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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c171
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c30
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c59
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h1
8 files changed, 134 insertions, 169 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index ed5c01df21ba..73cdcbccc89e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -39,16 +39,6 @@
#define INVALID_PAE_ROOT 0
#define IS_VALID_PAE_ROOT(x) (!!(x))
-static inline hpa_t kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root(void)
-{
- return my_zero_pfn(0) << PAGE_SHIFT;
-}
-
-static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(hpa_t shadow_page)
-{
- return is_zero_pfn(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
typedef u64 __rcu *tdp_ptep_t;
struct kvm_mmu_page {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
index 3133f066927e..91ce29fd6f1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h
@@ -246,6 +246,16 @@ static inline int spte_index(u64 *sptep)
*/
extern u64 __read_mostly shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask;
+static inline hpa_t kvm_mmu_get_dummy_root(void)
+{
+ return my_zero_pfn(0) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(hpa_t shadow_page)
+{
+ return is_zero_pfn(shadow_page >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
static inline struct kvm_mmu_page *to_shadow_page(hpa_t shadow_page)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page((shadow_page) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 976d0706c920..40777278eabb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@
static bool __read_mostly enable_shadow_vmcs = 1;
module_param_named(enable_shadow_vmcs, enable_shadow_vmcs, bool, S_IRUGO);
-static bool __read_mostly nested_early_check = 0;
-module_param(nested_early_check, bool, S_IRUGO);
+static bool __ro_after_init warn_on_missed_cc;
+module_param(warn_on_missed_cc, bool, 0444);
#define CC KVM_NESTED_VMENTER_CONSISTENCY_CHECK
@@ -555,6 +555,9 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_tpr_shadow_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (CC(!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr)))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (CC(!nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) && vmcs12->tpr_threshold >> 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -761,7 +764,7 @@ static void nested_cache_shadow_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer, VMCS12_SIZE))
return;
- kvm_read_guest_cached(vmx->vcpu.kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
+ kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
VMCS12_SIZE);
}
@@ -780,7 +783,7 @@ static void nested_flush_cached_shadow_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer, VMCS12_SIZE))
return;
- kvm_write_guest_cached(vmx->vcpu.kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
+ kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, ghc, get_shadow_vmcs12(vcpu),
VMCS12_SIZE);
}
@@ -2296,15 +2299,6 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_constant_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
return;
vmx->nested.vmcs02_initialized = true;
- /*
- * We don't care what the EPTP value is we just need to guarantee
- * it's valid so we don't get a false positive when doing early
- * consistency checks.
- */
- if (enable_ept && nested_early_check)
- vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER,
- construct_eptp(&vmx->vcpu, 0, PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL));
-
if (vmx->ve_info)
vmcs_write64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS, __pa(vmx->ve_info));
@@ -2749,7 +2743,7 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat);
vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->guest_ia32_pat;
} else if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vcpu->arch.pat);
}
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
@@ -2961,6 +2955,10 @@ static int nested_check_vm_execution_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
}
+ if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING) &&
+ CC(!vmcs12->tsc_multiplier))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -3078,6 +3076,38 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
+static int nested_vmx_check_controls_late(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ void *vapic = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
+ u32 vtpr = vapic ? (*(u32 *)(vapic + APIC_TASKPRI)) >> 4 : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't bother with the consistency checks if KVM isn't configured to
+ * WARN on missed consistency checks, as KVM needs to rely on hardware
+ * to fully detect an illegal vTPR vs. TRP Threshold combination due to
+ * the vTPR being writable by L1 at all times (it's an in-memory value,
+ * not a VMCS field). I.e. even if the check passes now, it might fail
+ * at the actual VM-Enter.
+ *
+ * Keying off the module param also allows treating an invalid vAPIC
+ * mapping as a consistency check failure without increasing the risk
+ * of breaking a "real" VM.
+ */
+ if (!warn_on_missed_cc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
+ nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has_vid(vmcs12) &&
+ !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES) &&
+ (CC(!vapic) ||
+ CC((vmcs12->tpr_threshold & GENMASK(3, 0)) > (vtpr & GENMASK(3, 0)))))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int nested_vmx_check_address_space_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
@@ -3333,84 +3363,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return 0;
}
-static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long cr3, cr4;
- bool vm_fail;
-
- if (!nested_early_check)
- return 0;
-
- if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
- if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr)
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
-
- preempt_disable();
-
- vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * Induce a consistency check VMExit by clearing bit 1 in GUEST_RFLAGS,
- * which is reserved to '1' by hardware. GUEST_RFLAGS is guaranteed to
- * be written (by prepare_vmcs02()) before the "real" VMEnter, i.e.
- * there is no need to preserve other bits or save/restore the field.
- */
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0);
-
- cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
- if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
- }
-
- cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
- if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
- }
-
- vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
- __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
-
- if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
- if (vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr)
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
-
- if (vm_fail) {
- u32 error = vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
-
- preempt_enable();
-
- trace_kvm_nested_vmenter_failed(
- "early hardware check VM-instruction error: ", error);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(error != VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
- return 1;
- }
-
- /*
- * VMExit clears RFLAGS.IF and DR7, even on a consistency check.
- */
- if (hw_breakpoint_active())
- set_debugreg(__this_cpu_read(cpu_dr7), 7);
- local_irq_enable();
- preempt_enable();
-
- /*
- * A non-failing VMEntry means we somehow entered guest mode with
- * an illegal RIP, and that's just the tip of the iceberg. There
- * is no telling what memory has been modified or what state has
- * been exposed to unknown code. Hitting this all but guarantees
- * a (very critical) hardware issue.
- */
- WARN_ON(!(vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON) &
- VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV
static bool nested_get_evmcs_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -3667,22 +3619,18 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
&vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_ssp_tbl);
/*
- * Overwrite vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 with L1's CR3 if EPT is disabled *and*
- * nested early checks are disabled. In the event of a "late" VM-Fail,
- * i.e. a VM-Fail detected by hardware but not KVM, KVM must unwind its
- * software model to the pre-VMEntry host state. When EPT is disabled,
- * GUEST_CR3 holds KVM's shadow CR3, not L1's "real" CR3, which causes
- * nested_vmx_restore_host_state() to corrupt vcpu->arch.cr3. Stuffing
- * vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 results in the unwind naturally setting arch.cr3 to
- * the correct value. Smashing vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is safe because nested
- * VM-Exits, and the unwind, reset KVM's MMU, i.e. vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is
- * guaranteed to be overwritten with a shadow CR3 prior to re-entering
- * L1. Don't stuff vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 when using nested early checks as
- * KVM modifies vcpu->arch.cr3 if and only if the early hardware checks
- * pass, and early VM-Fails do not reset KVM's MMU, i.e. the VM-Fail
- * path would need to manually save/restore vmcs01.GUEST_CR3.
+ * Overwrite vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 with L1's CR3 if EPT is disabled. In the
+ * event of a "late" VM-Fail, i.e. a VM-Fail detected by hardware but
+ * not KVM, KVM must unwind its software model to the pre-VM-Entry host
+ * state. When EPT is disabled, GUEST_CR3 holds KVM's shadow CR3, not
+ * L1's "real" CR3, which causes nested_vmx_restore_host_state() to
+ * corrupt vcpu->arch.cr3. Stuffing vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 results in the
+ * unwind naturally setting arch.cr3 to the correct value. Smashing
+ * vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is safe because nested VM-Exits, and the unwind,
+ * reset KVM's MMU, i.e. vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is guaranteed to be
+ * overwritten with a shadow CR3 prior to re-entering L1.
*/
- if (!enable_ept && !nested_early_check)
+ if (!enable_ept)
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, vcpu->arch.cr3);
vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->nested.vmcs02);
@@ -3695,7 +3643,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return NVMX_VMENTRY_KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- if (nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(vcpu)) {
+ if (nested_vmx_check_controls_late(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
return NVMX_VMENTRY_VMFAIL;
}
@@ -5164,12 +5112,13 @@ void __nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
/*
* The only expected VM-instruction error is "VM entry with
* invalid control field(s)." Anything else indicates a
- * problem with L0. And we should never get here with a
- * VMFail of any type if early consistency checks are enabled.
