diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/arena.c | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/btf.c | 118 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 203 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/core.c | 151 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 469 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/link_iter.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/local_storage.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.lskel-big-endian.h | 492 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/prog_iter.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/rqspinlock.c | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/stream.c | 526 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 289 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/tcx.c | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/tnum.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/token.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2345 |
26 files changed, 3514 insertions, 1317 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Makefile b/kernel/bpf/Makefile index 3a335c50e6e3..269c04a24664 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/Makefile +++ b/kernel/bpf/Makefile @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_local_storage.o bpf_task_storage.o obj-${CONFIG_BPF_LSM} += bpf_inode_storage.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += disasm.o mprog.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_JIT) += trampoline.o -obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += btf.o memalloc.o rqspinlock.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += btf.o memalloc.o rqspinlock.o stream.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_MMU)$(CONFIG_64BIT),yy) obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += arena.o range_tree.o endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arena.c b/kernel/bpf/arena.c index 0d56cea71602..5b37753799d2 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arena.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arena.c @@ -550,6 +550,34 @@ static void arena_free_pages(struct bpf_arena *arena, long uaddr, long page_cnt) } } +/* + * Reserve an arena virtual address range without populating it. This call stops + * bpf_arena_alloc_pages from adding pages to this range. + */ +static int arena_reserve_pages(struct bpf_arena *arena, long uaddr, u32 page_cnt) +{ + long page_cnt_max = (arena->user_vm_end - arena->user_vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + long pgoff; + int ret; + + if (uaddr & ~PAGE_MASK) + return 0; + + pgoff = compute_pgoff(arena, uaddr); + if (pgoff + page_cnt > page_cnt_max) + return -EINVAL; + + guard(mutex)(&arena->lock); + + /* Cannot guard already allocated pages. */ + ret = is_range_tree_set(&arena->rt, pgoff, page_cnt); + if (ret) + return -EBUSY; + + /* "Allocate" the region to prevent it from being allocated. */ + return range_tree_clear(&arena->rt, pgoff, page_cnt); +} + __bpf_kfunc_start_defs(); __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_arena_alloc_pages(void *p__map, void *addr__ign, u32 page_cnt, @@ -573,11 +601,26 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_arena_free_pages(void *p__map, void *ptr__ign, u32 page_cnt return; arena_free_pages(arena, (long)ptr__ign, page_cnt); } + +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_arena_reserve_pages(void *p__map, void *ptr__ign, u32 page_cnt) +{ + struct bpf_map *map = p__map; + struct bpf_arena *arena = container_of(map, struct bpf_arena, map); + + if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!page_cnt) + return 0; + + return arena_reserve_pages(arena, (long)ptr__ign, page_cnt); +} __bpf_kfunc_end_defs(); BTF_KFUNCS_START(arena_kfuncs) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_arena_alloc_pages, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_ARENA_RET | KF_ARENA_ARG2) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_arena_free_pages, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_ARENA_ARG2) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_arena_reserve_pages, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_ARENA_ARG2) BTF_KFUNCS_END(arena_kfuncs) static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set common_kfunc_set = { diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index eb28c0f219ee..3d080916faf9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -530,8 +530,6 @@ static int array_map_check_btf(const struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf_type *key_type, const struct btf_type *value_type) { - u32 int_data; - /* One exception for keyless BTF: .bss/.data/.rodata map */ if (btf_type_is_void(key_type)) { if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY || @@ -544,14 +542,11 @@ static int array_map_check_btf(const struct bpf_map *map, return 0; } - if (BTF_INFO_KIND(key_type->info) != BTF_KIND_INT) - return -EINVAL; - - int_data = *(u32 *)(key_type + 1); - /* bpf array can only take a u32 key. This check makes sure + /* + * Bpf array can only take a u32 key. This check makes sure * that the btf matches the attr used during map_create. */ - if (BTF_INT_BITS(int_data) != 32 || BTF_INT_OFFSET(int_data)) + if (!btf_type_is_i32(key_type)) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c index 380e9a7cac75..0cbcae727079 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c @@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(link_mutex); /* incremented on every opened seq_file */ static atomic64_t session_id; -static int prepare_seq_file(struct file *file, struct bpf_iter_link *link, - const struct bpf_iter_seq_info *seq_info); +static int prepare_seq_file(struct file *file, struct bpf_iter_link *link); static void bpf_iter_inc_seq_num(struct seq_file *seq) { @@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int iter_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct bpf_iter_link *link = inode->i_private; - return prepare_seq_file(file, link, __get_seq_info(link)); + return prepare_seq_file(file, link); } static int iter_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -553,7 +552,8 @@ int bpf_iter_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, if (!link) return -ENOMEM; - bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_ITER, &bpf_iter_link_lops, prog); + bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_ITER, &bpf_iter_link_lops, prog, + attr->link_create.attach_type); link->tinfo = tinfo; err = bpf_link_prime(&link->link, &link_primer); @@ -586,9 +586,9 @@ static void init_seq_meta(struct bpf_iter_priv_data *priv_data, priv_data->done_stop = false; } -static int prepare_seq_file(struct file *file, struct bpf_iter_link *link, - const struct bpf_iter_seq_info *seq_info) +static int prepare_seq_file(struct file *file, struct bpf_iter_link *link) { + const struct bpf_iter_seq_info *seq_info = __get_seq_info(link); struct bpf_iter_priv_data *priv_data; struct bpf_iter_target_info *tinfo; struct bpf_prog *prog; @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ int bpf_iter_new_fd(struct bpf_link *link) } iter_link = container_of(link, struct bpf_iter_link, link); - err = prepare_seq_file(file, iter_link, __get_seq_info(iter_link)); + err = prepare_seq_file(file, iter_link); if (err) goto free_file; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c index fa56c30833ff..b931fbceb54d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c @@ -722,13 +722,7 @@ int bpf_local_storage_map_check_btf(const struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf_type *key_type, const struct btf_type *value_type) { - u32 int_data; - - if (BTF_INFO_KIND(key_type->info) != BTF_KIND_INT) - return -EINVAL; - - int_data = *(u32 *)(key_type + 1); - if (BTF_INT_BITS(int_data) != 32 || BTF_INT_OFFSET(int_data)) + if (!btf_type_is_i32(key_type)) return -EINVAL; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c index 96113633e391..687a3e9c76f5 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static long bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, goto reset_unlock; } bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, - &bpf_struct_ops_link_lops, prog); + &bpf_struct_ops_link_lops, prog, prog->expected_attach_type); *plink++ = &link->link; ksym = kzalloc(sizeof(*ksym), GFP_USER); @@ -1351,7 +1351,8 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_link_create(union bpf_attr *attr) err = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } - bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, &bpf_struct_ops_map_lops, NULL); + bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, &bpf_struct_ops_map_lops, NULL, + attr->link_create.attach_type); err = bpf_link_prime(&link->link, &link_primer); if (err) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 1d2cf898e21e..64739308902f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -858,26 +858,43 @@ const struct btf_type *btf_type_by_id(const struct btf *btf, u32 type_id) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(btf_type_by_id); /* - * Regular int is not a bit field and it must be either - * u8/u16/u32/u64 or __int128. + * Check that the type @t is a regular int. This means that @t is not + * a bit field and it has the same size as either of u8/u16/u32/u64 + * or __int128. If @expected_size is not zero, then size of @t should + * be the same. A caller should already have checked that the type @t + * is an integer. */ +static bool __btf_type_int_is_regular(const struct btf_type *t, size_t expected_size) +{ + u32 int_data = btf_type_int(t); + u8 nr_bits = BTF_INT_BITS(int_data); + u8 nr_bytes = BITS_ROUNDUP_BYTES(nr_bits); + + return BITS_PER_BYTE_MASKED(nr_bits) == 0 && + BTF_INT_OFFSET(int_data) == 0 && + (nr_bytes <= 16 && is_power_of_2(nr_bytes)) && + (expected_size == 0 || nr_bytes == expected_size); +} + static bool btf_type_int_is_regular(const struct btf_type *t) { - u8 nr_bits, nr_bytes; - u32 int_data; + return __btf_type_int_is_regular(t, 0); +} - int_data = btf_type_int(t); - nr_bits = BTF_INT_BITS(int_data); - nr_bytes = BITS_ROUNDUP_BYTES(nr_bits); - if (BITS_PER_BYTE_MASKED(nr_bits) || - BTF_INT_OFFSET(int_data) || - (nr_bytes != sizeof(u8) && nr_bytes != sizeof(u16) && - nr_bytes != sizeof(u32) && nr_bytes != sizeof(u64) && - nr_bytes != (2 * sizeof(u64)))) { - return false; - } +bool btf_type_is_i32(const struct btf_type *t) +{ + return btf_type_is_int(t) && __btf_type_int_is_regular(t, 4); +} - return true; +bool btf_type_is_i64(const struct btf_type *t) +{ + return btf_type_is_int(t) && __btf_type_int_is_regular(t, 8); +} + +bool btf_type_is_primitive(const struct btf_type *t) +{ + return (btf_type_is_int(t) && btf_type_int_is_regular(t)) || + btf_is_any_enum(t); } /* @@ -3443,7 +3460,8 @@ btf_find_graph_root(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *pt, node_field_name = strstr(value_type, ":"); if (!node_field_name) return -EINVAL; - value_type = kstrndup(value_type, node_field_name - value_type, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + value_type = kstrndup(value_type, node_field_name - value_type, + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!value_type) return -ENOMEM; id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, value_type, BTF_KIND_STRUCT); @@ -3958,7 +3976,7 @@ struct btf_record *btf_parse_fields(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type /* This needs to be kzalloc to zero out padding and unused fields, see * comment in btf_record_equal. */ - rec = kzalloc(struct_size(rec, fields, cnt), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + rec = kzalloc(struct_size(rec, fields, cnt), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!rec) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -6182,8 +6200,7 @@ int get_kern_ctx_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, enum bpf_prog_type prog_ty return kctx_type_id; } -BTF_ID_LIST(bpf_ctx_convert_btf_id) -BTF_ID(struct, bpf_ctx_convert) +BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_ctx_convert_btf_id, struct, bpf_ctx_convert) static struct btf *btf_parse_base(struct btf_verifier_env *env, const char *name, void *data, unsigned int data_size) @@ -6903,6 +6920,7 @@ enum bpf_struct_walk_result { /* < 0 error */ WALK_SCALAR = 0, WALK_PTR, + WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED, WALK_STRUCT, }; @@ -7144,6 +7162,8 @@ error: *field_name = mname; return WALK_PTR; } + + return WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED; } /* Allow more flexible access within an int as long as @@ -7216,6 +7236,9 @@ int btf_struct_access(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, *next_btf_id = id; *flag = tmp_flag; return PTR_TO_BTF_ID; + case WALK_PTR_UNTRUSTED: + *flag = MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + return PTR_TO_MEM; case WALK_SCALAR: return SCALAR_VALUE; case WALK_STRUCT: @@ -7628,11 +7651,12 @@ cand_cache_unlock: } enum btf_arg_tag { - ARG_TAG_CTX = BIT_ULL(0), - ARG_TAG_NONNULL = BIT_ULL(1), - ARG_TAG_TRUSTED = BIT_ULL(2), - ARG_TAG_NULLABLE = BIT_ULL(3), - ARG_TAG_ARENA = BIT_ULL(4), + ARG_TAG_CTX = BIT_ULL(0), + ARG_TAG_NONNULL = BIT_ULL(1), + ARG_TAG_TRUSTED = BIT_ULL(2), + ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED = BIT_ULL(3), + ARG_TAG_NULLABLE = BIT_ULL(4), + ARG_TAG_ARENA = BIT_ULL(5), }; /* Process BTF of a function to produce high-level expectation of function @@ -7740,6 +7764,8 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) tags |= ARG_TAG_CTX; } else if (strcmp(tag, "trusted") == 0) { tags |= ARG_TAG_TRUSTED; + } else if (strcmp(tag, "untrusted") == 0) { + tags |= ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED; } else if (strcmp(tag, "nonnull") == 0) { tags |= ARG_TAG_NONNULL; } else if (strcmp(tag, "nullable") == 0) { @@ -7800,6 +7826,38 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id; continue; } + if (tags & ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) { + struct btf *vmlinux_btf; + int kern_type_id; + + if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_UNTRUSTED) { + bpf_log(log, "arg#%d untrusted cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t->type, NULL); + if (btf_type_is_void(ref_t) || btf_type_is_primitive(ref_t)) { + sub->args[i].arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + sub->args[i].mem_size = 0; + continue; + } + + kern_type_id = btf_get_ptr_to_btf_id(log, i, btf, t); + if (kern_type_id < 0) + return kern_type_id; + + vmlinux_btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(); + ref_t = btf_type_by_id(vmlinux_btf, kern_type_id); + if (!btf_type_is_struct(ref_t)) { + tname = __btf_name_by_offset(vmlinux_btf, t->name_off); + bpf_log(log, "arg#%d has type %s '%s', but only struct or primitive types are allowed\n", + i, btf_type_str(ref_t), tname); + return -EINVAL; + } + sub->args[i].arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + sub->args[i].btf_id = kern_type_id; + continue; + } if (tags & ARG_TAG_ARENA) { if (tags & ~ARG_TAG_ARENA) { bpf_log(log, "arg#%d arena cannot be combined with any other tags\n", i); @@ -8183,7 +8241,7 @@ static int btf_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long op, attr->attr.mode = 0444; attr->size = btf->data_size; attr->private = btf->data; - attr->read_new = sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read; + attr->read = sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read; err = sysfs_create_bin_file(btf_kobj, attr); if (err) { @@ -9019,7 +9077,7 @@ static struct bpf_cand_cache *populate_cand_cache(struct bpf_cand_cache *cands, bpf_free_cands_from_cache(*cc); *cc = NULL; } - new_cands = kmemdup(cands, sizeof_cands(cands->cnt), GFP_KERNEL); + new_cands = kmemdup(cands, sizeof_cands(cands->cnt), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!new_cands) { bpf_free_cands(cands); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -9027,7 +9085,7 @@ static struct