checks, refactor the module section attributes to use the bin_attribute instead of attribute interface. Additionally removes the redundant "name" struct member. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Tested-by: Jessica Yu Acked-by: Jessica Yu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/module.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index a5022ae84e50..9e2954519259 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -1510,8 +1510,7 @@ static inline bool sect_empty(const Elf_Shdr *sect) } struct module_sect_attr { - struct module_attribute mattr; - char *name; + struct bin_attribute battr; unsigned long address; }; @@ -1521,11 +1520,16 @@ struct module_sect_attrs { struct module_sect_attr attrs[]; }; -static ssize_t module_sect_show(struct module_attribute *mattr, - struct module_kobject *mk, char *buf) +static ssize_t module_sect_read(struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj, + struct bin_attribute *battr, + char *buf, loff_t pos, size_t count) { struct module_sect_attr *sattr = - container_of(mattr, struct module_sect_attr, mattr); + container_of(battr, struct module_sect_attr, battr); + + if (pos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + return sprintf(buf, "0x%px\n", kptr_restrict < 2 ? (void *)sattr->address : NULL); } @@ -1535,7 +1539,7 @@ static void free_sect_attrs(struct module_sect_attrs *sect_attrs) unsigned int section; for (section = 0; section < sect_attrs->nsections; section++) - kfree(sect_attrs->attrs[section].name); + kfree(sect_attrs->attrs[section].battr.attr.name); kfree(sect_attrs); } @@ -1544,42 +1548,41 @@ static void add_sect_attrs(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) unsigned int nloaded = 0, i, size[2]; struct module_sect_attrs *sect_attrs; struct module_sect_attr *sattr; - struct attribute **gattr; + struct bin_attribute **gattr; /* Count loaded sections and allocate structures */ for (i = 0; i < info->hdr->e_shnum; i++) if (!sect_empty(&info->sechdrs[i])) nloaded++; size[0] = ALIGN(struct_size(sect_attrs, attrs, nloaded), - sizeof(sect_attrs->grp.attrs[0])); - size[1] = (nloaded + 1) * sizeof(sect_attrs->grp.attrs[0]); + sizeof(sect_attrs->grp.bin_attrs[0])); + size[1] = (nloaded + 1) * sizeof(sect_attrs->grp.bin_attrs[0]); sect_attrs = kzalloc(size[0] + size[1], GFP_KERNEL); if (sect_attrs == NULL) return; /* Setup section attributes. */ sect_attrs->grp.name = "sections"; - sect_attrs->grp.attrs = (void *)sect_attrs + size[0]; + sect_attrs->grp.bin_attrs = (void *)sect_attrs + size[0]; sect_attrs->nsections = 0; sattr = §_attrs->attrs[0]; - gattr = §_attrs->grp.attrs[0]; + gattr = §_attrs->grp.bin_attrs[0]; for (i = 0; i < info->hdr->e_shnum; i++) { Elf_Shdr *sec = &info->sechdrs[i]; if (sect_empty(sec)) continue; + sysfs_bin_attr_init(&sattr->battr); sattr->address = sec->sh_addr; - sattr->name = kstrdup(info->secstrings + sec->sh_name, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (sattr->name == NULL) + sattr->battr.attr.name = + kstrdup(info->secstrings + sec->sh_name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (sattr->battr.attr.name == NULL) goto out; sect_attrs->nsections++; - sysfs_attr_init(&sattr->mattr.attr); - sattr->mattr.show = module_sect_show; - sattr->mattr.store = NULL; - sattr->mattr.attr.name = sattr->name; - sattr->mattr.attr.mode = S_IRUSR; - *(gattr++) = &(sattr++)->mattr.attr; + sattr->battr.read = module_sect_read; + sattr->battr.size = 3 /* "0x", "\n" */ + (BITS_PER_LONG / 4); + sattr->battr.attr.mode = 0400; + *(gattr++) = &(sattr++)->battr; } *gattr = NULL; @@ -1669,7 +1672,7 @@ static void add_notes_attrs(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) continue; if (info->sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_NOTE) { sysfs_bin_attr_init(nattr); - nattr->attr.name = mod->sect_attrs->attrs[loaded].name; + nattr->attr.name = mod->sect_attrs->attrs[loaded].battr.attr.name; nattr->attr.mode = S_IRUGO; nattr->size = info->sechdrs[i].sh_size; nattr->private = (void *) info->sechdrs[i].sh_addr; -- cgit From b25a7c5af9051850d4f3d93ca500056ab6ec724b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 14:43:59 -0700 Subject: module: Do not expose section addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG The printing of section addresses in /sys/module/*/sections/* was not using the correct credentials to evaluate visibility. Before: # cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text 0xffffffffc0458000 ... # capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text" 0xffffffffc0458000 ... After: # cat /sys/module/*/sections/*.text 0xffffffffc0458000 ... # capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "cat /sys/module/*/sections/.*text" 0x0000000000000000 ... Additionally replaces the existing (safe) /proc/modules check with file->f_cred for consistency. Reported-by: Dominik Czarnota Fixes: be71eda5383f ("module: Fix display of wrong module .text address") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Jessica Yu Acked-by: Jessica Yu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/module.