Merge branch 'bpf-token'

Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
BPF token

This patch set is a combination of three BPF token-related patch sets ([0],
[1], [2]) with fixes ([3]) to kernel-side token_fd passing APIs incorporated
into relevant patches, bpf_token_capable() changes requested by
Christian Brauner, and necessary libbpf and BPF selftests side adjustments.

This patch set introduces an ability to delegate a subset of BPF subsystem
functionality from privileged system-wide daemon (e.g., systemd or any other
container manager) through special mount options for userns-bound BPF FS to
a *trusted* unprivileged application. Trust is the key here. This
functionality is not about allowing unconditional unprivileged BPF usage.
Establishing trust, though, is completely up to the discretion of respective
privileged application that would create and mount a BPF FS instance with
delegation enabled, as different production setups can and do achieve it
through a combination of different means (signing, LSM, code reviews, etc),
and it's undesirable and infeasible for kernel to enforce any particular way
of validating trustworthiness of particular process.

The main motivation for this work is a desire to enable containerized BPF
applications to be used together with user namespaces. This is currently
impossible, as CAP_BPF, required for BPF subsystem usage, cannot be namespaced
or sandboxed, as a general rule. E.g., tracing BPF programs, thanks to BPF
helpers like bpf_probe_read_kernel() and bpf_probe_read_user() can safely read
arbitrary memory, and it's impossible to ensure that they only read memory of
processes belonging to any given namespace. This means that it's impossible to
have a mechanically verifiable namespace-aware CAP_BPF capability, and as such
another mechanism to allow safe usage of BPF functionality is necessary.

BPF FS delegation mount options and BPF token derived from such BPF FS instance
is such a mechanism. Kernel makes no assumption about what "trusted"
constitutes in any particular case, and it's up to specific privileged
applications and their surrounding infrastructure to decide that. What kernel
provides is a set of APIs to setup and mount special BPF FS instance and
derive BPF tokens from it. BPF FS and BPF token are both bound to its owning
userns and in such a way are constrained inside intended container. Users can
then pass BPF token FD to privileged bpf() syscall commands, like BPF map
creation and BPF program loading, to perform such operations without having
init userns privileges.

This version incorporates feedback and suggestions ([4]) received on earlier
iterations of BPF token approach, and instead of allowing to create BPF tokens
directly assuming capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), we instead enhance BPF FS to accept
a few new delegation mount options. If these options are used and BPF FS itself
is properly created, set up, and mounted inside the user namespaced container,
user application is able to derive a BPF token object from BPF FS instance, and
pass that token to bpf() syscall. As explained in patch #3, BPF token itself
doesn't grant access to BPF functionality, but instead allows kernel to do
namespaced capabilities checks (ns_capable() vs capable()) for CAP_BPF,
CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, and CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as applicable. So it forms one
half of a puzzle and allows container managers and sys admins to have safe and
flexible configuration options: determining which containers get delegation of
BPF functionality through BPF FS, and then which applications within such
containers are allowed to perform bpf() commands, based on namespaces
capabilities.

Previous attempt at addressing this very same problem ([5]) attempted to
utilize authoritative LSM approach, but was conclusively rejected by upstream
LSM maintainers. BPF token concept is not changing anything about LSM
approach, but can be combined with LSM hooks for very fine-grained security
policy. Some ideas about making BPF token more convenient to use with LSM (in
particular custom BPF LSM programs) was briefly described in recent LSF/MM/BPF
2023 presentation ([6]). E.g., an ability to specify user-provided data
(context), which in combination with BPF LSM would allow implementing a very
dynamic and fine-granular custom security policies on top of BPF token. In the
interest of minimizing API surface area and discussions this was relegated to
follow up patches, as it's not essential to the fundamental concept of
delegatable BPF token.

