From d96f92f4aae1132482ce0a584c4bc3ce32c796ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 08:46:52 -0400 Subject: audit: add syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE records Tie syscall information to FEATURE_CHANGE calls since it is a result of user action. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/80 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: 80-char fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/audit.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 670665c6e2a6..e9f9a90790e5 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1099,8 +1099,8 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF) return; - - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, + GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; audit_log_task_info(ab, current); -- cgit From 23bcc480dac204c7dbdf49d96b2c918ed98223c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ondrej Mosnáček Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2018 10:00:06 +0200 Subject: audit: allow not equal op for audit by executable Current implementation of auditing by executable name only implements the 'equal' operator. This patch extends it to also support the 'not equal' operator. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/53 Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index d7a807e81451..a0c5a3ec6e60 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_EXE: - if (f->op != Audit_equal) + if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) return -EINVAL; if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4e0a4ac803db..479c031ec54c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -471,6 +471,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; case AUDIT_EXE: result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe); + if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) + result = !result; break; case AUDIT_UID: result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); -- cgit From d013db029491b49e1459d5a55ecd9ec1be1447ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 01:08:12 +0000 Subject: seccomp: Separate read and write code for actions_logged sysctl Break the read and write paths of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl into separate functions to maintain readability. An upcoming change will need to audit writes, but not reads, of this sysctl which would introduce too many conditional code paths on whether or not the 'write' parameter evaluates to true. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/seccomp.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index dc77548167ef..f4afe6790e4c 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1199,48 +1199,64 @@ static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names) return true; } -static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, - loff_t *ppos) +static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; struct ctl_table table; + + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); + + if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), + seccomp_actions_logged)) + return -EINVAL; + + table = *ro_table; + table.data = names; + table.maxlen = sizeof(names); + return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + struct ctl_table table; + u32 actions_logged; int ret; - if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); - if (!write) { - if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), - seccomp_actions_logged)) - return -EINVAL; - } - table = *ro_table; table.data = names; table.maxlen = sizeof(names); - ret = proc_dostring(&table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + ret = proc_dostring(&table, 1, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (ret) return ret; - if (write) { - u32 actions_logged; - - if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, - table.data)) - return -EINVAL; - - if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) - return -EINVAL; + if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, table.data)) + return -EINVAL; - seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; - } + if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) + return -EINVAL; + seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; return 0; } +static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + if (write) + return write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); + else + return read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = { { .procname = "kernel", }, { .procname = "seccomp", }, -- cgit From beb44acaf000c97d6c89de581f377df5757857f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 01:08:13 +0000 Subject: seccomp: Configurable separator for the actions_logged string The function that converts a bitmask of seccomp actions that are allowed to be logged is currently only used for constructing the display string for the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl. That string wants a space character to be used for the separator between actions. A future patch will make use of the same function for building a string that will be sent to the audit subsystem for tracking modifications to the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl. That string will need to use a comma as a separator. This patch allows the separator character to be configurable to meet both needs. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/seccomp.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index f4afe6790e4c..b36ac1e0cd0e 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1135,10 +1135,11 @@ static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = { }; static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, - u32 actions_logged) + u32 actions_logged, + const char *sep) { const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; - bool append_space = false; + bool append_sep = false; for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) { ssize_t ret; @@ -1146,15 +1147,15 @@ static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, if (!(actions_logged & cur->log)) continue; - if (append_space) { - ret = strscpy(names, " ", size); + if (append_sep) { + ret = strscpy(names, sep, size); if (ret < 0) return false; names += ret; size -= ret; } else - append_space = true; + append_sep = true; ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size); if (ret < 0) @@ -1208,7 +1209,7 @@ static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), - seccomp_actions_logged)) + seccomp_actions_logged, " ")) return -EINVAL; table = *ro_table; -- cgit From ea6eca778500b0aaf6e5f10dac4d2cd745c2a50b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 01:08:14 +0000 Subject: seccomp: Audit attempts to modify the actions_logged sysctl The decision to log a seccomp action will always be subject to the value of the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl, even for processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem, in an upcoming patch. Therefore, we need to emit an audit record on attempts at writing to the actions_logged sysctl when auditing is enabled. This patch updates the write handler for the actions_logged sysctl to emit an audit record on attempts to write to the sysctl. Successful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that includes a normalized list of logged actions in the "actions" field and a "res" field equal to 1. Unsuccessful writes to the sysctl will result in a record that doesn't include the "actions" field and has a "res" field equal to 0. Not all unsuccessful writes to the sysctl are audited. For example, an audit record will not be emitted if an unprivileged