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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- "hung_task: extend blocking task stacktrace dump to semaphore" from
Lance Yang enhances the hung task detector.
The detector presently dumps the blocking tasks's stack when it is
blocked on a mutex. Lance's series extends this to semaphores
- "nilfs2: improve sanity checks in dirty state propagation" from
Wentao Liang addresses a couple of minor flaws in nilfs2
- "scripts/gdb: Fixes related to lx_per_cpu()" from Illia Ostapyshyn
fixes a couple of issues in the gdb scripts
- "Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys" from
Coiby Xu addresses a usability problem with kdump.
When the dump device is LUKS-encrypted, the kdump kernel may not have
the keys to the encrypted filesystem. A full writeup of this is in
the series [0/N] cover letter
- "sysfs: add counters for lockups and stalls" from Max Kellermann adds
/sys/kernel/hardlockup_count and /sys/kernel/hardlockup_count and
/sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count
- "fork: Page operation cleanups in the fork code" from Pasha Tatashin
implements a number of code cleanups in fork.c
- "scripts/gdb/symbols: determine KASLR offset on s390 during early
boot" from Ilya Leoshkevich fixes some s390 issues in the gdb
scripts
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-05-31-15-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (67 commits)
llist: make llist_add_batch() a static inline
delayacct: remove redundant code and adjust indentation
squashfs: add optional full compressed block caching
crash_dump, nvme: select CONFIGFS_FS as built-in
scripts/gdb/symbols: determine KASLR offset on s390 during early boot
scripts/gdb/symbols: factor out pagination_off()
scripts/gdb/symbols: factor out get_vmlinux()
kernel/panic.c: format kernel-doc comments
mailmap: update and consolidate Casey Connolly's name and email
nilfs2: remove wbc->for_reclaim handling
fork: define a local GFP_VMAP_STACK
fork: check charging success before zeroing stack
fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code
fork: clean-up ifdef logic around stack allocation
kernel/rcu/tree_stall: add /sys/kernel/rcu_stall_count
kernel/watchdog: add /sys/kernel/{hard,soft}lockup_count
x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible
x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to kdump kernel
Revert "x86/mm: Remove unused __set_memory_prot()"
crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel
...
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1st kernel will build up the kernel command parameter dmcryptkeys as
similar to elfcorehdr to pass the memory address of the stored info of dm
crypt key to kdump kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250502011246.99238-8-coxu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com>
Cc: Liu Pingfan <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Cc: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Cc: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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kexec handover (KHO) creates a metadata that the kernels pass between each
other during kexec. This metadata is stored in memory and kexec image
contains a (physical) pointer to that memory.
In addition, KHO keeps "scratch regions" available for kexec: physically
contiguous memory regions that are guaranteed to not have any memory that
KHO would preserve. The new kernel bootstraps itself using the scratch
regions and sets all handed over memory as in use. When subsystems that
support KHO initialize, they introspect the KHO metadata, restore
preserved memory regions, and retrieve their state stored in the preserved
memory.
Enlighten x86 kexec-file and boot path about the KHO metadata and make
sure it gets passed along to the next kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250509074635.3187114-12-changyuanl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Ben Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Gowans <jgowans@amazon.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Pratyush Yadav <ptyadav@amazon.de>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Sumanth Korikkar has taught s390 to allocate hotplug-time page frames
from hotplugged memory rather than only from main memory. Series
"implement "memmap on memory" feature on s390".
- More folio conversions from Matthew Wilcox in the series
"Convert memcontrol charge moving to use folios"
"mm: convert mm counter to take a folio"
- Chengming Zhou has optimized zswap's rbtree locking, providing
significant reductions in system time and modest but measurable
reductions in overall runtimes. The series is "mm/zswap: optimize the
scalability of zswap rb-tree".
- Chengming Zhou has also provided the series "mm/zswap: optimize zswap
lru list" which provides measurable runtime benefits in some
swap-intensive situations.
- And Chengming Zhou further optimizes zswap in the series "mm/zswap:
optimize for dynamic zswap_pools". Measured improvements are modest.
- zswap cleanups and simplifications from Yosry Ahmed in the series
"mm: zswap: simplify zswap_swapoff()".
