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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-07-29 17:18:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-07-29 17:18:46 -0700
commit14bed9bc81bae64db98349319f367bfc7dab0afd (patch)
treedd2b911e2790c18be4490c17de4d75168713eed0
parent01fce21e1a890462ba1f37b577fc96c10753c608 (diff)
parenta7549636f67f973474ebe1ad262acc2aa4d1327d (diff)
Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Map the SNP calling area pages too so that OVMF EFI fw can issue SVSM calls properly with the goal of implementing EFI variable store in the SVSM - a component which is trusted by the guest, vs in the firmware, which is not - Allow the kernel to handle #VC exceptions from EFI runtime services properly when running as a SNP guest - Rework and cleanup the SNP guest request issue glue code a bit * tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/sev: Let sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs() map the CA pages too x86/sev/vc: Fix EFI runtime instruction emulation x86/sev: Drop unnecessary parameter in snp_issue_guest_request() x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers x86/sev: Allocate request in TSC_INFO_REQ on stack virt: sev-guest: Contain snp_guest_request_ioctl in sev-guest
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c89
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c9
5 files changed, 70 insertions, 55 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 7543a8b52c67..fc59ce78c477 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1045,11 +1045,13 @@ int __init sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
* This is needed by the OVMF UEFI firmware which will use whatever it finds in
* the GHCB MSR as its GHCB to talk to the hypervisor. So make sure the per-cpu
* runtime GHCBs used by the kernel are also mapped in the EFI page-table.
+ *
+ * When running under SVSM the CA page is needed too, so map it as well.
*/
-int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
+int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs_cas(pgd_t *pgd)
{
+ unsigned long address, pflags, pflags_enc;
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- unsigned long address, pflags;
int cpu;
u64 pfn;
@@ -1057,6 +1059,7 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
return 0;
pflags = _PAGE_NX | _PAGE_RW;
+ pflags_enc = cc_mkenc(pflags);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
@@ -1066,6 +1069,16 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, address, 1, pflags))
return 1;
+
+ if (snp_vmpl) {
+ address = per_cpu(svsm_caa_pa, cpu);
+ if (!address)
+ return 1;
+
+ pfn = address >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, address, 1, pflags_enc))
+ return 1;
+ }
}
return 0;
@@ -1389,16 +1402,16 @@ int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_svsm_attest_req);
-static int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_data *input,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
+static int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req)
{
+ struct snp_req_data *input = &req->input;
struct ghcb_state state;
struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
unsigned long flags;
struct ghcb *ghcb;
int ret;
- rio->exitinfo2 = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
+ req->exitinfo2 = SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL;
/*
* __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is using
@@ -1423,8 +1436,8 @@ static int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req, struct snp_req_dat
if (ret)
goto e_put;
- rio->exitinfo2 = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
- switch (rio->exitinfo2) {
+ req->exitinfo2 = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
+ switch (req->exitinfo2) {
case 0:
break;
@@ -1919,8 +1932,7 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, u64 seqno, struct snp_guest_r
return 0;
}
-static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
+static int __handle_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req)
{
unsigned long req_start = jiffies;
unsigned int override_npages = 0;
@@ -1934,7 +1946,7 @@ retry_request:
* sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
* prevent reuse of the IV.
*/
- rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req, &req->input, rio);
+ rc = snp_issue_guest_request(req);
switch (rc) {
case -ENOSPC:
/*
@@ -1987,7 +1999,7 @@ retry_request:
snp_inc_msg_seqno(mdesc);
if (override_err) {
- rio->exitinfo2 = override_err;
+ req->exitinfo2 = override_err;
/*
* If an extended guest request was issued and the supplied certificate
@@ -2005,12 +2017,20 @@ retry_request:
return rc;
}
-int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio)
+int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req)
{
u64 seqno;
int rc;
+ /*
+ * enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW.
+ * The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping.