bpf_cand_cache *populate_cand_cache(struct bpf_cand_cache *cands, /* strdup the name, since it will stay in cache. * the cands->name points to strings in prog's BTF and the prog can be unloaded. */ - new_cands->name = kmemdup_nul(cands->name, cands->name_len, GFP_KERNEL); + new_cands->name = kmemdup_nul(cands->name, cands->name_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); bpf_free_cands(cands); if (!new_cands->name) { kfree(new_cands); @@ -9111,7 +9169,7 @@ bpf_core_add_cands(struct bpf_cand_cache *cands, const struct btf *targ_btf, continue; /* most of the time there is only one candidate for a given kind+name pair */ - new_cands = kmalloc(sizeof_cands(cands->cnt + 1), GFP_KERNEL); + new_cands = kmalloc(sizeof_cands(cands->cnt + 1), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!new_cands) { bpf_free_cands(cands); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -9228,7 +9286,7 @@ int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo, /* ~4k of temp memory necessary to convert LLVM spec like "0:1:0:5" * into arrays of btf_ids of struct fields and array indices. */ - specs = kcalloc(3, sizeof(*specs), GFP_KERNEL); + specs = kcalloc(3, sizeof(*specs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!specs) return -ENOMEM; @@ -9253,7 +9311,7 @@ int bpf_core_apply(struct bpf_core_ctx *ctx, const struct bpf_core_relo *relo, goto out; } if (cc->cnt) { - cands.cands = kcalloc(cc->cnt, sizeof(*cands.cands), GFP_KERNEL); + cands.cands = kcalloc(cc->cnt, sizeof(*cands.cands), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!cands.cands) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index f4885514f007..180b630279b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -658,6 +658,116 @@ static struct bpf_prog_list *find_attach_entry(struct hlist_head *progs, return NULL; } +static struct bpf_link *bpf_get_anchor_link(u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd) +{ + struct bpf_link *link = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (flags & BPF_F_ID) + link = bpf_link_by_id(id_or_fd); + else if (id_or_fd) + link = bpf_link_get_from_fd(id_or_fd); + return link; +} + +static struct bpf_prog *bpf_get_anchor_prog(u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd) +{ + struct bpf_prog *prog = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if (flags & BPF_F_ID) + prog = bpf_prog_by_id(id_or_fd); + else if (id_or_fd) + prog = bpf_prog_get(id_or_fd); + return prog; +} + +static struct bpf_prog_list *get_prog_list(struct hlist_head *progs, struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd) +{ + bool is_link = flags & BPF_F_LINK, is_id = flags & BPF_F_ID; + struct bpf_prog_list *pltmp, *pl = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + bool preorder = flags & BPF_F_PREORDER; + struct bpf_link *anchor_link = NULL; + struct bpf_prog *anchor_prog = NULL; + bool is_before, is_after; + + is_before = flags & BPF_F_BEFORE; + is_after = flags & BPF_F_AFTER; + if (is_link || is_id || id_or_fd) { + /* flags must have either BPF_F_BEFORE or BPF_F_AFTER */ + if (is_before == is_after) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if ((is_link && !link) || (!is_link && !prog)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } else if (!hlist_empty(progs)) { + /* flags cannot have both BPF_F_BEFORE and BPF_F_AFTER */ + if (is_before && is_after) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + + if (is_link) { + anchor_link = bpf_get_anchor_link(flags, id_or_fd); + if (IS_ERR(anchor_link)) + return ERR_CAST(anchor_link); + } else if (is_id || id_or_fd) { + anchor_prog = bpf_get_anchor_prog(flags, id_or_fd); + if (IS_ERR(anchor_prog)) + return ERR_CAST(anchor_prog); + } + + if (!anchor_prog && !anchor_link) { + /* if there is no anchor_prog/anchor_link, then BPF_F_PREORDER + * doesn't matter since either prepend or append to a combined + * list of progs will end up with correct result. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(pltmp, progs, node) { + if (is_before) + return pltmp; + if (pltmp->node.next) + continue; + return pltmp; + } + return NULL; + } + + hlist_for_each_entry(pltmp, progs, node) { + if ((anchor_prog && anchor_prog == pltmp->prog) || + (anchor_link && anchor_link == &pltmp->link->link)) { + if (!!(pltmp->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER) != preorder) + goto out; + pl = pltmp; + goto out; + } + } + + pl = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); +out: + if (anchor_link) + bpf_link_put(anchor_link); + else + bpf_prog_put(anchor_prog); + return pl; +} + +static int insert_pl_to_hlist(struct bpf_prog_list *pl, struct hlist_head *progs, + struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, + u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd) +{ + struct bpf_prog_list *pltmp; + + pltmp = get_prog_list(progs, prog, link, flags, id_or_fd); + if (IS_ERR(pltmp)) + return PTR_ERR(pltmp); + + if (!pltmp) + hlist_add_head(&pl->node, progs); + else if (flags & BPF_F_BEFORE) + hlist_add_before(&pl->node, &pltmp->node); + else + hlist_add_behind(&pl->node, &pltmp->node); + + return 0; +} + /** * __cgroup_bpf_attach() - Attach the program or the link to a cgroup, and * propagate the change to descendants @@ -667,6 +777,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog_list *find_attach_entry(struct hlist_head *progs, * @replace_prog: Previously attached program to replace if BPF_F_REPLACE is set * @type: Type of attach operation * @flags: Option flags + * @id_or_fd: Relative prog id or fd + * @revision: bpf_prog_list revision * * Exactly one of @prog or @link can be non-null. * Must be called with cgroup_mutex held. @@ -674,7 +786,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog_list *find_attach_entry(struct hlist_head *progs, static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_prog *replace_prog, struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, - enum bpf_attach_type type, u32 flags) + enum bpf_attach_type type, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, + u64 revision) { u32 saved_flags = (flags & (BPF_F_ALLOW_OVERRIDE | BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI)); struct bpf_prog *old_prog = NULL; @@ -690,6 +803,9 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, ((flags & BPF_F_REPLACE) && !(flags & BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI))) /* invalid combination */ return -EINVAL; + if ((flags & BPF_F_REPLACE) && (flags & (BPF_F_BEFORE | BPF_F_AFTER))) + /* only either replace or insertion with before/after */ + return -EINVAL; if (link && (prog || replace_prog)) /* only either link or prog/replace_prog can be specified */ return -EINVAL; @@ -700,6 +816,8 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, atype = bpf_cgroup_atype_find(type, new_prog->aux->attach_btf_id); if (atype < 0) return -EINVAL; + if (revision && revision != cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype]) + return -ESTALE; progs = &cgrp->bpf.progs[atype]; @@ -728,22 +846,18 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, if (pl) { old_prog = pl->prog; } else { - struct hlist_node *last = NULL; - pl = kmalloc(sizeof(*pl), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pl) { bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage); return -ENOMEM; } - if (hlist_empty(progs)) - hlist_add_head(&pl->node, progs); - else - hlist_for_each(last, progs) { - if (last->next) - continue; - hlist_add_behind(&pl->node, last); - break; - } + + err = insert_pl_to_hlist(pl, progs, prog, link, flags, id_or_fd); + if (err) { + kfree(pl); + bpf_cgroup_storages_free(new_storage); + return err; + } } pl->prog = prog; @@ -753,7 +867,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] = saved_flags; if (type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) { - err = bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(new_prog, atype); + err = bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(new_prog, atype, type); if (err) goto cleanup; } @@ -762,6 +876,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, if (err) goto cleanup_trampoline; + cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype] += 1; if (old_prog) { if (type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) bpf_trampoline_unlink_cgroup_shim(old_prog); @@ -793,12 +908,13 @@ static int cgroup_bpf_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_prog *replace_prog, struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, enum bpf_attach_type type, - u32 flags) + u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision) { int ret; cgroup_lock(); - ret = __cgroup_bpf_attach(cgrp, prog, replace_prog, link, type, flags); + ret = __cgroup_bpf_attach(cgrp, prog, replace_prog, link, type, flags, + id_or_fd, revision); cgroup_unlock(); return ret; } @@ -868,7 +984,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_replace(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct hlist_head *progs; bool found = false; - atype = bpf_cgroup_atype_find(link->type, new_prog->aux->attach_btf_id); + atype = bpf_cgroup_atype_find(link->link.attach_type, new_prog->aux->attach_btf_id); if (atype < 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -886,6 +1002,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_replace(struct cgroup *cgrp, if (!found) return -ENOENT; + cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype] += 1; old_prog = xchg(&link->link.prog, new_prog); replace_effective_prog(cgrp, atype, link); bpf_prog_put(old_prog); @@ -1011,12 +1128,14 @@ found: * @prog: A program to detach or NULL * @link: A link to detach or NULL * @type: Type of detach operation + * @revision: bpf_prog_list revision * * At most one of @prog or @link can be non-NULL. * Must be called with cgroup_mutex held. */ static int __cgroup_bpf_detach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, - struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, enum bpf_attach_type type) + struct bpf_cgroup_link *link, enum bpf_attach_type type, + u64 revision) { enum cgroup_bpf_attach_type atype; struct bpf_prog *old_prog; @@ -1034,6 +1153,9 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_detach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, if (atype < 0) return -EINVAL; + if (revision && revision != cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype]) + return -ESTALE; + progs = &cgrp->bpf.progs[atype]; flags = cgrp->bpf.flags[atype]; @@ -1059,6 +1181,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_detach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, /* now can actually delete it from this cgroup list */ hlist_del(&pl->node); + cgrp->bpf.revisions[atype] += 1; kfree(pl); if (hlist_empty(progs)) @@ -1074,12 +1197,12 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_detach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, } static int cgroup_bpf_detach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct bpf_prog *prog, - enum bpf_attach_type type) + enum bpf_attach_type type, u64 revision) { int ret; cgroup_lock(); - ret = __cgroup_bpf_detach(cgrp, prog, NULL, type); + ret = __cgroup_bpf_detach(cgrp, prog, NULL, type, revision); cgroup_unlock(); return ret; } @@ -1097,6 +1220,7 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_query(struct cgroup *cgrp, const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog_array *effective; int cnt, ret = 0, i; int total_cnt = 0; + u64 revision = 0; u32 flags; if (effective_query && prog_attach_flags) @@ -1134,6 +1258,10 @@ static int __cgroup_bpf_query(struct cgroup *cgrp, const union bpf_attr *attr, return -EFAULT; if (copy_to_user(&uattr->query.prog_cnt, &total_cnt, sizeof(total_cnt))) return -EFAULT; + if (!effective_query && from_atype == to_atype) + revision = cgrp->bpf.revisions[from_atype]; + if (copy_to_user(&uattr->query.revision, &revision, sizeof(revision))) + return -EFAULT; if (attr->query.prog_cnt == 0 || !prog_ids || !total_cnt) /* return early if user requested only program count + flags */ return 0; @@ -1216,7 +1344,8 @@ int cgroup_bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, } ret = cgroup_bpf_attach(cgrp, prog, replace_prog, NULL, - attr->attach_type, attr->attach_flags); + attr->attach_type, attr->attach_flags, + attr->relative_fd, attr->expected_revision); if (replace_prog) bpf_prog_put(replace_prog); @@ -1238,7 +1367,7 @@ int cgroup_bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr, enum bpf_prog_type ptype) if (IS_ERR(prog)) prog = NULL; - ret = cgroup_bpf_detach(cgrp, prog, attr->attach_type); + ret = cgroup_bpf_detach(cgrp, prog, attr->attach_type, attr->expected_revision); if (prog) bpf_prog_put(prog); @@ -1267,8 +1396,8 @@ static void bpf_cgroup_link_release(struct bpf_link *link) } WARN_ON(__cgroup_bpf_detach(cg_link->cgroup, NULL, cg_link, - cg_link->type)); - if (cg_link->type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) + link->attach_type, 0)); + if (link->attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) bpf_trampoline_unlink_cgroup_shim(cg_link->link.prog); cg = cg_link->cgroup; @@ -1310,7 +1439,7 @@ static void bpf_cgroup_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, "cgroup_id:\t%llu\n" "attach_type:\t%d\n", cg_id, - cg_link->type); + link->attach_type); } static int bpf_cgroup_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, @@ -1326,7 +1455,7 @@ static int bpf_cgroup_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, cgroup_unlock(); info->cgroup.cgroup_id = cg_id; - info->cgroup.attach_type = cg_link->type; + info->cgroup.attach_type = link->attach_type; return 0; } @@ -1339,6 +1468,13 @@ static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_cgroup_link_lops = { .fill_link_info = bpf_cgroup_link_fill_link_info, }; +#define BPF_F_LINK_ATTACH_MASK \ + (BPF_F_ID | \ + BPF_F_BEFORE | \ + BPF_F_AFTER | \ + BPF_F_PREORDER | \ + BPF_F_LINK) + int cgroup_bpf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) { struct bpf_link_primer link_primer; @@ -1346,7 +1482,7 @@ int cgroup_bpf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) struct cgroup *cgrp; int err; - if (attr->link_create.flags) + if (attr->link_create.flags & (~BPF_F_LINK_ATTACH_MASK)) return -EINVAL; cgrp = cgroup_get_from_fd(attr->link_create.target_fd); @@ -1359,9 +1495,8 @@ int cgroup_bpf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) goto out_put_cgroup; } bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_CGROUP, &bpf_cgroup_link_lops, - prog); + prog, attr->link_create.attach_type); link->cgroup = cgrp; - link->type = attr->link_create.attach_type; err = bpf_link_prime(&link->link, &link_primer); if (err) { @@ -1370,7 +1505,9 @@ int cgroup_bpf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) } err = cgroup_bpf_attach(cgrp, NULL, NULL, link, - link->type, BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI); + link->link.attach_type, BPF_F_ALLOW_MULTI | attr->link_create.flags, + attr->link_create.cgroup.relative_fd, + attr->link_create.cgroup.expected_revision); if (err) { bpf_link_cleanup(&link_primer); goto out_put_cgroup; @@ -2440,22 +2577,22 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size, } switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): + case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): if (size != size_default) return false; return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index dae281a1286d..09dde5b00d0c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_alloc_no_stats(unsigned int size, gfp_t gfp_extra_flag mutex_init(&fp->aux->ext_mutex); mutex_init(&fp->aux->dst_mutex); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + bpf_prog_stream_init(fp); +#endif + return fp; } @@ -778,7 +782,10 @@ bool is_bpf_text_address(unsigned long addr) struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_ksym_find(unsigned long addr) { - struct bpf_ksym *ksym = bpf_ksym_find(addr); + struct bpf_ksym *ksym; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + ksym = bpf_ksym_find(addr); return ksym && ksym->prog ? container_of(ksym, struct bpf_prog_aux, ksym)->prog : @@ -1290,6 +1297,13 @@ int bpf_jit_get_func_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog, return 0; } +const char *bpf_jit_get_prog_name(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + if (prog->aux->ksym.prog) + return prog->aux->ksym.name; + return prog->aux->name; +} + static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from, const struct bpf_insn *aux, struct bpf_insn *to_buff, @@ -2102,14 +2116,15 @@ out: #undef COND_JMP /* ST, STX and LDX*/ ST_NOSPEC: - /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass. - * In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as - * controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the - * mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code - * with no need to provide any additional instructions here. - * In case of x86, we use 'lfence' insn for mitigation. We - * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that - * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well. + /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass, + * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we + * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd + * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it + * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any + * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence' + * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre + * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on + * x86 for v4 as well. */ barrier_nospec(); CONT; @@ -2861,6 +2876,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_free_deferred(struct work_struct *work) aux = container_of(work, struct bpf_prog_aux, work); #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL bpf_free_kfunc_btf_tab(aux->kfunc_btf_tab); + bpf_prog_stream_free(aux->prog); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF if (aux->cgroup_atype != CGROUP_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE_INVALID) @@ -3034,6 +3050,21 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_needs_zext(void) return false; } +/* By default, enable the verifier's mitigations against Spectre v1 and v4 for + * all archs. The value returned must not change at runtime as there is + * currently no support for reloading programs that were loaded without + * mitigations. + */ +bool __weak bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1(void) +{ + return false; +} + +bool __weak bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4(void) +{ + return false; +} + /* Return true if the JIT inlines the call to the helper corresponding to * the imm. * @@ -3144,6 +3175,22 @@ u64 __weak arch_bpf_timed_may_goto(void) return 0; } +static noinline void bpf_prog_report_may_goto_violation(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + struct bpf_stream_stage ss; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + + prog = bpf_prog_find_from_stack(); + if (!prog) + return; + bpf_stream_stage(ss, prog, BPF_STDERR, ({ + bpf_stream_printk(ss, "ERROR: Timeout detected for may_goto instruction\n"); + bpf_stream_dump_stack(ss); + })); +#endif +} + u64 bpf_check_timed_may_goto(struct bpf_timed_may_goto *p) { u64 time = ktime_get_mono_fast_ns(); @@ -3154,8 +3201,10 @@ u64 bpf_check_timed_may_goto(struct bpf_timed_may_goto *p) return BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS; } /* Check if we've exhausted our time slice, and zero count. */ - if (time - p->timestamp >= (NSEC_PER_SEC / 4)) + if (unlikely(time - p->timestamp >= (NSEC_PER_SEC / 4))) { + bpf_prog_report_may_goto_violation(); return 0; + } /* Refresh the count for the stack frame. */ return BPF_MAX_TIMED_LOOPS; } @@ -3192,3 +3241,85 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bpf_stats_enabled_key); EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdp_exception); EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(xdp_bulk_tx); + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + +int bpf_prog_get_file_line(struct bpf_prog *prog, unsigned long ip, const char **filep, + const char **linep, int *nump) +{ + int idx = -1, insn_start, insn_end, len; + struct bpf_line_info *linfo; + void **jited_linfo; + struct btf *btf; + int nr_linfo; + + btf = prog->aux->btf; + linfo = prog->aux->linfo; + jited_linfo = prog->aux->jited_linfo; + + if (!btf || !linfo || !jited_linfo) + return -EINVAL; + len = prog->aux->func ? prog->aux->func[prog->aux->func_idx]->len : prog->len; + + linfo = &prog->aux->linfo[prog->aux->linfo_idx]; + jited_linfo = &prog->aux->jited_linfo[prog->aux->linfo_idx]; + + insn_start = linfo[0].insn_off; + insn_end = insn_start + len; + nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo - prog->aux->linfo_idx; + + for (int i = 0; i < nr_linfo && + linfo[i].insn_off >= insn_start && linfo[i].insn_off < insn_end; i++) { + if (jited_linfo[i] >= (void *)ip) + break; + idx = i; + } + + if (idx == -1) + return -ENOENT; + + /* Get base component of the file path. */ + *filep = btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[idx].file_name_off); + *filep = kbasename(*filep); + /* Obtain the source line, and strip whitespace in prefix. */ + *linep = btf_name_by_offset(btf, linfo[idx].line_off); + while (isspace(**linep)) + *linep += 1; + *nump = BPF_LINE_INFO_LINE_NUM(linfo[idx].line_col); + return 0; +} + +struct walk_stack_ctx { + struct bpf_prog *prog; +}; + +static bool find_from_stack_cb(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp) +{ + struct walk_stack_ctx *ctxp = cookie; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + + /* + * The RCU read lock is held to safely traverse the latch tree, but we + * don't need its protection when accessing the prog, since it has an + * active stack frame on the current stack trace, and won't disappear. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); + prog = bpf_prog_ksym_find(ip); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!prog) + return true; + if (bpf_is_subprog(prog)) + return true; + ctxp->prog = prog; + return false; +} + +struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_find_from_stack(void) +{ + struct walk_stack_ctx ctx = {}; + + arch_bpf_stack_walk(find_from_stack_cb, &ctx); + return ctx.prog; +} + +#endif diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c index 67e8a2fc1a99..b2b7b8ec2c2a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c @@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ static void cpu_map_gro_flush(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu, bool empty) * This is equivalent to how NAPI decides whether to perform a full * flush. */ - gro_flush(&rcpu->gro, !empty && HZ >= 1000); - gro_normal_list(&rcpu->gro); + gro_flush_normal(&rcpu->gro, !empty && HZ >= 1000); } static int cpu_map_kthread_run(void *data) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 88035dae38c1..6b4877e85a68 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h> #include <linux/kasan.h> #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> #include "../../lib/kstrtox.h" @@ -763,22 +764,13 @@ static int bpf_trace_copy_string(char *buf, void *unsafe_ptr, char fmt_ptype, return -EINVAL; } -/* Per-cpu temp buffers used by printf-like helpers to store the bprintf binary - * arguments representation. - */ -#define MAX_BPRINTF_BIN_ARGS 512 - /* Support executing three nested bprintf helper calls on a given CPU */ #define MAX_BPRINTF_NEST_LEVEL 3 -struct bpf_bprintf_buffers { - char bin_args[MAX_BPRINTF_BIN_ARGS]; - char buf[MAX_BPRINTF_BUF]; -}; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_bprintf_buffers[MAX_BPRINTF_NEST_LEVEL], bpf_bprintf_bufs); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, bpf_bprintf_nest_level); -static int try_get_buffers(struct bpf_bprintf_buffers **bufs) +int bpf_try_get_buffers(struct bpf_bprintf_buffers **bufs) { int nest_level; @@ -794,16 +786,21 @@ static int try_get_buffers(struct bpf_bprintf_buffers **bufs) return 0; } -void bpf_bprintf_cleanup(struct bpf_bprintf_data *data) +void bpf_put_buffers(void) { - if (!data->bin_args && !data->buf) - return; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this_cpu_read(bpf_bprintf_nest_level) == 0)) return; this_cpu_dec(bpf_bprintf_nest_level); preempt_enable(); } +void bpf_bprintf_cleanup(struct bpf_bprintf_data *data) +{ + if (!data->bin_args && !data->buf) + return; + bpf_put_buffers(); +} + /* * bpf_bprintf_prepare - Generic pass on format strings for bprintf-like helpers * @@ -818,7 +815,7 @@ void bpf_bprintf_cleanup(struct bpf_bprintf_data *data) * In argument preparation mode, if 0 is returned, safe temporary buffers are * allocated and bpf_bprintf_cleanup should be called to free them after use. */ -int bpf_bprintf_prepare(char *fmt, u32 fmt_size, const u64 *raw_args, +int bpf_bprintf_prepare(const char *fmt, u32 fmt_size, const u64 *raw_args, u32 num_args, struct bpf_bprintf_data *data) { bool get_buffers = (data->get_bin_args && num_args) || data->get_buf; @@ -834,7 +831,7 @@ int bpf_bprintf_prepare(char *fmt, u32 fmt_size, const u64 *raw_args, return -EINVAL; fmt_size = fmt_end - fmt; - if (get_buffers && try_get_buffers(&buffers)) + if (get_buffers && bpf_try_get_buffers(&buffers)) return -EBUSY; if (data->get_bin_args) { @@ -2911,6 +2908,52 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_copy(struct bpf_dynptr *dst_ptr, u32 dst_off, return 0; } +/** + * bpf_dynptr_memset() - Fill dynptr memory with a constant byte. + * @p: Destination dynptr - where data will be filled + * @offset: Offset into the dynptr to start filling from + * @size: Number of bytes to fill + * @val: Constant byte to fill the memory with + * + * Fills the @size bytes of the memory area pointed to by @p + * at @offset with the constant byte @val. + * Returns 0 on success; negative error, otherwise. + */ + __bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_memset(struct bpf_dynptr *p, u32 offset, u32 size, u8 val) + { + struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)p; + u32 chunk_sz, write_off; + char buf[256]; + void* slice; + int err; + + slice = bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr(p, offset, NULL, size); + if (likely(slice)) { + memset(slice, val, size); + return 0; + } + + if (__bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(ptr)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(ptr, offset, size); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Non-linear data under the dynptr, write from a local buffer */ + chunk_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(buf), size); + memset(buf, val, chunk_sz); + + for (write_off = 0; write_off < size; write_off += chunk_sz) { + chunk_sz = min_t(u32, sizeof(buf), size - write_off); + err = __bpf_dynptr_write(ptr, offset + write_off, buf, chunk_sz, 0); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + __bpf_kfunc void *bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx(void *obj) { return obj; @@ -2943,9 +2986,16 @@ static bool bpf_stack_walker(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp) struct bpf_throw_ctx *ctx = cookie; struct bpf_prog *prog; - if (!is_bpf_text_address(ip)) - return !ctx->cnt; + /* + * The RCU read lock is held to safely traverse the latch tree, but we + * don't need its protection when accessing the prog, since it has an + * active stack frame on the current stack trace, and won't disappear. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); prog = bpf_prog_ksym_find(ip); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!prog) + return !ctx->cnt; ctx->cnt++; if (bpf_is_subprog(prog)) return true; @@ -3283,6 +3333,376 @@ __bpf_kfunc void __bpf_trap(void) { } +/* + * Kfuncs for string operations. + * + * Since strings are not necessarily %NUL-terminated, we cannot directly call + * in-kernel implementations. Instead, we open-code the implementations using + * __get_kernel_nofault instead of plain dereference to make them safe. + */ + +/** + * bpf_strcmp - Compare two strings + * @s1__ign: One string + * @s2__ign: Another string + * + * Return: + * * %0 - Strings are equal + * * %-1 - @s1__ign is smaller + * * %1 - @s2__ign is smaller + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read one of the strings + * * %-E2BIG - One of strings is too large + * * %-ERANGE - One of strings is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcmp(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign) +{ + char c1, c2; + int i; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s1__ign, 1) || + !copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s2__ign, 1)) { + return -ERANGE; + } + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&c1, s1__ign, char, err_out); + __get_kernel_nofault(&c2, s2__ign, char, err_out); + if (c1 != c2) + return c1 < c2 ? -1 : 1; + if (c1 == '\0') + return 0; + s1__ign++; + s2__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strnchr - Find a character in a length limited string + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @count: The number of characters to be searched + * @c: The character to search for + * + * Note that the %NUL-terminator is considered part of the string, and can + * be searched for. + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - Index of the first occurrence of @c within @s__ign + * * %-ENOENT - @c not found in the first @count characters of @s__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strnchr(const char *s__ign, size_t count, char c) +{ + char sc; + int i; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1)) + return -ERANGE; + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < count && i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&sc, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (sc == c) + return i; + if (sc == '\0') + return -ENOENT; + s__ign++; + } + return i == XATTR_SIZE_MAX ? -E2BIG : -ENOENT; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strchr - Find the first occurrence of a character in a string + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @c: The character to search for + * + * Note that the %NUL-terminator is considered part of the string, and can + * be searched for. + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - The index of the first occurrence of @c within @s__ign + * * %-ENOENT - @c not found in @s__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strchr(const char *s__ign, char c) +{ + return bpf_strnchr(s__ign, XATTR_SIZE_MAX, c); +} + +/** + * bpf_strchrnul - Find and return a character in a string, or end of string + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @c: The character to search for + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - Index of the first occurrence of @c within @s__ign or index of + * the null byte at the end of @s__ign when @c is not found + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strchrnul(const char *s__ign, char c) +{ + char sc; + int i; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1)) + return -ERANGE; + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&sc, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (sc == '\0' || sc == c) + return i; + s__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strrchr - Find the last occurrence of a character in a string + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @c: The character to search for + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - Index of the last occurrence of @c within @s__ign + * * %-ENOENT - @c not found in @s__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strrchr(const char *s__ign, int c) +{ + char sc; + int i, last = -ENOENT; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1)) + return -ERANGE; + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&sc, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (sc == c) + last = i; + if (sc == '\0') + return last; + s__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strnlen - Calculate the length of a length-limited string + * @s__ign: The string + * @count: The maximum number of characters to count + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - The length of @s__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strnlen(const char *s__ign, size_t count) +{ + char c; + int i; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1)) + return -ERANGE; + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < count && i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&c, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (c == '\0') + return i; + s__ign++; + } + return i == XATTR_SIZE_MAX ? -E2BIG : i; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strlen - Calculate the length of a string + * @s__ign: The string + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - The length of @s__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read @s__ign + * * %-E2BIG - @s__ign is too large + * * %-ERANGE - @s__ign is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strlen(const char *s__ign) +{ + return bpf_strnlen(s__ign, XATTR_SIZE_MAX); +} + +/** + * bpf_strspn - Calculate the length of the initial substring of @s__ign which + * only contains letters in @accept__ign + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @accept__ign: The string to search for + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - The length of the initial substring of @s__ign which only + * contains letters from @accept__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read one of the strings + * * %-E2BIG - One of the strings is too large + * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strspn(const char *s__ign, const char *accept__ign) +{ + char cs, ca; + int i, j; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1) || + !copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(accept__ign, 1)) { + return -ERANGE; + } + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&cs, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (cs == '\0') + return i; + for (j = 0; j < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; j++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&ca, accept__ign + j, char, err_out); + if (cs == ca || ca == '\0') + break; + } + if (j == XATTR_SIZE_MAX) + return -E2BIG; + if (ca == '\0') + return i; + s__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strcspn - Calculate the length of the initial substring of @s__ign which + * does not contain letters in @reject__ign + * @s__ign: The string to be searched + * @reject__ign: The string to search for + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - The length of the initial substring of @s__ign which does not + * contain letters from @reject__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read one of the strings + * * %-E2BIG - One of the strings is too large + * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strcspn(const char *s__ign, const char *reject__ign) +{ + char cs, cr; + int i, j; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s__ign, 1) || + !copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(reject__ign, 1)) { + return -ERANGE; + } + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&cs, s__ign, char, err_out); + if (cs == '\0') + return i; + for (j = 0; j < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; j++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&cr, reject__ign + j, char, err_out); + if (cs == cr || cr == '\0') + break; + } + if (j == XATTR_SIZE_MAX) + return -E2BIG; + if (cr != '\0') + return i; + s__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strnstr - Find the first substring in a length-limited string + * @s1__ign: The string to be searched + * @s2__ign: The string to search for + * @len: the maximum number of characters to search + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - Index of the first character of the first occurrence of @s2__ign + * within the first @len characters of @s1__ign + * * %-ENOENT - @s2__ign not found in the first @len characters of @s1__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read one of the strings + * * %-E2BIG - One of the strings is too large + * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strnstr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign, size_t len) +{ + char c1, c2; + int i, j; + + if (!copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s1__ign, 1) || + !copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed(s2__ign, 1)) { + return -ERANGE; + } + + guard(pagefault)(); + for (i = 0; i < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; i++) { + for (j = 0; i + j < len && j < XATTR_SIZE_MAX; j++) { + __get_kernel_nofault(&c2, s2__ign + j, char, err_out); + if (c2 == '\0') + return i; + __get_kernel_nofault(&c1, s1__ign + j, char, err_out); + if (c1 == '\0') + return -ENOENT; + if (c1 != c2) + break; + } + if (j == XATTR_SIZE_MAX) + return -E2BIG; + if (i + j == len) + return -ENOENT; + s1__ign++; + } + return -E2BIG; +err_out: + return -EFAULT; +} + +/** + * bpf_strstr - Find the first substring in a string + * @s1__ign: The string to be searched + * @s2__ign: The string to search for + * + * Return: + * * >=0 - Index of the first character of the first occurrence of @s2__ign + * within @s1__ign + * * %-ENOENT - @s2__ign is not a substring of @s1__ign + * * %-EFAULT - Cannot read one of the strings + * * %-E2BIG - One of the strings is too large + * * %-ERANGE - One of the strings is outside of kernel address space + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_strstr(const char *s1__ign, const char *s2__ign) +{ + return bpf_strnstr(s1__ign, s2__ign, XATTR_SIZE_MAX); +} + __bpf_kfunc_end_defs(); BTF_KFUNCS_START(generic_btf_ids) @@ -3369,6 +3789,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_size) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_clone) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_copy) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_dynptr_memset) #ifdef CONFIG_NET BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_modify_return_test_tp) #endif @@ -3402,9 +3823,21 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPAB BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE) #endif BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap) -#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchr); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchrnul); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnchr); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strrchr); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strlen); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnlen); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strspn); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcspn); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strstr); +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnstr); +#if defined(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) && defined(CONFIG_CGROUPS) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cgroup_read_xattr, KF_RCU) #endif +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_stream_vprintk, KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) BTF_KFUNCS_END(common_btf_ids) static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set common_kfunc_set = { diff --git a/kernel/bpf/link_iter.c b/kernel/bpf/link_iter.c index fec8005a121c..8158e9c1af7b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/link_iter.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/link_iter.c @@ -78,8 +78,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations bpf_link_seq_ops = { .show = bpf_link_seq_show, }; -BTF_ID_LIST(btf_bpf_link_id) -BTF_ID(struct, bpf_link) +BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(btf_bpf_link_id, struct, bpf_link) static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info bpf_link_seq_info = { .seq_ops = &bpf_link_seq_ops, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c index 3969eb0382af..632d51b05fe9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/local_storage.c @@ -394,17 +394,10 @@ static int cgroup_storage_check_btf(const struct bpf_map *map, if (!btf_member_is_reg_int(btf, key_type, m, offset, size)) return -EINVAL; } else { - u32 int_data; - /* * Key is expected to be u64, which stores the cgroup_inode_id */ - - if (BTF_INFO_KIND(key_type->info) != BTF_KIND_INT) - return -EINVAL; - - int_data = *(u32 *)(key_type + 1); - if (BTF_INT_BITS(int_data) != 64 || BTF_INT_OFFSET(int_data)) + if (!btf_type_is_i64(key_type)) return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c index 868cc2c43899..8e88201c98bf 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c @@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ struct bpf_netns_link { struct bpf_link link; - enum bpf_attach_type type; - enum netns_bpf_attach_type netns_type; /* We don't hold a ref to net in order to auto-detach the link * when netns is going away. Instead we rely on pernet @@ -21,6 +19,7 @@ struct bpf_netns_link { */ struct net *net; struct list_head node; /* node in list of links attached to net */ + enum netns_bpf_attach_type netns_type; }; /* Protects updates to netns_bpf */ @@ -216,7 +215,7 @@ static int bpf_netns_link_fill_info(const struct bpf_link *link, mutex_unlock(&netns_bpf_mutex); info->netns.netns_ino = inum; - info->netns.attach_type = net_link->type; + info->netns.attach_type = link->attach_type; return 0; } @@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ static void bpf_netns_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, "netns_ino:\t%u\n" "attach_type:\t%u\n", info.netns.netns_ino, - info.netns.attach_type); + link->attach_type); } static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_netns_link_ops = { @@ -501,9 +500,8 @@ int netns_bpf_link_create(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) goto out_put_net; } bpf_link_init(&net_link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_NETNS, - &bpf_netns_link_ops, prog); + &bpf_netns_link_ops, prog, type); net_link->net = net; - net_link->type = type; net_link->netns_type = netns_type; err = bpf_link_prime(&net_link->link, &link_primer); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig b/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig index c9d45c9d6918..aef7b0bc96d6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/Kconfig @@ -1,8 +1,4 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -config USERMODE_DRIVER - bool - default n - menuconfig BPF_PRELOAD bool "Preload BPF file system with kernel specific program and map iterators" depends on BPF @@ -10,7 +6,6 @@ menuconfig BPF_PRELOAD # The dependency on !COMPILE_TEST prevents it from being enabled # in allmodconfig or allyesconfig configurations depends on !COMPILE_TEST - select USERMODE_DRIVER help This builds kernel module with several embedded BPF programs that are pinned into BPF FS mount point as human readable files that are diff --git a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.lskel-big-endian.h b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.lskel-big-endian.h index ebdc6c0cdb70..49b1d515a847 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.lskel-big-endian.h +++ b/kernel/bpf/preload/iterators/iterators.lskel-big-endian.h @@ -89,10 +89,7 @@ iterators_bpf__load(struct iterators_bpf *skel) { struct bpf_load_and_run_opts opts = {}; int err; - - opts.ctx = (struct bpf_loader_ctx *)skel; - opts.data_sz = 6008; - opts.data = (void *)"\ + static const char opts_data[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))) = "\ \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ @@ -126,190 +123,196 @@ iterators_bpf__load(struct iterators_bpf *skel) \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ \0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xeb\x9f\x01\0\ 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+\x74\x65\x72\x5f\x62\x70\x66\x5f\x70\x72\x6f\x67\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"; + static const char opts_insn[] __attribute__((__aligned__(8))) = "\ \xbf\x61\0\0\0\0\0\0\xbf\x1a\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07\x10\0\0\xff\xff\xff\x78\xb7\x20\0\ \0\0\0\0\x88\xb7\x30\0\0\0\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\x71\x05\0\0\x14\0\0\0\0\x61\ \x1a\xff\x78\0\0\0\0\xd5\x10\0\x01\0\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\xa8\x61\x1a\xff\x7c\ @@ -318,72 +321,87 @@ iterators_bpf__load(struct iterators_bpf *skel) \0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\xa8\x18\x06\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x61\x10\0\0\0\0\ \0\0\xd5\x10\0\x02\0\0\0\0\xbf\x91\0\0\0\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\xa8\xbf\x07\0\0\ \0\0\0\0\x95\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x61\x06\0\x08\0\0\0\0\x18\x16\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ -\0\x0e\x68\x63\x10\0\0\0\0\0\0\x61\x06\0\x0c\0\0\0\0\x18\x16\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ -\0\0\0\x0e\x64\x63\x10\0\0\0\0\0\0\x79\x06\0\x10\0\0\0\0\x18\x16\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\ -\0\0\0\0\0\x0e\x58\x7b\x10\0\0\0\0\0\0\x18\x06\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x05\0\ 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+\x6c\0\0\0\0\x77\x70\0\0\0\0\0\x20\x63\x07\0\x70\0\0\0\0\xb7\x10\0\0\0\0\0\x05\ +\x18\x26\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x17\x78\xb7\x30\0\0\0\0\0\x8c\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\ +\xa6\xbf\x70\0\0\0\0\0\0\x18\x06\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x17\xe8\x61\x10\0\0\0\ +\0\0\0\xd5\x10\0\x02\0\0\0\0\xbf\x91\0\0\0\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\xa8\xc5\x70\ +\xfe\xe3\0\0\0\0\x63\xa7\xff\x84\0\0\0\0\x61\x1a\xff\x78\0\0\0\0\xd5\x10\0\x02\ +\0\0\0\0\xbf\x91\0\0\0\0\0\0\x85\0\0\0\0\0\0\xa8\x61\x0a\xff\x80\0\0\0\0\x63\ +\x60\0\x28\0\0\0\0\x61\x0a\xff\x84\0\0\0\0\x63\x60\0\x2c\0\0\0\0\x18\x16\0\0\0\ +\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x61\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\x63\x60\0\x18\0\0\0\0\xb7\0\0\0\0\0\ +\0\0\x95\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"; + + opts.ctx = (struct bpf_loader_ctx *)skel; + opts.data_sz = sizeof(opts_data) - 1; + opts.data = (void *)opts_data; + opts.insns_sz = sizeof(opts_insn) - 1; + opts.insns = (void *)opts_insn; + err = bpf_load_and_run(&opts); if (err < 0) return err; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/prog_iter.c b/kernel/bpf/prog_iter.c index 53a73c841c13..85d8fcb56fb7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/prog_iter.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/prog_iter.c @@ -78,8 +78,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations bpf_prog_seq_ops = { .show = bpf_prog_seq_show, }; -BTF_ID_LIST(btf_bpf_prog_id) -BTF_ID(struct, bpf_prog) +BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(btf_bpf_prog_id, struct, bpf_prog) static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info bpf_prog_seq_info = { .seq_ops = &bpf_prog_seq_ops, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/rqspinlock.c b/kernel/bpf/rqspinlock.c index 338305c8852c..5ab354d55d82 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/rqspinlock.