- In the series "Add DAX ABI for memmap_on_memory", Vishal Verma has
contributed several DAX cleanups as well as adding a sysfs tunable to
control the memmap_on_memory setting when the dax device is
hotplugged as system memory.
- Johannes Weiner has added the large series "mm: zswap: cleanups",
which does that.
- More DAMON work from SeongJae Park in the series
"mm/damon: make DAMON debugfs interface deprecation unignorable"
"selftests/damon: add more tests for core functionalities and corner cases"
"Docs/mm/damon: misc readability improvements"
"mm/damon: let DAMOS feeds and tame/auto-tune itself"
- In the series "mm/mempolicy: weighted interleave mempolicy and sysfs
extension" Rakie Kim has developed a new mempolicy interleaving
policy wherein we allocate memory across nodes in a weighted fashion
rather than uniformly. This is beneficial in heterogeneous memory
environments appearing with CXL.
- Christophe Leroy has contributed some cleanup and consolidation work
against the ARM pagetable dumping code in the series "mm: ptdump:
Refactor CONFIG_DEBUG_WX and check_wx_pages debugfs attribute".
- Luis Chamberlain has added some additional xarray selftesting in the
series "test_xarray: advanced API multi-index tests".
- Muhammad Usama Anjum has reworked the selftest code to make its
human-readable output conform to the TAP ("Test Anything Protocol")
format. Amongst other things, this opens up the use of third-party
tools to parse and process out selftesting results.
- Ryan Roberts has added fork()-time PTE batching of THP ptes in the
series "mm/memory: optimize fork() with PTE-mapped THP". Mainly
targeted at arm64, this significantly speeds up fork() when the
process has a large number of pte-mapped folios.
- David Hildenbrand also gets in on the THP pte batching game in his
series "mm/memory: optimize unmap/zap with PTE-mapped THP". It
implements batching during munmap() and other pte teardown
situations. The microbenchmark improvements are nice.
- And in the series "Transparent Contiguous PTEs for User Mappings"
Ryan Roberts further utilizes arm's pte's contiguous bit ("contpte
mappings"). Kernel build times on arm64 improved nicely. Ryan's
series "Address some contpte nits" provides some followup work.
- In the series "mm/hugetlb: Restore the reservation" Breno Leitao has
fixed an obscure hugetlb race which was causing unnecessary page
faults. He has also added a reproducer under the selftest code.
- In the series "selftests/mm: Output cleanups for the compaction
test", Mark Brown did what the title claims.
- Kinsey Ho has added the series "mm/mglru: code cleanup and
refactoring".
- Even more zswap material from Nhat Pham. The series "fix and extend
zswap kselftests" does as claimed.
- In the series "Introduce cpu_dcache_is_aliasing() to fix DAX
regression" Mathieu Desnoyers has cleaned up and fixed rather a mess
in our handling of DAX on archiecctures which have virtually aliasing
data caches. The arm architecture is the main beneficiary.
- Lokesh Gidra's series "per-vma locks in userfaultfd" provides
dramatic improvements in worst-case mmap_lock hold times during
certain userfaultfd operations.
- Some page_owner enhancements and maintenance work from Oscar Salvador
in his series
"page_owner: print stacks and their outstanding allocations"
"page_owner: Fixup and cleanup"
- Uladzislau Rezki has contributed some vmalloc scalability
improvements in his series "Mitigate a vmap lock contention". It
realizes a 12x improvement for a certain microbenchmark.
- Some kexec/crash cleanup work from Baoquan He in the series "Split
crash out from kexec and clean up related config items".
- Some zsmalloc maintenance work from Chengming Zhou in the series
"mm/zsmalloc: fix and optimize objects/page migration"
"mm/zsmalloc: some cleanup for get/set_zspage_mapping()"
- Zi Yan has taught the MM to perform compaction on folios larger than
order=0. This a step along the path to implementaton of the merging
of large anonymous folios. The series is named "Enable >0 order folio
memory compaction".
- Christoph Hellwig has done quite a lot of cleanup work in the
pagecache writeback code in his series "convert write_cache_pages()
to an iterator".
