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authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2023-06-10 09:57:38 +0200
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2023-07-10 13:59:39 -0400
commitc31288e56c1a7bb57a1be1f9f6f3faacbeddeff6 (patch)
treef4709a801a51b9b4f9d98b35b7c161c8433b1029 /security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
parent6db7d1dee8003921b353d7e613471fe8995f46b5 (diff)
evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr
Currently, evm_inode_init_security() processes a single LSM xattr from the array passed by security_inode_init_security(), and calculates the HMAC on it and other inode metadata. As the LSM infrastructure now can pass to EVM an array with multiple xattrs, scan them until the terminator (xattr name NULL), and calculate the HMAC on all of them. Also, double check that the xattrs array terminator is the first non-filled slot (obtained with lsm_get_xattr_slot()). Consumers of the xattrs array, such as the initxattrs() callbacks, rely on the terminator. Finally, change the name of the lsm_xattr parameter of evm_init_hmac() to xattrs, to reflect the new type of information passed. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c29
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 84eaf05ce0d4..ff9a939dad8e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
return found;
}
-static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
{
return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
}
@@ -872,14 +872,35 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
int *xattr_count)
{
struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
- struct xattr *evm_xattr;
+ struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr;
+ bool evm_protected_xattrs = false;
int rc;
- if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs ||
- !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name))
+ if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * security_inode_init_security() makes sure that the xattrs array is
+ * contiguous, there is enough space for security.evm, and that there is
+ * a terminator at the end of the array.
+ */
+ for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->name; xattr++) {
+ if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name))
+ evm_protected_xattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ /* EVM xattr not needed. */
+ if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
return 0;
evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ /*
+ * Array terminator (xattr name = NULL) must be the first non-filled
+ * xattr slot.
+ */
+ WARN_ONCE(evm_xattr != xattr,
+ "%s: xattrs terminator is not the first non-filled slot\n",
+ __func__);
xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
if (!xattr_data)