diff options
| author | Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> | 2016-09-16 00:31:22 +0200 | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-09-15 15:49:28 -0700 | 
| commit | 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a (patch) | |
| tree | e862a0c7bb66ba58b3ad3298efe066793c14a234 /net/lapb | |
| parent | 024c7e3756d8a42fc41fe8a9488488b9b09d1dcc (diff) | |
aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec
This ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings
executable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set.  Such
behavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't
catch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X
policy enforced by SELinux.
I have tested the patch on my machine.
To test the behavior, compile and run this:
    #define _GNU_SOURCE
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/personality.h>
    #include <linux/aio_abi.h>
    #include <err.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/syscall.h>
    int main(void) {
        personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
        aio_context_t ctx = 0;
        if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))
            err(1, "io_setup");
        char cmd[1000];
        sprintf(cmd, "cat /proc/%d/maps | grep -F '/[aio]'",
            (int)getpid());
        system(cmd);
        return 0;
    }
In the output, "rw-s" is good, "rwxs" is bad.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/lapb')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
