From e37c1877ba5b17d4251e1688449f8d43fc090802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 16:31:47 -0500
Subject: scripts/selinux: modernize mdp

Derived in part from a patch by Dominick Grift.

The MDP example no longer works on modern systems.  Fix it.
While we are at it, add MLS support and enable it.

NB This still does not work on systems using dbus-daemon instead of
dbus-broker because dbus-daemon does not yet gracefully handle unknown
classes/permissions.  This appears to be a deficiency in libselinux's
selinux_set_mapping() interface and underlying implementation,
which was never fully updated to deal with unknown classes/permissions
unlike the kernel.  The same problem also occurs with XSELinux.
Programs that instead use selinux_check_access() like dbus-broker
should not have this problem.

Changes to mdp:
Add support for devtmpfs, required by modern Linux distributions.
Add MLS support, with sample sensitivities, categories, and constraints.
Generate fs_use and genfscon rules based on kernel configuration.
Update list of filesystem types for fs_use and genfscon rules.
Use object_r for object contexts.

Changes to install_policy.sh:
Bail immediately on any errors.
Provide more helpful error messages when unable to find userspace tools.
Refuse to run if SELinux is already enabled.
Unconditionally move aside /etc/selinux/config and create a new one.
Build policy with -U allow so that userspace object managers do not break.
Build policy with MLS enabled by default.
Create seusers, failsafe_context, and default_contexts for use by
pam_selinux / libselinux.
Create x_contexts for the SELinux X extension.
Create virtual_domain_context and virtual_image_context for libvirtd.
Set to permissive mode rather than enforcing to permit initial autorelabel.
Update the list of filesystem types to be relabeled.
Write -F to /.autorelabel to cause a forced autorelabel on reboot.
Drop broken attempt to relabel the /dev mountpoint directory.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Dominick Grift <dominick.grift@defensec.nl>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh |  92 ++++++++++++---------
 scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c         | 165 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
index 0b86c47baf7d..2dccf141241d 100755
--- a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
+++ b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
@@ -1,30 +1,61 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+set -e
 if [ `id -u` -ne 0 ]; then
 	echo "$0: must be root to install the selinux policy"
 	exit 1
 fi
+
 SF=`which setfiles`
 if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
-	if [ -f /sbin/setfiles ]; then
-		SF="/usr/setfiles"
-	else
-		echo "no selinux tools installed: setfiles"
-		exit 1
-	fi
+	echo "Could not find setfiles"
+	echo "Do you have policycoreutils installed?"
+	exit 1
 fi
 
-cd mdp
-
 CP=`which checkpolicy`
+if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+	echo "Could not find checkpolicy"
+	echo "Do you have checkpolicy installed?"
+	exit 1
+fi
 VERS=`$CP -V | awk '{print $1}'`
 
-./mdp policy.conf file_contexts
-$CP -o policy.$VERS policy.conf
+ENABLED=`which selinuxenabled`
+if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+	echo "Could not find selinuxenabled"
+	echo "Do you have libselinux-utils installed?"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if selinuxenabled; then
+    echo "SELinux is already enabled"
+    echo "This prevents safely relabeling all files."
+    echo "Boot with selinux=0 on the kernel command-line or"
+    echo "SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config."
+    exit 1
+fi
+
+cd mdp
+./mdp -m policy.conf file_contexts
+$CP -U allow -M -o policy.$VERS policy.conf
 
 mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
 mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
 
+echo "__default__:user_u:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/seusers
+echo "base_r:base_t:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/failsafe_context
+echo "base_r:base_t:s0 base_r:base_t:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/default_contexts
+cat > /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/x_contexts <<EOF
+client * user_u:base_r:base_t:s0
+property * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+extension * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+selection * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+event * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+EOF
+touch /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/virtual_domain_context
+touch /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/virtual_image_context
+
 cp file_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
 cp dbus_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts
 cp policy.$VERS /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
@@ -33,37 +64,22 @@ FC_FILE=/etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files/file_contexts
 if [ ! -d /etc/selinux ]; then
 	mkdir -p /etc/selinux
 fi
-if [ ! -f /etc/selinux/config ]; then
-	cat > /etc/selinux/config << EOF
-SELINUX=enforcing
+if [ -f /etc/selinux/config ]; then
+    echo "/etc/selinux/config exists, moving to /etc/selinux/config.bak."
+    mv /etc/selinux/config /etc/selinux/config.bak
+fi
+echo "Creating new /etc/selinux/config for dummy policy."
+cat > /etc/selinux/config << EOF
+SELINUX=permissive
 SELINUXTYPE=dummy
 EOF
-else
-	TYPE=`cat /etc/selinux/config | grep "^SELINUXTYPE" | tail -1 | awk -F= '{ print $2 '}`
-	if [ "eq$TYPE" != "eqdummy" ]; then
-		selinuxenabled
-		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-			echo "SELinux already enabled with a non-dummy policy."
-			echo "Exiting.  Please install policy by hand if that"
-			echo "is what you REALLY want."
-			exit 1
-		fi
-		mv /etc/selinux/config /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak
-		grep -v "^SELINUXTYPE" /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak >> /etc/selinux/config
-		echo "SELINUXTYPE=dummy" >> /etc/selinux/config
-	fi
-fi
 
 cd /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
-$SF file_contexts /
+$SF -F file_contexts /
 
-mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | egrep "ext2|ext3|xfs|jfs|ext4|ext4dev|gfs2" | awk '{ print $2 '}`
-$SF file_contexts $mounts
+mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | \
+	egrep "ext[234]|jfs|xfs|reiserfs|jffs2|gfs2|btrfs|f2fs|ocfs2" | \
+	awk '{ print $2 '}`
+$SF -F file_contexts $mounts
 
-
-dodev=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | grep "/dev "`
-if [ "eq$dodev" != "eq" ]; then
-	mount --move /dev /mnt
-	$SF file_contexts /dev
-	mount --move /mnt /dev
-fi
+echo "-F" > /.autorelabel
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
index 073fe7537f6c..edaba8e51651 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
 
 static void usage(char *name)
 {
@@ -95,10 +96,31 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	}
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
-	/* NOW PRINT OUT MLS STUFF */
+	/* print out mls declarations and constraints */
 	if (mls) {
-		printf("MLS not yet implemented\n");
-		exit(1);
+		fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s0;\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s1;\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "dominance { s0 s1 }\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "category c0;\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "category c1;\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "level s0:c0.c1;\n");
+		fprintf(fout, "level s1:c0.c1;\n");
+#define SYSTEMLOW "s0"
+#define SYSTEMHIGH "s1:c0.c1"
+		for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+			struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+
+			fprintf(fout, "mlsconstrain %s {\n", map->name);
+			for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
+				fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]);
+			/*
+			 * This requires all subjects and objects to be
+			 * single-level (l2 eq h2), and that the subject
+			 * level dominate the object level (h1 dom h2)
+			 * in order to have any permissions to it.
+			 */
+			fprintf(fout, "} (l2 eq h2 and h1 dom h2);\n\n");
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* types, roles, and allows */
@@ -108,34 +130,127 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
 		fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",
 			secclass_map[i].name);
-	fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r }");
+	if (mls)
+		fprintf(fout, " level %s range %s - %s", SYSTEMLOW,
+			SYSTEMLOW, SYSTEMHIGH);
+	fprintf(fout, ";\n");
+
+#define SUBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:base_r:base_t"
+#define OBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:object_r:base_t"
 
 	/* default sids */
 	for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
-		fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
+		fprintf(fout, "sid %s " SUBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n",
+			initial_sid_to_string[i], mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
 	fprintf(fout, "\n");
 
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext4 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jffs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr gfs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+#define FS_USE(behavior, fstype)			    \
+	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_%s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s;\n", \
+		behavior, fstype, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
+
+	/*
+	 * Filesystems whose inode labels can be fetched via getxattr.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY
+	FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_USE_FOR_EXT2
+	FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
+#endif
+	FS_USE("xattr", "ext3");
+	FS_USE("xattr", "ext4");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY
+	FS_USE("xattr", "jfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
+	FS_USE("xattr", "reiserfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_SECURITY
+	FS_USE("xattr", "jffs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_FS
+	FS_USE("xattr", "xfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GFS2_FS
+	FS_USE("xattr", "gfs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS
+	FS_USE("xattr", "btrfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
+	FS_USE("xattr", "f2fs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OCFS2_FS
+	FS_USE("xattr", "ocsfs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS
+	FS_USE("xattr", "overlay");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XATTR
+	FS_USE("xattr", "squashfs");
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from allocating task.
+	 */
+	FS_USE("task", "pipefs");
+	FS_USE("task", "sockfs");
 
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task eventpollfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+	/*
+	 * Filesystems whose inode labels are computed from both
+	 * the allocating task and the superblock label.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
+	FS_USE("trans", "devpts");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLBFS
+	FS_USE("trans", "hugetlbfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
+	FS_USE("trans", "tmpfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVTMPFS
+	FS_USE("trans", "devtmpfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE
+	FS_USE("trans", "mqueue");
+#endif
 
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans mqueue user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans hugetlbfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+#define GENFSCON(fstype, prefix)			     \
+	fprintf(fout, "genfscon %s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", \
+		fstype, prefix, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
 
