From 76ad9dffd91be11e51b847eb115d623b713a3bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arvind Yadav Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 18:10:38 +0000 Subject: efi/capsule-loader: Fix pr_err() string to end with newline pr_err() messages should be terminated with a newline to avoid other messages being concatenated onto the end. Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tyler Baicar Cc: Vasyl Gomonovych Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102181042.19074-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c index 055e2e8f985a..e456f4602df1 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int __efi_capsule_setup_info(struct capsule_info *cap_info) pages_needed = ALIGN(cap_info->total_size, PAGE_SIZE) / PAGE_SIZE; if (pages_needed == 0) { - pr_err("invalid capsule size"); + pr_err("invalid capsule size\n"); return -EINVAL; } -- cgit From 50342b2e498777df237a40a23eebc02f0935e636 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasyl Gomonovych Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 18:10:40 +0000 Subject: efi: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() Fix ptr_ret.cocci warnings: drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c:610:8-14: WARNING: PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO can be used Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO rather than if(IS_ERR(...)) + PTR_ERR Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/ptr_ret.cocci Signed-off-by: Vasyl Gomonovych Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arvind Yadav Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Tyler Baicar Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102181042.19074-4-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 557a47829d03..8ce70c2e73d5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int __init efi_load_efivars(void) return 0; pdev = platform_device_register_simple("efivars", 0, NULL, 0); - return IS_ERR(pdev) ? PTR_ERR(pdev) : 0; + return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(pdev); } device_initcall(efi_load_efivars); #endif -- cgit From c6d8c8ef1d0d94fdae9f5d72982963db89f9cdad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Baicar Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 18:10:41 +0000 Subject: efi: Move ARM CPER code to new file The ARM CPER code is currently mixed in with the other CPER code. Move it to a new file to separate it from the rest of the CPER code. Signed-off-by: Tyler Baicar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arvind Yadav Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matt Fleming Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vasyl Gomonovych Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102181042.19074-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 5 ++ drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c | 122 +-------------------------------- 4 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig index 2b4c39fdfa91..aab108e82f78 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig @@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ endmenu config UEFI_CPER bool +config UEFI_CPER_ARM + bool + depends on UEFI_CPER && ( ARM || ARM64 ) + default y + config EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER bool depends on ACPI diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile index 269501dfba53..a3e73d6e8a43 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile @@ -30,3 +30,4 @@ arm-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI) := arm-init.o arm-runtime.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARM) += $(arm-obj-y) obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += $(arm-obj-y) obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER) += capsule-loader.o +obj-$(CONFIG_UEFI_CPER_ARM) += cper-arm.o diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4afbfed52163 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +/* + * UEFI Common Platform Error Record (CPER) support + * + * Copyright (C) 2017, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version + * 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define INDENT_SP " " + +static const char * const arm_reg_ctx_strs[] = { + "AArch32 general purpose registers", + "AArch32 EL1 context registers", + "AArch32 EL2 context registers", + "AArch32 secure context registers", + "AArch64 general purpose registers", + "AArch64 EL1 context registers", + "AArch64 EL2 context registers", + "AArch64 EL3 context registers", + "Misc. system register structure", +}; + +void cper_print_proc_arm(const char *pfx, + const struct cper_sec_proc_arm *proc) +{ + int i, len, max_ctx_type; + struct cper_arm_err_info *err_info; + struct cper_arm_ctx_info *ctx_info; + char newpfx[64]; + + printk("%sMIDR: 0x%016llx\n", pfx, proc->midr); + + len = proc->section_length - (sizeof(*proc) + + proc->err_info_num * (sizeof(*err_info))); + if (len < 