Merge tag 'keys-next-6.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull keys updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
 "A few minor updates/fixes for keys"

* tag 'keys-next-6.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  security: keys: use menuconfig for KEYS symbol
  KEYS: encrypted: Use SHA-256 library instead of crypto_shash
  KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
  KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
  KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time

5 files changed, 117 insertions, 331 deletions

diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
index a088b33fd0e3..0fadc6a4f166 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
@@ -5,41 +5,8 @@
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
 
-/* implementation specific TPM constants */
-#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET			2
-#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET		6
-#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET			10
-
-#define LOAD32(buffer, offset)	(ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)	(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
-#define LOAD16(buffer, offset)	(ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-
 extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
 
-struct osapsess {
-	uint32_t handle;
-	unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-};
-
-/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
-enum {
-	SEAL_keytype = 1,
-	SRK_keytype = 4
-};
-
-int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
-			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
-			unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...);
-int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
-			  const uint32_t command,
-			  const unsigned char *ononce,
-			  const unsigned char *key,
-			  unsigned int keylen, ...);
-
-int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen);
-int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
-
 int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 		      struct trusted_key_options *options);
@@ -47,50 +14,4 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 			struct trusted_key_options *options);
 
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-	pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
-	pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
-	pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
-	pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
-	pr_info("secret:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-	pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-		       16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-	int len;
-
-	pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
-	len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
-	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
-}
-#else
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-}
-#endif
 #endif
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index d4f5fc1e7263..84f39e50ca36 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # Key management configuration
 #
 
-config KEYS
+menuconfig KEYS
 	bool "Enable access key retention support"
 	select ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY
 	help
@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ config KEYS
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
 
+if KEYS
+
 config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
 	bool "Enable temporary caching of the last request_key() result"
-	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option causes the result of the last successful request_key()
 	  call that didn't upcall to the kernel to be cached temporarily in the
@@ -41,7 +42,6 @@ config KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE
 
 config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 	bool "Enable register of persistent per-UID keyrings"
-	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option provides a register of persistent per-UID keyrings,
 	  primarily aimed at Kerberos key storage.  The keyrings are persistent
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ config PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
 
 config BIG_KEYS
 	bool "Large payload keys"
-	depends on KEYS
 	depends on TMPFS
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
 	help
@@ -70,7 +69,6 @@ config BIG_KEYS
 
 config TRUSTED_KEYS
 	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS
 	help
 	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
 	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,
@@ -85,12 +83,10 @@ endif
 
 config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
-	depends on KEYS
 	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_CBC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA256
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
 	select CRYPTO_RNG
 	help
 	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys
@@ -114,7 +110,6 @@ config USER_DECRYPTED_DATA
 
 config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
        bool "Diffie-Hellman operations on retained keys"
-       depends on KEYS
        select CRYPTO
        select CRYPTO_KDF800108_CTR
        select CRYPTO_DH
@@ -127,9 +122,11 @@ config KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
 
 config KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
 	bool "Provide key/keyring change notifications"
-	depends on KEYS && WATCH_QUEUE
+	depends on WATCH_QUEUE
 	help
 	  This option provides support for getting change notifications
 	  on keys and keyrings on which the caller has View permission.
 	  This makes use of pipes to handle the notification buffer and
 	  provides KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY to enable/disable watches.
+
+endif # KEYS
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 831cb84fd75a..513c09e2b01c 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/utils.h>
@@ -37,8 +36,6 @@
 
 static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
 static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
-static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
-static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
 static const char blkcipher_alg[] = "cbc(aes)";
 static const char key_format_default[] = "default";
 static const char key_format_ecryptfs[] = "ecryptfs";
@@ -54,8 +51,6 @@ static int blksize;
 #define MIN_DATA_SIZE  20
 #define KEY_ENC32_PAYLOAD_LEN 32
 
