diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 |
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst index 5964901d66e3..d0bdbd81dcf9 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ SRSO X X X X SSB X TAA X X X X * (Note 2) TSA X X X X +VMSCAPE X =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ======== Notes: diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst index 48c7b0b72aed..754679db0ce8 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ XEON PHI specific considerations command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option. XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated - before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF + before the CPU enters an idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF either disabling SMT is not required for full protection. .. _mds_smt_control: diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 132e0bc6007e..991f12adef8d 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ Intel white papers: .. _spec_ref1: -[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_. +[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/analysis-of-speculative-execution-side-channels-white-paper.pdf>`_. .. _spec_ref2: @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ AMD white papers: .. _spec_ref5: -[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_. +[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/white-papers/111006-architecture-guidelines-update-amd64-technology-indirect-branch-control-extension.pdf>`_. .. _spec_ref6: @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ MIPS white paper: .. _spec_ref10: -[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_. +[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://web.archive.org/web/20220512003005if_/https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_. Academic papers: |