-	fprintf(fout, "genfscon proc / user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
+	/*
+	 * Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from path prefix match
+	 * relative to the filesystem root.  Depending on the filesystem,
+	 * only a single label for all inodes may be supported.  Here
+	 * we list the filesystem types for which per-file labeling is
+	 * supported using genfscon; any other filesystem type can also
+	 * be added by only with a single entry for all of its inodes.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	GENFSCON("proc", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	GENFSCON("selinuxfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+	GENFSCON("sysfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+	GENFSCON("debugfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
+	GENFSCON("tracefs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PSTORE
+	GENFSCON("pstore", "/");
+#endif
+	GENFSCON("cgroup", "/");
+	GENFSCON("cgroup2", "/");
 
 	fclose(fout);
 
@@ -144,8 +259,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		printf("Wrote policy, but cannot open %s for writing\n", ctxout);
 		usage(argv[0]);
 	}
-	fprintf(fout, "/ user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
-	fprintf(fout, "/.* user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
+	fprintf(fout, "/ " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
+	fprintf(fout, "/.* " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
 	fclose(fout);
 
 	return 0;
-- 
cgit 


From ff1bf4c0714e7936330bb316090a75eaa35061e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Date: Sun, 24 Feb 2019 21:55:28 -0300
Subject: selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp

When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:

    In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
    ./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  ^~~~~
    make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
    scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
    [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
    make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
    make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.

Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c | 1 -
 scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c               | 1 -
 security/selinux/include/classmap.h     | 1 +
 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
index 1ceedea847dd..544ca126a8a8 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
 
 struct security_class_mapping {
 	const char *name;
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
index edaba8e51651..18fd6143888b 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <linux/kconfig.h>
 
 static void usage(char *name)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index bd5fe0d3204a..201f7e588a29 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
 
 #define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \
     "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map"
-- 
cgit 


From ccd19d4cafaaf36132c372e77ee9304b707c1e70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 09:21:06 -0400
Subject: scripts/selinux: fix build

We need to add the object tree include directory to the include path
for building mdp in order to pick up generated/autoconf.h. Otherwise,
make O=/path/to/objtree breaks.

Fixes: e37c1877ba5b ("scripts/selinux: modernize mdp")
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
index e9c92db7e2a3..8a1269a9d0ba 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 hostprogs-y	:= mdp
 HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += \
 	-I$(srctree)/include/uapi -I$(srctree)/include \
-	-I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+	-I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include -I$(objtree)/include
 
 always		:= $(hostprogs-y)
 clean-files	:= policy.* file_contexts
-- 
cgit 


From 05895219627c416e3ba78de84b83c6937387786b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:12 +0100
Subject: kernfs: clean up struct kernfs_iattrs

Right now, kernfs_iattrs embeds the whole struct iattr, even though it
doesn't really use half of its fields... This both leads to wasting
space and makes the code look awkward. Let's just list the few fields
we need directly in struct kernfs_iattrs.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: merged a number of chunks manually due to fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/dir.c             | 10 ++++------
 fs/kernfs/inode.c           | 47 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  6 +++++-
 fs/kernfs/symlink.c         |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index b84d635567d3..1654d9136458 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -795,9 +795,8 @@ int kernfs_add_one(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	/* Update timestamps on the parent */
 	ps_iattr = parent->iattr;
 	if (ps_iattr) {
-		struct iattr *ps_iattrs = &ps_iattr->ia_iattr;
-		ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattrs->ia_ctime);
-		ps_iattrs->ia_mtime = ps_iattrs->ia_ctime;
+		ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime);
+		ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime;
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
@@ -1329,9 +1328,8 @@ static void __kernfs_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 
 			/* update timestamps on the parent */
 			if (ps_iattr) {
-				ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime);
-				ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_mtime =
-					ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime;
+				ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime);
+				ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime;
 			}
 
 			kernfs_put(pos);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 0c1fd945ce42..7d30b4949a84 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 {
 	static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex);
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *ret;
-	struct iattr *iattrs;
 
 	mutex_lock(&iattr_mutex);
 
@@ -45,16 +44,14 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	kn->iattr = kmem_cache_zalloc(kernfs_iattrs_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!kn->iattr)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	iattrs = &kn->iattr->ia_iattr;
 
 	/* assign default attributes */
-	iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode;
-	iattrs->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
-	iattrs->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+	kn->iattr->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+	kn->iattr->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
 
-	ktime_get_real_ts64(&iattrs->ia_atime);
-	iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime;
-	iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime;
+	ktime_get_real_ts64(&kn->iattr->ia_atime);
+	kn->iattr->ia_mtime = kn->iattr->ia_atime;
+	kn->iattr->ia_ctime = kn->iattr->ia_atime;
 
 	simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
 out_unlock:
@@ -66,29 +63,24 @@ out_unlock:
 int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-	struct iattr *iattrs;
 	unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
 
 	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
 	if (!attrs)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	iattrs = &attrs->ia_iattr;
-
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
-		iattrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
+		attrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
-		iattrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
+		attrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
-		iattrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime;
+		attrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime;
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
-		iattrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime;
+		attrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime;
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
-		iattrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime;
-	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
-		umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
-		iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode = mode;
-	}
+		attrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime;
+	if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
+		kn->mode = iattr->ia_mode;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -171,14 +163,15 @@ static inline void set_default_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
 		inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
 }
 