-static struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
-
 enum {
 	Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_err
 };
@@ -329,26 +324,6 @@ error:
 	return ukey;
 }
 
-static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
-		     const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
-{
-	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
-	int err;
-
-	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-		pr_err("encrypted_key: can't alloc %s transform: %ld\n",
-		       hmac_alg, PTR_ERR(tfm));
-		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
-	}
-
-	err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
-	if (!err)
-		err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, buf, buflen, digest);
-	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
-	return err;
-}
-
 enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
 
 /* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
@@ -357,7 +332,6 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 {
 	u8 *derived_buf;
 	unsigned int derived_buf_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	derived_buf_len = strlen("AUTH_KEY") + 1 + master_keylen;
 	if (derived_buf_len < HASH_SIZE)
@@ -374,10 +348,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 
 	memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
 	       master_keylen);
-	ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len,
-				      derived_key);
+	sha256(derived_buf, derived_buf_len, derived_key);
 	kfree_sensitive(derived_buf);
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static struct skcipher_request *init_skcipher_req(const u8 *key,
@@ -503,10 +476,10 @@ static int datablob_hmac_append(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 		goto out;
 
 	digest = epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len;
-	ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key,
-			epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len);
-	if (!ret)
-		dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key),
+				epayload->format, epayload->datablob_len,
+				digest);
+	dump_hmac(NULL, digest, HASH_SIZE);
 out:
 	memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
 	return ret;
@@ -534,9 +507,8 @@ static int datablob_hmac_verify(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 	} else
 		p = epayload->format;
 
-	ret = calc_hmac(digest, derived_key, sizeof derived_key, p, len);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	hmac_sha256_usingrawkey(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), p, len,
+				digest);
 	ret = crypto_memneq(digest, epayload->format + epayload->datablob_len,
 			    sizeof(digest));
 	if (ret) {
@@ -1011,29 +983,14 @@ static int __init init_encrypted(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm)) {
-		pr_err("encrypted_key: can't allocate %s transform: %ld\n",
-		       hash_alg, PTR_ERR(hash_tfm));
-		return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
-	}
-
 	ret = aes_get_sizes();
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	return 0;
-out:
-	crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
-	return ret;
-
+		return ret;
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
 }
 
 static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
 {
-	crypto_free_shash(hash_tfm);
 	unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
index 1fb8aa001995..204a68c1429d 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig
@@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM
 	bool "TPM-based trusted keys"
 	depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS
 	default y
-	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS
 	select ASN1_ENCODER
 	select OID_REGISTRY
 	select ASN1
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d1800..636acb66a4f6 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/sha1.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
@@ -14,78 +16,92 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
 
 #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
 
-static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
-static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
 static struct tpm_chip *chip;
 static struct tpm_digest *digests;
 
-struct sdesc {
-	struct shash_desc shash;
-	char ctx[];
+/* implementation specific TPM constants */
+#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET			2
+#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET		6
+#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET			10
+
+#define LOAD32(buffer, offset)	(ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)	(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
+#define LOAD16(buffer, offset)	(ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
+
+struct osapsess {
+	uint32_t handle;
+	unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
 };
 
-static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
-static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
+enum {
+	SEAL_keytype = 1,
+	SRK_keytype = 4
+};
 
-static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg)
+#define TPM_DEBUG 0
+
+#if TPM_DEBUG
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
 {
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
-	int size;
-
-	size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(alg);
-	sdesc = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!sdesc)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	sdesc->shash.tfm = alg;
-	return sdesc;
+	pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
+	pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
+	pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
+	pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+		       16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
 }
 
-static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen,
-		    unsigned char *digest)
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
 {
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
-	int ret;
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+		       16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
+	pr_info("secret:\n");
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+		       16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+	pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+		       16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
+}
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+	int len;
 
-	ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
+	pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n");
+	len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
+}
+#else
+static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
+{
 }
 