- Some modest hugetlb cleanups and speedups in Vishal Moola's series
"Handle hugetlb faults under the VMA lock".
- Zi Yan has changed the page splitting code so we can split huge pages
into sizes other than order-0 to better utilize large folios. The
series is named "Split a folio to any lower order folios".
- David Hildenbrand has contributed the series "mm: remove
total_mapcount()", a cleanup.
- Matthew Wilcox has sought to improve the performance of bulk memory
freeing in his series "Rearrange batched folio freeing".
- Gang Li's series "hugetlb: parallelize hugetlb page init on boot"
provides large improvements in bootup times on large machines which
are configured to use large numbers of hugetlb pages.
- Matthew Wilcox's series "PageFlags cleanups" does that.
- Qi Zheng's series "minor fixes and supplement for ptdesc" does that
also. S390 is affected.
- Cleanups to our pagemap utility functions from Peter Xu in his series
"mm/treewide: Replace pXd_large() with pXd_leaf()".
- Nico Pache has fixed a few things with our hugepage selftests in his
series "selftests/mm: Improve Hugepage Test Handling in MM
Selftests".
- Also, of course, many singleton patches to many things. Please see
the individual changelogs for details.
* tag 'mm-stable-2024-03-13-20-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (435 commits)
mm/zswap: remove the memcpy if acomp is not sleepable
crypto: introduce: acomp_is_async to expose if comp drivers might sleep
memtest: use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE in memory scanning
mm: prohibit the last subpage from reusing the entire large folio
mm: recover pud_leaf() definitions in nopmd case
selftests/mm: skip the hugetlb-madvise tests on unmet hugepage requirements
selftests/mm: skip uffd hugetlb tests with insufficient hugepages
selftests/mm: dont fail testsuite due to a lack of hugepages
mm/huge_memory: skip invalid debugfs new_order input for folio split
mm/huge_memory: check new folio order when split a folio
mm, vmscan: retry kswapd's priority loop with cache_trim_mode off on failure
mm: add an explicit smp_wmb() to UFFDIO_CONTINUE
mm: fix list corruption in put_pages_list
mm: remove folio from deferred split list before uncharging it
filemap: avoid unnecessary major faults in filemap_fault()
mm,page_owner: drop unnecessary check
mm,page_owner: check for null stack_record before bumping its refcount
mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff()
mm/treewide: align up pXd_leaf() retval across archs
mm/treewide: drop pXd_large()
...
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Now crash codes under kernel/ folder has been split out from kexec
code, crash dumping can be separated from kexec reboot in config
items on x86 with some adjustments.
Here, also change some ifdefs or IS_ENABLED() check to more appropriate
ones, e,g
- #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -> #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
- (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)) - > (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRASH_RESERVE))
[bhe@redhat.com: don't nest CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP ifdef inside CONFIG_KEXEC_CODE ifdef scope]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SN6PR02MB4157931105FA68D72E3D3DB8D47B2@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com/T/#u
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240124051254.67105-7-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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A relocatable kernel will relocate itself to pref_address if it is
loaded below pref_address. This means a booted kernel may be relocating
itself to an area with reserved memory on modern systems, potentially
clobbering arbitrary data that may be important to the system.
This is often the case, as the default value of PHYSICAL_START is
0x1000000 and kernels are typically loaded at 0x100000 or above by
bootloaders like iPXE or kexec. GRUB behaves like the approach
implemented here.
Also fixes the documentation around pref_address and PHYSICAL_START to
be accurate.
[ dhansen: changelog tweak ]
Co-developed-by: Cloud Hsu <cloudhsu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cloud Hsu <cloudhsu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Koch <chrisko@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231215190521.3796022-1-chrisko%40google.com
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kexec_dprintk() expects the last argument to be kbuf.memsz, but the actual
argument being passed is kbuf.bufsz.
Although these two values are currently equal, it is better to pass the
correct one, in case these two values become different in the future.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231220154105.215610-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When detecting an error, the current code uses kexec_dprintk() to output
log message. This is not quite appropriate as kexec_dprintk() is mainly
used for outputting debugging messages, rather than error messages.
