From ea720935cf6686f72def9d322298bf7e9bd53377 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 10:14:42 +0200 Subject: mac80211: discard multicast and 4-addr A-MSDUs In mac80211, multicast A-MSDUs are accepted in many cases that they shouldn't be accepted in: * drop A-MSDUs with a multicast A1 (RA), as required by the spec in 9.11 (802.11-2012 version) * drop A-MSDUs with a 4-addr header, since the fourth address can't actually be useful for them; unless 4-address frame format is actually requested, even though the fourth address is still not useful in this case, but ignored Accepting the first case, in particular, is very problematic since it allows anyone else with possession of a GTK to send unicast frames encapsulated in a multicast A-MSDU, even when the AP has client isolation enabled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 6175db385ba7..3ac2f1cba317 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2308,16 +2308,22 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_AMSDU)) return RX_CONTINUE; - if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control) && - rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN && - !rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + if (unlikely(ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control))) { + switch (rx->sdata->vif.type) { + case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN: + if (!rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + break; + case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION: + if (!rx->sdata->u.mgd.use_4addr) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + break; + default: + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + } - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && - ((rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN && - rx->sdata->u.vlan.sta) || - (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && - rx->sdata->u.mgd.use_4addr))) + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; skb->dev = dev; -- cgit From 7f6990c830f3e8d703f13d7963acf51936c52ad2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 15:29:49 +0200 Subject: cfg80211: let ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s() take only header-less SKB There's only a single case where has_80211_header is passed as true, which is in mac80211. Given that there's only simple code that needs to be done before calling it, export that function from cfg80211 instead and let mac80211 call it itself. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 3ac2f1cba317..de2d75fa5c51 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2298,6 +2298,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) __le16 fc = hdr->frame_control; struct sk_buff_head frame_list; struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); + struct ethhdr ethhdr; if (unlikely(!ieee80211_is_data(fc))) return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -2329,9 +2330,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) skb->dev = dev; __skb_queue_head_init(&frame_list); + if (ieee80211_data_to_8023_exthdr(skb, ðhdr, + rx->sdata->vif.addr, + rx->sdata->vif.type)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr, rx->sdata->vif.type, - rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, true); + rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom); while (!skb_queue_empty(&frame_list)) { rx->skb = __skb_dequeue(&frame_list); -- cgit From 8b935ee2ea17db720d70f6420f77f594c0c93f75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 16:17:01 +0200 Subject: cfg80211: add ability to check DA/SA in A-MSDU decapsulation We should not accept arbitrary DA/SA inside A-MSDUs, it could be used to circumvent protections, like allowing a station to send frames and make them seem to come from somewhere else. Add the necessary infrastructure in cfg80211 to allow such checks, in further patches we'll start using them. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index de2d75fa5c51..cf53fe1a0aa2 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2337,7 +2337,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr, rx->sdata->vif.type, - rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom); + rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, + NULL, NULL); while (!skb_queue_empty(&frame_list)) { rx->skb = __skb_dequeue(&frame_list); -- cgit From e2b5227faaf33109d9d00f8a99f7b4f45a9d9c9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2016 16:42:06 +0200 Subject: mac80211: validate DA/SA during A-MSDU decapsulation As pointed out by Michael Braun, we don't check inner L2 addresses during A-MSDU decapsulation, leading to the possibility that, for example, a station associated to an AP sends frames as though they came from somewhere else. Fix this problem by letting cfg80211 validate the addresses, as indicated by passing in the ones that need to be validated. Reported-by: Michael Braun Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index cf53fe1a0aa2..a47bbc973f2d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -2299,6 +2299,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct sk_buff_head frame_list; struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); struct ethhdr ethhdr; + const u8 *check_da = ethhdr.h_dest, *check_sa = ethhdr.h_source; if (unlikely(!ieee80211_is_data(fc))) return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -2322,6 +2323,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) default: return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } + check_da = NULL; + check_sa = NULL; + } else switch (rx->sdata->vif.type) { + case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP: + case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN: + check_da = NULL; + break; + case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION: + if (!rx->sta || + !test_sta_flag(rx->sta, WLAN_STA_TDLS_PEER)) + check_sa = NULL; + break; + case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT: + check_sa = NULL; + break; + default: + break; } if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) @@ -2338,7 +2356,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr, rx->sdata->vif.type, rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, - NULL, NULL); + check_da, check_sa); while (!skb_queue_empty(&frame_list)) { rx->skb = __skb_dequeue(&frame_list); -- cgit From 1d4de2e222b41006007d7dbfce2abfe448217e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Braun Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 13:14:15 +0200 Subject: mac80211: fix CMD_FRAME for AP_VLAN When using IEEE 802.11r