From b9dd05c7002ee0ca8b676428b2268c26399b5e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 18:44:28 +0100 Subject: ARM: 8720/1: ensure dump_instr() checks addr_limit When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER is enabled, it's possible for a user to deliberately trigger dump_instr() with a chosen kernel address. Let's avoid problems resulting from this by using get_user() rather than __get_user(), ensuring that we don't erroneously access kernel memory. So that we can use the same code to dump user instructions and kernel instructions, the common dumping code is factored out to __dump_instr(), with the fs manipulated appropriately in dump_instr() around calls to this. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King --- arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c index 948c648fea00..0fcd82f01388 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c @@ -154,30 +154,26 @@ static void dump_mem(const char *lvl, const char *str, unsigned long bottom, set_fs(fs); } -static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) +static void __dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs); const int thumb = thumb_mode(regs); const int width = thumb ? 4 : 8; - mm_segment_t fs; char str[sizeof("00000000 ") * 5 + 2 + 1], *p = str; int i; /* - * We need to switch to kernel mode so that we can use __get_user - * to safely read from kernel space. Note that we now dump the - * code first, just in case the backtrace kills us. + * Note that we now dump the code first, just in case the backtrace + * kills us. */ - fs = get_fs(); - set_fs(KERNEL_DS); for (i = -4; i < 1 + !!thumb; i++) { unsigned int val, bad; if (thumb) - bad = __get_user(val, &((u16 *)addr)[i]); + bad = get_user(val, &((u16 *)addr)[i]); else - bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]); + bad = get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]); if (!bad) p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%0*x) " : "%0*x ", @@ -188,8 +184,20 @@ static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) } } printk("%sCode: %s\n", lvl, str); +} - set_fs(fs); +static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + mm_segment_t fs; + + if (!user_mode(regs)) { + fs = get_fs(); + set_fs(KERNEL_DS); + __dump_instr(lvl, regs); + set_fs(fs); + } else { + __dump_instr(lvl, regs); + } } #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_UNWIND -- cgit From 87df26175e67c26ccdd3a002fbbb8cde78e28a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Kosina Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 21:18:18 +0100 Subject: x86/mm: Unbreak modules that rely on external PAGE_KERNEL availability Commit 7744ccdbc16f0 ("x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support") as a side-effect made PAGE_KERNEL all of a sudden unavailable to modules which can't make use of EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() symbols. This is because once SME is enabled, sme_me_mask (which is introduced as EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL) makes its way to PAGE_KERNEL through _PAGE_ENC, causing imminent build failure for all the modules which make use of all the EXPORT-SYMBOL()-exported API (such as vmap(), __vmalloc(), remap_pfn_range(), ...). Exporting (as EXPORT_SYMBOL()) interfaces (and having done so for ages) that take pgprot_t argument, while making it impossible to -- all of a sudden -- pass PAGE_KERNEL to it, feels rather incosistent. Restore the original behavior and make it possible to pass PAGE_KERNEL to all its EXPORT_SYMBOL() consumers. [ This is all so not wonderful. We shouldn't need that "sme_me_mask" access at all in all those places that really don't care about that level of detail, and just want _PAGE_KERNEL or whatever. We have some similar issues with _PAGE_CACHE_WP and _PAGE_NOCACHE, both of which hide a "cachemode2protval()" call, and which also ends up using another EXPORT_SYMBOL(), but at least that only triggers for the much more rare cases. Maybe we could move these dynamic page table bits to be generated much deeper down in the VM layer, instead of hiding them in the macros that everybody uses. So this all would merit some cleanup. But not today. - Linus ] Cc: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Despised-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 16c5f37933a2..0286327e65fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off"; * section is later cleared. */ u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0; -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask); /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */ static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); -- cgit