process attempts to open the sysctl file for reading since that access control check is not part of the sysctl's write handler. Below are some example audit records when writing various strings to the actions_logged sysctl. Writing "not-a-real-action", when the kernel.seccomp.actions_logged sysctl previously was "kill_process kill_thread trap errno trace log", emits this audit record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392371.454:120): op=seccomp-logging actions=? old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=0 If you then write "kill_process kill_thread errno trace log", this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392401.645:126): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,trap,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write "log log errno trace kill_process kill_thread", which is unordered and contains the log action twice, it results in the same actions value as the previous record: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392436.354:132): op=seccomp-logging actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 If you then write an empty string to the sysctl, this audit record is emitted: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1525392494.413:138): op=seccomp-logging actions=(none) old-actions=kill_process,kill_thread,errno,trace,log res=1 No audit records are generated when reading the actions_logged sysctl. Suggested-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++ kernel/seccomp.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 479c031ec54c..46ef2c23618d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2480,6 +2480,26 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) audit_log_end(ab); } +void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, + int res) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, + AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); + if (unlikely(!ab)) + return; + + audit_log_format(ab, "op=seccomp-logging"); + audit_log_format(ab, " actions=%s", names); + audit_log_format(ab, " old-actions=%s", old_names); + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", res); + audit_log_end(ab); +} + struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) { struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index b36ac1e0cd0e..f5630d1a88fe 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -1219,11 +1219,10 @@ static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, } static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, - size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged) { char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; struct ctl_table table; - u32 actions_logged; int ret; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -1238,24 +1237,65 @@ static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, if (ret) return ret; - if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, table.data)) + if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data)) return -EINVAL; - if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) + if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) return -EINVAL; - seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; + seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged; return 0; } +static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 old_actions_logged, + int ret) +{ + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + const char *new = names; + const char *old = old_names; + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); + memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names)); + + if (ret) + new = "?"; + else if (!actions_logged) + new = "(none)"; + else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), + actions_logged, ",")) + new = "?"; + + if (!old_actions_logged) + old = "(none)"; + else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names, + sizeof(old_names), + old_actions_logged, ",")) + old = "?"; + + return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret); +} + static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - if (write) - return write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); - else - return read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); + int ret; + + if (write) { + u32 actions_logged = 0; + u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged; + + ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos, + &actions_logged); + audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret); + } else + ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); + + return ret; } static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = { -- cgit From 326bee0286d7f6b0d780f5b75a35ea9fe489a802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tyler Hicks Date: Fri, 4 May 2018 01:08:15 +0000 Subject: seccomp: Don't special case audited processes when logging Seccomp logging for "handled" actions such as RET_TRAP, RET_TRACE, or RET_ERRNO can be very noisy for processes that are being audited. This patch modifies the seccomp logging behavior to treat processes that are being inspected via the audit subsystem the same as processes that aren't under inspection. Handled actions will no longer be logged just because the process is being inspected. Since v4.14, applications have the ability to request logging of handled actions by using the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG flag when loading seccomp filters. With this patch, the logic for deciding if an action will be logged is: if action == RET_ALLOW: do not log else if action not in actions_logged: do not log else if action == RET_KILL: log else if action == RET_LOG: log else if filter-requests-logging: log else: do not log Reported-by: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 +++++++++++++- kernel/seccomp.c | 17 +++++++---------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 46ef2c23618d..0d4e7ab847b1 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2466,7 +2466,19 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) audit_log_end(ab); } -void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) +/** + * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action + * @syscall: syscall number + * @signr: signal value + * @code: the seccomp action + * + * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for + * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log(). + * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled + * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when + * audit is not in use. + */ +void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { struct audit_buffer *ab; diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index f5630d1a88fe..5386749cdd21 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -584,18 +584,15 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action, } /* - * Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is RET_KILL_*, - * RET_LOG, or the FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set and the action is - * allowed to be logged by the admin. + * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the + * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence + * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the + * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl. */ - if (log) - return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); + if (!log) + return; - /* - * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based - * on whether the current task itself is being audited. - */ - return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); + audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); } /* -- cgit From f0b752168d7091f38e7d61a80de2542e8b71d266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Sat, 12 May 2018 21:58:19 -0400 Subject: audit: convert sessionid unset to a macro Use a macro, "AUDIT_SID_UNSET", to replace each instance of initialization and comparison to an audit session ID. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 0d4e7ab847b1..378c45b92775 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) { struct task_struct *task = current; - unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1; + unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET; kuid_t oldloginuid; int rc; @@ -2064,7 +2064,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) /* are we setting or clearing? */ if (uid_valid(loginuid)) { sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); - if (unlikely(sessionid == (unsigned int)-1)) + if (unlikely(sessionid == AUDIT_SID_UNSET)) sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); } -- cgit From cdfb6b341f0f2409aba24b84f3b4b2bba50be5c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Sat, 12 May 2018 21:58:20 -0400 Subject: audit: use inline function to get audit context Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: merge fuzz in auditsc.c and selinuxfs.c, checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/audit.c | 6 ++--- kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index e9f9a90790e5..e7478cb58079 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1099,8 +1099,7 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF) return; - ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, - GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; audit_log_task_info(ab, current); @@ -2317,8 +2316,7 @@ void audit_log_link_denied(const char *operation) return; /* Generate AUDIT_ANOM_LINK with subject, operation, outcome. */ - ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, - AUDIT_ANOM_LINK); + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_LINK); if (!ab) return; audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s", operation); diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c index 9eb8b3511636..f1ba88994508 100644 --- a/kernel/audit_watch.c +++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent, /* If the update involves invalidating rules, do the inode-based * filtering now, so we don't omit records. */ if (invalidating && !audit_dummy_context()) - audit_filter_inodes(current, current->audit_context); + audit_filter_inodes(current, audit_context()); /* updating ino will likely change which audit_hash_list we * are on so we need a new watch for the new list */ diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 378c45b92775..fce4acba576d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1509,8 +1509,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); enum audit_state state; if (!audit_enabled || !context) @@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { context->prio = 0; - if (auditd_test_task(tsk)) + if (auditd_test_task(current)) return; } @@ -1563,12 +1562,12 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) else success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; - context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code); + context = audit_take_context(current, success, return_code); if (!context) return; if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) - audit_log_exit(context, tsk); + audit_log_exit(context, current); context->in_syscall = 0; context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; @@ -1602,7 +1601,7 @@ static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) int count; if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) return; - context = current->audit_context; + context = audit_context(); p = context->trees; count = context->tree_count; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1633,7 +1632,7 @@ static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) unsigned long seq; int count; - context = current->audit_context; + context = audit_context(); p = context->trees; count = context->tree_count; retry: @@ -1715,7 +1714,7 @@ static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, struct filename * __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct audit_names *n; list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { @@ -1738,7 +1737,7 @@ __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) */ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct audit_names *n; if (!context->in_syscall) @@ -1766,7 +1765,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct audit_names *n; bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; @@ -1865,7 +1864,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, const struct dentry *dentry, const unsigned char type) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; @@ -2084,7 +2083,7 @@ out: */ void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); if (attr) memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); @@ -2108,7 +2107,7 @@ void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; if (abs_timeout) @@ -2132,7 +2131,7 @@ void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); if (notification) context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; @@ -2151,7 +2150,7 @@ void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) */ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; @@ -2164,7 +2163,7 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) */ void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; @@ -2184,7 +2183,7 @@ void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) */ void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; @@ -2195,7 +2194,7 @@ void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mo void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; @@ -2210,7 +2209,7 @@ void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) return -EINVAL; @@ -2228,7 +2227,7 @@ int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) */ void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->fds[0] = fd1; context->fds[1] = fd2; } @@ -2242,7 +2241,7 @@ void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) */ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); if (!context->sockaddr) { void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -2258,7 +2257,7 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); @@ -2279,19 +2278,18 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; - struct task_struct *tsk = current; - struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; + struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) { - audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); - if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) - audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; + audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current); + if (uid_valid(current->loginuid)) + audit_sig_uid = current->loginuid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) @@ -2347,7 +2345,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -2387,7 +2385,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, */ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; @@ -2398,7 +2396,7 @@ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->mmap.fd = fd; context->mmap.flags = flags; context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; @@ -2406,7 +2404,7 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) { - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); context->module.name = kmalloc(strlen(name) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); strcpy(context->module.name, name); @@ -2415,7 +2413,7 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name) void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) { - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response); } @@ -2514,7 +2512,7 @@ void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) { - struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; + struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) return NULL; return &ctx->killed_trees; -- cgit From c0b0ae8a871bc2ebbe1ff9c9871efcf88994ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Sat, 12 May 2018 21:58:21 -0400 Subject: audit: use inline function to set audit context Recognizing that the audit context is an internal audit value, use an access function to set the audit context pointer for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to set it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: merge fuzz in audit.h] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 7 +++---- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index fce4acba576d..cbab0da86d15 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk, audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); } - tsk->audit_context = NULL; + audit_set_context(tsk, NULL); return context; } @@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) } context->filterkey = key; - tsk->audit_context = context; + audit_set_context(tsk, context); set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); return 0; } @@ -1554,7 +1554,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, */ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) { - struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *context; if (success) @@ -1589,7 +1588,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) kfree(context->filterkey); context->filterkey = NULL; } - tsk->audit_context = context; + audit_set_context(current, context); } static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 242c8c93d285..cd18448b025a 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1713,7 +1713,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( p->start_time = ktime_get_ns(); p->real_start_time = ktime_get_boot_ns(); p->io_context = NULL; - p->audit_context = NULL; + audit_set_context(p, NULL); cgroup_fork(p); #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy); -- cgit From 8982a1fbe0b51efba09401f18cc69abc801149c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Wed, 16 May 2018 07:55:45 -0400 Subject: audit: use new audit_context access funciton for seccomp_actions_logged On the rebase of the following commit on the new seccomp actions_logged function, one audit_context access was missed. commit cdfb6b341f0f2409aba24b84f3b4b2bba50be5c5 ("audit: use inline function to get audit context") Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index cbab0da86d15..f3d3dc652c2c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2497,7 +2497,7 @@ void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names, if (!audit_enabled) return; - ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (unlikely(!ab)) return; -- cgit From 38f80590486e38a4f2aac7b1fcf9cf60cb618a1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Wed, 16 May 2018 07:55:46 -0400 Subject: audit: normalize loginuid read access Recognizing that the loginuid is an internal audit value, use an access function to retrieve the audit loginuid value for the task rather than reaching directly into the task struct to get it. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index f3d3dc652c2c..ef3e189bcb15 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: - return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); + return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: @@ -385,7 +385,8 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); /* uid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: - return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); + return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, + audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: @@ -394,11 +395,14 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); /* auid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: - return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); + return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, + cred->euid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: - return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); + return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, + cred->suid); case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: - return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); + return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op, + cred->fsuid); /* euid comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); @@ -611,7 +615,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: - result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); + result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), + f->op, f->uid); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); @@ -2278,14 +2283,15 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); - kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); + kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid, t_uid = task_uid(t); if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2)) { audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(current); - if (uid_valid(current->loginuid)) - audit_sig_uid = current->loginuid; + auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); + if (uid_valid(auid)) + audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); -- cgit From 5c5b8d8bebee2b4e784e67b2751934fa564b1a79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Guy Briggs Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 22:01:48 -0400 Subject: audit: use existing session info function Use the existing audit_log_session_info() function rather than hardcoding its functionality. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a0c5a3ec6e60..eaa320148d97 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1089,8 +1089,6 @@ static void audit_list_rules(int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)); - unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); if (!audit_enabled) return; @@ -1098,7 +1096,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int re ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); if (!ab) return; - audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid); + audit_log_session_info(ab); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", action); audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey); -- cgit From 5b71388663c0920848c0ee7de946970a2692b76d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ondrej Mosnáček Date: Thu, 17 May 2018 17:31:14 +0200 Subject: audit: Fix wrong task in comparison of session ID The audit_filter_rules() function in auditsc.c compared the session ID with the credentials of the current task, while it should use the credentials of the task given to audit_filter_rules() as a parameter (tsk). GitHub issue: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/82 Fixes: 8fae47705685 ("audit: add support for session ID user filter") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: not user visible, dropped stable] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index ef3e189bcb15..ceb1c4596c51 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); break; case AUDIT_SESSIONID: - sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); + sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk); result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PERS: -- cgit