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 9e2954519259..e6c7571092cb 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -1530,8 +1530,8 @@ static ssize_t module_sect_read(struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj, if (pos != 0) return -EINVAL; - return sprintf(buf, "0x%px\n", kptr_restrict < 2 ? - (void *)sattr->address : NULL); + return sprintf(buf, "0x%px\n", + kallsyms_show_value(file->f_cred) ? (void *)sattr->address : NULL); } static void free_sect_attrs(struct module_sect_attrs *sect_attrs) @@ -4380,7 +4380,7 @@ static int modules_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!err) { struct seq_file *m = file->private_data; - m->private = kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()) ? NULL : (void *)8ul; + m->private = kallsyms_show_value(file->f_cred) ? NULL : (void *)8ul; } return err; -- cgit From 60f7bb66b88b649433bf700acfc60c3f24953871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 15:20:22 -0700 Subject: kprobes: Do not expose probe addresses to non-CAP_SYSLOG The kprobe show() functions were using "current"'s creds instead of the file opener's creds for kallsyms visibility. Fix to use seq_file->file->f_cred. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 81365a947de4 ("kprobes: Show address of kprobes if kallsyms does") Fixes: ffb9bd68ebdb ("kprobes: Show blacklist addresses as same as kallsyms does") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index d4de217e4a91..2e97febeef77 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ static void report_probe(struct seq_file *pi, struct kprobe *p, else kprobe_type = "k"; - if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(pi->file->f_cred)) addr = NULL; if (sym) @@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static int kprobe_blacklist_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * If /proc/kallsyms is not showing kernel address, we won't * show them here either. */ - if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(m->file->f_cred)) seq_printf(m, "0x%px-0x%px\t%ps\n", NULL, NULL, (void *)ent->start_addr); else -- cgit From 63960260457a02af2a6cb35d75e6bdb17299c882 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2020 15:45:23 -0700 Subject: bpf: Check correct cred for CAP_SYSLOG in bpf_dump_raw_ok() When evaluating access control over kallsyms visibility, credentials at open() time need to be used, not the "current" creds (though in BPF's case, this has likely always been the same). Plumb access to associated file->f_cred down through bpf_dump_raw_ok() and its callers now that kallsysm_show_value() has been refactored to take struct cred. Cc: Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7105e828c087 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/filter.h | 4 ++-- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 55104f6c78e8..0b0144752d78 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -884,12 +884,12 @@ void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void); bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func); -static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(void) +static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred) { /* Reconstruction of call-sites is dependent on kallsyms, * thus make dump the same restriction. */ - return kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()); + return kallsyms_show_value(cred); } struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_single(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 off, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 8da159936bab..859053ddf05b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -3139,7 +3139,8 @@ static const struct bpf_map *bpf_map_from_imm(const struct bpf_prog *prog, return NULL; } -static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog) +static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + const struct cred *f_cred) { const struct bpf_map *map; struct bpf_insn *insns; @@ -3165,7 +3166,7 @@ static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog) code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS)) { if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS)) insns[i].code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL; - if (!bpf_dump_raw_ok()) + if (!bpf_dump_raw_ok(f_cred)) insns[i].imm = 0; continue; } @@ -3221,7 +3222,8 @@ static int set_info_rec_size(struct bpf_prog_info *info) return 0; } -static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, +static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, + struct bpf_prog *prog, const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -3290,11 +3292,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_insn *insns_sanitized; bool fault; - if (prog->blinded && !bpf_dump_raw_ok()) { + if (prog->blinded && !bpf_dump_raw_ok(file->f_cred)) { info.xlated_prog_insns = 0; goto done; } - insns_sanitized = bpf_insn_prepare_dump(prog); + insns_sanitized = bpf_insn_prepare_dump(prog, file->f_cred); if (!insns_sanitized) return -ENOMEM; uinsns = u64_to_user_ptr(info.xlated_prog_insns); @@ -3328,7 +3330,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, } if (info.jited_prog_len && ulen) { - if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) { + if (bpf_dump_raw_ok(file->f_cred)) { uinsns = u64_to_user_ptr(info.jited_prog_insns); ulen = min_t(u32, info.jited_prog_len, ulen); @@ -3363,7 +3365,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, ulen = info.nr_jited_ksyms; info.nr_jited_ksyms = prog->aux->func_cnt ? : 1; if (ulen) { - if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) { + if (bpf_dump_raw_ok(file->f_cred)) { unsigned