diff options
| author | Neill Kapron <nkapron@google.com> | 2025-08-28 17:03:15 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2025-09-07 12:54:56 -0400 |
| commit | 68e1e908cb7682db9fb7f79907f9352435a81c0f (patch) | |
| tree | 17613d161517fe475086cd1c0dedea5eba4b620d /security/selinux/include/security.h | |
| parent | 59ffc9beeb8b332940d36f4b9803352b7f893f5a (diff) | |
selinux: enable per-file labeling for functionfs
This patch adds support for genfscon per-file labeling of functionfs
files as well as support for userspace to apply labels after new
functionfs endpoints are created.
This allows for separate labels and therefore access control on a
per-endpoint basis. An example use case would be for the default
endpoint EP0 used as a restricted control endpoint, and additional
usb endpoints to be used by other more permissive domains.
It should be noted that if there are multiple functionfs mounts on a
system, genfs file labels will apply to all mounts, and therefore will not
likely be as useful as the userspace relabeling portion of this patch -
the addition to selinux_is_genfs_special_handling().
This patch introduces the functionfs_seclabel policycap to maintain
existing functionfs genfscon behavior unless explicitly enabled.
Signed-off-by: Neill Kapron <nkapron@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: trim changelog, apply boolean logic fixup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/include/security.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 7f19972f7922..0f954a40d3fc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -203,6 +203,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void) +{ + return READ_ONCE( + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]); +} + struct selinux_policy_convert_data; struct selinux_load_state { |