diff options
author | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2023-08-30 16:06:38 -0700 |
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committer | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2023-08-30 16:06:38 -0700 |
commit | 1ac731c529cd4d6adbce134754b51ff7d822b145 (patch) | |
tree | 143ab3f35ca5f3b69f583c84e6964b17139c2ec1 /net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | |
parent | 07b4c950f27bef0362dc6ad7ee713aab61d58149 (diff) | |
parent | 54116d442e001e1b6bd482122043b1870998a1f3 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' into for-linus
Prepare input updates for 6.6 merge window.
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 37 |
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c index 06581223238c..1d249d839819 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c @@ -987,6 +987,34 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg); + /* Make sure the cmd is valid before doing anything */ + switch (cmd) { + case HCIGETDEVLIST: + case HCIGETDEVINFO: + case HCIGETCONNLIST: + case HCIDEVUP: + case HCIDEVDOWN: + case HCIDEVRESET: + case HCIDEVRESTAT: + case HCISETSCAN: + case HCISETAUTH: + case HCISETENCRYPT: + case HCISETPTYPE: + case HCISETLINKPOL: + case HCISETLINKMODE: + case HCISETACLMTU: + case HCISETSCOMTU: + case HCIINQUIRY: + case HCISETRAW: + case HCIGETCONNINFO: + case HCIGETAUTHINFO: + case HCIBLOCKADDR: + case HCIUNBLOCKADDR: + break; + default: + return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + } + lock_sock(sk); if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) { @@ -1003,7 +1031,14 @@ static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, if (hci_sock_gen_cookie(sk)) { struct sk_buff *skb; - if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + /* Perform careful checks before setting the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED + * flag. Make sure that not only the current task but also + * the socket opener has the required capability, since + * privileged programs can be tricked into making ioctl calls + * on HCI sockets, and the socket should not be marked as + * trusted simply because the ioctl caller is privileged. + */ + if (sk_capable(sk, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) hci_sock_set_flag(sk, HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED); /* Send event to monitor */ |