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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-11-29 10:08:17 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-11-29 10:08:17 -0800 |
| commit | 7255a39d24a7960da3a55e840ca5cbed5fcb476f (patch) | |
| tree | a05ad79ea909e9f009cc070662a9e0707634b94a /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | |
| parent | aae5ab854e38151e69f261dbf0e3b7e396403178 (diff) | |
| parent | 25bc65d8ddfc17cc1d7a45bd48e9bdc0e729ced3 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"A couple of urgent fixes which accumulated this last week:
- Two resctrl fixes to prevent refcount leaks when manipulating the
resctrl fs (Xiaochen Shen)
- Correct prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) reporting (Anand K Mistry)
- A fix to not lose already seen MCE severity which determines
whether the machine can recover (Gabriele Paoloni)"
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.10-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mce: Do not overwrite no_way_out if mce_end() fails
x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb
x86/resctrl: Add necessary kernfs_put() calls to prevent refcount leak
x86/resctrl: Remove superfluous kernfs_get() calls to prevent refcount leak
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 581fb7223ad0..d41b70fe4918 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -739,11 +739,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode; switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: @@ -757,8 +759,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n", static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ? "always-on" : "conditional"); - - spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode; } /* |