Replace kexec_dprintk() with pr_err(). This also makes the output method
for this error log align with the output method for other error logs in
this function.
Additionally, the last return statement in set_page_address() is
unnecessary, remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231220030124.149160-1-ytcoode@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Then when specifying '-d' for kexec_file_load interface, loaded locations
of kernel/initrd/cmdline etc can be printed out to help debug.
Here replace pr_debug() with the newly added kexec_dprintk() in kexec_file
loading related codes.
And also print out e820 memmap passed to 2nd kernel just as kexec_load
interface has been doing.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231213055747.61826-4-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Move the x86 documentation under Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning
up the top-level directory and making the structure of our docs more
closely match the structure of the source directories it describes.
All in-kernel references to the old paths have been updated.
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315211523.108836-1-corbet@lwn.net/
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one EVM cleanup patch, all the other changes are kexec
related.
On different architectures different keyrings are used to verify the
kexec'ed kernel image signature. Here are a number of preparatory
cleanup patches and the patches themselves for making the keyrings -
builtin_trusted_keyring, .machine, .secondary_trusted_keyring, and
.platform - consistent across the different architectures"
* tag 'integrity-v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification
arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic
kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
kexec: drop weak attribute from functions
kexec_file: drop weak attribute from functions
evm: Use IS_ENABLED to initialize .enabled
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commit 278311e417be ("kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for
signature verify") adds platform keyring support on x86 kexec but not
arm64.
The code in bzImage64_verify_sig uses the keys on the
.builtin_trusted_keys, .machine, if configured and enabled,
.secondary_trusted_keys, also if configured, and .platform keyrings
to verify the signed kernel image as PE file.
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently, the only way x86 can get an early boot RNG seed is via EFI,
which is generally always used now for physical machines, but is very
rarely used in VMs, especially VMs that are optimized for starting
"instantaneously", such as Firecracker's MicroVM. For tiny fast booting
VMs, EFI is not something you generally need or want.
Rather, the image loader or firmware should be able to pass a single
random seed, exactly as device tree platforms do with the "rng-seed"
property. Additionally, this is something that bootloaders can append,
with their own seed file management, which is something every other
major OS ecosystem has that Linux does not (yet).
Add SETUP_RNG_SEED, similar to the other eight setup_data entries that
are parsed at boot. It also takes care to zero out the seed immediately
after using, in order to retain forward secrecy. This all takes about 7
trivial lines of code.
Then, on kexec_file_load(), a new fresh seed is generated and passed to
the next kernel, just as is done on device tree architectures when
using kexec. And, importantly, I've tested that QEMU is able to properly
pass SETUP_RNG_SEED as well, making this work for every step of the way.
This code too is pretty straight forward.
Together these measures ensure that VMs and nested kexec()'d kernels
always receive a proper boot time RNG seed at the earliest possible
stage from their parents:
- Host [already has strongly initialized RNG]
- QEMU [passes fresh seed in SETUP_RNG_SEED field]
- Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own]
- kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field]
- Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own]
- kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field]
- Linux [uses parent's seed and gathers entropy of its own]
- kexec [passes this in SETUP_RNG_SEED field]
- ...
I've verified in several scenarios that this works quite well from a
host kernel to QEMU and down inwards, mixing and matching loaders, with
every layer providing a seed to the next.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630113300.1892799-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
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On kexec file load, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
subsystem may verify the IMA signature of the kernel and initramfs, and
measure it. The command line parameters passed to the kernel in the
kexec call may also be measured by IMA.
A remote attestation service can verify a TPM quote based on the TPM
event log, the IMA measurement list and the TPM PCR data. This can
be achieved only if the IMA measurement log is carried over from the
current kernel to the next kernel across the kexec call.
PowerPC and ARM64 both achieve this using device tree with a
"linux,ima-kexec-buffer" node. x86 platforms generally don't make use of
device tree, so use the setup_data mechanism to pass the IMA buffer to
the new kernel.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # IMA function definitions
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YmKyvlF3my1yWTvK@noodles-fedora-PC23Y6EG
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ELF related fields elf_headers, elf_headers_sz, and elf_load_addr
have been moved from 'struct kimage_arch' to 'struct kimage'.
