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-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst1
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst2
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst6
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
index 5964901d66e3..d0bdbd81dcf9 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst
@@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ SRSO X X X X
SSB X
TAA X X X X * (Note 2)
TSA X X X X
+VMSCAPE X
=============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ========
Notes:
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
index 48c7b0b72aed..754679db0ce8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ XEON PHI specific considerations
command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
- before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+ before the CPU enters an idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
.. _mds_smt_control:
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 132e0bc6007e..991f12adef8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ Intel white papers:
.. _spec_ref1:
-[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/Intel-Analysis-of-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channels.pdf>`_.
+[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels <https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/analysis-of-speculative-execution-side-channels-white-paper.pdf>`_.
.. _spec_ref2:
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref5:
-[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Architecture_Guidelines_Update_Indirect_Branch_Control.pdf>`_.
+[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension <https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/white-papers/111006-architecture-guidelines-update-amd64-technology-indirect-branch-control-extension.pdf>`_.
.. _spec_ref6:
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ MIPS white paper:
.. _spec_ref10:
-[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
+[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities <https://web.archive.org/web/20220512003005if_/https://www.mips.com/blog/mips-response-on-speculative-execution-and-side-channel-vulnerabilities/>`_.
Academic papers: