summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-03-24 15:34:38 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-03-24 15:34:38 -0700
commit11c2b2e3322b23b3e54120b778119d2d09db4421 (patch)
treec395bd8fb1c21784d0f2daf8cf284ec39a8d8fb1
parentfc13a78e1f68fa5ca41280a397a046a6eff6cc9b (diff)
parent8f19331384e6ca816f5bea20ab45c4b72a5cd05f (diff)
Merge tag 'seccomp-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook: - avoid the lock trip seccomp_filter_release in common case (Mateusz Guzik) - remove unused 'sd' argument through-out (Oleg Nesterov) - selftests/seccomp: Add hard-coded __NR_uretprobe for x86_64 * tag 'seccomp-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: seccomp: avoid the lock trip seccomp_filter_release in common case seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter() seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing() seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing() selftests/seccomp: Add hard-coded __NR_uretprobe for x86_64
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c20
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/seccomp.h12
-rw-r--r--kernel/entry/common.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c49
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c6
6 files changed, 43 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index 61503a36067e..f7107479c7fa 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1326,24 +1326,8 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
return -1;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
- if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))) {
- int ret, i;
- struct seccomp_data sd;
- unsigned long args[6];
-
- sd.nr = current_thread_info()->syscall;
- sd.arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
- syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, args);
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- sd.args[i] = args[i];
- sd.instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(current);
-
- ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
- if (ret == -1)
- return ret;
- }
-#endif
+ if (secure_computing())
+ return -1;
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[2]);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
index 727ed4a14545..c6997df63287 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs)
* have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put
* something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE).
*/
- if (__secure_computing(NULL))
+ if (__secure_computing())
return -1;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index e45531455d3b..9b959972bf4a 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -22,21 +22,17 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/seccomp.h>
+extern int __secure_computing(void);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd);
static inline int secure_computing(void)
{
if (unlikely(test_syscall_work(SECCOMP)))
- return __secure_computing(NULL);
+ return __secure_computing();
return 0;
}
#else
extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
-static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
-{
- secure_computing_strict(sd->nr);
- return 0;
-}
#endif
extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
@@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
#else
static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
#endif
-static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { return 0; }
+static inline int __secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
{
diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
index e33691d5adf7..20154572ede9 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall,
/* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes. */
if (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP) {
- ret = __secure_computing(NULL);
+ ret = __secure_computing();
if (ret == -1L)
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 7bbb408431eb..41aa761c7738 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -29,13 +29,11 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
+
/* Not exposed in headers: strictly internal use only. */
#define SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD (SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + 1)
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-#include <asm/syscall.h>
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
@@ -576,6 +574,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
if (WARN_ON((tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) == 0))
return;
+ if (READ_ONCE(tsk->seccomp.filter) == NULL)
+ return;
+
spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
/* Detach task from its filter tree. */
@@ -601,6 +602,13 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+ /*
+ * Don't touch any of the threads if the process is being killed.
+ * This allows for a lockless check in seccomp_filter_release.
+ */
+ if (current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)
+ return;
+
/* Synchronize all threads. */
caller = current;
for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
@@ -1074,6 +1082,13 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
else
BUG();
}
+int __secure_computing(void)
+{
+ int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+
+ secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+ return 0;
+}
#else
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -1225,13 +1240,12 @@ out:
return -1;
}
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
- const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
+ struct seccomp_data sd;
struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
int data;
- struct seccomp_data sd_local;
/*
* Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
@@ -1239,12 +1253,9 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
*/
smp_rmb();
- if (!sd) {
- populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
- sd = &sd_local;
- }
+ populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
- filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
+ filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(&sd, &match);
data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
@@ -1302,13 +1313,13 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
* a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
* a skip would have already been reported.
*/
- if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
+ if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
return -1;
return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
- if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd))
+ if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd))
goto skip;
return 0;
@@ -1350,8 +1361,7 @@ skip:
return -1;
}
#else
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
- const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
BUG();
@@ -1359,7 +1369,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
}
#endif
-int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+int __secure_computing(void)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int this_syscall;
@@ -1368,15 +1378,14 @@ int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
return 0;
- this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
- syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+ this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
return 0;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
+ return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false);
/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 14ba51b52095..b2f76a52215a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -155,6 +155,12 @@ struct seccomp_data {
# endif
#endif
+#ifndef __NR_uretprobe
+# if defined(__x86_64__)
+# define __NR_uretprobe 335
+# endif
+#endif
+
#ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
#endif