+ * problem with L0.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR) !=
VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(nested_early_check);
+
+ /* VM-Fail at VM-Entry means KVM missed a consistency check. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(warn_on_missed_cc);
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index f2d8fc3fecaa..2d7a4d52ccfb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -2706,9 +2706,11 @@ DEFINE_CLASS(tdx_vm_state_guard, tdx_vm_state_guard_t,
static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
{
+ struct kvm_tdx_init_vm __user *user_data = u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data);
struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);
struct kvm_tdx_init_vm *init_vm;
struct td_params *td_params = NULL;
+ u32 nr_user_entries;
int ret;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*init_vm) != 256 + sizeof_field(struct kvm_tdx_init_vm, cpuid));
@@ -2720,28 +2722,16 @@ static int tdx_td_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
if (cmd->flags)
return -EINVAL;
- init_vm = kmalloc(sizeof(*init_vm) +
- sizeof(init_vm->cpuid.entries[0]) * KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!init_vm)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (copy_from_user(init_vm, u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data), sizeof(*init_vm))) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (get_user(nr_user_entries, &user_data->cpuid.nent))
+ return -EFAULT;
- if (init_vm->cpuid.nent > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES) {
- ret = -E2BIG;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (nr_user_entries > KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES)
+ return -E2BIG;
- if (copy_from_user(init_vm->cpuid.entries,
- u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->data) + sizeof(*init_vm),
- flex_array_size(init_vm, cpuid.entries, init_vm->cpuid.nent))) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
+ init_vm = memdup_user(user_data,
+ struct_size(user_data, cpuid.entries, nr_user_entries));
+ if (IS_ERR(init_vm))
+ return PTR_ERR(init_vm);
if (memchr_inv(init_vm->reserved, 0, sizeof(init_vm->reserved))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index 909be7bbe5bc..4426d34811fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -116,13 +116,23 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
* and vmentry.
*/
mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
- movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi
- movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi
- cmp %edi, %esi
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ mov VMX_spec_ctrl(%rdi), %rdx
+ cmp PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+ je .Lspec_ctrl_done
+ movl %edx, %eax
+ shr $32, %rdx
+#else
+ mov VMX_spec_ctrl(%edi), %eax
+ mov PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %ecx
+ xor %eax, %ecx
+ mov VMX_spec_ctrl + 4(%edi), %edx
+ mov PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current + 4), %edi
+ xor %edx, %edi
+ or %edi, %ecx
je .Lspec_ctrl_done
+#endif
mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
- xor %edx, %edx
- mov %edi, %eax
wrmsr
.Lspec_ctrl_done:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 2d98b7111746..4cbe8c84b636 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
}
-void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+static void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
{
int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
@@ -3329,6 +3329,40 @@ static inline int vmx_get_current_vpid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
}
+static u64 construct_eptp(hpa_t root_hpa)
+{
+ u64 eptp = root_hpa | VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+ struct kvm_mmu_page *root;
+
+ if (kvm_mmu_is_dummy_root(root_hpa))
+ return eptp | VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+
+ /*
+ * EPT roots should always have an associated MMU page. Return a "bad"
+ * EPTP to induce VM-Fail instead of continuing on in a unknown state.
+ */
+ root = root_to_sp(root_hpa);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root))
+ return INVALID_PAGE;
+
+ eptp |= (root->role.level == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+
+ if (enable_ept_ad_bits && !root->role.ad_disabled)
+ eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
+
+ return eptp;
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_ept_root(hpa_t root_hpa)
+{
+ u64 eptp = construct_eptp(root_hpa);
+
+ if (VALID_PAGE(eptp))
+ ept_sync_context(eptp);
+ else
+ ept_sync_global();
+}
+
void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
@@ -3339,8 +3373,7 @@ void vmx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;
if (enable_ept)
- ept_sync_context(construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa,
- mmu->root_role.level));
+ vmx_flush_tlb_ept_root(root_hpa);
else
vpid_sync_context(vmx_get_current_vpid(vcpu));
}
@@ -3506,30 +3539,16 @@ static int vmx_get_max_ept_level(void)
return 4;
}
-u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
-{
- u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
-
- eptp |= (root_level == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
-
- if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
- (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
- eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
- eptp |= root_hpa;
-
- return eptp;
-}
-
void vmx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level)
{
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
unsigned long guest_cr3;
- u64 eptp;
if (enable_ept) {
- eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, root_hpa, root_level);
- vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(root_to_sp(root_hpa) &&
+ root_level != root_to_sp(root_hpa)->role.level);
+ vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, construct_eptp(root_hpa));
hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index ea93121029f9..bc3ed3145d7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -369,7 +369,6 @@ void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
void __vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg);
-u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
bool vmx_guest_inject_ac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -681,7 +680,6 @@ struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs);
int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
-void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs);
static inline struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs(bool shadow)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index a7a870919580..d09abeac2b56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt);
-void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val);
void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg);