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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-27 17:18:48 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-06-27 17:18:48 -0700
commit729b39ec1bdb7e1ca594e14069d05f682d9ab868 (patch)
tree026492d4365a7c222d3221fba29e1517a270f938 /security/selinux/hooks.c
parentcae72026b5ecf059687ccb431cb0e5965e863fea (diff)
parent447a5688005e5b789633bd080016517a08f9fd8d (diff)
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20230626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Thanks to help from the MPTCP folks, it looks like we have finally sorted out a proper solution to the MPTCP socket labeling issue, see the new security_mptcp_add_subflow() LSM hook. - Fix the labeled NFS handling such that a labeled NFS share mounted prior to the initial SELinux policy load is properly labeled once a policy is loaded; more information in the commit description. - Two patches to security/selinux/Makefile, the first took the cleanups in v6.4 a bit further and the second removed the grouped targets support as that functionality doesn't appear to be properly supported prior to make v4.3. - Deprecate the "fs" object context type in SELinux policies. The fs object context type was an old vestige that was introduced back in v2.6.12-rc2 but never really used. - A number of small changes that remove dead code, clean up some awkward bits, and generally improve the quality of the code. See the individual commit descriptions for more information. * tag 'selinux-pr-20230626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: avoid bool as identifier name selinux: fix Makefile for versions of make < v4.3 selinux: make labeled NFS work when mounted before policy load selinux: cleanup exit_sel_fs() declaration selinux: deprecated fs ocon selinux: make header files self-including selinux: keep context struct members in sync selinux: Implement mptcp_add_subflow hook security, lsm: Introduce security_mptcp_add_subflow() selinux: small cleanups in selinux_audit_rule_init() selinux: declare read-only data arrays const selinux: retain const qualifier on string literal in avtab_hash_eval() selinux: drop return at end of void function avc_insert() selinux: avc: drop unused function avc_disable() selinux: adjust typos in comments selinux: do not leave dangling pointer behind selinux: more Makefile tweaks
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c78
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79b4890e9936..d06e350fedee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ enum {
};
#define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
-static struct {
+static const struct {
const char *name;
int len;
int opt;
@@ -605,6 +605,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
int rc = 0;
+ /*
+ * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+ * place the results is not allowed
+ */
+ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
if (!selinux_initialized()) {
@@ -612,6 +619,10 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
server is ready to handle calls. */
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -619,12 +630,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
"before the security server is initialized\n");
goto out;
}
- if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
- /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
- * place the results is not allowed */
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
/*
* Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
@@ -757,7 +762,17 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
* sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
* the superblock context if not already set.
*/
- if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
+ /*
+ * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
+ * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
+ * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
+ * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
+ * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
+ * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
+ */
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
}
@@ -869,31 +884,37 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
/*
- * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
- * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
- */
- if (!selinux_initialized())
- return 0;
-
- /*
* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
* place the results is not allowed.
*/
if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
return -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
+ * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
+ */
+ if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
+ newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+ mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
}
- mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
-
newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
@@ -937,7 +958,7 @@ out:
}
/*
- * NOTE: the caller is resposible for freeing the memory even if on error.
+ * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
*/
static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
{
@@ -1394,8 +1415,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+ /*
+ * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
+ * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
+ */
case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
- break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
sid = sbsec->def_sid;
@@ -5379,6 +5403,21 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk
selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
}
+static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+ ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+
+ /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
+ * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
+ */
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
+ return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
+}
+
static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
@@ -7074,6 +7113,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),