From ee6493462f74013c6f365429401b716500aff838 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chriz Chow Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 15:46:24 +0800 Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow for large advertisement data There are some controllers sending out advertising data with illegal length value which is longer than HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH, causing the buffer last_adv_data overflows. To avoid these controllers from overflowing the buffer, we do not process the advertisement data if its length is incorrect. Signed-off-by: Chriz Chow Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/bluetooth') diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 139707cd9d35..235b5aaab23d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4942,10 +4942,14 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr; s8 rssi; - rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; - process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, - ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi, - ev->data, ev->length); + if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) { + rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; + process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, + ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi, + ev->data, ev->length); + } else { + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Dropping invalid advertising data"); + } ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1; } -- cgit