From e7a5f1f1cd0008e5ad379270a8657e121eedb669 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lingpeng Chen Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 09:48:33 +0800 Subject: bpf/sockmap: Read psock ingress_msg before sk_receive_queue Right now in tcp_bpf_recvmsg, sock read data first from sk_receive_queue if not empty than psock->ingress_msg otherwise. If a FIN packet arrives and there's also some data in psock->ingress_msg, the data in psock->ingress_msg will be purged. It is always happen when request to a HTTP1.0 server like python SimpleHTTPServer since the server send FIN packet after data is sent out. Fixes: 604326b41a6fb ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: Arika Chen Suggested-by: Arika Chen Signed-off-by: Lingpeng Chen Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Song Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200109014833.18951-1-forrest0579@gmail.com --- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index e38705165ac9..e6b08b5a0895 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -121,14 +121,14 @@ int tcp_bpf_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, struct sk_psock *psock; int copied, ret; - if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) - return inet_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); - if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) - return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); - psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); + if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)) + return inet_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len); + if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) && + sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) + return tcp_recvmsg(sk, msg, len, nonblock, flags, addr_len); lock_sock(sk); msg_bytes_ready: copied = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len, flags); @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ msg_bytes_ready: timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); data = tcp_bpf_wait_data(sk, psock, flags, timeo, &err); if (data) { - if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) + if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) goto msg_bytes_ready; release_sock(sk); sk_psock_put(sk, psock); -- cgit From 9827c0634e461703abf81e8cc8b7adf5da5886d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Ahern Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2020 09:03:58 -0800 Subject: ipv4: Detect rollover in specific fib table dump Sven-Haegar reported looping on fib dumps when 255.255.255.255 route has been added to a table. The looping is caused by the key rolling over from FFFFFFFF to 0. When dumping a specific table only, we need a means to detect when the table dump is done. The key and count saved to cb args are both 0 only at the start of the table dump. If key is 0 and count > 0, then we are in the rollover case. Detect and return to avoid looping. This only affects dumps of a specific table; for dumps of all tables (the case prior to the change in the Fixes tag) inet_dump_fib moved the entry counter to the next table and reset the cb args used by fib_table_dump and fn_trie_dump_leaf, so the rollover ffffffff back to 0 did not cause looping with the dumps. Fixes: effe67926624 ("net: Enable kernel side filtering of route dumps") Reported-by: Sven-Haegar Koch Signed-off-by: David Ahern Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index b9df9c09b84e..195469a13371 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -2193,6 +2193,12 @@ int fib_table_dump(struct fib_table *tb, struct sk_buff *skb, int count = cb->args[2]; t_key key = cb->args[3]; + /* First time here, count and key are both always 0. Count > 0 + * and key == 0 means the dump has wrapped around and we are done. + */ + if (count && !key) + return skb->len; + while ((l = leaf_walk_rcu(&tp, key)) != NULL) { int err; -- cgit From 212e7f56605ef9688d0846db60c6c6ec06544095 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 23:19:53 +0100 Subject: netfilter: arp_tables: init netns pointer in xt_tgdtor_param struct An earlier commit (1b789577f655060d98d20e, "netfilter: arp_tables: init netns pointer in xt_tgchk_param struct") fixed missing net initialization for arptables, but turns out it was incomplete. We can get a very similar struct net NULL deref during error unwinding: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:xt_rateest_put+0xa1/0x440 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:77 xt_rateest_tg_destroy+0x72/0xa0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:175 cleanup_entry net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:509 [inline] translate_table+0x11f4/0x1d80 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:587 do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:981 [inline] do_arpt_set_ctl+0x317/0x650 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:1461 Also init the netns pointer in xt_tgdtor_param struct. Fixes: add67461240c1d ("netfilter: add struct net * to target parameters") Reported-by: syzbot+91bdd8eece0f6629ec8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 069f72edb264..f1f78a742b36 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -496,12 +496,13 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e, return 0; } -static inline void cleanup_entry(struct arpt_entry *e) +static void cleanup_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, struct net *net) { struct xt_tgdtor_param par; struct xt_entry_target *t; t = arpt_get_target(e); + par.net = net; par.target = t->u.kernel.target; par.targinfo = t->data; par.family = NFPROTO_ARP; @@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) { if (i-- == 0) break; - cleanup_entry(iter); + cleanup_entry(iter, net); } return ret; } @@ -927,7 +928,7 @@ static int __do_replace(struct net *net, const char *name, /* Decrease module usage counts and free resource */ loc_cpu_old_entry = oldinfo->entries; xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_old_entry, oldinfo->size) - cleanup_entry(iter); + cleanup_entry(iter, net); xt_free_table_info(oldinfo); if (copy_to_user(counters_ptr, counters, @@ -990,7 +991,7 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, free_newinfo_untrans: xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size) - cleanup_entry(iter); + cleanup_entry(iter, net); free_newinfo: xt_free_table_info(newinfo); return ret; @@ -1287,7 +1288,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, free_newinfo_untrans: xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size) - cleanup_entry(iter); + cleanup_entry(iter, net); free_newinfo: xt_free_table_info(newinfo); return ret; @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static int do_arpt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len return ret; } -static void __arpt_unregister_table(struct xt_table *table) +static void __arpt_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table *table) { struct xt_table_info *private; void *loc_cpu_entry; @@ -1526,7 +1527,7 @@ static void __arpt_unregister_table(struct xt_table *table) /* Decrease module usage counts and free