From e4d221b42354b2e2ddb9187a806afb651eee2cda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Andrea Parri (Microsoft)" Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 08:08:26 +0100 Subject: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Resolve race condition in vmbus_onoffer_rescind() An erroneous or malicious host could send multiple rescind messages for a same channel. In vmbus_onoffer_rescind(), the guest maps the channel ID to obtain a pointer to the channel object and it eventually releases such object and associated data. The host could time rescind messages and lead to an use-after-free. Add a new flag to the channel structure to make sure that only one instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() can get the reference to the channel object. Reported-by: Juan Vazquez Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201209070827.29335-6-parri.andrea@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu --- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'drivers/hv') diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c index 4072fd1f2214..68950a1e4b63 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c @@ -1063,6 +1063,18 @@ static void vmbus_onoffer_rescind(struct vmbus_channel_message_header *hdr) mutex_lock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); channel = relid2channel(rescind->child_relid); + if (channel != NULL) { + /* + * Guarantee that no other instance of vmbus_onoffer_rescind() + * has got a reference to the channel object. Synchronize on + * &vmbus_connection.channel_mutex. + */ + if (channel->rescind_ref) { + mutex_unlock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); + return; + } + channel->rescind_ref = true; + } mutex_unlock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); if (channel == NULL) { -- cgit