-static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
+static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode,
+				  struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs)
 {
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
-	inode->i_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
-	inode->i_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
-	inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran);
-	inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran);
-	inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran);
+	inode->i_uid = attrs->ia_uid;
+	inode->i_gid = attrs->ia_gid;
+	inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran);
+	inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran);
+	inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran);
 }
 
 static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
@@ -191,7 +184,7 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
 		 * kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from
 		 * persistent copy in kernfs_node.
 		 */
-		set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
+		set_inode_attr(inode, attrs);
 		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
 					    attrs->ia_secdata_len);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 0b7d197a904c..385a5ca0b2f6 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
 
 struct kernfs_iattrs {
-	struct iattr		ia_iattr;
+	kuid_t			ia_uid;
+	kgid_t			ia_gid;
+	struct timespec64	ia_atime;
+	struct timespec64	ia_mtime;
+	struct timespec64	ia_ctime;
 	void			*ia_secdata;
 	u32			ia_secdata_len;
 
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
index 162f43b80c84..eb46c3a16e2f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_create_link(struct kernfs_node *parent,
 	kgid_t gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
 
 	if (target->iattr) {
-		uid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_uid;
-		gid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_gid;
+		uid = target->iattr->ia_uid;
+		gid = target->iattr->ia_gid;
 	}
 
 	kn = kernfs_new_node(parent, name, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, uid, gid,
-- 
cgit 


From d0c9c153b4bd6963c8fcccbc0caa12e8fa8d971d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:13 +0100
Subject: kernfs: do not alloc iattrs in kernfs_xattr_get

This is a read-only operation, so we can simply return -ENODATA if
kn->iattr is NULL.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: minor merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 7d30b4949a84..5c5569fb2110 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ static const struct inode_operations kernfs_iops = {
 	.listxattr	= kernfs_iop_listxattr,
 };
 
-static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *__kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn, int alloc)
 {
 	static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex);
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *ret;
 
 	mutex_lock(&iattr_mutex);
 
-	if (kn->iattr)
+	if (kn->iattr || !alloc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	kn->iattr = kmem_cache_zalloc(kernfs_iattrs_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@ out_unlock:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 1);
+}
+
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 0);
+}
+
 int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr)
 {
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
@@ -306,9 +316,9 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
 
-	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
+	attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn);
 	if (!attrs)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return -ENODATA;
 
 	return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size);
 }
-- 
cgit 


From b754026bd98e644f9337224ffd4201e02dfe1c43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:14 +0100
Subject: selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems

Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use
these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it
from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call.

We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all
mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the
xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in
inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set.

This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and
removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixups]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 157 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..085409b36794 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -751,11 +751,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 
 	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
-	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
-	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+	if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 	    !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
-		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+		sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
 
 	if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 		/*
@@ -1354,6 +1356,67 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+				  u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+	char *context;
+	unsigned int len;
+	int rc;
+
+	len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+	context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!context)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	context[len] = '\0';
+	rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+	if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+		kfree(context);
+
+		/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+
+		len = rc;
+		context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!context)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		context[len] = '\0';
+		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+				    context, len);
+	}
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		kfree(context);
+		if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+				__func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+			return rc;
+		}
+		*sid = def_sid;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
+					     def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc) {
+		char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+		unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+		if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
+					      ino, dev, context);
+		} else {
+			pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+				__func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(context);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
 {
@@ -1362,9 +1425,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 	u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
-#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
-	char *context = NULL;
-	unsigned len = 0;
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
@@ -1432,72 +1492,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
-		context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
-		if (!context) {
-			rc = -ENOMEM;
-			dput(dentry);
-			goto out;
-		}
-		context[len] = '\0';
-		rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
-		if (rc == -ERANGE) {
-			kfree(context);
-
-			/* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
-			rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
-			if (rc < 0) {
-				dput(dentry);
-				goto out;
-			}
-			len = rc;
-			context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
-			if (!context) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				dput(dentry);
-				goto out;
-			}
-			context[len] = '\0';
-			rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
-		}
+		rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
+					    &sid);
 		dput(dentry);
-		if (rc < 0) {
-			if (rc != -ENODATA) {
-				pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
-				       "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
-				       -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
-				kfree(context);
-				goto out;
-			}
-			/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
-			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
-			rc = 0;
-		} else {
-			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
-							     context, rc, &sid,
-							     sbsec->def_sid,
-							     GFP_NOFS);
-			if (rc) {
-				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
-				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
-
-				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
-					if (printk_ratelimit())
-						pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
-							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
-							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
-				} else {
-					pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
-				}
-				kfree(context);
-				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
-				rc = 0;
-				break;
-			}
-		}
-		kfree(context);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
 		break;
 	case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 		sid = task_sid;
@@ -1548,9 +1547,21 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 				goto out;
 			rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
 						   sbsec->flags, &sid);
-			dput(dentry);
-			if (rc)
+			if (rc) {
+				dput(dentry);
 				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
+			    (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+				rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
+							    sid, &sid);
+				if (rc) {
+					dput(dentry);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			dput(dentry);
 		}
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b5b7c5aade8c..111121281c47 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #define SE_SBINITIALIZED	0x0100
 #define SE_SBPROC		0x0200
 #define SE_SBGENFS		0x0400
+#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR	0x0800
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR	"context"
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR	"fscontext"
-- 
cgit 


