// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause /* * Simple Landlock sandbox manager able to launch a process restricted by a * user-defined filesystem access control policy. * * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün * Copyright © 2020 ANSSI */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef landlock_create_ruleset static inline int landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr, const size_t size, const __u32 flags) { return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags); } #endif #ifndef landlock_add_rule static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd, const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, const void *const rule_attr, const __u32 flags) { return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, rule_attr, flags); } #endif #ifndef landlock_restrict_self static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd, const __u32 flags) { return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags); } #endif #define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO" #define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW" #define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND" #define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT" #define ENV_DELIMITER ":" static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list) { int i, num_paths = 0; if (env_path) { num_paths++; for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) { if (env_path[i] == ENV_DELIMITER[0]) num_paths++; } } *path_list = malloc(num_paths * sizeof(**path_list)); for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_DELIMITER); return num_paths; } /* clang-format off */ #define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) /* clang-format on */ static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, const __u64 allowed_access) { int num_paths, i, ret = 1; char *env_path_name; const char **path_list = NULL; struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { .parent_fd = -1, }; env_path_name = getenv(env_var); if (!env_path_name) { /* Prevents users to forget a setting. */ fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var); return 1; } env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name); unsetenv(env_var); num_paths = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list); if (num_paths == 1 && path_list[0][0] == '\0') { /* * Allows to not use all possible restrictions (e.g. use * LL_FS_RO without LL_FS_RW). */ ret = 0; goto out_free_name; } for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { struct stat statbuf; path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path_list[i], O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n", path_list[i], strerror(errno)); goto out_free_name; } if (fstat(path_beneath.parent_fd, &statbuf)) { close(path_beneath.parent_fd); goto out_free_name; } path_beneath.allowed_access = allowed_access; if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) path_beneath.allowed_access &= ACCESS_FILE; if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &path_beneath, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s\n", path_list[i], strerror(errno)); close(path_beneath.parent_fd); goto out_free_name; } close(path_beneath.parent_fd); } ret = 0; out_free_name: free(path_list); free(env_path_name); return ret; } static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, const __u64 allowed_access) { int ret = 1; char *env_port_name, *strport; struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port = { .allowed_access = allowed_access, .port = 0, }; env_port_name = getenv(env_var); if (!env_port_name) return 0; env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name); unsetenv(env_var); while ((strport = strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_DELIMITER))) { net_port.port = atoi(strport); if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT, &net_port, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%llu\": %s\n", net_port.port, strerror(errno)); goto out_free_name; } } ret = 0; out_free_name: free(env_port_name); return ret; } /* clang-format off */ #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR) #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) /* clang-format on */ #define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4 int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) { const char *cmd_path; char *const *cmd_argv; int ruleset_fd, abi; char *env_port_name; __u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ, access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE; struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw, .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, }; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s " " [args]...\n\n", ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]); fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths and ports " "each separated by a colon:\n"); fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n", ENV_FS_RO_NAME); fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n\n", ENV_FS_RW_NAME); fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing ports are optional " "and could be skipped.\n"); fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of ports allowed to bind (server).\n", ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME); fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n", ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME); fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n" "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" " "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" " "%s=\"9418\" " "%s=\"80:443\" " "%s bash -i\n\n", ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]); fprintf(stderr, "This sandboxer can use Landlock features " "up to ABI version %d.\n", LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST); return 1; } abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION); if (abi < 0) { const int err = errno; perror("Failed to check Landlock compatibility"); switch (err) { case ENOSYS: fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is not supported by the current kernel. " "To support it, build the kernel with " "CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and prepend " "\"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM.\n"); break; case EOPNOTSUPP: fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is currently disabled. " "It can be enabled in the kernel configuration by " "prepending \"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM, " "or at boot time by setting the same content to the " "\"lsm\" kernel parameter.\n"); break; } return 1; } /* Best-effort security. */ switch (abi) { case 1: /* * Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 * * Note: The "refer" operations (file renaming and linking * across different directories) are always forbidden when using * Landlock with ABI 1. * * If only ABI 1 is available, this sandboxer knowingly forbids * refer operations. * * If a program *needs* to do refer operations after enabling * Landlock, it can not use Landlock at ABI level 1. To be * compatible with different kernel versions, such programs * should then fall back to not restrict themselves at all if * the running kernel only supports ABI 1. */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; __attribute__((fallthrough)); case 2: /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; __attribute__((fallthrough)); case 3: /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); fprintf(stderr, "Hint: You should update the running kernel " "to leverage Landlock features " "provided by ABI version %d (instead of %d).\n", LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST, abi); __attribute__((fallthrough)); case LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST: break; default: fprintf(stderr, "Hint: You should update this sandboxer " "to leverage Landlock features " "provided by ABI version %d (instead of %d).\n", abi, LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST); } access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs; access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs; /* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */ env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME); if (!env_port_name) { ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP; } /* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */ env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME); if (!env_port_name) { ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP; } ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); if (ruleset_fd < 0) { perror("Failed to create a ruleset"); return 1; } if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) { goto err_close_ruleset; } if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) { goto err_close_ruleset; } if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)) { goto err_close_ruleset; } if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)) { goto err_close_ruleset; } if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { perror("Failed to restrict privileges"); goto err_close_ruleset; } if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) { perror("Failed to enforce ruleset"); goto err_close_ruleset; } close(ruleset_fd); cmd_path = argv[1]; cmd_argv = argv + 1; execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp); fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path, strerror(errno)); fprintf(stderr, "Hint: access to the binary, the interpreter or " "shared libraries may be denied.\n"); return 1; err_close_ruleset: close(ruleset_fd); return 1; }