summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/apparmor/file.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2022-09-07 12:46:30 -0700
committerJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2025-01-18 06:47:12 -0800
commitc05e705812d179f4b85aeacc34a555a42bc4f9ac (patch)
tree82878c6d4d617e5c4b77e3ef81b612dcc11b4235 /security/apparmor/file.c
parentb4940d913cc2c67f8f6bf17abbf3e5301f95e260 (diff)
apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation
Extend af_unix mediation to support fine grained controls based on the type (abstract, anonymous, fs), the address, and the labeling on the socket. This allows for using socket addresses to label and the socket and control which subjects can communicate. The unix rule format follows standard apparmor rules except that fs based unix sockets can be mediated by existing file rules. None fs unix sockets can be mediated by a unix socket rule. Where The address of an abstract unix domain socket begins with the @ character, similar to how they are reported (as paths) by netstat -x. The address then follows and may contain pattern matching and any characters including the null character. In apparmor null characters must be specified by using an escape sequence \000 or \x00. The pattern matching is the same as is used by file path matching so * will not match / even though it has no special meaning with in an abstract socket name. Eg. allow unix addr=@*, Autobound unix domain sockets have a unix sun_path assigned to them by the kernel, as such specifying a policy based address is not possible. The autobinding of sockets can be controlled by specifying the special auto keyword. Eg. allow unix addr=auto, To indicate that the rule only applies to auto binding of unix domain sockets. It is important to note this only applies to the bind permission as once the socket is bound to an address it is indistinguishable from a socket that have an addr bound with a specified name. When the auto keyword is used with other permissions or as part of a peer addr it will be replaced with a pattern that can match an autobound socket. Eg. For some kernels allow unix rw addr=auto, It is important to note, this pattern may match abstract sockets that were not autobound but have an addr that fits what is generated by the kernel when autobinding a socket. Anonymous unix domain sockets have no sun_path associated with the socket address, however it can be specified with the special none keyword to indicate the rule only applies to anonymous unix domain sockets. Eg. allow unix addr=none, If the address component of a rule is not specified then the rule applies to autobind, abstract and anonymous sockets. The label on the socket can be compared using the standard label= rule conditional. Eg. allow unix addr=@foo peer=(label=bar), see man apparmor.d for full syntax description. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/file.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c16
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 6ce6547301dc..d918b5dc6f59 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
@@ -217,16 +218,17 @@ aa_state_t aa_str_perms(struct aa_policydb *file_rules, aa_state_t start,
return state;
}
-static int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
- struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
- u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
- struct aa_perms *perms)
+int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
+ struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
+ u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
+ struct aa_perms *perms)
{
struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
typeof(*rules), list);
int e = 0;
- if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+ if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
+ ((flags & PATH_SOCK_COND) && !RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules)))
return 0;
aa_str_perms(rules->file, rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
name, cond, perms);
@@ -549,12 +551,12 @@ static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, const struct cred *subj_cred,
return 0;
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
- error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock);
+ error = aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
if (denied) {
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(subj_cred, flabel, op,
- request, sock));
+ request, file));
}
if (!error)
update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);