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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-28 14:10:15 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-28 14:10:15 -0700 |
commit | 672dcda246071e1940eab8bb5a03d04ea026f46e (patch) | |
tree | d61473700d424b8045d8dee79dd4ebf0e0ef5f52 /kernel | |
parent | 7031769e102b768b3fa0c4c726faf532cb31e973 (diff) | |
parent | 1f531e35c146cca22dc6f4a1bc657098f146f358 (diff) |
Merge tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.pidfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull pidfs updates from Christian Brauner:
- persistent info
Persist exit and coredump information independent of whether anyone
currently holds a pidfd for the struct pid.
The current scheme allocated pidfs dentries on-demand repeatedly.
This scheme is reaching it's limits as it makes it impossible to pin
information that needs to be available after the task has exited or
coredumped and that should not be lost simply because the pidfd got
closed temporarily. The next opener should still see the stashed
information.
This is also a prerequisite for supporting extended attributes on
pidfds to allow attaching meta information to them.
If someone opens a pidfd for a struct pid a pidfs dentry is allocated
and stashed in pid->stashed. Once the last pidfd for the struct pid
is closed the pidfs dentry is released and removed from pid->stashed.
So if 10 callers create a pidfs dentry for the same struct pid
sequentially, i.e., each closing the pidfd before the other creates a
new one then a new pidfs dentry is allocated every time.
Because multiple tasks acquiring and releasing a pidfd for the same
struct pid can race with each another a task may still find a valid
pidfs entry from the previous task in pid->stashed and reuse it. Or
it might find a dead dentry in there and fail to reuse it and so
stashes a new pidfs dentry. Multiple tasks may race to stash a new
pidfs dentry but only one will succeed, the other ones will put their
dentry.
The current scheme aims to ensure that a pidfs dentry for a struct
pid can only be created if the task is still alive or if a pidfs
dentry already existed before the task was reaped and so exit
information has been was stashed in the pidfs inode.
That's great except that it's buggy. If a pidfs dentry is stashed in
pid->stashed after pidfs_exit() but before __unhash_process() is
called we will return a pidfd for a reaped task without exit
information being available.
The pidfds_pid_valid() check does not guard against this race as it
doens't sync at all with pidfs_exit(). The pid_has_task() check might
be successful simply because we're before __unhash_process() but
after pidfs_exit().
Introduce a new scheme where the lifetime of information associated
with a pidfs entry (coredump and exit information) isn't bound to the
lifetime of the pidfs inode but the struct pid itself.
The first time a pidfs dentry is allocated for a struct pid a struct
pidfs_attr will be allocated which will be used to store exit and
coredump information.
If all pidfs for the pidfs dentry are closed the dentry and inode can
be cleaned up but the struct pidfs_attr will stick until the struct
pid itself is freed. This will ensure minimal memory usage while
persisting relevant information.
The new scheme has various advantages. First, it allows to close the
race where we end up handing out a pidfd for a reaped task for which
no exit information is available. Second, it minimizes memory usage.
Third, it allows to remove complex lifetime tracking via dentries
when registering a struct pid with pidfs. There's no need to get or
put a reference. Instead, the lifetime of exit and coredump
information associated with a struct pid is bound to the lifetime of
struct pid itself.
- extended attributes
Now that we have a way to persist information for pidfs dentries we
can start supporting extended attributes on pidfds. This will allow
userspace to attach meta information to tasks.
One natural extension would be to introduce a custom pidfs.* extended
attribute space and allow for the inheritance of extended attributes
across fork() and exec().
The first simple scheme will allow privileged userspace to set
trusted extended attributes on pidfs inodes.
- Allow autonomous pidfs file handles
Various filesystems such as pidfs and drm support opening file
handles without having to require a file descriptor to identify the
filesystem. The filesystem are global single instances and can be
trivially identified solely on the information encoded in the file
handle.
This makes it possible to not have to keep or acquire a sentinal file
descriptor just to pass it to open_by_handle_at() to identify the
filesystem. That's especially useful when such sentinel file
descriptor cannot or should not be acquired.
For pidfs this means a file handle can function as full replacement
for storing a pid in a file. Instead a file handle can be stored and
reopened purely based on the file handle.
Such autonomous file handles can be opened with or without specifying
a a file descriptor. If no proper file descriptor is used the
FD_PIDFS_ROOT sentinel must be passed. This allows us to define
further special negative fd sentinels in the future.
Userspace can trivially test for support by trying to open the file
handle with an invalid file descriptor.
- Allow pidfds for reaped tasks with SCM_PIDFD messages
This is a logical continuation of the earlier work to create pidfds
for reaped tasks through the SO_PEERPIDFD socket option merged in
923ea4d4482b ("Merge patch series "net, pidfs: enable handing out
pidfds for reaped sk->sk_peer_pid"").
- Two minor fixes:
* Fold fs_struct->{lock,seq} into a seqlock
* Don't bother with path_{get,put}() in unix_open_file()
* tag 'vfs-6.17-rc1.pidfs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (37 commits)
don't bother with path_get()/path_put() in unix_open_file()
fold fs_struct->{lock,seq} into a seqlock
selftests: net: extend SCM_PIDFD test to cover stale pidfds
af_unix: enable handing out pidfds for reaped tasks in SCM_PIDFD
af_unix: stash pidfs dentry when needed
af_unix/scm: fix whitespace errors
af_unix: introduce and use scm_replace_pid() helper
af_unix: introduce unix_skb_to_scm helper
af_unix: rework unix_maybe_add_creds() to allow sleep
selftests/pidfd: decode pidfd file handles withou having to specify an fd
fhandle, pidfs: support open_by_handle_at() purely based on file handle
uapi/fcntl: add FD_PIDFS_ROOT
uapi/fcntl: add FD_INVALID
fcntl/pidfd: redefine PIDFD_SELF_THREAD_GROUP
uapi/fcntl: mark range as reserved
fhandle: reflow get_path_anchor()
pidfs: add pidfs_root_path() helper
fhandle: rename to get_path_anchor()
fhandle: hoist copy_from_user() above get_path_from_fd()
fhandle: raise FILEID_IS_DIR in handle_type
...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/pid.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1ee8eb11f38b..6318a25a16ba 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1542,14 +1542,14 @@ static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk) struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs; if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) { /* tsk->fs is already what we want */ - spin_lock(&fs->lock); + read_seqlock_excl(&fs->seq); /* "users" and "in_exec" locked for check_unsafe_exec() */ if (fs->in_exec) { - spin_unlock(&fs->lock); + read_sequnlock_excl(&fs->seq); return -EAGAIN; } fs->users++; - spin_unlock(&fs->lock); + read_sequnlock_excl(&fs->seq); return 0; } tsk->fs = copy_fs_struct(fs); @@ -3149,13 +3149,13 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags) if (new_fs) { fs = current->fs; - spin_lock(&fs->lock); + read_seqlock_excl(&fs->seq); current->fs = new_fs; if (--fs->users) new_fs = NULL; else new_fs = fs; - spin_unlock(&fs->lock); + read_sequnlock_excl(&fs->seq); } if (new_fd) diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c index 8317bcbc7cf7..07db7d8d066c 100644 --- a/kernel/pid.c +++ b/kernel/pid.c @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid) ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns; if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed); + pidfs_free_pid(pid); kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid); put_pid_ns(ns); } |