Merge tag 'asoc-v6.6' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-linus

ASoC: Updates for v6.6

The rest of the updates for v6.6, some of the highlights include:

 - A big API cleanup from Morimoto-san, rationalising the places we put
   functions.
 - Lots of work on the SOF framework, AMD and Intel drivers, including a
   lot of cleanup and new device support.
 - Standardisation of the presentation of jacks from drivers.
 - Provision of some generic sound card DT properties.
 - Conversion oof more drivers to the maple tree register cache.
 - New drivers for AMD Van Gogh, AWInic AW88261, Cirrus Logic cs42l43,
   various Intel platforms, Mediatek MT7986, RealTek RT1017 and StarFive
   JH7110.

1 files changed, 34 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0ba1067f4e5f..e3a65e9fc750 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1250,6 +1250,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 /* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
 #define SMT_RSB		BIT(4)
+/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
+#define SRSO		BIT(5)
+/* CPU is affected by GDS */
+#define GDS		BIT(6)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1262,27 +1266,30 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
 	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1406,6 +1413,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
 
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
+	 * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
+	 * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
+	 * which means that AVX will be disabled.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1962,6 +1984,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
 	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
 	update_srbds_msr();
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+		update_gds_msr();
 
 	tsx_ap_init();
 }