FT OVER-DS roaming with AP_VLAN, hostapd needs to send out a frame using CMD_FRAME for a station assigned to an AP_VLAN interface. Right now, the userspace needs to give the exact AP_VLAN interface index for CMD_FRAME; hostapd does not do this. Additionally, userspace cannot use GET_STATION to query the AP_VLAN ifidx, as while GET_STATION finds stations assigned to AP_VLAN even if the AP iface is queried, it does not return AP_VLAN ifidx (it returns the queried one). This breaks IEEE 802.11r over_ds with vlans, as the reply frame does not get out. This patch fixes this by using get_sta_bss for CMD_FRAME. Signed-off-by: Michael Braun Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/offchannel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/offchannel.c b/net/mac80211/offchannel.c index c3f610bba3fe..eede5c6db8d5 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/offchannel.c +++ b/net/mac80211/offchannel.c @@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ int ieee80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev, mgmt->u.action.category == WLAN_CATEGORY_SPECTRUM_MGMT) break; rcu_read_lock(); - sta = sta_info_get(sdata, mgmt->da); + sta = sta_info_get_bss(sdata, mgmt->da); rcu_read_unlock(); if (!sta) return -ENOLINK; -- cgit From f4a067f9ffca603b45f7e82ddd2ba50e5904cea3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 15:05:33 +0100 Subject: mac80211: move struct aead_req off the stack Some crypto implementations (such as the generic CCM wrapper in crypto/) use scatterlists to map fields of private data in their struct aead_req. This means these data structures cannot live in the vmalloc area, which means that they cannot live on the stack (with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK.) This currently occurs only with the generic software implementation, but the private data and usage is implementation specific, so move the whole data structures off the stack into heap by allocating every time we need to use them. In addition, take care not to put any of our own stack allocations into scatterlists. This involves reserving some extra room when allocating the aead_request structures, and referring to those allocations in the scatter- lists (while copying the data from the stack before the crypto operation) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h | 8 +++++--- net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h | 6 ++++-- net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h | 4 ++++ net/mac80211/wpa.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 7 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) (limited to 'net/mac80211') diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c index 7663c28ba353..a4e0d59a40dd 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.c @@ -18,21 +18,24 @@ #include "key.h" #include "aes_ccm.h" -void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, - u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, - size_t mic_len) +int ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, + size_t mic_len) { struct scatterlist sg[3]; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); + u8 *__aad; - char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + - crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] - __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); - struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data; + aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + CCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; - memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); + __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; + memcpy(__aad, aad, CCM_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 3); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad)); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len); @@ -41,6 +44,9 @@ void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + kzfree(aead_req); + + return 0; } int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, @@ -48,18 +54,23 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t mic_len) { struct scatterlist sg[3]; - char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + - crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] - __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); - struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *) aead_req_data; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); + u8 *__aad; + int err; if (data_len == 0) return -EINVAL; - memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); + aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + CCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; + memcpy(__aad, aad, CCM_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 3); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad)); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len); @@ -67,7 +78,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0); aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); - return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + kzfree(aead_req); + + return err; } struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h index 6a73d1e4d186..fcd3254c5cf0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_ccm.h @@ -12,12 +12,14 @@ #include +#define CCM_AAD_LEN 32 + struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], size_t key_len, size_t mic_len); -void ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, - u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, - size_t mic_len); +int ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, + size_t mic_len); int ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic, size_t mic_len); diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c index 3afe361fd27c..8a4397cc1b08 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.c @@ -15,20 +15,23 @@ #include "key.h" #include "aes_gcm.h" -void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, - u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) +int ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) { struct scatterlist sg[3]; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); + u8 *__aad; - char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + - crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] - __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); - struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data; + aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; - memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); + __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; + memcpy(__aad, aad, GCM_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 3); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad)); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN); @@ -37,24 +40,31 @@ void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + kzfree(aead_req); + return 0; } int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) { struct scatterlist sg[3]; - char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + - crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] - __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); - struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); + u8 *__aad; + int err; if (data_len == 0) return -EINVAL; - memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); + aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GCM_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; + memcpy(__aad, aad, GCM_AAD_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 3); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)aad)); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], &__aad[2], be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)__aad)); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN); @@ -63,7 +73,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, data_len + IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN, j_0); aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length); - return crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); + kzfree(aead_req); + + return err; } struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h index 1347fda6b76a..55aed5352494 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gcm.h @@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ #include -void ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, - u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); +#define GCM_AAD_LEN 32 + +int ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, + u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); int ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad, u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic); struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(const u8 key[], diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c index 3ddd927aaf30..bd72a862ddb7 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.c @@ -17,28 +17,27 @@ #include "key.h" #include "aes_gmac.h" -#define GMAC_MIC_LEN 16 -#define GMAC_NONCE_LEN 12 -#define AAD_LEN 20 - int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) { struct scatterlist sg[4]; - char aead_req_data[sizeof(struct aead_request) + - crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm)] - __aligned(__alignof__(struct aead_request)); - struct aead_request *aead_req = (void *)aead_req_data; - u8 zero[GMAC_MIC_LEN], iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 *zero, *__aad, iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); if (data_len < GMAC_MIC_LEN) return -EINVAL; - memset(aead_req, 0, sizeof(aead_req_data)); + aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + GMAC_MIC_LEN + GMAC_AAD_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + zero = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize; + __aad = zero + GMAC_MIC_LEN; + memcpy(__aad, aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); - memset(zero, 0, GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_init_table(sg, 4); - sg_set_buf(&sg[0], aad, AAD_LEN); + sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, GMAC_AAD_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len - GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[2], zero, GMAC_MIC_LEN); sg_set_buf(&sg[3], mic, GMAC_MIC_LEN); @@ -49,9 +48,10 @@ int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm); aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, 0, iv); - aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, AAD_LEN + data_len); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, GMAC_AAD_LEN + data_len); crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); + kzfree(aead_req); return 0; } diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h index d328204d73a8..32e6442c95be 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h +++ b/net/mac80211/aes_gmac.h @@ -11,6 +11,10 @@ #include +#define GMAC_AAD_LEN 20 +#define GMAC_MIC_LEN 16 +#define GMAC_NONCE_LEN 12 + struct crypto_aead *ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(const u8 key[], size_t key_len); int ieee80211_aes_gmac(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *aad, u8 *nonce, diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index b48c1e13e281..42ce9bd4426f 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pos; u8 pn[6]; u64 pn64; - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN]; u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (info->control.hw_key && @@ -461,10 +461,8 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN; ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad); - ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, - skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len); - - return 0; + return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len, + skb_put(skb, mic_len), mic_len); } @@ -639,7 +637,7 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) u8 *pos; u8 pn[6]; u64 pn64; - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN]; u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; if (info->control.hw_key && @@ -696,10 +694,8 @@ static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN; gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad); - ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, - skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); - - return 0; + return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len, + skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN)); } ieee80211_tx_result @@ -1123,9 +1119,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key; struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; - u8 aad[20]; + u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN]; u64 pn64; - u8 nonce[12]; + u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1)) return TX_DROP; @@ -1171,7 +1167,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key; struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie; - u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6], nonce[12]; + u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], mic[GMAC_MIC_LEN], ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN]; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) -- cgit