libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader

To fulfill the BPF signing contract, represented as Sig(I_loader ||
H_meta), the generated trusted loader program must verify the integrity
of the metadata. This signature cryptographically binds the loader's
instructions (I_loader) to a hash of the metadata (H_meta).

The verification process is embedded directly into the loader program.
Upon execution, the loader loads the runtime hash from struct bpf_map
i.e. BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX and compares this runtime hash against an
expected hash value that has been hardcoded directly by
bpf_obj__gen_loader.

The load from bpf_map can be improved by calling
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD from the kernel context after BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
has been updated for being called from the kernel context.

The following instructions are generated:

    ld_imm64 r1, const_ptr_to_map // insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX
    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part1 // constant precomputed by
bpftool (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part2 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 16);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part3 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 24);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part4 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;
    ...

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250921160120.9711-4-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions