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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/mm/fault.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/mm/fault.c113
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 86 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index ec0a337891dd..fcc783e8e9bb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -53,18 +53,12 @@ struct fault_info {
};
static const struct fault_info fault_info[];
-static struct fault_info debug_fault_info[];
static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_fault_info(unsigned long esr)
{
return fault_info + (esr & ESR_ELx_FSC);
}
-static inline const struct fault_info *esr_to_debug_fault_info(unsigned long esr)
-{
- return debug_fault_info + DBG_ESR_EVT(esr);
-}
-
static void data_abort_decode(unsigned long esr)
{
unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr);
@@ -487,17 +481,29 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
}
}
-static bool fault_from_pkey(unsigned long esr, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned int mm_flags)
+static bool fault_from_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int mm_flags)
{
- unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr);
-
if (!system_supports_poe())
return false;
- if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr) && (iss2 & ESR_ELx_Overlay))
- return true;
-
+ /*
+ * We do not check whether an Overlay fault has occurred because we
+ * cannot make a decision based solely on its value:
+ *
+ * - If Overlay is set, a fault did occur due to POE, but it may be
+ * spurious in those cases where we update POR_EL0 without ISB (e.g.
+ * on context-switch). We would then need to manually check POR_EL0
+ * against vma_pkey(vma), which is exactly what
+ * arch_vma_access_permitted() does.
+ *
+ * - If Overlay is not set, we may still need to report a pkey fault.
+ * This is the case if an access was made within a mapping but with no
+ * page mapped, and POR_EL0 forbids the access (according to
+ * vma_pkey()). Such access will result in a SIGSEGV regardless
+ * because core code checks arch_vma_access_permitted(), but in order
+ * to report the correct error code - SEGV_PKUERR - we must handle
+ * that case here.
+ */
return !arch_vma_access_permitted(vma,
mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
@@ -635,7 +641,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
goto bad_area;
}
- if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
+ if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
vma_end_read(vma);
fault = 0;
@@ -679,7 +685,7 @@ retry:
goto bad_area;
}
- if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
+ if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
fault = 0;
@@ -826,6 +832,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
siaddr = untagged_addr(far);
}
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);
return 0;
@@ -837,9 +844,12 @@ static int do_tag_check_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
/*
* The architecture specifies that bits 63:60 of FAR_EL1 are UNKNOWN
* for tag check faults. Set them to corresponding bits in the untagged
- * address.
+ * address if ARM64_MTE_FAR isn't supported.
+ * Otherwise, bits 63:60 of FAR_EL1 are not UNKNOWN.
*/
- far = (__untagged_addr(far) & ~MTE_TAG_MASK) | (far & MTE_TAG_MASK);
+ if (!cpus_have_cap(ARM64_MTE_FAR))
+ far = (__untagged_addr(far) & ~MTE_TAG_MASK) | (far & MTE_TAG_MASK);
+
do_bad_area(far, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
@@ -939,75 +949,6 @@ void do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_sp_pc_abort);
/*
- * __refdata because early_brk64 is __init, but the reference to it is
- * clobbered at arch_initcall time.
- * See traps.c and debug-monitors.c:debug_traps_init().
- */
-static struct fault_info __refdata debug_fault_info[] = {
- { do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware breakpoint" },
- { do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware single-step" },
- { do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_HWBKPT, "hardware watchpoint" },
- { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 3" },
- { do_bad, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch32 BKPT" },
- { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "aarch32 vector catch" },
- { early_brk64, SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, "aarch64 BRK" },
- { do_bad, SIGKILL, SI_KERNEL, "unknown 7" },
-};
-
-void __init hook_debug_fault_code(int nr,
- int (*fn)(unsigned long, unsigned long, struct pt_regs *),
- int sig, int code, const char *name)
-{
- BUG_ON(nr < 0 || nr >= ARRAY_SIZE(debug_fault_info));
-
- debug_fault_info[nr].fn = fn;
- debug_fault_info[nr].sig = sig;
- debug_fault_info[nr].code = code;
- debug_fault_info[nr].name = name;
-}
-
-/*
- * In debug exception context, we explicitly disable preemption despite
- * having interrupts disabled.
- * This serves two purposes: it makes it much less likely that we would
- * accidentally schedule in exception context and it will force a warning
- * if we somehow manage to schedule by accident.
- */
-static void debug_exception_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- preempt_disable();
-
- /* This code is a bit fragile. Test it. */
- RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "exception_enter didn't work");
-}
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(debug_exception_enter);
-
-static void debug_exception_exit(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- preempt_enable_no_resched();
-}
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(debug_exception_exit);
-
-void do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr_if_watchpoint, unsigned long esr,
- struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- const struct fault_info *inf = esr_to_debug_fault_info(esr);
- unsigned long pc = instruction_pointer(regs);
-
- debug_exception_enter(regs);
-
- if (user_mode(regs) && !is_ttbr0_addr(pc))
- arm64_apply_bp_hardening();
-
- if (inf->fn(addr_if_watchpoint, esr, regs)) {
- arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, pc, esr);
- }
-
- debug_exception_exit(regs);
-}
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug_exception);
-
-/*
* Used during anonymous page fault handling.
*/
struct folio *vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,