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/rqspinlock.c @@ -666,6 +666,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(resilient_queued_spin_lock_slowpath); __bpf_kfunc_start_defs(); +static void bpf_prog_report_rqspinlock_violation(const char *str, void *lock, bool irqsave) +{ + struct rqspinlock_held *rqh = this_cpu_ptr(&rqspinlock_held_locks); + struct bpf_stream_stage ss; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + + prog = bpf_prog_find_from_stack(); + if (!prog) + return; + bpf_stream_stage(ss, prog, BPF_STDERR, ({ + bpf_stream_printk(ss, "ERROR: %s for bpf_res_spin_lock%s\n", str, irqsave ? "_irqsave" : ""); + bpf_stream_printk(ss, "Attempted lock = 0x%px\n", lock); + bpf_stream_printk(ss, "Total held locks = %d\n", rqh->cnt); + for (int i = 0; i < min(RES_NR_HELD, rqh->cnt); i++) + bpf_stream_printk(ss, "Held lock[%2d] = 0x%px\n", i, rqh->locks[i]); + bpf_stream_dump_stack(ss); + })); +} + +#define REPORT_STR(ret) ({ (ret) == -ETIMEDOUT ? "Timeout detected" : "AA or ABBA deadlock detected"; }) + __bpf_kfunc int bpf_res_spin_lock(struct bpf_res_spin_lock *lock) { int ret; @@ -676,6 +697,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_res_spin_lock(struct bpf_res_spin_lock *lock) preempt_disable(); ret = res_spin_lock((rqspinlock_t *)lock); if (unlikely(ret)) { + bpf_prog_report_rqspinlock_violation(REPORT_STR(ret), lock, false); preempt_enable(); return ret; } @@ -698,6 +720,7 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave(struct bpf_res_spin_lock *lock, unsign local_irq_save(flags); ret = res_spin_lock((rqspinlock_t *)lock); if (unlikely(ret)) { + bpf_prog_report_rqspinlock_violation(REPORT_STR(ret), lock, true); local_irq_restore(flags); preempt_enable(); return ret; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stream.c b/kernel/bpf/stream.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ab592db4a4bf --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/bpf/stream.c @@ -0,0 +1,526 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* Copyright (c) 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */ + +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> +#include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h> +#include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/memory.h> +#include <linux/local_lock.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> + +/* + * Simple per-CPU NMI-safe bump allocation mechanism, backed by the NMI-safe + * try_alloc_pages()/free_pages_nolock() primitives. We allocate a page and + * stash it in a local per-CPU variable, and bump allocate from the page + * whenever items need to be printed to a stream. Each page holds a global + * atomic refcount in its first 4 bytes, and then records of variable length + * that describe the printed messages. Once the global refcount has dropped to + * zero, it is a signal to free the page back to the kernel's page allocator, + * given all the individual records in it have been consumed. + * + * It is possible the same page is used to serve allocations across different + * programs, which may be consumed at different times individually, hence + * maintaining a reference count per-page is critical for correct lifetime + * tracking. + * + * The bpf_stream_page code will be replaced to use kmalloc_nolock() once it + * lands. + */ +struct bpf_stream_page { + refcount_t ref; + u32 consumed; + char buf[]; +}; + +/* Available room to add data to a refcounted page. */ +#define BPF_STREAM_PAGE_SZ (PAGE_SIZE - offsetofend(struct bpf_stream_page, consumed)) + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(local_trylock_t, stream_local_lock) = INIT_LOCAL_TRYLOCK(stream_local_lock); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct bpf_stream_page *, stream_pcpu_page); + +static bool bpf_stream_page_local_lock(unsigned long *flags) +{ + return local_trylock_irqsave(&stream_local_lock, *flags); +} + +static void bpf_stream_page_local_unlock(unsigned long *flags) +{ + local_unlock_irqrestore(&stream_local_lock, *flags); +} + +static void bpf_stream_page_free(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page) +{ + struct page *p; + + if (!stream_page) + return; + p = virt_to_page(stream_page); + free_pages_nolock(p, 0); +} + +static void bpf_stream_page_get(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page) +{ + refcount_inc(&stream_page->ref); +} + +static void bpf_stream_page_put(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page) +{ + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&stream_page->ref)) + bpf_stream_page_free(stream_page); +} + +static void bpf_stream_page_init(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page) +{ + refcount_set(&stream_page->ref, 1); + stream_page->consumed = 0; +} + +static struct bpf_stream_page *bpf_stream_page_replace(void) +{ + struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page, *old_stream_page; + struct page *page; + + page = alloc_pages_nolock(NUMA_NO_NODE, 0); + if (!page) + return NULL; + stream_page = page_address(page); + bpf_stream_page_init(stream_page); + + old_stream_page = this_cpu_read(stream_pcpu_page); + if (old_stream_page) + bpf_stream_page_put(old_stream_page); + this_cpu_write(stream_pcpu_page, stream_page); + return stream_page; +} + +static int bpf_stream_page_check_room(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page, int len) +{ + int min = offsetof(struct bpf_stream_elem, str[0]); + int consumed = stream_page->consumed; + int total = BPF_STREAM_PAGE_SZ; + int rem = max(0, total - consumed - min); + + /* Let's give room of at least 8 bytes. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(rem % 8 != 0); + rem = rem < 8 ? 0 : rem; + return min(len, rem); +} + +static void bpf_stream_elem_init(struct bpf_stream_elem *elem, int len) +{ + init_llist_node(&elem->node); + elem->total_len = len; + elem->consumed_len = 0; +} + +static struct bpf_stream_page *bpf_stream_page_from_elem(struct bpf_stream_elem *elem) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)elem; + + return (struct bpf_stream_page *)PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(addr); +} + +static struct bpf_stream_elem *bpf_stream_page_push_elem(struct bpf_stream_page *stream_page, int len) +{ + u32 consumed = stream_page->consumed; + + stream_page->consumed += round_up(offsetof(struct bpf_stream_elem, str[len]), 8); + return (struct bpf_stream_elem *)&stream_page->buf[consumed]; +} + +static struct bpf_stream_elem *bpf_stream_page_reserve_elem(int len) +{ + struct bpf_stream_elem *elem = NULL; + struct bpf_stream_page *page; + int room = 0; + + page = this_cpu_read(stream_pcpu_page); + if (!page) + page = bpf_stream_page_replace(); + if (!page) + return NULL; + + room = bpf_stream_page_check_room(page, len); + if (room != len) + page = bpf_stream_page_replace(); + if (!page) + return NULL; + bpf_stream_page_get(page); + room = bpf_stream_page_check_room(page, len); + WARN_ON_ONCE(room != len); + + elem = bpf_stream_page_push_elem(page, room); + bpf_stream_elem_init(elem, room); + return elem; +} + +static struct bpf_stream_elem *bpf_stream_elem_alloc(int len) +{ + const int max_len = ARRAY_SIZE((struct bpf_bprintf_buffers){}.buf); + struct bpf_stream_elem *elem; + unsigned long flags; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(max_len > BPF_STREAM_PAGE_SZ); + /* + * Length denotes the amount of data to be written as part of stream element, + * thus includes '\0' byte. We're capped by how much bpf_bprintf_buffers can + * accomodate, therefore deny allocations that won't fit into them. + */ + if (len < 0 || len > max_len) + return NULL; + + if (!bpf_stream_page_local_lock(&flags)) + return NULL; + elem = bpf_stream_page_reserve_elem(len); + bpf_stream_page_local_unlock(&flags); + return elem; +} + +static int __bpf_stream_push_str(struct llist_head *log, const char *str, int len) +{ + struct bpf_stream_elem *elem = NULL; + + /* + * Allocate a bpf_prog_stream_elem and push it to the bpf_prog_stream + * log, elements will be popped at once and reversed to print the log. + */ + elem = bpf_stream_elem_alloc(len); + if (!elem) + return -ENOMEM; + + memcpy(elem->str, str, len); + llist_add(&elem->node, log); + + return 0; +} + +static int bpf_stream_consume_capacity(struct bpf_stream *stream, int len) +{ + if (atomic_read(&stream->capacity) >= BPF_STREAM_MAX_CAPACITY) + return -ENOSPC; + if (atomic_add_return(len, &stream->capacity) >= BPF_STREAM_MAX_CAPACITY) { + atomic_sub(len, &stream->capacity); + return -ENOSPC; + } + return 0; +} + +static void bpf_stream_release_capacity(struct bpf_stream *stream, struct bpf_stream_elem *elem) +{ + int len = elem->total_len; + + atomic_sub(len, &stream->capacity); +} + +static int bpf_stream_push_str(struct bpf_stream *stream, const char *str, int len) +{ + int ret = bpf_stream_consume_capacity(stream, len); + + return ret ?: __bpf_stream_push_str(&stream->log, str, len); +} + +static struct bpf_stream *bpf_stream_get(enum bpf_stream_id stream_id, struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + if (stream_id != BPF_STDOUT && stream_id != BPF_STDERR) + return NULL; + return &aux->stream[stream_id - 1]; +} + +static void bpf_stream_free_elem(struct bpf_stream_elem *elem) +{ + struct bpf_stream_page *p; + + p = bpf_stream_page_from_elem(elem); + bpf_stream_page_put(p); +} + +static void bpf_stream_free_list(struct llist_node *list) +{ + struct bpf_stream_elem *elem, *tmp; + + llist_for_each_entry_safe(elem, tmp, list, node) + bpf_stream_free_elem(elem); +} + +static struct llist_node *bpf_stream_backlog_peek(struct bpf_stream *stream) +{ + return stream->backlog_head; +} + +static struct llist_node *bpf_stream_backlog_pop(struct bpf_stream *stream) +{ + struct llist_node *node; + + node = stream->backlog_head; + if (stream->backlog_head == stream->backlog_tail) + stream->backlog_head = stream->backlog_tail = NULL; + else + stream->backlog_head = node->next; + return node; +} + +static void bpf_stream_backlog_fill(struct bpf_stream *stream) +{ + struct llist_node *head, *tail; + + if (llist_empty(&stream->log)) + return; + tail = llist_del_all(&stream->log); + if (!tail) + return; + head = llist_reverse_order(tail); + + if (!stream->backlog_head) { + stream->backlog_head = head; + stream->backlog_tail = tail; + } else { + stream->backlog_tail->next = head; + stream->backlog_tail = tail; + } + + return; +} + +static bool bpf_stream_consume_elem(struct bpf_stream_elem *elem, int *len) +{ + int rem = elem->total_len - elem->consumed_len; + int used = min(rem, *len); + + elem->consumed_len += used; + *len -= used; + + return elem->consumed_len == elem->total_len; +} + +static int bpf_stream_read(struct bpf_stream *stream, void __user *buf, int len) +{ + int rem_len = len, cons_len, ret = 0; + struct bpf_stream_elem *elem = NULL; + struct llist_node *node; + + mutex_lock(&stream->lock); + + while (rem_len) { + int pos = len - rem_len; + bool cont; + + node = bpf_stream_backlog_peek(stream); + if (!node) { + bpf_stream_backlog_fill(stream); + node = bpf_stream_backlog_peek(stream); + } + if (!node) + break; + elem = container_of(node, typeof(*elem), node); + + cons_len = elem->consumed_len; + cont = bpf_stream_consume_elem(elem, &rem_len) == false; + + ret = copy_to_user(buf + pos, elem->str + cons_len, + elem->consumed_len - cons_len); + /* Restore in case of error. */ + if (ret) { + ret = -EFAULT; + elem->consumed_len = cons_len; + break; + } + + if (cont) + continue; + bpf_stream_backlog_pop(stream); + bpf_stream_release_capacity(stream, elem); + bpf_stream_free_elem(elem); + } + + mutex_unlock(&stream->lock); + return ret ? ret : len - rem_len; +} + +int bpf_prog_stream_read(struct bpf_prog *prog, enum bpf_stream_id stream_id, void __user *buf, int len) +{ + struct bpf_stream *stream; + + stream = bpf_stream_get(stream_id, prog->aux); + if (!stream) + return -ENOENT; + return bpf_stream_read(stream, buf, len); +} + +__bpf_kfunc_start_defs(); + +/* + * Avoid using enum bpf_stream_id so that kfunc users don't have to pull in the + * enum in headers. + */ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_stream_vprintk(int stream_id, const char *fmt__str, const void *args, u32 len__sz, void *aux__prog) +{ + struct bpf_bprintf_data data = { + .get_bin_args = true, + .get_buf = true, + }; + struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = aux__prog; + u32 fmt_size = strlen(fmt__str) + 1; + struct bpf_stream *stream; + u32 data_len = len__sz; + int ret, num_args; + + stream = bpf_stream_get(stream_id, aux); + if (!stream) + return -ENOENT; + + if (data_len & 7 || data_len > MAX_BPRINTF_VARARGS * 8 || + (data_len && !args)) + return -EINVAL; + num_args = data_len / 8; + + ret = bpf_bprintf_prepare(fmt__str, fmt_size, args, num_args, &data); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = bstr_printf(data.buf, MAX_BPRINTF_BUF, fmt__str, data.bin_args); + /* Exclude NULL byte during push. */ + ret = bpf_stream_push_str(stream, data.buf, ret); + bpf_bprintf_cleanup(&data); + + return ret; +} + +__bpf_kfunc_end_defs(); + +/* Added kfunc to common_btf_ids */ + +void bpf_prog_stream_init(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(prog->aux->stream); i++) { + atomic_set(&prog->aux->stream[i].capacity, 0); + init_llist_head(&prog->aux->stream[i].log); + mutex_init(&prog->aux->stream[i].lock); + prog->aux->stream[i].backlog_head = NULL; + prog->aux->stream[i].backlog_tail = NULL; + } +} + +void bpf_prog_stream_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + struct llist_node *list; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(prog->aux->stream); i++) { + list = llist_del_all(&prog->aux->stream[i].log); + bpf_stream_free_list(list); + bpf_stream_free_list(prog->aux->stream[i].backlog_head); + } +} + +void bpf_stream_stage_init(struct bpf_stream_stage *ss) +{ + init_llist_head(&ss->log); + ss->len = 0; +} + +void bpf_stream_stage_free(struct bpf_stream_stage *ss) +{ + struct llist_node *node; + + node = llist_del_all(&ss->log); + bpf_stream_free_list(node); +} + +int bpf_stream_stage_printk(struct bpf_stream_stage *ss, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + struct bpf_bprintf_buffers *buf; + va_list args; + int ret; + + if (bpf_try_get_buffers(&buf)) + return -EBUSY; + + va_start(args, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(buf->buf, ARRAY_SIZE(buf->buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + ss->len += ret; + /* Exclude NULL byte during push. */ + ret = __bpf_stream_push_str(&ss->log, buf->buf, ret); + bpf_put_buffers(); + return ret; +} + +int bpf_stream_stage_commit(struct bpf_stream_stage *ss, struct bpf_prog *prog, + enum bpf_stream_id stream_id) +{ + struct llist_node *list, *head, *tail; + struct bpf_stream *stream; + int ret; + + stream = bpf_stream_get(stream_id, prog->aux); + if (!stream) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = bpf_stream_consume_capacity(stream, ss->len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + list = llist_del_all(&ss->log); + head = tail = list; + + if (!list) + return 0; + while (llist_next(list)) { + tail = llist_next(list); + list = tail; + } + llist_add_batch(head, tail, &stream->log); + return 0; +} + +struct dump_stack_ctx { + struct bpf_stream_stage *ss; + int err; +}; + +static bool dump_stack_cb(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp) +{ + struct dump_stack_ctx *ctxp = cookie; + const char *file = "", *line = ""; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + int num, ret; + + rcu_read_lock(); + prog = bpf_prog_ksym_find(ip); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (prog) { + ret = bpf_prog_get_file_line(prog, ip, &file, &line, &num); + if (ret < 0) + goto end; + ctxp->err = bpf_stream_stage_printk(ctxp->ss, "%pS\n %s @ %s:%d\n", + (void *)(long)ip, line, file, num); + return !ctxp->err; + } +end: + ctxp->err = bpf_stream_stage_printk(ctxp->ss, "%pS\n", (void *)(long)ip); + return !ctxp->err; +} + +int bpf_stream_stage_dump_stack(struct bpf_stream_stage *ss) +{ + struct dump_stack_ctx ctx = { .ss = ss }; + int ret; + + ret = bpf_stream_stage_printk(ss, "CPU: %d UID: %d PID: %d Comm: %s\n", + raw_smp_processor_id(), __kuid_val(current_real_cred()->euid), + current->pid, current->comm); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = bpf_stream_stage_printk(ss, "Call trace:\n"); + if (ret) + return ret; + arch_bpf_stack_walk(dump_stack_cb, &ctx); + if (ctx.err) + return ctx.err; + return bpf_stream_stage_printk(ss, "\n"); +} diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index dd5304c6ac3c..e63039817af3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -3069,7 +3069,7 @@ static int bpf_obj_get(const union bpf_attr *attr) */ void bpf_link_init_sleepable(struct bpf_link *link, enum bpf_link_type type, const struct bpf_link_ops *ops, struct bpf_prog *prog, - bool sleepable) + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type, bool sleepable) { WARN_ON(ops->dealloc && ops->dealloc_deferred); atomic64_set(&link->refcnt, 1); @@ -3078,12 +3078,14 @@ void bpf_link_init_sleepable(struct bpf_link *link, enum bpf_link_type type, link->id = 0; link->ops = ops; link->prog = prog; + link->attach_type = attach_type; } void bpf_link_init(struct bpf_link *link, enum bpf_link_type type, - const struct bpf_link_ops *ops, struct bpf_prog *prog) + const struct bpf_link_ops *ops, struct bpf_prog *prog, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { - bpf_link_init_sleepable(link, type, ops, prog, false); + bpf_link_init_sleepable(link, type, ops, prog, attach_type, false); } static void bpf_link_free_id(int id) @@ -3228,7 +3230,14 @@ static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) char prog_tag[sizeof(prog->tag) * 2 + 1] = { }; if (type < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_link_type_strs) && bpf_link_type_strs[type]) { - seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", bpf_link_type_strs[type]); + if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI) + seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", link->flags == BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN ? + "kretprobe_multi" : "kprobe_multi"); + else if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_UPROBE_MULTI) + seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", link->flags == BPF_F_UPROBE_MULTI_RETURN ? + "uretprobe_multi" : "uprobe_multi"); + else + seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", bpf_link_type_strs[type]); } else { WARN_ONCE(1, "missing BPF_LINK_TYPE(...) for link type %u\n", type); seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t<%u>\n", type); @@ -3403,10 +3412,12 @@ static void bpf_tracing_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, seq_printf(seq, "attach_type:\t%d\n" "target_obj_id:\t%u\n" - "target_btf_id:\t%u\n", - tr_link->attach_type, + "target_btf_id:\t%u\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + link->attach_type, target_obj_id, - target_btf_id); + target_btf_id, + tr_link->link.cookie); } static int bpf_tracing_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, @@ -3415,7 +3426,8 @@ static int bpf_tracing_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_tracing_link *tr_link = container_of(link, struct bpf_tracing_link, link.link); - info->tracing.attach_type = tr_link->attach_type; + info->tracing.attach_type = link->attach_type; + info->tracing.cookie = tr_link->link.cookie; bpf_trampoline_unpack_key(tr_link->trampoline->key, &info->tracing.target_obj_id, &info->tracing.target_btf_id); @@ -3433,7 +3445,8 @@ static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_tracing_link_lops = { static int bpf_tracing_prog_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog, int tgt_prog_fd, u32 btf_id, - u64 bpf_cookie) + u64 bpf_cookie, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { struct bpf_link_primer link_primer; struct bpf_prog *tgt_prog = NULL; @@ -3501,8 +3514,8 @@ static int bpf_tracing_prog_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog, goto out_put_prog; } bpf_link_init(&link->link.link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TRACING, - &bpf_tracing_link_lops, prog); - link->attach_type = prog->expected_attach_type; + &bpf_tracing_link_lops, prog, attach_type); + link->link.cookie = bpf_cookie; mutex_lock(&prog->aux->dst_mutex); @@ -3651,8 +3664,10 @@ static void bpf_raw_tp_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, container_of(link, struct bpf_raw_tp_link, link); seq_printf(seq, - "tp_name:\t%s\n", - raw_tp_link->btp->tp->name); + "tp_name:\t%s\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + raw_tp_link->btp->tp->name, + raw_tp_link->cookie); } static int bpf_copy_to_user(char __user *ubuf, const char *buf, u32 ulen, @@ -3688,6 +3703,7 @@ static int bpf_raw_tp_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, return -EINVAL; info->raw_tracepoint.tp_name_len = tp_len + 1; + info->raw_tracepoint.cookie = raw_tp_link->cookie; if (!ubuf) return 0; @@ -3794,6 +3810,32 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_fill_kprobe(const struct perf_event *event, info->perf_event.kprobe.cookie = event->bpf_cookie; return 0; } + +static void bpf_perf_link_fdinfo_kprobe(const struct perf_event *event, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ + const char *name; + int err; + u32 prog_id, type; + u64 offset, addr; + unsigned long missed; + + err = bpf_get_perf_event_info(event, &prog_id, &type, &name, + &offset, &addr, &missed); + if (err) + return; + + seq_printf(seq, + "name:\t%s\n" + "offset:\t%#llx\n" + "missed:\t%lu\n" + "addr:\t%#llx\n" + "event_type:\t%s\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + name, offset, missed, addr, + type == BPF_FD_TYPE_KRETPROBE ? "kretprobe" : "kprobe", + event->bpf_cookie); +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS @@ -3822,6 +3864,31 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_fill_uprobe(const struct perf_event *event, info->perf_event.uprobe.ref_ctr_offset = ref_ctr_offset; return 0; } + +static void bpf_perf_link_fdinfo_uprobe(const struct perf_event *event, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ + const char *name; + int err; + u32 prog_id, type; + u64 offset, ref_ctr_offset; + unsigned long missed; + + err = bpf_get_perf_event_info(event, &prog_id, &type, &name, + &offset, &ref_ctr_offset, &missed); + if (err) + return; + + seq_printf(seq, + "name:\t%s\n" + "offset:\t%#llx\n" + "ref_ctr_offset:\t%#llx\n" + "event_type:\t%s\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + name, offset, ref_ctr_offset, + type == BPF_FD_TYPE_URETPROBE ? "uretprobe" : "uprobe", + event->bpf_cookie); +} #endif static int bpf_perf_link_fill_probe(const struct perf_event *event, @@ -3890,10 +3957,79 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link, } } +static void bpf_perf_event_link_show_fdinfo(const struct perf_event *event, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ + seq_printf(seq, + "type:\t%u\n" + "config:\t%llu\n" + "event_type:\t%s\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + event->attr.type, event->attr.config, + "event", event->bpf_cookie); +} + +static void bpf_tracepoint_link_show_fdinfo(const struct perf_event *event, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ + int err; + const char *name; + u32 prog_id; + + err = bpf_get_perf_event_info(event, &prog_id, NULL, &name, NULL, + NULL, NULL); + if (err) + return; + + seq_printf(seq, + "tp_name:\t%s\n" + "event_type:\t%s\n" + "cookie:\t%llu\n", + name, "tracepoint", event->bpf_cookie); +} + +static void bpf_probe_link_show_fdinfo(const struct perf_event *event, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBE_EVENTS + if (event->tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_KPROBE) + return bpf_perf_link_fdinfo_kprobe(event, seq); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS + if (event->tp_event->flags & TRACE_EVENT_FL_UPROBE) + return bpf_perf_link_fdinfo_uprobe(event, seq); +#endif +} + +static void bpf_perf_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, + struct seq_file *seq) +{ + struct bpf_perf_link *perf_link; + const struct perf_event *event; + + perf_link = container_of(link, struct bpf_perf_link, link); + event = perf_get_event(perf_link->perf_file); + if (IS_ERR(event)) + return; + + switch (event->prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT: + return bpf_perf_event_link_show_fdinfo(event, seq); + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT: + return bpf_tracepoint_link_show_fdinfo(event, seq); + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE: + return bpf_probe_link_show_fdinfo(event, seq); + default: + return; + } +} + static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_perf_link_lops = { .release = bpf_perf_link_release, .dealloc = bpf_perf_link_dealloc, .fill_link_info = bpf_perf_link_fill_link_info, + .show_fdinfo = bpf_perf_link_show_fdinfo, }; static int bpf_perf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog) @@ -3916,7 +4052,8 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pro err = -ENOMEM; goto out_put_file; } - bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_PERF_EVENT, &bpf_perf_link_lops, prog); + bpf_link_init(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_PERF_EVENT, &bpf_perf_link_lops, prog, + attr->link_create.attach_type); link->perf_file = perf_file; err = bpf_link_prime(&link->link, &link_primer); @@ -3948,7 +4085,8 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pro #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ static int bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog, - const char __user *user_tp_name, u64 cookie) + const char __user *user_tp_name, u64 cookie, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { struct bpf_link_primer link_primer; struct bpf_raw_tp_link *link; @@ -3971,7 +4109,7 @@ static int bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog, tp_name = prog->aux->attach_func_name; break; } - return bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog, 0, 0, 0); + return bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog, 0, 0, 0, attach_type); case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT_WRITABLE: if (strncpy_from_user(buf, user_tp_name, sizeof(buf) - 1) < 0) @@ -3993,7 +4131,7 @@ static int bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(struct bpf_prog *prog, goto out_put_btp; } bpf_link_init_sleepable(&link->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT, - &bpf_raw_tp_link_lops, prog, + &bpf_raw_tp_link_lops, prog, attach_type, tracepoint_is_faultable(btp->tp)); link->btp = btp; link->cookie = cookie; @@ -4035,7 +4173,7 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) tp_name = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->raw_tracepoint.name); cookie = attr->raw_tracepoint.cookie; - fd = bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(prog, tp_name, cookie); + fd = bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(prog, tp_name, cookie, prog->expected_attach_type); if (fd < 0) bpf_prog_put(prog); return fd; @@ -4185,6 +4323,25 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, } } +static bool is_cgroup_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type ptype, enum bpf_attach_type atype, + bool check_atype) +{ + switch (ptype) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: + return true; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: + return check_atype ? atype == BPF_LSM_CGROUP : true; + default: + return false; + } +} + #define BPF_PROG_ATTACH_LAST_FIELD expected_revision #define BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK_BASE \ @@ -4215,6 +4372,9 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr) if (bpf_mprog_supported(ptype)) { if (attr->attach_flags & ~BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK_MPROG) return -EINVAL; + } else if (is_cgroup_prog_type(ptype, 0, false)) { + if (attr->attach_flags & ~(BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK_BASE | BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK_MPROG)) + return -EINVAL; } else { if (attr->attach_flags & ~BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK_BASE) return -EINVAL; @@ -4232,6 +4392,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr) return -EINVAL; } + if (is_cgroup_prog_type(ptype, prog->expected_attach_type, true)) { + ret = cgroup_bpf_prog_attach(attr, ptype, prog); + goto out; + } + switch (ptype) { case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG: @@ -4243,20 +4408,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr) case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: ret = netns_bpf_prog_attach(attr, prog); break; - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: - if (ptype == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM && - prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_LSM_CGROUP) - ret = -EINVAL; - else - ret = cgroup_bpf_prog_attach(attr, ptype, prog); - break; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: if (attr->attach_type == BPF_TCX_INGRESS || attr->attach_type == BPF_TCX_EGRESS) @@ -4267,7 +4418,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr) default: ret = -EINVAL; } - +out: if (ret) bpf_prog_put(prog); return ret; @@ -4295,6 +4446,9 @@ static int bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr) if (IS_ERR(prog)) return PTR_ERR(prog); } + } else if (is_cgroup_prog_type(ptype, 0, false)) { + if (attr->attach_flags || attr->relative_fd) + return -EINVAL; } else if (attr->attach_flags || attr->relative_fd || attr->expected_revision) { @@ -5085,6 +5239,21 @@ static int bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, } +static int token_get_info_by_fd(struct file *file, + struct bpf_token *token, + const union bpf_attr *attr, + union bpf_attr __user *uattr) +{ + struct bpf_token_info __user *uinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->info.info); + u32 info_len = attr->info.info_len; + int err; + + err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(USER_BPFPTR(uinfo), sizeof(*uinfo), info_len); + if (err) + return err; + return bpf_token_get_info_by_fd(token, attr, uattr); +} + #define BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD_LAST_FIELD info.info static int bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, @@ -5108,6 +5277,9 @@ static int bpf_obj_get_info_by_fd(const union bpf_attr *attr, else if (fd_file(f)->f_op == &bpf_link_fops || fd_file(f)->f_op == &bpf_link_fops_poll) return bpf_link_get_info_by_fd(fd_file(f), fd_file(f)->private_data, attr, uattr); + else if (fd_file(f)->f_op == &bpf_token_fops) + return token_get_info_by_fd(fd_file(f), fd_file(f)->private_data, + attr, uattr); return -EINVAL; } @@ -5195,21 +5367,10 @@ static int bpf_task_fd_query_copy(const union bpf_attr *attr, if (put_user(zero, ubuf)) return -EFAULT; - } else if (input_len >= len + 1) { - /* ubuf can hold the string with NULL terminator */ - if (copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, len + 1)) - return -EFAULT; } else { - /* ubuf cannot hold the string with NULL terminator, - * do a partial copy with NULL terminator. - */ - char zero = '\0'; - - err = -ENOSPC; - if (copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, input_len - 1)) - return -EFAULT; - if (put_user(zero, ubuf + input_len - 1)) - return -EFAULT; + err = bpf_copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, input_len, len); + if (err == -EFAULT) + return err; } } @@ -5387,7 +5548,8 @@ static int link_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) ret = bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog, attr->link_create.target_fd, attr->link_create.target_btf_id, - attr->link_create.tracing.cookie); + attr->link_create.tracing.cookie, + attr->link_create.attach_type); break; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING: @@ -5396,7 +5558,8 @@ static int link_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) goto out; } if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP) - ret = bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(prog, NULL, attr->link_create.tracing.cookie); + ret = bpf_raw_tp_link_attach(prog, NULL, attr->link_create.tracing.cookie, + attr->link_create.attach_type); else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER) ret = bpf_iter_link_attach(attr, uattr, prog); else if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP) @@ -5405,7 +5568,8 @@ static int link_create(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) ret = bpf_tracing_prog_attach(prog, attr->link_create.target_fd, attr->link_create.target_btf_id, - attr->link_create.tracing.cookie); + attr->link_create.tracing.cookie, + attr->link_create.attach_type); break; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: @@ -5794,6 +5958,28 @@ static int token_create(union bpf_attr *attr) return bpf_token_create(attr); } +#define BPF_PROG_STREAM_READ_BY_FD_LAST_FIELD prog_stream_read.prog_fd + +static int prog_stream_read(union bpf_attr *attr) +{ + char __user *buf = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->prog_stream_read.stream_buf); + u32 len = attr->prog_stream_read.stream_buf_len; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + int ret; + + if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_STREAM_READ_BY_FD)) + return -EINVAL; + + prog = bpf_prog_get(attr->prog_stream_read.prog_fd); + if (IS_ERR(prog)) + return PTR_ERR(prog); + + ret = bpf_prog_stream_read(prog, attr->prog_stream_read.stream_id, buf, len); + bpf_prog_put(prog); + + return ret; +} + static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size) { union bpf_attr attr; @@ -5930,6 +6116,9 @@ static int __sys_bpf(enum bpf_cmd cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size) case BPF_TOKEN_CREATE: err = token_create(&attr); break; + case BPF_PROG_STREAM_READ_BY_FD: + err = prog_stream_read(&attr); + break; default: err = -EINVAL; break; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c b/kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c index 8e61dc555415..9cbe15ce3540 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/sysfs_btf.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static int btf_sysfs_vmlinux_mmap(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, static struct bin_attribute bin_attr_btf_vmlinux __ro_after_init = { .attr = { .name = "vmlinux", .mode = 0444, }, - .read_new = sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read, + .read = sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read, .mmap = btf_sysfs_vmlinux_mmap, }; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c index 2e4885e7781f..efd987ea6872 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int tcx_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, u64 revision) { struct tcx_link *tcx = tcx_link(link); - bool created, ingress = tcx->location == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; + bool created, ingress = link->attach_type == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry, *entry_new; struct net_device *dev = tcx->dev; int ret; @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int tcx_link_prog_attach(struct bpf_link *link, u32 flags, u32 id_or_fd, static void tcx_link_release(struct bpf_link *link) { struct tcx_link *tcx = tcx_link(link); - bool ingress = tcx->location == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; + bool ingress = link->attach_type == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry, *entry_new; struct net_device *dev; int ret = 0; @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static int tcx_link_update(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_prog *nprog, struct bpf_prog *oprog) { struct tcx_link *tcx = tcx_link(link); - bool ingress = tcx->location == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; + bool ingress = link->attach_type == BPF_TCX_INGRESS; struct bpf_mprog_entry *entry, *entry_new; struct net_device *dev; int ret = 0; @@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ static void tcx_link_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link, struct seq_file *seq) seq_printf(seq, "ifindex:\t%u\n", ifindex); seq_printf(seq, "attach_type:\t%u (%s)\n", - tcx->location, - tcx->location == BPF_TCX_INGRESS ? "ingress" : "egress"); + link->attach_type, + link->attach_type == BPF_TCX_INGRESS ? "ingress" : "egress"); } static int tcx_link_fill_info(const struct bpf_link *link, @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int tcx_link_fill_info(const struct bpf_link *link, rtnl_unlock(); info->tcx.ifindex = ifindex; - info->tcx.attach_type = tcx->location; + info->tcx.attach_type = link->attach_type; return 0; } @@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ static int tcx_link_init(struct tcx_link *tcx, struct net_device *dev, struct bpf_prog *prog) { - bpf_link_init(&tcx->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX, &tcx_link_lops, prog); - tcx->location = attr->link_create.attach_type; + bpf_link_init(&tcx->link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_TCX, &tcx_link_lops, prog, + attr->link_create.attach_type); tcx->dev = dev; return bpf_link_prime(&tcx->link, link_primer); } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tnum.c b/kernel/bpf/tnum.c index 9dbc31b25e3d..fa353c5d550f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/tnum.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/tnum.c @@ -83,6 +83,11 @@ struct tnum tnum_sub(struct tnum a, struct tnum b) return TNUM(dv & ~mu, mu); } +struct tnum tnum_neg(struct tnum a) +{ + return tnum_sub(TNUM(0, 0), a); +} + struct tnum tnum_and(struct tnum a, struct tnum b) { u64 alpha, beta, v; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/token.c b/kernel/bpf/token.c index 26057aa13503..0bbe412f854e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/token.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/token.c @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static void bpf_token_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) static const struct inode_operations bpf_token_iops = { }; -static const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = { +const struct file_operations bpf_token_fops = { .release = bpf_token_release, .show_fdinfo = bpf_token_show_fdinfo, }; @@ -210,6 +210,29 @@ out_file: return err; } +int bpf_token_get_info_by_fd(struct bpf_token *token, + const union bpf_attr *attr, + union bpf_attr __user *uattr) +{ + struct bpf_token_info __user *uinfo = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->info.info); + struct bpf_token_info info; + u32 info_len = attr->info.info_len; + + info_len = min_t(u32, info_len, sizeof(info)); + memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info)); + + info.allowed_cmds = token->allowed_cmds; + info.allowed_maps = token->allowed_maps; + info.allowed_progs = token->allowed_progs; + info.allowed_attachs = token->allowed_attachs; + + if (copy_to_user(uinfo, &info, info_len) || + put_user(info_len, &uattr->info.info_len)) + return -EFAULT; + + return 0; +} + struct bpf_token *bpf_token_get_from_fd(u32 ufd) { CLASS(fd, f)(ufd); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c index c4b1a98ff726..0e364614c3a2 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c @@ -674,7 +674,8 @@ static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_shim_tramp_link_lops = { static struct bpf_shim_tramp_link *cgroup_shim_alloc(const struct bpf_prog *prog, bpf_func_t bpf_func, - int cgroup_atype) + int cgroup_atype, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { struct bpf_shim_tramp_link *shim_link = NULL; struct bpf_prog *p; @@ -701,7 +702,7 @@ static struct bpf_shim_tramp_link *cgroup_shim_alloc(const struct bpf_prog *prog p->expected_attach_type = BPF_LSM_MAC; bpf_prog_inc(p); bpf_link_init(&shim_link->link.link, BPF_LINK_TYPE_UNSPEC, - &bpf_shim_tramp_link_lops, p); + &bpf_shim_tramp_link_lops, p, attach_type); bpf_cgroup_atype_get(p->aux->attach_btf_id, cgroup_atype); return shim_link; @@ -726,7 +727,8 @@ static struct bpf_shim_tramp_link *cgroup_shim_find(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, } int bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(struct bpf_prog *prog, - int cgroup_atype) + int cgroup_atype, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { struct bpf_shim_tramp_link *shim_link = NULL; struct bpf_attach_target_info tgt_info = {}; @@ -763,7 +765,7 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(struct bpf_prog *prog, /* Allocate and install new shim. */ - shim_link = cgroup_shim_alloc(prog, bpf_func, cgroup_atype); + shim_link = cgroup_shim_alloc(prog, bpf_func, cgroup_atype, attach_type); if (!shim_link) { err = -ENOMEM; goto err; @@ -911,27 +913,32 @@ static u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_tram return bpf_prog_start_time(); } -static void notrace update_prog_stats(struct bpf_prog *prog, - u64 start) +static void notrace __update_prog_stats(struct bpf_prog *prog, u64 start) { struct bpf_prog_stats *stats; + unsigned long flags; + u64 duration; - if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_stats_enabled_key) && - /* static_key could be enabled in __bpf_prog_enter* - * and disabled in __bpf_prog_exit*. - * And vice versa. - * Hence check that 'start' is valid. - */ - start > NO_START_TIME) { - u64 duration = sched_clock() - start; - unsigned long flags; - - stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->stats); - flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(&stats->syncp); - u64_stats_inc(&stats->cnt); - u64_stats_add(&stats->nsecs, duration); - u64_stats_update_end_irqrestore(&stats->syncp, flags); - } + /* + * static_key could be enabled in __bpf_prog_enter* and disabled in + * __bpf_prog_exit*. And vice versa. Check that 'start' is valid. + */ + if (start <= NO_START_TIME) + return; + + duration = sched_clock() - start; + stats = this_cpu_ptr(prog->stats); + flags = u64_stats_update_begin_irqsave(&stats->syncp); + u64_stats_inc(&stats->cnt); + u64_stats_add(&stats->nsecs, duration); + u64_stats_update_end_irqrestore(&stats->syncp, flags); +} + +static __always_inline void notrace update_prog_stats(struct bpf_prog *prog, + u64 start) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_stats_enabled_key)) + __update_prog_stats(prog, start); } static void notrace __bpf_prog_exit_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog, u64 start, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index a0d663be91a2..399f03e62508 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { #undef BPF_LINK_TYPE }; +enum bpf_features { + BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID = 0, + BPF_FEAT_STREAMS = 1, + __MAX_BPF_FEAT, +}; + struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_global_percpu_ma; static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set; @@ -405,7 +411,8 @@ static bool reg_not_null(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) type == PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || (type == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && is_trusted_reg(reg)) || - type == PTR_TO_MEM; + (type == PTR_TO_MEM && !(reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) || + type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; } static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) @@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_re * dynptr */ if (state->stack[i].slot_type[0] != STACK_DYNPTR) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured ref_obj_id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured ref_obj_id"); return -EFAULT; } if (state->stack[i].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot) @@ -1403,7 +1410,7 @@ static void *realloc_array(void *arr, size_t old_n, size_t new_n, size_t size) goto out; alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(new_n, size)); - new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + new_arr = krealloc(arr, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!new_arr) { kfree(arr); return NULL; @@ -1420,7 +1427,7 @@ out: static int copy_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst, const struct bpf_verifier_state *src) { dst->refs = copy_array(dst->refs, src->refs, src->acquired_refs, - sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL); + sizeof(struct bpf_reference_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!dst->refs) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1439,7 +1446,7 @@ static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_st size_t n = src->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; dst->stack = copy_array(dst->stack, src->stack, n, sizeof(struct bpf_stack_state), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!dst->stack) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1647,7 +1654,7 @@ static void update_peak_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { u32 cur_states; - cur_states = env->explored_states_size + env->free_list_size; + cur_states = env->explored_states_size + env->free_list_size + env->num_backedges; env->peak_states = max(env->peak_states, cur_states); } @@ -1659,6 +1666,13 @@ static void free_func_state(struct bpf_func_state *state) kfree(state); } +static void clear_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_state *state) +{ + kfree(state->jmp_history); + state->jmp_history = NULL; + state->jmp_history_cnt = 0; +} + static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, bool free_self) { @@ -1669,11 +1683,12 @@ static void free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, state->frame[i] = NULL; } kfree(state->refs); + clear_jmp_history(state); if (free_self) kfree(state); } -/* struct bpf_verifier_state->{parent,loop_entry} refer to states +/* struct bpf_verifier_state->parent refers to states * that are in either of env->{expored_states,free_list}. * In both cases the state is contained in struct bpf_verifier_state_list. */ @@ -1684,37 +1699,24 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state_list *state_parent_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_ return NULL; } -static struct bpf_verifier_state_list *state_loop_entry_as_list(struct bpf_verifier_state *st) -{ - if (st->loop_entry) - return container_of(st->loop_entry, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, state); - return NULL; -} +static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *st); /* A state can be freed if it is no longer referenced: * - is in the env->free_list; * - has no children states; - * - is not used as loop_entry. - * - * Freeing a state can make it's loop_entry free-able. */ static void maybe_free_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl) { - struct bpf_verifier_state_list *loop_entry_sl; - - while (sl && sl->in_free_list && - sl->state.branches == 0 && - sl->state.used_as_loop_entry == 0) { - loop_entry_sl = state_loop_entry_as_list(&sl->state); - if (loop_entry_sl) - loop_entry_sl->state.used_as_loop_entry--; - list_del(&sl->node); - free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); - kfree(sl); - env->free_list_size--; - sl = loop_entry_sl; - } + if (!sl->in_free_list + || sl->state.branches != 0 + || incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) + return; + list_del(&sl->node); + free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false); + kfree(sl); + env->free_list_size--; } /* copy verifier state from src to dst growing dst stack space @@ -1733,6 +1735,13 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, struct bpf_func_state *dst; int i, err; + dst_state->jmp_history = copy_array(dst_state->jmp_history, src->jmp_history, + src->jmp_history_cnt, sizeof(*dst_state->jmp_history), + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!dst_state->jmp_history) + return -ENOMEM; + dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt; + /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them, this is also * necessary in case of exceptional exits using bpf_throw. */ @@ -1750,17 +1759,14 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, dst_state->parent = src->parent; dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; - dst_state->insn_hist_start = src->insn_hist_start; - dst_state->insn_hist_end = src->insn_hist_end; dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; - dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry; dst_state->may_goto_depth = src->may_goto_depth; - dst_state->loop_entry = src->loop_entry; + dst_state->equal_state = src->equal_state; for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { dst = dst_state->frame[i]; if (!dst) { - dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL); + dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!dst) return -ENOMEM; dst_state->frame[i] = dst; @@ -1799,181 +1805,241 @@ static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_sta return true; } -/* Open coded iterators allow back-edges in the state graph in order to - * check unbounded loops that iterators. - * - * In is_state_visited() it is necessary to know if explored states are - * part of some loops in order to decide whether non-exact states - * comparison could be used: - * - non-exact states comparison establishes sub-state relation and uses - * read and precision marks to do so, these marks are propagated from - * children states and thus are not guaranteed to be final in a loop; - * - exact states comparison just checks if current and explored states - * are identical (and thus form a back-edge). - * - * Paper "A New Algorithm for Identifying Loops in Decompilation" - * by Tao Wei, Jian Mao, Wei Zou and Yu Chen [1] presents a convenient - * algorithm for loop structure detection and gives an overview of - * relevant terminology. It also has helpful illustrations. - * - * [1] https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15784067 - * - * We use a similar algorithm but because loop nested structure is - * irrelevant for verifier ours is significantly simpler and resembles - * strongly connected components algorithm from Sedgewick's textbook. - * - * Define topmost loop entry as a first node of the loop traversed in a - * depth first search starting from initial state. The goal of the loop - * tracking algorithm is to associate topmost loop entries with states - * derived from these entries. - * - * For each step in the DFS states traversal algorithm needs to identify - * the following situations: - * - * initial initial initial - * | | | - * V V V - * ... ... .