0) { + printk("%ssection length: %d\n", pfx, proc->section_length); + printk("%ssection length is too small\n", pfx); + printk("%sfirmware-generated error record is incorrect\n", pfx); + printk("%sERR_INFO_NUM is %d\n", pfx, proc->err_info_num); + return; + } + + if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_MPIDR) + printk("%sMultiprocessor Affinity Register (MPIDR): 0x%016llx\n", + pfx, proc->mpidr); + + if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_AFFINITY_LEVEL) + printk("%serror affinity level: %d\n", pfx, + proc->affinity_level); + + if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_RUNNING_STATE) { + printk("%srunning state: 0x%x\n", pfx, proc->running_state); + printk("%sPower State Coordination Interface state: %d\n", + pfx, proc->psci_state); + } + + snprintf(newpfx, sizeof(newpfx), "%s%s", pfx, INDENT_SP); + + err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)(proc + 1); + for (i = 0; i < proc->err_info_num; i++) { + printk("%sError info structure %d:\n", pfx, i); + + printk("%snum errors: %d\n", pfx, err_info->multiple_error + 1); + + if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_FLAGS) { + if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_FIRST) + printk("%sfirst error captured\n", newpfx); + if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_LAST) + printk("%slast error captured\n", newpfx); + if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_PROPAGATED) + printk("%spropagated error captured\n", + newpfx); + if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_OVERFLOW) + printk("%soverflow occurred, error info is incomplete\n", + newpfx); + } + + printk("%serror_type: %d, %s\n", newpfx, err_info->type, + err_info->type < ARRAY_SIZE(cper_proc_error_type_strs) ? + cper_proc_error_type_strs[err_info->type] : "unknown"); + if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_ERR_INFO) + printk("%serror_info: 0x%016llx\n", newpfx, + err_info->error_info); + if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_VIRT_ADDR) + printk("%svirtual fault address: 0x%016llx\n", + newpfx, err_info->virt_fault_addr); + if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_PHYSICAL_ADDR) + printk("%sphysical fault address: 0x%016llx\n", + newpfx, err_info->physical_fault_addr); + err_info += 1; + } + + ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)err_info; + max_ctx_type = ARRAY_SIZE(arm_reg_ctx_strs) - 1; + for (i = 0; i < proc->context_info_num; i++) { + int size = sizeof(*ctx_info) + ctx_info->size; + + printk("%sContext info structure %d:\n", pfx, i); + if (len < size) { + printk("%ssection length is too small\n", newpfx); + printk("%sfirmware-generated error record is incorrect\n", pfx); + return; + } + if (ctx_info->type > max_ctx_type) { + printk("%sInvalid context type: %d (max: %d)\n", + newpfx, ctx_info->type, max_ctx_type); + return; + } + printk("%sregister context type: %s\n", newpfx, + arm_reg_ctx_strs[ctx_info->type]); + print_hex_dump(newpfx, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 4, + (ctx_info + 1), ctx_info->size, 0); + len -= size; + ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)((long)ctx_info + size); + } + + if (len > 0) { + printk("%sVendor specific error info has %u bytes:\n", pfx, + len); + print_hex_dump(newpfx, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 4, ctx_info, + len, true); + } +} diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c index d2fcafcea07e..c165933ebf38 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static const char * const proc_isa_strs[] = { "ARM A64", }; -static const char * const proc_error_type_strs[] = { +const char * const cper_proc_error_type_strs[] = { "cache error", "TLB error", "bus error", @@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ static void cper_print_proc_generic(const char *pfx, if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_PROC_VALID_ERROR_TYPE) { printk("%s""error_type: 0x%02x\n", pfx, proc->proc_error_type); cper_print_bits(pfx, proc->proc_error_type, - proc_error_type_strs, - ARRAY_SIZE(proc_error_type_strs)); + cper_proc_error_type_strs, + ARRAY_SIZE(cper_proc_error_type_strs)); } if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_PROC_VALID_OPERATION) printk("%s""operation: %d, %s\n", pfx, proc->operation, @@ -188,122 +188,6 @@ static void cper_print_proc_generic(const char *pfx, printk("%s""IP: 0x%016llx\n", pfx, proc->ip); } -#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64) || defined(CONFIG_ARM) -static const char * const arm_reg_ctx_strs[] = { - "AArch32 general purpose registers", - "AArch32 EL1 context registers", - "AArch32 EL2 context registers", - "AArch32 secure context registers", - "AArch64 general purpose registers", - "AArch64 EL1 context registers", - "AArch64 EL2 context registers", - "AArch64 EL3 context registers", - "Misc. system register structure", -}; - -static void cper_print_proc_arm(const char *pfx, - const struct cper_sec_proc_arm *proc) -{ - int i, len, max_ctx_type; - struct cper_arm_err_info *err_info; - struct cper_arm_ctx_info *ctx_info; - char newpfx[64]; - - printk("%sMIDR: 0x%016llx\n", pfx, proc->midr); - - len = proc->section_length - (sizeof(*proc) + - proc->err_info_num * (sizeof(*err_info))); - if (len < 0) { - printk("%ssection length: %d\n", pfx, proc->section_length); - printk("%ssection length is too small\n", pfx); - printk("%sfirmware-generated error record is incorrect\n", pfx); - printk("%sERR_INFO_NUM is %d\n", pfx, proc->err_info_num); - return; - } - - if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_MPIDR) - printk("%sMultiprocessor Affinity Register (MPIDR): 0x%016llx\n", - pfx, proc->mpidr); - - if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_AFFINITY_LEVEL) - printk("%serror affinity level: %d\n", pfx, - proc->affinity_level); - - if (proc->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_VALID_RUNNING_STATE) { - printk("%srunning state: 0x%x\n", pfx, proc->running_state); - printk("%sPower State Coordination Interface state: %d\n", - pfx, proc->psci_state); - } - - snprintf(newpfx, sizeof(newpfx), "%s%s", pfx, INDENT_SP); - - err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)(proc + 1); - for (i = 0; i < proc->err_info_num; i++) { - printk("%sError info structure %d:\n", pfx, i); - - printk("%snum errors: %d\n", pfx, err_info->multiple_error + 1); - - if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_FLAGS) { - if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_FIRST) - printk("%sfirst error captured\n", newpfx); - if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_LAST) - printk("%slast error captured\n", newpfx); - if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_PROPAGATED) - printk("%spropagated error captured\n", - newpfx); - if (err_info->flags & CPER_ARM_INFO_FLAGS_OVERFLOW) - printk("%soverflow occurred, error info is incomplete\n", - newpfx); - } - - printk("%serror_type: %d, %s\n", newpfx, err_info->type, - err_info->type < ARRAY_SIZE(proc_error_type_strs) ? - proc_error_type_strs[err_info->type] : "unknown"); - if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_ERR_INFO) - printk("%serror_info: 0x%016llx\n", newpfx, - err_info->error_info); - if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_VIRT_ADDR) - printk("%svirtual fault address: 0x%016llx\n", - newpfx, err_info->virt_fault_addr); - if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_PHYSICAL_ADDR) - printk("%sphysical fault address: 0x%016llx\n", - newpfx, err_info->physical_fault_addr); - err_info += 1; - } - - ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)err_info; - max_ctx_type = ARRAY_SIZE(arm_reg_ctx_strs) - 1; - for (i = 0; i < proc->context_info_num; i++) { - int size = sizeof(*ctx_info) + ctx_info->size; - - printk("%sContext info structure %d:\n", pfx, i); - if (len < size) { - printk("%ssection length is too small\n", newpfx); - printk("%sfirmware-generated error record is incorrect\n", pfx); - return; - } - if (ctx_info->type > max_ctx_type) { - printk("%sInvalid context type: %d (max: %d)\n", - newpfx, ctx_info->type, max_ctx_type); - return; - } - printk("%sregister context type: %s\n", newpfx, - arm_reg_ctx_strs[ctx_info->type]); - print_hex_dump(newpfx, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 4, - (ctx_info + 1), ctx_info->size, 0); - len -= size; - ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)((long)ctx_info + size); - } - - if (len > 0) { - printk("%sVendor specific error info has %u bytes:\n", pfx, - len); - print_hex_dump(newpfx, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 4, ctx_info, - len, true); - } -} -#endif - static const char * const mem_err_type_strs[] = { "unknown", "no error", -- cgit From 301f55b1a9177132d2b9ce8a90bf0ae4b37bb850 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Baicar Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 18:10:42 +0000 Subject: efi: Parse ARM error information value ARM errors just print out the error information value, then the value needs to be manually decoded as per the UEFI spec. Add decoding of the ARM error information value so that the kernel logs capture all of the valid information at first glance. ARM error information value decoding is captured in UEFI 2.7 spec tables 263-265. Signed-off-by: Tyler Baicar Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Arvind Yadav Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matt Fleming Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vasyl Gomonovych Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180102181042.19074-6-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 211 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c index 4afbfed52163..698e5c8e0c8d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/cper-arm.c @@ -44,13 +44,218 @@ static const char * const arm_reg_ctx_strs[] = { "Misc. system register structure", }; +static