resources */ loc_cpu_entry = private->entries; xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, private->size) - cleanup_entry(iter); + cleanup_entry(iter, net); if (private->number > private->initial_entries) module_put(table_owner); xt_free_table_info(private); @@ -1566,7 +1567,7 @@ int arpt_register_table(struct net *net, ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks)); if (ret != 0) { - __arpt_unregister_table(new_table); + __arpt_unregister_table(net, new_table); *res = NULL; } @@ -1581,7 +1582,7 @@ void arpt_unregister_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table *table, const struct nf_hook_ops *ops) { nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks)); - __arpt_unregister_table(table); + __arpt_unregister_table(net, table); } /* The built-in targets: standard (NULL) and error. */ -- cgit From e176b1ba476cf36f723cfcc7a9e57f3cb47dec70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pengcheng Yang Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 17:23:40 +0800 Subject: tcp: fix marked lost packets not being retransmitted When the packet pointed to by retransmit_skb_hint is unlinked by ACK, retransmit_skb_hint will be set to NULL in tcp_clean_rtx_queue(). If packet loss is detected at this time, retransmit_skb_hint will be set to point to the current packet loss in tcp_verify_retransmit_hint(), then the packets that were previously marked lost but not retransmitted due to the restriction of cwnd will be skipped and cannot be retransmitted. To fix this, when retransmit_skb_hint is NULL, retransmit_skb_hint can be reset only after all marked lost packets are retransmitted (retrans_out >= lost_out), otherwise we need to traverse from tcp_rtx_queue_head in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(). Packetdrill to demonstrate: // Disable RACK and set max_reordering to keep things simple 0 `sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_recovery=0` +0 `sysctl -q net.ipv4.tcp_max_reordering=3` // Establish a connection +0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 +.1 < S 0:0(0) win 32792 +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <...> +.01 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 // Send 8 data segments +0 write(4, ..., 8000) = 8000 +0 > P. 1:8001(8000) ack 1 // Enter recovery and 1:3001 is marked lost +.01 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 +0 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 +0 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 257 // Retransmit 1:1001, now retransmit_skb_hint points to 1001:2001 +0 > . 1:1001(1000) ack 1 // 1001:2001 was ACKed causing retransmit_skb_hint to be set to NULL +.01 < . 1:1(0) ack 2001 win 257 // Now retransmit_skb_hint points to 4001:5001 which is now marked lost // BUG: 2001:3001 was not retransmitted +0 > . 2001:3001(1000) ack 1 Signed-off-by: Pengcheng Yang Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Tested-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 0238b554a1f0..5347ab2c9c58 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -915,9 +915,10 @@ static void tcp_check_sack_reordering(struct sock *sk, const u32 low_seq, /* This must be called before lost_out is incremented */ static void tcp_verify_retransmit_hint(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct sk_buff *skb) { - if (!tp->retransmit_skb_hint || - before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, - TCP_SKB_CB(tp->retransmit_skb_hint)->seq)) + if ((!tp->retransmit_skb_hint && tp->retrans_out >= tp->lost_out) || + (tp->retransmit_skb_hint && + before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, + TCP_SKB_CB(tp->retransmit_skb_hint)->seq))) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = skb; } -- cgit From 33bfe20dd7117dd81fd896a53f743a233e1ad64f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 06:12:01 +0000 Subject: bpf: Sockmap/tls, push write_space updates through ulp updates When sockmap sock with TLS enabled is removed we cleanup bpf/psock state and call tcp_update_ulp() to push updates to TLS ULP on top. However, we don't push the write_space callback up and instead simply overwrite the op with the psock stored previous op. This may or may not be correct so to ensure we don't overwrite the TLS write space hook pass this field to the ULP and have it fixup the ctx. This completes a previous fix that pushed the ops through to the ULP but at the time missed doing this for write_space, presumably because write_space TLS hook was added around the same time. Fixes: 95fa145479fbc ("bpf: sockmap/tls, close can race with map free") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com --- net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c index 12ab5db2b71c..38d3ad141161 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c @@ -99,17 +99,19 @@ void tcp_get_available_ulp(char *buf, size_t maxlen) rcu_read_unlock(); } -void tcp_update_ulp(struct sock *sk, struct proto *proto) +void tcp_update_ulp(struct sock *sk, struct proto *proto, + void (*write_space)(struct sock *sk)) { struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); if (!icsk->icsk_ulp_ops) { + sk->sk_write_space = write_space; sk->sk_prot = proto; return; } if (icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->update) - icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->update(sk, proto); + icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->update(sk, proto, write_space); } void tcp_cleanup_ulp(struct sock *sk) -- cgit From 7361d44896ff20d48bdd502d1a0cd66308055d45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 06:12:06 +0000 Subject: bpf: Sockmap/tls, fix pop data with SK_DROP return code When user returns SK_DROP we need to reset the number of copied bytes to indicate to the user the bytes were dropped and not sent. If we don't reset the copied arg sendmsg will return as if those bytes were copied giving the user a positive return value. This works as expected today except in the case where the user also pops bytes. In the pop case the sg.size is reduced but we don't correctly account for this when copied bytes is reset. The popped bytes are not accounted for and we return a small positive value potentially confusing the user. The reason this happens is due to a typo where we do the wrong comparison when accounting for pop bytes. In this fix notice the if/else is not needed and that we have a similar problem if we push data except its not visible to the user because if delta is larger the sg.size we return a negative value so it appears as an error regardless. Fixes: 7246d8ed4dcce ("bpf: helper to pop data from messages") Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-9-john.fastabend@gmail.com --- net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/ipv4') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c index e6b08b5a0895..8a01428f80c1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c @@ -315,10 +315,7 @@ more_data: */ delta = msg->sg.size; psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg); - if (msg->sg.size < delta) - delta -= msg->sg.size; - else - delta = 0; + delta -= msg->sg.size; } if (msg->cork_bytes && -- cgit