Use the ELF fields defined in 'struct kimage'.
Suggested-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-5-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
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kexec_file_load() currently reuses the old boot_params.screen_info,
but if drivers have change the hardware state, boot_param.screen_info
could contain invalid info.
For example, the video type might be no longer VGA, or the frame buffer
address might be changed. If the kexec kernel keeps using the old screen_info,
kexec'ed kernel may attempt to write to an invalid framebuffer
memory region.
There are two screen_info instances globally available, boot_params.screen_info
and screen_info. Later one is a copy, and is updated by drivers.
So let kexec_file_load use the updated copy.
[ mingo: Tidied up the changelog. ]
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014092429.1415040-2-kasong@redhat.com
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In removing UV1 support, efi_have_uv1_memmap is no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200713212955.786177105@hpe.com
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There is some code that exposes physical addresses of certain parts of
the EFI firmware implementation via sysfs nodes. These nodes are only
used on x86, and are of dubious value to begin with, so let's move
their handling into the x86 arch code.
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> # arch/ia64
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Since commit 33b85447fa61946b ("efi/x86: Drop two near identical versions
of efi_runtime_init()"), we no longer map the EFI runtime services table
before calling SetVirtualAddressMap(), which means we don't need the 1:1
mapped physical address of this table, and so there is no point in passing
the address via EFI setup data on kexec boot.
Note that the kexec tools will still look for this address in sysfs, so
we still need to provide it.
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> # arch/ia64
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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We carry a quirk in the x86 EFI code to switch back to an older
method of mapping the EFI runtime services memory regions, because
it was deemed risky at the time to implement a new method without
providing a fallback to the old method in case problems arose.
Such problems did arise, but they appear to be limited to SGI UV1
machines, and so these are the only ones for which the fallback gets
enabled automatically (via a DMI quirk). The fallback can be enabled
manually as well, by passing efi=old_map, but there is very little
evidence that suggests that this is something that is being relied
upon in the field.
Given that UV1 support is not enabled by default by the distros
(Ubuntu, Fedora), there is no point in carrying this fallback code
all the time if there are no other users. So let's move it into the
UV support code, and document that efi=old_map now requires this
support code to be enabled.
Note that efi=old_map has been used in the past on other SGI UV
machines to work around kernel regressions in production, so we
keep the option to enable it by hand, but only if the kernel was
built with UV support.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-8-ardb@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Assorted updates to kexec/kdump:
- Proper kexec support for 4/5-level paging and jumping from a
5-level to a 4-level paging kernel.
- Make the EFI support for kexec/kdump more robust
- Enforce that the GDT is properly aligned instead of getting the
alignment by chance"
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/kdump/64: Restrict kdump kernel reservation to <64TB
x86/kexec/64: Prevent kexec from 5-level paging to a 4-level only kernel
x86/boot: Add xloadflags bits to check for 5-level paging support
x86/boot: Make the GDT 8-byte aligned
x86/kexec: Add the ACPI NVS region to the ident map
x86/boot: Call get_rsdp_addr() after console_init()
Revert "x86/boot: Disable RSDP parsing temporarily"
x86/boot: Use efi_setup_data for searching RSDP on kexec-ed kernels
x86/kexec: Add the EFI system tables and ACPI tables to the ident map
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If the running kernel has 5-level paging activated, the 5-level paging mode
is preserved across kexec. If the kexec'ed kernel does not contain support
for handling active 5-level paging mode in the decompressor, the
decompressor will crash with #GP.
Prevent this situation at load time. If 5-level paging is active, check the
xloadflags whether the kexec kernel can handle 5-level paging at least in
the decompressor. If not, reject the load attempt and print out an error
message.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190524073810.24298-3-bhe@redhat.com
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Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this source code is licensed under the gnu general public license
version 2 see the file copying for more details
this source code is licensed under general public license version 2
see
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 52 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190602204653.449021192@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Most of the changes center around the difficult problem of KASLR
pinning down hot-removable memory regions. At the very early stage
KASRL is making irreversible kernel address layout decisions we don't
have full knowledge about the memory maps yet.