const char * const arm_err_trans_type_strs[] = { + "Instruction", + "Data Access", + "Generic", +}; + +static const char * const arm_bus_err_op_strs[] = { + "Generic error (type cannot be determined)", + "Generic read (type of instruction or data request cannot be determined)", + "Generic write (type of instruction of data request cannot be determined)", + "Data read", + "Data write", + "Instruction fetch", + "Prefetch", +}; + +static const char * const arm_cache_err_op_strs[] = { + "Generic error (type cannot be determined)", + "Generic read (type of instruction or data request cannot be determined)", + "Generic write (type of instruction of data request cannot be determined)", + "Data read", + "Data write", + "Instruction fetch", + "Prefetch", + "Eviction", + "Snooping (processor initiated a cache snoop that resulted in an error)", + "Snooped (processor raised a cache error caused by another processor or device snooping its cache)", + "Management", +}; + +static const char * const arm_tlb_err_op_strs[] = { + "Generic error (type cannot be determined)", + "Generic read (type of instruction or data request cannot be determined)", + "Generic write (type of instruction of data request cannot be determined)", + "Data read", + "Data write", + "Instruction fetch", + "Prefetch", + "Local management operation (processor initiated a TLB management operation that resulted in an error)", + "External management operation (processor raised a TLB error caused by another processor or device broadcasting TLB operations)", +}; + +static const char * const arm_bus_err_part_type_strs[] = { + "Local processor originated request", + "Local processor responded to request", + "Local processor observed", + "Generic", +}; + +static const char * const arm_bus_err_addr_space_strs[] = { + "External Memory Access", + "Internal Memory Access", + "Unknown", + "Device Memory Access", +}; + +static void cper_print_arm_err_info(const char *pfx, u32 type, + u64 error_info) +{ + u8 trans_type, op_type, level, participation_type, address_space; + u16 mem_attributes; + bool proc_context_corrupt, corrected, precise_pc, restartable_pc; + bool time_out, access_mode; + + /* If the type is unknown, bail. */ + if (type > CPER_ARM_MAX_TYPE) + return; + + /* + * Vendor type errors have error information values that are vendor + * specific. + */ + if (type == CPER_ARM_VENDOR_ERROR) + return; + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_TRANSACTION_TYPE) { + trans_type = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_TRANSACTION_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_TRANSACTION_MASK); + if (trans_type < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_err_trans_type_strs)) { + printk("%stransaction type: %s\n", pfx, + arm_err_trans_type_strs[trans_type]); + } + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_OPERATION_TYPE) { + op_type = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_OPERATION_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_OPERATION_MASK); + switch (type) { + case CPER_ARM_CACHE_ERROR: + if (op_type < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_cache_err_op_strs)) { + printk("%soperation type: %s\n", pfx, + arm_cache_err_op_strs[op_type]); + } + break; + case CPER_ARM_TLB_ERROR: + if (op_type < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_tlb_err_op_strs)) { + printk("%soperation type: %s\n", pfx, + arm_tlb_err_op_strs[op_type]); + } + break; + case CPER_ARM_BUS_ERROR: + if (op_type < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_bus_err_op_strs)) { + printk("%soperation type: %s\n", pfx, + arm_bus_err_op_strs[op_type]); + } + break; + } + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_LEVEL) { + level = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_LEVEL_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_LEVEL_MASK); + switch (type) { + case CPER_ARM_CACHE_ERROR: + printk("%scache level: %d\n", pfx, level); + break; + case CPER_ARM_TLB_ERROR: + printk("%sTLB level: %d\n", pfx, level); + break; + case CPER_ARM_BUS_ERROR: + printk("%saffinity level at which the bus error occurred: %d\n", + pfx, level); + break; + } + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_PROC_CONTEXT_CORRUPT) { + proc_context_corrupt = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_PC_CORRUPT_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_PC_CORRUPT_MASK); + if (proc_context_corrupt) + printk("%sprocessor context corrupted\n", pfx); + else + printk("%sprocessor context not corrupted\n", pfx); + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_CORRECTED) { + corrected = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_CORRECTED_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_CORRECTED_MASK); + if (corrected) + printk("%sthe error has been corrected\n", pfx); + else + printk("%sthe error has not been corrected\n", pfx); + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_PRECISE_PC) { + precise_pc = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_PRECISE_PC_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_PRECISE_PC_MASK); + if (precise_pc) + printk("%sPC is precise\n", pfx); + else + printk("%sPC is imprecise\n", pfx); + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_RESTARTABLE_PC) { + restartable_pc = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_RESTARTABLE_PC_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_RESTARTABLE_PC_MASK); + if (restartable_pc) + printk("%sProgram execution can be restarted reliably at the PC associated with the error.