diff options
| author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-05-23 18:40:46 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-05-23 18:40:46 -0700 |
| commit | 340611ab7f8c95e9638bb8a181cb078e900dc5ec (patch) | |
| tree | a39dca4181d43db663b5796335fecbed7b0ed34f /drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | |
| parent | 8892475386e819aa50856947948c546ccc964d96 (diff) | |
| parent | a5560a6c17a4af4e8f45d5c1215ba7d5bb0ff109 (diff) | |
Merge branch 'xen_split_event_channels'
Wei Liu says:
====================
This series adds a new feature called split event channels.
In the original implementation, only one event channel is setup between
frontend and backend. This is not ideal as TX notification interferes with RX
notification. Using dedicated event channels for TX and RX solves this issue.
Changes since V2:
* feature_split_event_channels -> separate_tx_rx_irq
* make separate_tx_rx_irq bool
* document this feature in header file
* don't report fatal if writing feature to xenstore fails
* frontend will fall back to single event channel if new feature setup fails
Changes since V1:
* change subject lines of commits to be more specific
* add parameter feature_split_event_channels for xen-netback
* remove two dev_info
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 2d9477fd900f..82576fffb452 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -47,6 +47,13 @@ #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h> #include <asm/xen/page.h> +/* Provide an option to disable split event channels at load time as + * event channels are limited resource. Split event channels are + * enabled by default. + */ +bool separate_tx_rx_irq = 1; +module_param(separate_tx_rx_irq, bool, 0644); + /* * This is the maximum slots a skb can have. If a guest sends a skb * which exceeds this limit it is considered malicious. @@ -662,7 +669,7 @@ static void xen_netbk_rx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk) { struct xenvif *vif = NULL, *tmp; s8 status; - u16 irq, flags; + u16 flags; struct xen_netif_rx_response *resp; struct sk_buff_head rxq; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -771,7 +778,6 @@ static void xen_netbk_rx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk) sco->meta_slots_used); RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&vif->rx, ret); - irq = vif->irq; if (ret && list_empty(&vif->notify_list)) list_add_tail(&vif->notify_list, ¬ify); @@ -783,7 +789,7 @@ static void xen_netbk_rx_action(struct xen_netbk *netbk) } list_for_each_entry_safe(vif, tmp, ¬ify, notify_list) { - notify_remote_via_irq(vif->irq); + notify_remote_via_irq(vif->rx_irq); list_del_init(&vif->notify_list); } @@ -1762,7 +1768,7 @@ static void make_tx_response(struct xenvif *vif, vif->tx.rsp_prod_pvt = ++i; RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&vif->tx, notify); if (notify) - notify_remote_via_irq(vif->irq); + notify_remote_via_irq(vif->tx_irq); } static struct xen_netif_rx_response *make_rx_response(struct xenvif *vif, |