It should be noted that BPF token is conceptually quite similar to the idea of
/dev/bpf device file, proposed by Song a while ago ([7]). The biggest
difference is the idea of using virtual anon_inode file to hold BPF token and
allowing multiple independent instances of them, each (potentially) with its
own set of restrictions. And also, crucially, BPF token approach is not using
any special stateful task-scoped flags. Instead, bpf() syscall accepts
token_fd parameters explicitly for each relevant BPF command. This addresses
main concerns brought up during the /dev/bpf discussion, and fits better with
overall BPF subsystem design.

Second part of this patch set adds full support for BPF token in libbpf's BPF
object high-level API. Good chunk of the changes rework libbpf feature
detection internals, which are the most affected by BPF token presence.

Besides internal refactorings, libbpf allows to pass location of BPF FS from
which BPF token should be created by libbpf. This can be done explicitly though
a new bpf_object_open_opts.bpf_token_path field. But we also add implicit BPF
token creation logic to BPF object load step, even without any explicit
involvement of the user. If the environment is setup properly, BPF token will
be created transparently and used implicitly. This allows for all existing
application to gain BPF token support by just linking with latest version of
libbpf library. No source code modifications are required.  All that under
assumption that privileged container management agent properly set up default
BPF FS instance at /sys/bpf/fs to allow BPF token creation.

libbpf adds support to override default BPF FS location for BPF token creation
through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar knowledge. This allows admins or container
managers to mount BPF token-enabled BPF FS at non-standard location without the
need to coordinate with applications.  LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH can also be used
to disable BPF token implicit creation by setting it to an empty value.

  [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=805707&state=*
  [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=810260&state=*
  [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=809800&state=*
  [3] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231219053150.336991-1-andrii@kernel.org/
  [4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
  [5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230412043300.360803-1-andrii@kernel.org/
  [6] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/Trusted_unprivileged_BPF_LSFMM2023.pdf
  [7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190627201923.2589391-2-songliubraving@fb.com/

v1->v2:
  - disable BPF token creation in init userns, and simplify
    bpf_token_capable() logic (Christian);
  - use kzalloc/kfree instead of kvzalloc/kvfree (Linus);
  - few more selftest cases to validate LSM and BPF token interations.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124022127.2379740-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 34 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
index b133acfe08fb..97ec005c3c47 100644
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int sys_bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, int attempts)
  *   [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201201215900.3569844-1-guro@fb.com/
  *   [1] d05512618056 ("bpf: Add bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns helper")
  */
-int probe_memcg_account(void)
+int probe_memcg_account(int token_fd)
 {
 	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, attach_btf_obj_fd);
 	struct bpf_insn insns[] = {
@@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ int probe_memcg_account(void)
 	attr.insns = ptr_to_u64(insns);
 	attr.insn_cnt = insn_cnt;
 	attr.license = ptr_to_u64("GPL");
+	attr.prog_token_fd = token_fd;
+	if (token_fd)
+		attr.prog_flags |= BPF_F_TOKEN_FD;
 
 	prog_fd = sys_bpf_fd(BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, attr_sz);
 	if (prog_fd >= 0) {
@@ -146,7 +149,7 @@ int bump_rlimit_memlock(void)
 	struct rlimit rlim;
 
 	/* if kernel supports memcg-based accounting, skip bumping RLIMIT_MEMLOCK */
-	if (memlock_bumped || kernel_supports(NULL, FEAT_MEMCG_ACCOUNT))
+	if (memlock_bumped || feat_supported(NULL, FEAT_MEMCG_ACCOUNT))
 		return 0;
 
 	memlock_bumped = true;
@@ -169,8 +172,7 @@ int bpf_map_create(enum bpf_map_type map_type,
 		   __u32 max_entries,
 		   const struct bpf_map_create_opts *opts)
 {
-	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr,
-					   value_type_btf_obj_fd);
+	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, map_token_fd);
 	union bpf_attr attr;
 	int fd;
 