So the changes from Chao Fan add this (parsing the RSDP table early),
together with fixes from Borislav Petkov"
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot/compressed/64: Do not read legacy ROM on EFI system
x86/boot: Correct RSDP parsing with 32-bit EFI
x86/kexec: Fill in acpi_rsdp_addr from the first kernel
x86/boot: Fix randconfig build error due to MEMORY_HOTREMOVE
x86/boot: Fix cmdline_find_option() prototype visibility
x86/boot/KASLR: Limit KASLR to extract the kernel in immovable memory only
x86/boot: Parse SRAT table and count immovable memory regions
x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params
x86/boot: Search for RSDP in memory
x86/boot: Search for RSDP in the EFI tables
x86/boot: Add "acpi_rsdp=" early parsing
x86/boot: Copy kstrtoull() to boot/string.c
x86/boot: Build the command line parsing code unconditionally
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When efi=noruntime or efi=oldmap is used on the kernel command line, EFI
services won't be available in the second kernel, therefore the second
kernel will not be able to get the ACPI RSDP address from firmware by
calling EFI services and so it won't boot.
Commit
e6e094e053af ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available")
added an acpi_rsdp_addr field to boot_params which stores the RSDP
address for other kernel users.
Recently, after
3a63f70bf4c3 ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params")
the acpi_rsdp_addr will always be filled with a valid RSDP address.
So fill in that value into the second kernel's boot_params thus ensuring
that the second kernel receives the RSDP value from the first kernel.
[ bp: massage commit message. ]
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Chao Fan <fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190204173852.4863-1-kasong@redhat.com
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This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed
kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform
keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not
finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings.
This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature
should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease
the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY,
so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it
won't generate extra noises.
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> (for kexec_file_load part)
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description,
and fixed checkpatch warning.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command
line causes the following null pointer dereference:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
#PF error: [normal kernel read fault]
Call Trace:
efi_runtime_map_copy+0x28/0x30
bzImage64_load+0x688/0x872
arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x6d/0x70
kimage_file_alloc_init+0x13e/0x220
__x64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x144/0x290
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Just skip the EFI info setup if EFI runtime services are not enabled.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: erik.schmauss@intel.com
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: lenb@kernel.org
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com
Cc: robert.moore@intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190118111310.29589-2-kasong@redhat.com
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Commit
b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()")
changed the behavior of kexec_locate_mem_hole(): it will try to allocate
free memory only when kbuf.mem is initialized to zero.
However, x86's kexec_file_load() implementation reuses a struct
kexec_buf allocated on the stack and its kbuf.mem member gets set by
each kexec_add_buffer() invocation.
The second kexec_add_buffer() will reuse the same kbuf but not
reinitialize kbuf.mem.
Therefore, explictily reset kbuf.mem each time in order for
kexec_locate_mem_hole() to locate a free memory region each time.
[ bp: massage commit message. ]
Fixes: b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()")
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181228011247.GA9999@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
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The split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and
.secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by
keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd.
Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to
verify_pefile_signature().
Fixes: d3bfe84129f6 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Chun-Yi reported a kernel warning message below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ../mm/early_ioremap.c:182 early_iounmap+0x4f/0x12c()
early_iounmap(ffffffffff200180, 00000118) [0] size not consistent 00000120
The problem is x86 kexec_file_load adds extra alignment to the efi
memmap: in bzImage64_load():
efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size();
efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16);
And __efi_memmap_init maps with the size including the alignment bytes
but efi_memmap_unmap use nr_maps * desc_size which does not include the
extra bytes.
The alignment in kexec code is only needed for the kexec buffer internal
use Actually kexec should pass exact size of the efi memmap to 2nd
kernel.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417083600.GA1972@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Reported-by: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
Tested-by: Randy Wright <rwright@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they
are booted. With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the
kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address. In particular,
kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets
the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it.
Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem. By returning 1
in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off. This
allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand. While the trick works
fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the
architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer.
Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing
kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it. With this change
architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need.