From 0ac6075a32fc05bc7fa025965914e8dcd448a668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:15 +0100
Subject: kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes

Replace the special handling of security xattrs with simple_xattrs, as
is already done for the trusted xattrs. This simplifies the code and
allows LSMs to use more than just a single xattr to do their business.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: manual merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/dir.c             |  3 ---
 fs/kernfs/inode.c           | 55 ++-------------------------------------------
 fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h |  2 --
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index 1654d9136458..bd48e315347b 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,9 +532,6 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
 	kfree_const(kn->name);
 
 	if (kn->iattr) {
-		if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
-			security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
-						kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
 		simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
 		kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 5c5569fb2110..a365088caa3c 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -137,23 +137,6 @@ out:
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
-				  u32 *secdata_len)
-{
-	void *old_secdata;
-	size_t old_secdata_len;
-
-	old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
-	old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
-
-	attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
-	attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
-
-	*secdata = old_secdata;
-	*secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
-	return 0;
-}
-
 ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(dentry);
@@ -189,15 +172,12 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
 
 	inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
-	if (attrs) {
+	if (attrs)
 		/*
 		 * kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from
 		 * persistent copy in kernfs_node.
 		 */
 		set_inode_attr(inode, attrs);
-		security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
-					    attrs->ia_secdata_len);
-	}
 
 	if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
 		set_nlink(inode, kn->dir.subdirs + 2);
@@ -345,41 +325,10 @@ static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = {
 	.set = kernfs_xattr_set,
 };
 
-static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-				     struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
-				     const char *suffix, const void *value,
-				     size_t size, int flags)
-{
-	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
-	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-	void *secdata;
-	u32 secdata_len = 0;
-	int error;
-
-	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
-	if (!attrs)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-	error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
-	mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
-	error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
-	mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
-
-	if (secdata)
-		security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
-	return error;
-}
-
 static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler = {
 	.prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 	.get = kernfs_xattr_get,
-	.set = kernfs_security_xattr_set,
+	.set = kernfs_xattr_set,
 };
 
 const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 385a5ca0b2f6..3c437990f39a 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -25,8 +25,6 @@ struct kernfs_iattrs {
 	struct timespec64	ia_atime;
 	struct timespec64	ia_mtime;
 	struct timespec64	ia_ctime;
-	void			*ia_secdata;
-	u32			ia_secdata_len;
 
 	struct simple_xattrs	xattrs;
 };
-- 
cgit 


From b230d5aba2d1a7b0636408889a75bf9eae6b8bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:16 +0100
Subject: LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization

This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which
provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to
operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an
associated inode at the moment of creation).

The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
for handling the creation of new nodes.

This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for
getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are
able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible
direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then
new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs
them).

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/inode.c         | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 include/linux/kernfs.h    | 15 +++++++++++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/linux/security.h  |  9 +++++++++
 security/security.c       |  6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index a365088caa3c..673ef598d97d 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -288,12 +288,11 @@ int kernfs_iop_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	return generic_permission(inode, mask);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
-			    const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
+static int kernfs_node_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+				 struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+				 void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
-	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
 
 	attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn);
@@ -303,13 +302,11 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
-			    const char *suffix, const void *value,
-			    size_t size, int flags)
+static int kernfs_node_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+				 struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+				 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
-	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
 
 	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
@@ -319,6 +316,25 @@ static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
 	return simple_xattr_set(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
+static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+			    const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
+
+	return kernfs_node_xattr_get(handler, kn, suffix, value, size);
+}
+
+static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+			    const char *suffix, const void *value,
+			    size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
+
+	return kernfs_node_xattr_set(handler, kn, suffix, value, size, flags);
+}
+
 static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = {
 	.prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
 	.get = kernfs_xattr_get,
@@ -336,3 +352,17 @@ const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
 	&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
 	NULL
 };
+
+int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+			      void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return kernfs_node_xattr_get(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
+				     kn, suffix, value, size);
+}
+
+int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+			      void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	return kernfs_node_xattr_set(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
+				     kn, suffix, value, size, flags);
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h
index c8893f663470..39eea07c2900 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernfs.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h
@@ -371,6 +371,11 @@ __poll_t kernfs_generic_poll(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 			     struct poll_table_struct *pt);
 void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn);
 
