diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-03-24 15:34:38 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-03-24 15:34:38 -0700 |
commit | 11c2b2e3322b23b3e54120b778119d2d09db4421 (patch) | |
tree | c395bd8fb1c21784d0f2daf8cf284ec39a8d8fb1 | |
parent | fc13a78e1f68fa5ca41280a397a046a6eff6cc9b (diff) | |
parent | 8f19331384e6ca816f5bea20ab45c4b72a5cd05f (diff) |
Merge tag 'seccomp-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
- avoid the lock trip seccomp_filter_release in common case (Mateusz
Guzik)
- remove unused 'sd' argument through-out (Oleg Nesterov)
- selftests/seccomp: Add hard-coded __NR_uretprobe for x86_64
* tag 'seccomp-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
seccomp: avoid the lock trip seccomp_filter_release in common case
seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __seccomp_filter()
seccomp: remove the 'sd' argument from __secure_computing()
seccomp: fix the __secure_computing() stub for !HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
seccomp/mips: change syscall_trace_enter() to use secure_computing()
selftests/seccomp: Add hard-coded __NR_uretprobe for x86_64
-rw-r--r-- | arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/seccomp.h | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/entry/common.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 49 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 6 |
6 files changed, 43 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c index 61503a36067e..f7107479c7fa 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -1326,24 +1326,8 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) return -1; } -#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP - if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP))) { - int ret, i; - struct seccomp_data sd; - unsigned long args[6]; - - sd.nr = current_thread_info()->syscall; - sd.arch = syscall_get_arch(current); - syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, args); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) - sd.args[i] = args[i]; - sd.instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(current); - - ret = __secure_computing(&sd); - if (ret == -1) - return ret; - } -#endif + if (secure_computing()) + return -1; if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[2]); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c index 727ed4a14545..c6997df63287 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace.c @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int do_seccomp(struct pt_regs *regs) * have already loaded -ENOSYS into r3, or seccomp has put * something else in r3 (via SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO/TRACE). */ - if (__secure_computing(NULL)) + if (__secure_computing()) return -1; /* diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h index e45531455d3b..9b959972bf4a 100644 --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h @@ -22,21 +22,17 @@ #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <asm/seccomp.h> +extern int __secure_computing(void); + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER -extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd); static inline int secure_computing(void) { if (unlikely(test_syscall_work(SECCOMP))) - return __secure_computing(NULL); + return __secure_computing(); return 0; } #else extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall); -static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) -{ - secure_computing_strict(sd->nr); - return 0; -} #endif extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void); @@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; } #else static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; } #endif -static inline int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) { return 0; } +static inline int __secure_computing(void) { return 0; } static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void) { diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c index e33691d5adf7..20154572ede9 100644 --- a/kernel/entry/common.c +++ b/kernel/entry/common.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall, /* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes. */ if (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP) { - ret = __secure_computing(NULL); + ret = __secure_computing(); if (ret == -1L) return ret; } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 7bbb408431eb..41aa761c7738 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -29,13 +29,11 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <asm/syscall.h> + /* Not exposed in headers: strictly internal use only. */ #define SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD (SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + 1) -#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER -#include <asm/syscall.h> -#endif - #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/filter.h> @@ -576,6 +574,9 @@ void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk) if (WARN_ON((tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) == 0)) return; + if (READ_ONCE(tsk->seccomp.filter) == NULL) + return; + spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock); orig = tsk->seccomp.filter; /* Detach task from its filter tree. */ @@ -601,6 +602,13 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags) BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex)); assert_spin_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock); + /* + * Don't touch any of the threads if the process is being killed. + * This allows for a lockless check in seccomp_filter_release. + */ + if (current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) + return; + /* Synchronize all threads. */ caller = current; for_each_thread(caller, thread) { @@ -1074,6 +1082,13 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) else BUG(); } +int __secure_computing(void) +{ + int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs()); + + secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); + return 0; +} #else #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER @@ -1225,13 +1240,12 @@ out: return -1; } -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, - const bool recheck_after_trace) +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) { u32 filter_ret, action; + struct seccomp_data sd; struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL; int data; - struct seccomp_data sd_local; /* * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have @@ -1239,12 +1253,9 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, */ smp_rmb(); - if (!sd) { - populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local); - sd = &sd_local; - } + populate_seccomp_data(&sd); - filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match); + filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(&sd, &match); data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL; @@ -1302,13 +1313,13 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since * a skip would have already been reported. */ - if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true)) + if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true)) return -1; return 0; case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF: - if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd)) + if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd)) goto skip; return 0; @@ -1350,8 +1361,7 @@ skip: return -1; } #else -static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, - const bool recheck_after_trace) +static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace) { BUG(); @@ -1359,7 +1369,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd, } #endif -int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) +int __secure_computing(void) { int mode = current->seccomp.mode; int this_syscall; @@ -1368,15 +1378,14 @@ int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd) unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) return 0; - this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr : - syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs()); + this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs()); switch (mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */ return 0; case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false); + return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false); /* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */ case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 14ba51b52095..b2f76a52215a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -155,6 +155,12 @@ struct seccomp_data { # endif #endif +#ifndef __NR_uretprobe +# if defined(__x86_64__) +# define __NR_uretprobe 335 +# endif +#endif + #ifndef SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0 #endif |