A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the
purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field. As now the information
stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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As arch_kexec_kernel_image_{probe,load}(),
arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() and arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig()
are almost duplicated among architectures, they can be commonalized with
an architecture-defined kexec_file_ops array. So let's factor them out.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306102303.9063-3-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently the e820_table_firmware[] table is mainly used by the kexec,
and it is not what it's supposed to be - despite its name it might be
modified by the kernel.
So change its name to e820_table_kexec[]. In the next patch we will
introduce the real e820_table_firmware[] table.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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We've got a number of defines related to the E820 table and its size:
E820MAP
E820NR
E820_X_MAX
E820MAX
The first two denote byte offsets into the zeropage (struct boot_params),
and can are not used in the kernel and can be removed.
The E820_*_MAX values have an inconsistent structure and it's unclear in any
case what they mean. 'X' presuably goes for extended - but it's not very
expressive altogether.
Change these over to:
E820_MAX_ENTRIES_ZEROPAGE
E820_MAX_ENTRIES
... which are self-explanatory names.
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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So there's a number of constants that start with "E820" but which
are not types - these create a confusing mixture when seen together
with 'enum e820_type' values:
E820MAP
E820NR
E820_X_MAX
E820MAX
To better differentiate the 'enum e820_type' values prefix them
with E820_TYPE_.
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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the description
So the 'e820_table_saved' is a bit of a misnomer that hides its real purpose.
At first sight the name suggests that it's some sort save/restore mechanism,
as this is how we typically name such facilities in the kernel.
But that is not so, e820_table_saved is the original firmware version of the
e820 table, not modified by the kernel. This table is displayed in the
/sys/firmware/memmap file, and it's also used by the hibernation code to
calculate a physical memory layout MD5 fingerprint checksum which is
invariant of the kernel.
So rename it to 'e820_table_firmware' and update all the comments to better
describe the main e820 data strutures.
Also rename:
'initial_e820_table_saved' => 'e820_table_firmware_init'
'e820_update_range_saved' => 'e820_update_range_firmware'
... to better match the new nomenclature.
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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So the e820_table->map and e820_table->nr_map names are a bit
confusing, because it's not clear what a 'map' really means
(it could be a bitmap, or some other data structure), nor is
it clear what nr_map means (is it a current index, or some
other count).
Rename the fields from:
e820_table->map => e820_table->entries
e820_table->nr_map => e820_table->nr_entries
which makes it abundantly clear that these are entries
of the table, and that the size of the table is ->nr_entries.
Propagate the changes to all affected files. Where necessary,
adjust local variable names to better reflect the new field names.
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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In line with the rename to 'struct e820_array', harmonize the naming of common e820
table variable names as well:
e820 => e820_array
e820_saved => e820_array_saved
e820_map => e820_array
initial_e820 => e820_array_init
This makes the variable names more consistent and easier to grep for.
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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'struct e820_array'
The 'e820entry' and 'e820map' names have various annoyances:
- the missing underscore departs from the usual kernel style
and makes the code look weird,
- in the past I kept confusing the 'map' with the 'entry', because
a 'map' is ambiguous in that regard,
- it's not really clear from the 'e820map' that this is a regular
C array.
Rename them to 'struct e820_entry' and 'struct e820_array' accordingly.
( Leave the legacy UAPI header alone but do the rename in the bootparam.h
and e820/types.h file - outside tools relying on these defines should
either adjust their code, or should use the legacy header, or should
create their private copies for the definitions. )
No change in functionality.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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A commonly used lowlevel x86 header, asm/pgtable.h, includes asm/e820/api.h
spuriously, without making direct use of it.
Removing it is not simple: over the years various .c code learned to rely
on this indirect inclusion.
Remove the unnecessary include - this should speed up the kernel build a bit,
as a large header is not included anymore in totally unrelated code.
Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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This is done to simplify the kexec_add_buffer argument list.
Adapt all callers to set up a kexec_buf to pass to kexec_add_buffer.
In addition, change the type of kexec_buf.buffer from char * to void *.
There is no particular reason for it to be a char *, and the change
allows us to get rid of 3 existing casts to char * in the code.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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This patch turns e820 and e820_saved into pointers to e820 tables,
of the same size as before.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160917213927.1787-2-dvlasenk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: trivial@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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