From fcd7c26901c83681532c6daac599e53d4df11738 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahmad Fatoum Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 16:57:00 +0200 Subject: KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key material The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Acked-by: Sumit Garg Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: David Gstir Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta Tested-by: Michael Walle # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'include/keys') diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index d89fa2579ac0..4eb64548a74f 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ struct trusted_key_ops { /* Unseal a key. */ int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); - /* Get a randomized key. */ + /* Optional: Get a randomized key. */ int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); /* Exit key interface. */ -- cgit