From 77d0910d153a7946df17cc15d3f423e534345f65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 16:13:33 +0100 Subject: X.509: Retain the key verification data Retain the key verification data (ie. the struct public_key_signature) including the digest and the key identifiers. Note that this means that we need to take a separate copy of the digest in x509_get_sig_params() rather than lumping it in with the crypto layer data. Signed-off-by: David Howells --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 8 ++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 20 +++++----- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 40 ++++++++++---------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 4 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys') diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index 7d7a39b47c62..ed8128230dce 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -80,16 +80,16 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, might_sleep(); last = x509; - sig = &last->sig; + sig = last->sig; } /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the * trusted keys. */ - if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) { + if (last && (last->sig->auth_ids[0] || last->sig->auth_ids[1])) { key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - last->akid_id, - last->akid_skid, + last->sig->auth_ids[0], + last->sig->auth_ids[1], false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { x509 = last; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 50be2a15e531..d8d8d234874e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) { + struct public_key_signature *sig; struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p; struct asymmetric_key_id *auth; int ret; @@ -193,14 +194,15 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); - if (x509->akid_id) + sig = x509->sig; + if (sig->auth_ids[0]) pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n", - x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data); - if (x509->akid_skid) + sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data); + if (sig->auth_ids[1]) pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n", - x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data); + sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data); - if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) || + if ((!x509->sig->auth_ids[0] && !x509->sig->auth_ids[1]) || strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root @@ -224,7 +226,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's * list to see if the next one is there. */ - auth = x509->akid_id; + auth = sig->auth_ids[0]; if (auth) { pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data); for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { @@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, goto found_issuer_check_skid; } } else { - auth = x509->akid_skid; + auth = sig->auth_ids[1]; pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data); for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { if (!p->skid) @@ -254,8 +256,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also. */ - if (x509->akid_skid && - !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) { + if (sig->auth_ids[1] && + !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) { pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n", sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index); return -EKEYREJECTED; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 05251c7f9a03..a2fefa713614 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -48,14 +48,11 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) { if (cert) { public_key_free(cert->pub); + public_key_signature_free(cert->sig); kfree(cert->issuer); kfree(cert->subject); kfree(cert->id); kfree(cert->skid); - kfree(cert->akid_id); - kfree(cert->akid_skid); - kfree(cert->sig.digest); - kfree(cert->sig.s); kfree(cert); } } @@ -78,6 +75,9 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL); if (!cert->pub) goto error_no_ctx; + cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cert->sig) + goto error_no_ctx; ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) goto error_no_ctx; @@ -188,33 +188,33 @@ int x509_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return -ENOPKG; /* Unsupported combination */ case OID_md4WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "md4"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "md4"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha1"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha256"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha256"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha384"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha384"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha512"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha512"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; case OID_sha224WithRSAEncryption: - ctx->cert->sig.hash_algo = "sha224"; - ctx->cert->sig.pkey_algo = "rsa"; + ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha224"; + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa"; break; } @@ -572,14 +572,14 @@ int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen, pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value); - if (ctx->cert->akid_skid) + if (ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) return 0; kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0); if (IS_ERR(kid)) return PTR_ERR(kid); pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); - ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid; + ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid; return 0; } @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value); - if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id) + if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0]) return 0; kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, @@ -622,6 +622,6 @@ int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return PTR_ERR(kid); pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); - ctx->cert->akid_id = kid; + ctx->cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid; return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index dbeed6018e63..26a4d83e4e6d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ struct x509_certificate { struct x509_certificate *next; struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ - struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ + struct public_key_signature *sig; /* Signature parameters */ char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */ struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */ time64_t valid_from; time64_t valid_to; const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 2fcf707fb208..4cd102de174c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -153,30 +153,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key); */ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) { + struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; struct crypto_shash *tfm; struct shash_desc *desc; - size_t digest_size, desc_size; - void *digest; + size_t desc_size; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); if (cert->unsupported_crypto) return -ENOPKG; - if (cert->sig.s) + if (sig->s) return 0; - cert->sig.s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!cert->sig.s) + sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig->s) return -ENOMEM; - cert->sig.s_size = cert->raw_sig_size; + sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size; /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how * big the hash operational data will be. */ - tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(cert->sig.hash_algo, 0, 0); + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { cert->unsupported_crypto = true; @@ -186,29 +185,28 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) } desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); - digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); - /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of the - * digest storage space. - */ ret = -ENOMEM; - digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!digest) + sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!sig->digest) goto error; - cert->sig.digest = digest; - cert->sig.digest_size = digest_size; + desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + goto error; - desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)); desc->tfm = tfm; desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); if (ret < 0) - goto error; + goto error_2; might_sleep(); - ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, digest); + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->digest); + +error_2: + kfree(desc); error: crypto_free_shash(tfm); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); @@ -230,7 +228,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, if (ret < 0) return ret; - ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig); + ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, cert->sig); if (ret == -ENOPKG) cert->unsupported_crypto = true; pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); @@ -250,17 +248,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature); static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, struct key *trust_keyring) { + struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig; struct key *key; int ret = 1; if (!trust_keyring) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid)) + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(sig->auth_ids[1], ca_keyid)) return -EPERM; key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, - cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid, + sig->auth_ids[0], sig->auth_ids[1], false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { if (!use_builtin_keys @@ -292,8 +291,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject); if (!cert->pub->pkey_algo || - !cert->sig.pkey_algo || - !cert->sig.hash_algo) { + !cert->sig->pkey_algo || + !cert->sig->hash_algo) { ret = -ENOPKG; goto error_free_cert; } @@ -301,15 +300,15 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo); pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to); pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n", - cert->sig.pkey_algo, - cert->sig.hash_algo); + cert->sig->pkey_algo, + cert->sig->hash_algo); cert->pub->id_type = "X509"; /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ - if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) || - asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) || - asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) { + if ((!cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && !cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) || + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) || + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0])) { ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */ if (ret < 0) goto error_free_cert; @@ -353,6 +352,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype; prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids; prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub; + prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig; prep->description = desc; prep->quotalen = 100; @@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub = NULL; cert->id = NULL; cert->skid = NULL; + cert->sig = NULL; desc = NULL; ret = 0; -- cgit