From 0466bdb99e8744bc9befa8d62a317f0fd7fd7421 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 11 Aug 2017 13:12:11 -0700 Subject: seccomp: Implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS action MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Right now, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (neé SECCOMP_RET_KILL) kills the current thread. There have been a few requests for this to kill the entire process (the thread group). This cannot be just changed (discovered when adding coredump support since coredumping kills the entire process) because there are userspace programs depending on the thread-kill behavior. Instead, implement SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS, which is 0x80000000, and can be processed as "-1" by the kernel, below the existing RET_KILL that is ABI-set to "0". For userspace, SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL is added to expand the mask to the signed bit. Old userspace using the SECCOMP_RET_ACTION mask will see SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS as 0 still, but this would only be visible when examining the siginfo in a core dump from a RET_KILL_*, where it will think it was thread-killed instead of process-killed. Attempts to introduce this behavior via other ways (filter flags, seccomp struct flags, masked RET_DATA bits) all come with weird side-effects and baggage. This change preserves the central behavioral expectations of the seccomp filter engine without putting too great a burden on changes needed in userspace to use the new action. The new action is discoverable by userspace through either the new actions_avail sysctl or through the SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL seccomp operation. If used without checking for availability, old kernels will treat RET_KILL_PROCESS as RET_KILL_THREAD (since the old mask will produce RET_KILL_THREAD). Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Fabricio Voznika Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- kernel/seccomp.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c') diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 5c7299b9d953..c24579dfa7a1 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ +#define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL))) static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, struct seccomp_filter **match) { @@ -206,7 +207,7 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, for (; f; f = f->prev) { u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, sd); - if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) { + if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) { ret = cur_ret; *match = f; } @@ -650,7 +651,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match); data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; - action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; + action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL; switch (action) { case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: @@ -890,6 +891,7 @@ static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction) return -EFAULT; switch (action) { + case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS: case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD: case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: @@ -1041,6 +1043,7 @@ out: #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL /* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */ +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME "kill_process" #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread" #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap" #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno" @@ -1049,6 +1052,7 @@ out: #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow" static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] = + SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME " " SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " " SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " " SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " " @@ -1062,6 +1066,7 @@ struct seccomp_log_name { }; static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = { + { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME }, { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME }, { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME }, { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME }, -- cgit