+int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+			      void *value, size_t size);
+int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
+			      void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+
 const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb);
 int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
 void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
@@ -473,6 +478,16 @@ static inline int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn,
 
 static inline void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
 
+static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn,
+					    const char *suffix, void *value,
+					    size_t size)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
+
+static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn,
+					    const char *suffix, void *value,
+					    size_t size, int flags)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
+
 static inline const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb)
 { return NULL; }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a9b8ff578b6b..0dd5bda719e6 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -445,6 +445,15 @@
  *	to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
  *	and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
  *
+ * Security hooks for kernfs node operations
+ *
+ * @kernfs_init_security
+ *	Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based
+ *	on its own and its parent's attributes.
+ *
+ *	@kn_dir the parent kernfs node
+ *	@kn the new child kernfs node
+ *
  * Security hooks for file operations
  *
  * @file_permission:
@@ -1578,6 +1587,9 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 	int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
 
+	int (*kernfs_init_security)(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+				    struct kernfs_node *kn);
+
 	int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
 	void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1879,6 +1891,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct hlist_head inode_getsecid;
 	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up;
 	struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
+	struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security;
 	struct hlist_head file_permission;
 	struct hlist_head file_alloc_security;
 	struct hlist_head file_free_security;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..d543293216b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct fown_struct;
 struct file_operations;
 struct msg_msg;
 struct xattr;
+struct kernfs_node;
 struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
 struct mm_struct;
 struct fs_context;
@@ -299,6 +300,8 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+				  struct kernfs_node *kn);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -801,6 +804,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+						struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..8d6ef9da94eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1318,6 +1318,12 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
 
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+				  struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+}
+
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	int ret;
-- 
cgit 


From ec882da5cda911e799b8a5ede94d099fdc0c656b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:17 +0100
Subject: selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook

The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with
the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the
actual inodes later by other hooks.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: minor merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 085409b36794..ab4b049daf17 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/shm.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/stringhash.h>	/* for hashlen_string() */
 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
@@ -3382,6 +3384,68 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+/* kernfs node operations */
+
+int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+				 struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
+	int rc;
+	char *context;
+
+	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, NULL, 0);
+	if (rc == -ENODATA)
+		return 0;
+	else if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	clen = (u32)rc;
+	context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!context)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context,
+				       clen);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		kfree(context);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
+	kfree(context);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	if (tsec->create_sid) {
+		newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+	} else {
+		u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
+		struct qstr q;
+
+		q.name = kn->name;
+		q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
+
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+					     parent_sid, secclass, &q,
+					     &newsid);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+					   &context, &clen);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen,
+				       XATTR_CREATE);
+	kfree(context);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -6730,6 +6794,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
+
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
-- 
cgit 


From e19dfdc83b60f196e0653d683499f7bc5548128f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2019 15:57:18 +0100
Subject: kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes

Use the new security_kernfs_init_security() hook to allow LSMs to
possibly assign a non-default security context to a newly created kernfs
node based on the attributes of the new node and also its parent node.

This fixes an issue with cgroupfs under SELinux, where newly created
cgroup subdirectories/files would not inherit its parent's context if
it had been set explicitly to a non-default value (other than the genfs
context specified by the policy). This can be reproduced as follows (on
Fedora/RHEL):

    # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test
    # # Need permissive to change the label under Fedora policy:
    # setenforce 0
    # chcon -t container_file_t /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test
    # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    total 0
    -r--r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.controllers
    -rw-r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.depth
    -rw-r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.descendants
    -rw-r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.procs
    -r--r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.stat
    -rw-r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.subtree_control
    -rw-r--r--.  1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.threads
    drwxr-xr-x.  2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 init.scope
    drwxr-xr-x. 26 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:21 system.slice
    drwxr-xr-x.  3 root root system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 test
    drwxr-xr-x.  3 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0         0 Jan 29 03:06 user.slice
    # mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir

Actual result:

    # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir
    drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir

Expected result:

    # ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir
    drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root unconfined_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir

Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/39

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/dir.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index bd48e315347b..79be45df6746 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -615,6 +615,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
 }
 
 static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
+					     struct kernfs_node *parent,
 					     const char *name, umode_t mode,
 					     kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
 					     unsigned flags)
@@ -671,6 +672,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
 			goto err_out3;
 	}
 
+	if (parent) {
+		ret = security_kernfs_init_security(parent, kn);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_out3;
+	}
+
 	return kn;
 
  err_out3:
@@ -689,7 +696,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_node *parent,
 {
 	struct kernfs_node *kn;
 
-	kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent),
+	kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), parent,
 			       name, mode, uid, gid, flags);
 	if (kn) {
 		kernfs_get(parent);
@@ -958,7 +965,7 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_create_root(struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root->supers);
 	root->next_generation = 1;
 
-	kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
+	kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, NULL, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
 			       GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
 			       KERNFS_DIR);
 	if (!kn) {
-- 
cgit 


From c72c4cde8095aa0e4336cb337dac25d6e347240d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 22:04:00 +0800
Subject: selinux: Make selinux_kernfs_init_security static

Fix sparse warning:

security/selinux/hooks.c:3389:5: warning:
 symbol 'selinux_kernfs_init_security' was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ab4b049daf17..b6e61524d68d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3386,8 +3386,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
 
 /* kernfs node operations */
 
-int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
-				 struct kernfs_node *kn)
+static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+					struct kernfs_node *kn)
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
-- 
cgit 


From 24f7c45fdb2a17ef6ad3142e9a8ba4066ac674a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 09:05:35 +0100
Subject: LSM: lsm_hooks.h - fix missing colon in docstring

Apparently without it it is incorrect syntax and causes a warning about
undocumented struct field.

Fixes: b230d5aba2d1 ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 0dd5bda719e6..b987dc282d63 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
  *
  * Security hooks for kernfs node operations
  *
- * @kernfs_init_security
+ * @kernfs_init_security:
  *	Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based
  *	on its own and its parent's attributes.
  *
-- 
cgit 


From 9e0cfe28fa32f6fefd831192a4d0b19c804c746b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 09:11:15 +0100
Subject: selinux: remove useless assignments

The code incorrectly assigned directly to the variables instead of the
values they point to. Since the values are already set to NULL/0 at the
beginning of the function, we can simply remove these useless
assignments.

Reported-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hariprasad.kelam@gmail.com>
Fixes: fede148324c3 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: removed a bad comment that was causing compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..cc043bc8fd4c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1318,14 +1318,11 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	if (only_invalid && !context->len) {
-		scontext = NULL;
-		scontext_len = 0;
+	if (only_invalid && !context->len)
 		rc = 0;
-	} else {
+	else
 		rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
 					      scontext_len);
-	}
 out_unlock:
 	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
-- 
cgit 


From 98bbbb76f2edcfb8fb2b8f4b3ccc7b6e99d64bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:23:11 +0100
Subject: selinux: avoid uninitialized variable warning

clang correctly points out a code path that would lead
to an uninitialized variable use:

security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:6: error: variable 'addr' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false
      [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
        if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:322:40: note: uninitialized use occurs here
        rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
                                              ^~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:310:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
        if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/netlabel.c:291:23: note: initialize the variable 'addr' to silence this warning
        struct sockaddr *addr;
                             ^
                              = NULL

This is probably harmless since we should not see ipv6 packets
of CONFIG_IPV6 is disabled, but it's better to rearrange the code
so this cannot happen.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[PM: removed old patchwork link, fixed checkpatch.pl style errors]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/netlabel.c | 14 +++++---------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..6fd9954e1c08 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -288,11 +288,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
-	struct sockaddr *addr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
-#endif
 
 	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
 				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
@@ -310,16 +307,15 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
 		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
 		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
-		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-	} else {
+		rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
+	} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
 		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
 		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
-		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
-#endif
+		rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
+	} else {
+		rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 	}
 
-	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
 
-- 
cgit 


From 593854c05210fccf92a5883ab8a8505837b82199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2019 17:57:35 -0400
Subject: MAINTAINERS: update SELinux file patterns

Update MAINTAINERS to reflect that there are no SELinux headers under
include/linux, but we do have include/uapi/linux/selinux_netlink.h.

Reported-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 MAINTAINERS | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index e17ebf70b548..7b2e7887f3a7 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -13937,7 +13937,7 @@ W:	https://selinuxproject.org
 W:	https://github.com/SELinuxProject
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
 S:	Supported
-F:	include/linux/selinux*
+F:	include/uapi/linux/selinux_netlink.h
 F:	security/selinux/
 F:	scripts/selinux/
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SELinux.rst
-- 
cgit 


From 1537ad15c9c59ce852748578eb5633139053e86b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 09:29:41 +0200
Subject: kernfs: fix xattr name handling in LSM helpers

The implementation of kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers reuses the
kernfs_node_xattr_*() functions, which take the suffix of the xattr name
and extract full xattr name from it using xattr_full_name(). However,
this function relies on the fact that the suffix passed to xattr
handlers from VFS is always constructed from the full name by just
incerementing the pointer. This doesn't necessarily hold for the callers
of kernfs_security_xattr_*(), so their usage will easily lead to
out-of-bounds access.

Fix this by moving the xattr name reconstruction to the VFS xattr
handlers and replacing the kernfs_security_xattr_*() helpers with more
general kernfs_xattr_*() helpers that take full xattr name and allow
accessing all kernfs node's xattrs.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Fixes: b230d5aba2d1 ("LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization")
Fixes: ec882da5cda9 ("selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 fs/kernfs/inode.c        | 62 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 include/linux/kernfs.h   | 18 +++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c |  9 ++++---
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 673ef598d97d..f89a0f13840e 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -288,63 +288,57 @@ int kernfs_iop_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	return generic_permission(inode, mask);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_node_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-				 struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-				 void *value, size_t size)
+int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+		     void *value, size_t size)
 {
-	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
-	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-
-	attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn);
+	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn);
 	if (!attrs)
 		return -ENODATA;
 
 	return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_node_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-				 struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-				 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+		     const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
-	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-
-	attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
+	struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
 	if (!attrs)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	return simple_xattr_set(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
-			    const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
+static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+				struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+				const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
 {
+	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 
-	return kernfs_node_xattr_get(handler, kn, suffix, value, size);
+	return kernfs_xattr_get(kn, name, value, size);
 }
 
-static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
-			    struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
-			    const char *suffix, const void *value,
-			    size_t size, int flags)
+static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+				struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+				const char *suffix, const void *value,
+				size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
 	struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
 
-	return kernfs_node_xattr_set(handler, kn, suffix, value, size, flags);
+	return kernfs_xattr_set(kn, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 
 static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = {
 	.prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
-	.get = kernfs_xattr_get,
-	.set = kernfs_xattr_set,
+	.get = kernfs_vfs_xattr_get,
+	.set = kernfs_vfs_xattr_set,
 };
 
 static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler = {
 	.prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-	.get = kernfs_xattr_get,
-	.set = kernfs_xattr_set,
+	.get = kernfs_vfs_xattr_get,
+	.set = kernfs_vfs_xattr_set,
 };
 
 const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
@@ -352,17 +346,3 @@ const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
 	&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
 	NULL
 };
-
-int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-			      void *value, size_t size)
-{
-	return kernfs_node_xattr_get(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
-				     kn, suffix, value, size);
-}
-
-int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-			      void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-	return kernfs_node_xattr_set(&kernfs_security_xattr_handler,
-				     kn, suffix, value, size, flags);
-}
diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h
index 39eea07c2900..7987e0f89b69 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernfs.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h
@@ -371,10 +371,10 @@ __poll_t kernfs_generic_poll(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 			     struct poll_table_struct *pt);
 void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn);
 
-int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-			      void *value, size_t size);
-int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *suffix,
-			      void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+		     void *value, size_t size);
+int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+		     const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 
 const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb);
 int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
@@ -478,14 +478,12 @@ static inline int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn,
 
 static inline void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
 
-static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn,
-					    const char *suffix, void *value,
-					    size_t size)
+static inline int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+				   void *value, size_t size)
 { return -ENOSYS; }
 
-static inline int kernfs_security_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn,
-					    const char *suffix, void *value,
-					    size_t size, int flags)
+static inline int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 { return -ENOSYS; }
 
 static inline const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b6e61524d68d..d5fdcb0d26fe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3394,7 +3394,7 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 	int rc;
 	char *context;
 
-	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, NULL, 0);
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 	if (rc == -ENODATA)
 		return 0;
 	else if (rc < 0)
@@ -3405,8 +3405,7 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 	if (!context)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context,
-				       clen);
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		kfree(context);
 		return rc;
@@ -3439,8 +3438,8 @@ static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = kernfs_security_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, context, clen,
-				       XATTR_CREATE);
+	rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
+			      XATTR_CREATE);
 	kfree(context);
 	return rc;
 }
-- 
cgit 


From c750e6929d3c76d13d1d0ba475989d6dd74785d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 19:59:34 +0900
Subject: selinux: Check address length before reading address family

KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect() is
shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d5fdcb0d26fe..c61787b15f27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4512,7 +4512,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
-		u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
+		u16 family_sa;
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
@@ -4522,6 +4522,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
 		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
 		 */
+		if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		family_sa = address->sa_family;
 		switch (family_sa) {
 		case AF_UNSPEC:
 		case AF_INET:
@@ -4654,6 +4657,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
 		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
 		 */
+		if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		switch (address->sa_family) {
 		case AF_INET:
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
-- 
cgit 


From 35a196bef449b5824033865b963ed9a43fb8c730 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2019 14:55:12 -0400
Subject: proc: prevent changes to overridden credentials

Prevent userspace from changing the the /proc/PID/attr values if the
task's credentials are currently overriden.  This not only makes sense
conceptually, it also prevents some really bizarre error cases caused
when trying to commit credentials to a task with overridden
credentials.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: "chengjian (D)" <cj.chengjian@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index ddef482f1334..87ba007b86db 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2539,6 +2539,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
+	/* Prevent changes to overridden credentials. */
+	if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return -EBUSY;
+	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
-- 
cgit