\n", pfx); + } + + /* The rest of the fields are specific to bus errors */ + if (type != CPER_ARM_BUS_ERROR) + return; + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_PARTICIPATION_TYPE) { + participation_type = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_PARTICIPATION_TYPE_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_PARTICIPATION_TYPE_MASK); + if (participation_type < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_bus_err_part_type_strs)) { + printk("%sparticipation type: %s\n", pfx, + arm_bus_err_part_type_strs[participation_type]); + } + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_TIME_OUT) { + time_out = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_TIME_OUT_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_TIME_OUT_MASK); + if (time_out) + printk("%srequest timed out\n", pfx); + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_ADDRESS_SPACE) { + address_space = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_ADDRESS_SPACE_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_ADDRESS_SPACE_MASK); + if (address_space < ARRAY_SIZE(arm_bus_err_addr_space_strs)) { + printk("%saddress space: %s\n", pfx, + arm_bus_err_addr_space_strs[address_space]); + } + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_MEM_ATTRIBUTES) { + mem_attributes = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_MEM_ATTRIBUTES_MASK); + printk("%smemory access attributes:0x%x\n", pfx, mem_attributes); + } + + if (error_info & CPER_ARM_ERR_VALID_ACCESS_MODE) { + access_mode = ((error_info >> CPER_ARM_ERR_ACCESS_MODE_SHIFT) + & CPER_ARM_ERR_ACCESS_MODE_MASK); + if (access_mode) + printk("%saccess mode: normal\n", pfx); + else + printk("%saccess mode: secure\n", pfx); + } +} + void cper_print_proc_arm(const char *pfx, const struct cper_sec_proc_arm *proc) { int i, len, max_ctx_type; struct cper_arm_err_info *err_info; struct cper_arm_ctx_info *ctx_info; - char newpfx[64]; + char newpfx[64], infopfx[64]; printk("%sMIDR: 0x%016llx\n", pfx, proc->midr); @@ -102,9 +307,13 @@ void cper_print_proc_arm(const char *pfx, printk("%serror_type: %d, %s\n", newpfx, err_info->type, err_info->type < ARRAY_SIZE(cper_proc_error_type_strs) ? cper_proc_error_type_strs[err_info->type] : "unknown"); - if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_ERR_INFO) + if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_ERR_INFO) { printk("%serror_info: 0x%016llx\n", newpfx, err_info->error_info); + snprintf(infopfx, sizeof(infopfx), "%s%s", newpfx, INDENT_SP); + cper_print_arm_err_info(infopfx, err_info->type, + err_info->error_info); + } if (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_VIRT_ADDR) printk("%svirtual fault address: 0x%016llx\n", newpfx, err_info->virt_fault_addr); -- cgit From a5c03c31af2291f13689d11760c0b59fb70c9a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Garrett Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 09:10:02 +0000 Subject: x86/efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace Some distributions have turned on the reset attack mitigation feature, which is designed to force the platform to clear the contents of RAM if the machine is shut down uncleanly. However, in order for the platform to be able to determine whether the shutdown was clean or not, userspace has to be configured to clear the MemoryOverwriteRequest flag on shutdown - otherwise the firmware will end up clearing RAM on every reboot, which is unnecessarily time consuming. Add some additional clarity to the kconfig text to reduce the risk of systems being configured this way. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar --- drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig index aab108e82f78..6047ed4e8a3d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig @@ -159,7 +159,10 @@ config RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION using the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation specification. This protects against an attacker forcibly rebooting the system while it still contains secrets in RAM, booting another OS and extracting the - secrets. + secrets. This should only be enabled when userland is configured to + clear the MemoryOverwriteRequest flag on clean shutdown after secrets + have been evicted, since otherwise it will trigger even on clean + reboots. endmenu -- cgit