+ */
+ if (!virt_addr_valid(req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid(req->resp_buf)) {
+ pr_warn("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);
/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
@@ -2043,14 +2063,14 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
req->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
req->input.data_gpa = req->certs_data ? __pa(req->certs_data) : 0;
- rc = __handle_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio);
+ rc = __handle_guest_request(mdesc, req);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EIO &&
- rio->exitinfo2 == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN))
+ req->exitinfo2 == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN))
return rc;
pr_alert("Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, exitinfo2: 0x%llx\n",
- rc, rio->exitinfo2);
+ rc, req->exitinfo2);
snp_disable_vmpck(mdesc);
return rc;
@@ -2069,11 +2089,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_send_guest_request);
static int __init snp_get_tsc_info(void)
{
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio;
struct snp_tsc_info_resp *tsc_resp;
struct snp_tsc_info_req *tsc_req;
struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
- struct snp_guest_req *req;
+ struct snp_guest_req req = {};
int rc = -ENOMEM;
tsc_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*tsc_req), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -2089,32 +2108,24 @@ static int __init snp_get_tsc_info(void)
if (!tsc_resp)
goto e_free_tsc_req;
- req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req)
- goto e_free_tsc_resp;
-
- rio = kzalloc(sizeof(*rio), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!rio)
- goto e_free_req;
-
mdesc = snp_msg_alloc();
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc))
- goto e_free_rio;
+ goto e_free_tsc_resp;
rc = snp_msg_init(mdesc, snp_vmpl);
if (rc)
goto e_free_mdesc;
- req->msg_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
- req->msg_type = SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ;
- req->vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
- req->req_buf = tsc_req;
- req->req_sz = sizeof(*tsc_req);
- req->resp_buf = (void *)tsc_resp;
- req->resp_sz = sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
- req->exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
+ req.msg_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
+ req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ;
+ req.vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
+ req.req_buf = tsc_req;
+ req.req_sz = sizeof(*tsc_req);
+ req.resp_buf = (void *)tsc_resp;
+ req.resp_sz = sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
+ req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
- rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, req, rio);
+ rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
if (rc)
goto e_request;
@@ -2135,11 +2146,7 @@ e_request:
memzero_explicit(tsc_resp, sizeof(*tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN);
e_free_mdesc:
snp_msg_free(mdesc);
-e_free_rio:
- kfree(rio);
-e_free_req:
- kfree(req);
- e_free_tsc_resp:
+e_free_tsc_resp:
kfree(tsc_resp);
e_free_tsc_req:
kfree(tsc_req);
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index 0989d98da130..faf1fce89ed4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
#include <asm/init.h>
@@ -178,9 +179,15 @@ static enum es_result __vc_decode_kern_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
return ES_OK;
}
+/*
+ * User instruction decoding is also required for the EFI runtime. Even though
+ * the EFI runtime is running in kernel mode, it uses special EFI virtual
+ * address mappings that require the use of efi_mm to properly address and
+ * decode.
+ */
static enum es_result vc_decode_insn(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
{
- if (user_mode(ctxt->regs))
+ if (user_mode(ctxt->regs) || mm_is_efi(current->active_mm))
return __vc_decode_user_insn(ctxt);
else
return __vc_decode_kern_insn(ctxt);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index a631f7d7c0c0..89075ff19afa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct snp_guest_req {
size_t resp_sz;
u64 exit_code;
+ u64 exitinfo2;
unsigned int vmpck_id;
u8 msg_version;
u8 msg_type;
@@ -460,7 +461,7 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
__sev_es_nmi_complete();
}
-extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
+extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs_cas(pgd_t *pgd);
extern void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
/*
@@ -501,8 +502,6 @@ static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate)
return rc;
}
-struct snp_guest_request_ioctl;
-
void setup_ghcb(void);
void early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages);
@@ -528,8 +527,7 @@ void snp_kexec_begin(void);
int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id);
struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void);
void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc);
-int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
+int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req);
int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer);
@@ -571,7 +569,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
-static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
+static inline int sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs_cas(pgd_t *pgd) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline int pvalidate(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, bool validate) { return 0; }
static inline int rmpadjust(unsigned long vaddr, bool rmp_psize, unsigned long attrs) { return 0; }
@@ -602,8 +600,8 @@ static inline void snp_kexec_begin(void) { }
static inline int snp_msg_init(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, int vmpck_id) { return -1; }
static inline struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void) { return NULL; }
static inline void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc) { }
-static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req,
- struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc,
+ struct snp_guest_req *req) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index e7e8f77f77f8..b4409df2105a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
* When SEV-ES is active, the GHCB as set by the kernel will be used
* by firmware. Create a 1:1 unencrypted mapping for each GHCB.
*/
- if (sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd)) {
- pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the GHCBs!\n");
+ if (sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs_cas(pgd)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to create 1:1 mapping for the GHCBs and CAs!\n");
return 1;
}
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 7a4e2188f109..d2b3ae7113ab 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
req.resp_sz = resp_len;
req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
- rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg);
+ rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+ arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
if (rc)
goto e_free;
@@ -152,7 +153,8 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
req.resp_sz = resp_len;
req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
- rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg);
+ rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+ arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -249,7 +251,8 @@ cmd:
req.resp_sz = resp_len;
req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST;
- ret = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, arg);
+ ret = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
+ arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */
if (arg->vmm_error == SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN) {