+static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 		       unsigned int keylen, ...)
 {
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;
 	va_list argp;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned char *data;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-
-	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmacalg, key, keylen);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey(&hmac_ctx, key, keylen);
 
 	va_start(argp, keylen);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -97,46 +113,34 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		hmac_sha1_update(&hmac_ctx, data, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
 	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
+		hmac_sha1_final(&hmac_ctx, digest);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
  */
-int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 			unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
 			unsigned char *h2, unsigned int h3, ...)
 {
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned char *data;
 	unsigned char c;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 	va_list argp;
 
 	if (!chip)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-
 	c = !!h3;
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
 	va_start(argp, h3);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
@@ -147,27 +151,22 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, data, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, data, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
 	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
+		sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = TSS_rawhmac(digest, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 				  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
 				  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
 
 /*
  * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
  */
-int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 			  const uint32_t command,
 			  const unsigned char *ononce,
 			  const unsigned char *key,
@@ -182,7 +181,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 	unsigned char *authdata;
 	unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned int dpos;
 	va_list argp;
@@ -203,51 +202,30 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 	continueflag = authdata - 1;
 	enonce = continueflag - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-				  sizeof result);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-				  sizeof ordinal);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
 	va_start(argp, keylen);
 	for (;;) {
 		dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
 		if (dlen == 0)
 			break;
 		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
-	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac, key, keylen, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, paramdigest,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
 			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+		return ret;
 
-	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
 
 /*
  * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -273,7 +251,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct sdesc *sdesc;
+	struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;
 	unsigned int dlen;
 	unsigned int dpos;
 	va_list argp;
@@ -296,22 +274,9 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	enonce1 = continueflag1 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 	enonce2 = continueflag2 - TPM_NONCE_SIZE;
 
-	sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg);
-	if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) {
-		pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(sdesc);
-	}
-	ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result,
-				  sizeof result);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal,
-				  sizeof ordinal);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_init(&sha_ctx);
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result, sizeof(result));
+	sha1_update(&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal, sizeof(ordinal));
 
 	va_start(argp, keylen2);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -319,42 +284,33 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 		if (dlen == 0)
 			break;
 		dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);
-		ret = crypto_shash_update(&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
+		sha1_update(&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen);
 	}
 	va_end(argp);
-	if (!ret)
-		ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, paramdigest);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1_final(&sha_ctx, paramdigest);
 
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
+		return ret;
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-out:
-	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
-	return ret;
+		return ret;
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
  * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
  * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
  */
-int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
 {
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	int rc;
@@ -380,7 +336,6 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
 	tpm_put_ops(chip);
 	return rc;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
 
 /*
  * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
@@ -434,7 +389,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
 /*
  * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
  */
-int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -451,7 +406,6 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
 	       TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
 
 struct tpm_digests {
 	unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
@@ -498,9 +452,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	/* calculate encrypted authorization value */
 	memcpy(td->xorwork, sess.secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	memcpy(td->xorwork + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, sess.enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	ret = TSS_sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
+	sha1(td->xorwork, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2, td->xorhash);
 
 	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret < 0)
@@ -989,40 +941,6 @@ static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
 	return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);
 }
 
-static void trusted_shash_release(void)
-{
-	if (hashalg)
-		crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
-	if (hmacalg)
-		crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-}
-
-static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
-		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-			hmac_alg);
-		return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
-	}
-
-	hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
-		pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n",
-			hash_alg);
-		ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
-		goto hashalg_fail;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-
-hashalg_fail:
-	crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static int __init init_digests(void)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -1049,15 +967,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
 	ret = init_digests();
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_put;
-	ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_free;
 	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_release;
+		goto err_free;
 	return 0;
-err_release:
-	trusted_shash_release();
 err_free:
 	kfree(digests);
 err_put:
@@ -1070,7 +983,6 @@ static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
 	if (chip) {
 		put_device(&chip->dev);
 		kfree(digests);
-		trusted_shash_release();
 		unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 	}
 }