long ksym_addr; u64 __user *user_ksyms; u32 i; @@ -3394,7 +3396,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, ulen = info.nr_jited_func_lens; info.nr_jited_func_lens = prog->aux->func_cnt ? : 1; if (ulen) { - if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) { + if (bpf_dump_raw_ok(file->f_cred)) { u32 __user *user_lens; u32 func_len, i; @@ -3451,7 +3453,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_prog *prog, else info.nr_jited_line_info = 0; if (info.nr_jited_line_info && ulen) { - if (bpf_dump_raw_ok()) { + if (bpf_dump_raw_ok(file->f_cred)) { __u64 __user *user_linfo; u32 i; @@ -3497,7 +3499,8 @@ done: return 0; } -static int bpf_map_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_map *map, +static int bpf_map_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, + struct bpf_map *map, const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -3540,7 +3543,8 @@ static int bpf_map_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_map *map, return 0; } -static int bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd(struct btf *btf, +static int bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, + struct btf *btf, const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -3555,7 +3559,8 @@ static int bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd(struct btf *btf, return btf_get_info_by_fd(btf, attr, uattr); } -static int bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_link *link, +static int bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, + struct bpf_link *link, const union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { @@ -3608,15 +3613,15 @@ static int bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, return -EBADFD; if (f.file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) - err = bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(f.file->private_data, attr, + err = bpf_prog_get_info_by_fd(f.file, f.file->private_data, attr, uattr); else if (f.file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) - err = bpf_map_get_info_by_fd(f.file->private_data, attr, + err = bpf_map_get_info_by_fd(f.file, f.file->private_data, attr, uattr); else if (f.file->f_op == &btf_fops) - err = bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd(f.file->private_data, attr, uattr); + err = bpf_btf_get_info_by_fd(f.file, f.file->private_data, attr, uattr); else if (f.file->f_op == &bpf_link_fops) - err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(f.file->private_data, + err = bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(f.file, f.file->private_data, attr, uattr); else err = -EINVAL; diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c index f93f8ace6c56..6ada114bbcca 100644 --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable(struct ctl_table *table, int write, ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (write && !ret) { if (jit_enable < 2 || - (jit_enable == 2 && bpf_dump_raw_ok())) { + (jit_enable == 2 && bpf_dump_raw_ok(current_cred()))) { *(int *)table->data = jit_enable; if (jit_enable == 2) pr_warn("bpf_jit_enable = 2 was set! NEVER use this in production, only for JIT debugging!\n"); -- cgit From 2c79583927bb8154ecaa45a67dde97661d895ecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 11:25:09 -0700 Subject: selftests: kmod: Add module address visibility test Make sure we don't regress the CAP_SYSLOG behavior of the module address visibility via /proc/modules nor /sys/module/*/sections/*. Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh index 3702dbcc90a7..c82aa77958e5 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0008:150:1" ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0009:150:1" ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0010:1:1" ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0011:1:1" +ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0012:1:1" +ALL_TESTS="$ALL_TESTS 0013:1:1" # Kselftest framework requirement - SKIP code is 4. ksft_skip=4 @@ -470,6 +472,38 @@ kmod_test_0011() echo "$MODPROBE" > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe } +kmod_check_visibility() +{ + local name="$1" + local cmd="$2" + + modprobe $DEFAULT_KMOD_DRIVER + + local priv=$(eval $cmd) + local unpriv=$(capsh --drop=CAP_SYSLOG -- -c "$cmd") + + if [ "$priv" = "$unpriv" ] || \ + [ "${priv:0:3}" = "0x0" ] || \ + [ "${unpriv:0:3}" != "0x0" ] ; then + echo "${FUNCNAME[0]}: FAIL, $name visible to unpriv: '$priv' vs '$unpriv'" >&2 + exit 1 + else + echo "${FUNCNAME[0]}: OK!" + fi +} + +kmod_test_0012() +{ + kmod_check_visibility /proc/modules \ + "grep '^${DEFAULT_KMOD_DRIVER}\b' /proc/modules | awk '{print \$NF}'" +} + +kmod_test_0013() +{ + kmod_check_visibility '/sys/module/*/sections/*' \ + "cat /sys/module/${DEFAULT_KMOD_DRIVER}/sections/.*text | head -n1" +} + list_tests() { echo "Test ID list:" @@ -489,6 +523,8 @@ list_tests() echo "0009 x $(get_test_count 0009) - multithreaded - push kmod_concurrent over max_modprobes for get_fs_type()" echo "0010 x $(get_test_count 0010) - test nonexistent modprobe path" echo "0011 x $(get_test_count 0011) - test completely disabling module autoloading" + echo "0012 x $(get_test_count 0012) - test /proc/modules address visibility under CAP_SYSLOG" + echo "0013 x $(get_test_count 0013) - test /sys/module/*/sections/* visibility under CAP_SYSLOG" } usage() -- cgit