diff options
author | Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> | 2024-12-12 16:36:04 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2024-12-16 12:47:29 +0000 |
commit | 0471b1093e3a5d702ba2bf5987c35ee0e2336855 (patch) | |
tree | a4b7b39ebd281e81bccc51a0cd3f455fb94133d9 /net/tls | |
parent | 92c932b9946c1e082406aa0515916adb3e662e24 (diff) |
tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending
When a TLS handshake record carrying a KeyUpdate message is received,
all subsequent records will be encrypted with a new key. We need to
stop decrypting incoming records with the old key, and wait until
userspace provides a new key.
Make a note of this in the RX context just after decrypting that
record, and stop recvmsg/splice calls with EKEYEXPIRED until the new
key is available.
key_update_pending can't be combined with the existing bitfield,
because we will read it locklessly in ->poll.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/tls')
-rw-r--r-- | net/tls/tls_sw.c | 35 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index bbf26cc4f6ee..3dcf8ee60fea 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1314,6 +1314,10 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock, int ret = 0; long timeo; + /* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */ + if (unlikely(ctx->key_update_pending)) + return -EKEYEXPIRED; + timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock); while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) { @@ -1720,6 +1724,34 @@ tls_decrypt_device(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, return 1; } +static int tls_check_pending_rekey(struct tls_context *ctx, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + const struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb); + const struct tls_msg *tlm = tls_msg(skb); + char hs_type; + int err; + + if (likely(tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE)) + return 0; + + if (rxm->full_len < 1) + return 0; + + err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, &hs_type, 1); + if (err < 0) { + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return err; + } + + if (hs_type == TLS_HANDSHAKE_KEYUPDATE) { + struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx; + + WRITE_ONCE(rx_ctx->key_update_pending, true); + } + + return 0; +} + static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct tls_decrypt_arg *darg) { @@ -1739,7 +1771,7 @@ static int tls_rx_one_record(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size; tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx); - return 0; + return tls_check_pending_rekey(tls_ctx, darg->skb); } int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sgout) @@ -2719,6 +2751,7 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx) crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info; cctx = &ctx->rx; aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv; + sw_ctx_rx->key_update_pending = false; } cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(crypto_info->cipher_type); |