@@ -182,7 +184,7 @@ int bpf_map_create(enum bpf_map_type map_type,
 		return libbpf_err(-EINVAL);
 
 	attr.map_type = map_type;
-	if (map_name && kernel_supports(NULL, FEAT_PROG_NAME))
+	if (map_name && feat_supported(NULL, FEAT_PROG_NAME))
 		libbpf_strlcpy(attr.map_name, map_name, sizeof(attr.map_name));
 	attr.key_size = key_size;
 	attr.value_size = value_size;
@@ -200,6 +202,8 @@ int bpf_map_create(enum bpf_map_type map_type,
 	attr.numa_node = OPTS_GET(opts, numa_node, 0);
 	attr.map_ifindex = OPTS_GET(opts, map_ifindex, 0);
 
+	attr.map_token_fd = OPTS_GET(opts, token_fd, 0);
+
 	fd = sys_bpf_fd(BPF_MAP_CREATE, &attr, attr_sz);
 	return libbpf_err_errno(fd);
 }
@@ -234,7 +238,7 @@ int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
 		  const struct bpf_insn *insns, size_t insn_cnt,
 		  struct bpf_prog_load_opts *opts)
 {
-	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, log_true_size);
+	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, prog_token_fd);
 	void *finfo = NULL, *linfo = NULL;
 	const char *func_info, *line_info;
 	__u32 log_size, log_level, attach_prog_fd, attach_btf_obj_fd;
@@ -263,8 +267,9 @@ int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
 	attr.prog_flags = OPTS_GET(opts, prog_flags, 0);
 	attr.prog_ifindex = OPTS_GET(opts, prog_ifindex, 0);
 	attr.kern_version = OPTS_GET(opts, kern_version, 0);
+	attr.prog_token_fd = OPTS_GET(opts, token_fd, 0);
 
-	if (prog_name && kernel_supports(NULL, FEAT_PROG_NAME))
+	if (prog_name && feat_supported(NULL, FEAT_PROG_NAME))
 		libbpf_strlcpy(attr.prog_name, prog_name, sizeof(attr.prog_name));
 	attr.license = ptr_to_u64(license);
 
@@ -1184,7 +1189,7 @@ int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const char *name, int prog_fd)
 
 int bpf_btf_load(const void *btf_data, size_t btf_size, struct bpf_btf_load_opts *opts)
 {
-	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, btf_log_true_size);
+	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, btf_token_fd);
 	union bpf_attr attr;
 	char *log_buf;
 	size_t log_size;
@@ -1209,6 +1214,10 @@ int bpf_btf_load(const void *btf_data, size_t btf_size, struct bpf_btf_load_opts
 
 	attr.btf = ptr_to_u64(btf_data);
 	attr.btf_size = btf_size;
+
+	attr.btf_flags = OPTS_GET(opts, btf_flags, 0);
+	attr.btf_token_fd = OPTS_GET(opts, token_fd, 0);
+
 	/* log_level == 0 and log_buf != NULL means "try loading without
 	 * log_buf, but retry with log_buf and log_level=1 on error", which is
 	 * consistent across low-level and high-level BTF and program loading
@@ -1289,3 +1298,20 @@ int bpf_prog_bind_map(int prog_fd, int map_fd,
 	ret = sys_bpf(BPF_PROG_BIND_MAP, &attr, attr_sz);
 	return libbpf_err_errno(ret);
 }
+
+int bpf_token_create(int bpffs_fd, struct bpf_token_create_opts *opts)
+{
+	const size_t attr_sz = offsetofend(union bpf_attr, token_create);
+	union bpf_attr attr;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (!OPTS_VALID(opts, bpf_token_create_opts))
+		return libbpf_err(-EINVAL);
+
+	memset(&attr, 0, attr_sz);
+	attr.token_create.bpffs_fd = bpffs_fd;
+	attr.token_create.flags = OPTS_GET(opts, flags, 0);
+
+	fd = sys_bpf_fd(BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, &attr, attr_sz);
+	return libbpf_err_errno(fd);
+}