Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "Thirty three SELinux patches, which is a pretty big number for us, but
  there isn't really anything scary in here; in fact we actually manage
  to remove 10 lines of code with this :)

   - Promote the SELinux DEBUG_HASHES macro to CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG

     The DEBUG_HASHES macro was a buried SELinux specific preprocessor
     debug macro that was a problem waiting to happen. Promoting the
     debug macro to a proper Kconfig setting should help both improve
     the visibility of the feature as well enable improved test
     coverage. We've moved some additional debug functions under the
     CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG flag and we may see more work in the
     future.

   - Emit a pr_notice() message if virtual memory is executable by default

     As this impacts the SELinux access control policy enforcement, if
     the system's configuration is such that virtual memory is
     executable by default we print a single line notice to the console.

   - Drop avtab_search() in favor of avtab_search_node()

     Both functions are nearly identical so we removed avtab_search()
     and converted the callers to avtab_search_node().

   - Add some SELinux network auditing helpers

     The helpers not only reduce a small amount of code duplication, but
     they provide an opportunity to improve UDP flood performance
     slightly by delaying initialization of the audit data in some
     cases.

   - Convert GFP_ATOMIC allocators to GFP_KERNEL when reading SELinux policy

     There were two SELinux policy load helper functions that were
     allocating memory using GFP_ATOMIC, they have been converted to
     GFP_KERNEL.

   - Quiet a KMSAN warning in selinux_inet_conn_request()

     A one-line error path (re)set patch that resolves a KMSAN warning.
     It is important to note that this doesn't represent a real bug in
     the current code, but it quiets KMSAN and arguably hardens the code
     against future changes.

   - Cleanup the policy capability accessor functions

     This is a follow-up to the patch which reverted SELinux to using a
     global selinux_state pointer. This patch cleans up some artifacts
     of that change and turns each accessor into a one-line READ_ONCE()
     call into the policy capabilities array.

   - A number of patches from Christian Göttsche

     Christian submitted almost two-thirds of the patches in this pull
     request as he worked to harden the SELinux code against type
     differences, variable overflows, etc.

   - Support for separating early userspace from the kernel in policy,
     with a later revert

     We did have a patch that added a new userspace initial SID which
     would allow SELinux to distinguish between early user processes
     created before the initial policy load and the kernel itself.

     Unfortunately additional post-merge testing revealed a problematic
     interaction with an old SELinux userspace on an old version of
     Ubuntu so we've reverted the patch until we can resolve the
     compatibility issue.

   - Remove some outdated comments dealing with LSM hook registration

     When we removed the runtime disable functionality we forgot to
     remove some old comments discussing the importance of LSM hook
     registration ordering.

   - Minor administrative changes

     Stephen Smalley updated his email address and "debranded" SELinux
     from "NSA SELinux" to simply "SELinux". We've come a long way from
     the original NSA submission and I would consider SELinux a true
     community project at this point so removing the NSA branding just
     makes sense"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (33 commits)
  selinux: prevent KMSAN warning in selinux_inet_conn_request()
  selinux: use unsigned iterator in nlmsgtab code
  selinux: avoid implicit conversions in policydb code
  selinux: avoid implicit conversions in selinuxfs code
  selinux: make left shifts well defined
  selinux: update type for number of class permissions in services code
  selinux: avoid implicit conversions in avtab code
  selinux: revert SECINITSID_INIT support
  selinux: use GFP_KERNEL while reading binary policy
  selinux: update comment on selinux_hooks[]
  selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code
  selinux: avoid implicit conversions in mls code
  selinux: use identical iterator type in hashtab_duplicate()
  selinux: move debug functions into debug configuration
  selinux: log about VM being executable by default
  selinux: fix a 0/NULL mistmatch in ad_net_init_from_iif()
  selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configuration
  selinux: introduce and use lsm_ad_net_init*() helpers
  selinux: update my email address
  selinux: add missing newlines in pr_err() statements
  ...

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 78946b71c1c1..1eeffc66ea7d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the security services.
  *
- * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
 {
 	u16 i, j;
-	unsigned k;
 	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
 
 	/* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
@@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 	while (map[j].name) {
 		const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
 		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+		u16 k;
 
 		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
 		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
@@ -207,22 +207,22 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		}
 		avd->allowed = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
 			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		avd->auditallow = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
 			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
-				result |= 1<<i;
+				result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
 		 * should audit that denial
 		 */
 		for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
-			result |= 1<<i;
+			result |= (u32)1<<i;
 		avd->auditdeny = result;
 	}
 }
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
 	struct type_datum *type;
-	int index;
+	u32 index;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized())
@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
-		int i;
+		u32 i;
 
 		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
 			const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u32 specified,
+				u16 specified,
 				const char *objname,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
@@ -1706,8 +1706,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
 	struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
-	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
-	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct avtab_node *avnode, *node;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
@@ -1815,22 +1814,22 @@ retry:
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
-	if (!avdatum) {
+	if (!avnode) {
 		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
-				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				avnode = node;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (avdatum) {
+	if (avnode) {
 		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
-		newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+		newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data;
 	}
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
@@ -2822,7 +2821,6 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
 	struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
-	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
 	struct ocontext *c;
@@ -2844,7 +2842,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
-		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		size_t len = strlen(c->u.name);
 		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
 		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
 			break;
@@ -3332,7 +3330,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 {
 	struct class_datum *datum = d;
 	char *name = k, **classes = args;
-	int value = datum->value - 1;
+	u32 value = datum->value - 1;
 
 	classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!classes[value])
@@ -3342,7 +3340,7 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 }
 
 int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int rc;
@@ -3358,7 +3356,8 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 	rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			 *classes);
 	if (rc) {
-		int i;
+		u32 i;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
 			kfree((*classes)[i]);
 		kfree(*classes);
@@ -3372,7 +3371,7 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 {
 	struct perm_datum *datum = d;
 	char *name = k, **perms = args;
-	int value = datum->value - 1;
+	u32 value = datum->value - 1;
 
 	perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!perms[value])
@@ -3382,10 +3381,11 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 }
 
 int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
-			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+			     const char *class, char ***perms, u32 *nperms)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
-	int rc, i;
+	u32 i;
+	int rc;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3600,7 +3600,7 @@ err:
 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 {
-	int i;
+	u32 i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
 		struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];