---------> hdr - * | | | | - * V V | V - * cur .-> succ | .------... - * | | | | | | - * V | V | V V - * succ '-- cur | ... ... - * | | | - * | V V - * | succ <- cur - * | | - * | V - * | ... - * | | - * '----' - * - * (A) successor state of cur (B) successor state of cur or it's entry - * not yet traversed are in current DFS path, thus cur and succ - * are members of the same outermost loop - * - * initial initial - * | | - * V V - * ... ... - * | | - * V V - * .------... .------... - * | | | | - * V V V V - * .-> hdr ... ... ... - * | | | | | - * | V V V V - * | succ <- cur succ <- cur - * | | | - * | V V - * | ... ... - * | | | - * '----' exit - * - * (C) successor state of cur is a part of some loop but this loop - * does not include cur or successor state is not in a loop at all. - * - * Algorithm could be described as the following python code: - * - * traversed = set() # Set of traversed nodes - * entries = {} # Mapping from node to loop entry - * depths = {} # Depth level assigned to graph node - * path = set() # Current DFS path - * - * # Find outermost loop entry known for n - * def get_loop_entry(n): - * h = entries.get(n, None) - * while h in entries: - * h = entries[h] - * return h - * - * # Update n's loop entry if h comes before n in current DFS path. - * def update_loop_entry(n, h): - * if h in path and depths[entries.get(n, n)] < depths[n]: - * entries[n] = h1 +/* Return IP for a given frame in a call stack */ +static u32 frame_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, u32 frame) +{ + return frame == st->curframe + ? st->insn_idx + : st->frame[frame + 1]->callsite; +} + +/* For state @st look for a topmost frame with frame_insn_idx() in some SCC, + * if such frame exists form a corresponding @callchain as an array of + * call sites leading to this frame and SCC id. + * E.g.: * - * def dfs(n, depth): - * traversed.add(n) - * path.add(n) - * depths[n] = depth - * for succ in G.successors(n): - * if succ not in traversed: - * # Case A: explore succ and update cur's loop entry - * # only if succ's entry is in current DFS path. - * dfs(succ, depth + 1) - * h = entries.get(succ, None) - * update_loop_entry(n, h) - * else: - * # Case B or C depending on `h1 in path` check in update_loop_entry(). - * update_loop_entry(n, succ) - * path.remove(n) + * void foo() { A: loop {... SCC#1 ...}; } + * void bar() { B: loop { C: foo(); ... SCC#2 ... } + * D: loop { E: foo(); ... SCC#3 ... } } + * void main() { F: bar(); } * - * To adapt this algorithm for use with verifier: - * - use st->branch == 0 as a signal that DFS of succ had been finished - * and cur's loop entry has to be updated (case A), handle this in - * update_branch_counts(); - * - use st->branch > 0 as a signal that st is in the current DFS path; - * - handle cases B and C in is_state_visited(). + * @callchain at (A) would be either (F,SCC#2) or (F,SCC#3) depending + * on @st frame call sites being (F,C,A) or (F,E,A). */ -static struct bpf_verifier_state *get_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +static bool compute_scc_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *st, + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) { - struct bpf_verifier_state *topmost = st->loop_entry; - u32 steps = 0; + u32 i, scc, insn_idx; - while (topmost && topmost->loop_entry) { - if (verifier_bug_if(steps++ > st->dfs_depth, env, "infinite loop")) - return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); - topmost = topmost->loop_entry; + memset(callchain, 0, sizeof(*callchain)); + for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) { + insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(st, i); + scc = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].scc; + if (scc) { + callchain->scc = scc; + break; + } else if (i < st->curframe) { + callchain->callsites[i] = insn_idx; + } else { + return false; + } } - return topmost; + return true; } -static void update_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, struct bpf_verifier_state *hdr) +/* Check if bpf_scc_visit instance for @callchain exists. */ +static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_lookup(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) { - /* The hdr->branches check decides between cases B and C in - * comment for get_loop_entry(). If hdr->branches == 0 then - * head's topmost loop entry is not in current DFS path, - * hence 'cur' and 'hdr' are not in the same loop and there is - * no need to update cur->loop_entry. - */ - if (hdr->branches && hdr->dfs_depth < (cur->loop_entry ?: cur)->dfs_depth) { - if (cur->loop_entry) { - cur->loop_entry->used_as_loop_entry--; - maybe_free_verifier_state(env, state_loop_entry_as_list(cur)); - } - cur->loop_entry = hdr; - hdr->used_as_loop_entry++; + struct bpf_scc_info *info = env->scc_info[callchain->scc]; + struct bpf_scc_visit *visits = info->visits; + u32 i; + + if (!info) + return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < info->num_visits; i++) + if (memcmp(callchain, &visits[i].callchain, sizeof(*callchain)) == 0) + return &visits[i]; + return NULL; +} + +/* Allocate a new bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @callchain. + * Allocated instances are alive for a duration of the do_check_common() + * call and are freed by free_states(). + */ +static struct bpf_scc_visit *scc_visit_alloc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) +{ + struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; + struct bpf_scc_info *info; + u32 scc, num_visits; + u64 new_sz; + + scc = callchain->scc; + info = env->scc_info[scc]; + num_visits = info ? info->num_visits : 0; + new_sz = sizeof(*info) + sizeof(struct bpf_scc_visit) * (num_visits + 1); + info = kvrealloc(env->scc_info[scc], new_sz, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!info) + return NULL; + env->scc_info[scc] = info; + info->num_visits = num_visits + 1; + visit = &info->visits[num_visits]; + memset(visit, 0, sizeof(*visit)); + memcpy(&visit->callchain, callchain, sizeof(*callchain)); + return visit; +} + +/* Form a string '(callsite#1,callsite#2,...,scc)' in env->tmp_str_buf */ +static char *format_callchain(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain) +{ + char *buf = env->tmp_str_buf; + int i, delta = 0; + + delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "("); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(callchain->callsites); i++) { + if (!callchain->callsites[i]) + break; + delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u,", + callchain->callsites[i]); } + delta += snprintf(buf + delta, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN - delta, "%u)", callchain->scc); + return env->tmp_str_buf; } -static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +/* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), ensure that + * bpf_scc_visit instance for this callchain exists. + * If instance does not exist or is empty, assign visit->entry_state to @st. + */ +static int maybe_enter_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; + struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; + + if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) + return 0; + visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); + visit = visit ?: scc_visit_alloc(env, callchain); + if (!visit) + return -ENOMEM; + if (!visit->entry_state) { + visit->entry_state = st; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "SCC enter %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); + } + return 0; +} + +static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit); + +/* If callchain for @st exists (@st is in some SCC), make it empty: + * - set visit->entry_state to NULL; + * - flush accumulated backedges. + */ +static int maybe_exit_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; + struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; + + if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) + return 0; + visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); + if (!visit) { + verifier_bug(env, "scc exit: no visit info for call chain %s", + format_callchain(env, callchain)); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (visit->entry_state != st) + return 0; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "SCC exit %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); + visit->entry_state = NULL; + env->num_backedges -= visit->num_backedges; + visit->num_backedges = 0; + update_peak_states(env); + return propagate_backedges(env, visit); +} + +/* Lookup an bpf_scc_visit instance corresponding to @st callchain + * and add @backedge to visit->backedges. @st callchain must exist. + */ +static int add_scc_backedge(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *st, + struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge) +{ + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; + struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; + + if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) { + verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no SCC in verification path, insn_idx %d", + st->insn_idx); + return -EFAULT; + } + visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); + if (!visit) { + verifier_bug(env, "add backedge: no visit info for call chain %s", + format_callchain(env, callchain)); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "SCC backedge %s\n", format_callchain(env, callchain)); + backedge->next = visit->backedges; + visit->backedges = backedge; + visit->num_backedges++; + env->num_backedges++; + update_peak_states(env); + return 0; +} + +/* bpf_reg_state->live marks for registers in a state @st are incomplete, + * if state @st is in some SCC and not all execution paths starting at this + * SCC are fully explored. + */ +static bool incomplete_read_marks(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_scc_callchain *callchain = &env->callchain_buf; + struct bpf_scc_visit *visit; + + if (!compute_scc_callchain(env, st, callchain)) + return false; + visit = scc_visit_lookup(env, callchain); + if (!visit) + return false; + return !!visit->backedges; +} + +static void free_backedges(struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) +{ + struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge, *next; + + for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = next) { + free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); + next = backedge->next; + kvfree(backedge); + } + visit->backedges = NULL; +} + +static int update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) { struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl = NULL, *parent_sl; struct bpf_verifier_state *parent; + int err; while (st) { u32 br = --st->branches; - /* br == 0 signals that DFS exploration for 'st' is finished, - * thus it is necessary to update parent's loop entry if it - * turned out that st is a part of some loop. - * This is a part of 'case A' in get_loop_entry() comment. - */ - if (br == 0 && st->parent && st->loop_entry) - update_loop_entry(env, st->parent, st->loop_entry); - - /* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here, + /* verifier_bug_if(br > 1, ...) technically makes sense here, * but see comment in push_stack(), hence: */ - WARN_ONCE((int)br < 0, - "BUG update_branch_counts:branches_to_explore=%d\n", - br); + verifier_bug_if((int)br < 0, env, "%s:branches_to_explore=%d", __func__, br); if (br) break; + err = maybe_exit_scc(env, st); + if (err) + return err; parent = st->parent; parent_sl = state_parent_as_list(st); if (sl) @@ -1981,6 +2047,7 @@ static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifi st = parent; sl = parent_sl; } + return 0; } static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, @@ -2012,6 +2079,18 @@ static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx, return 0; } +static bool error_recoverable_with_nospec(int err) +{ + /* Should only return true for non-fatal errors that are allowed to + * occur during speculative verification. For these we can insert a + * nospec and the program might still be accepted. Do not include + * something like ENOMEM because it is likely to re-occur for the next + * architectural path once it has been recovered-from in all speculative + * paths. + */ + return err == -EPERM || err == -EACCES || err == -EINVAL; +} + static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx, bool speculative) @@ -2020,9 +2099,9 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; int err; - elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); + elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!elem) - goto err; + return NULL; elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; @@ -2032,12 +2111,12 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, env->stack_size++; err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur); if (err) - goto err; + return NULL; elem->st.speculative |= speculative; if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ) { verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex.\n", env->stack_size); - goto err; + return NULL; } if (elem->st.parent) { ++elem->st.parent->branches; @@ -2052,12 +2131,6 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ } return &elem->st; -err: - free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); - env->cur_state = NULL; - /* pop all elements and return */ - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); - return NULL; } #define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6 @@ -2450,6 +2523,58 @@ static void __reg64_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) if ((u64)reg->smin_value <= (u64)reg->smax_value) { reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value, reg->umin_value); reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value, reg->umax_value); + } else { + /* If the s64 range crosses the sign boundary, then it's split + * between the beginning and end of the U64 domain. In that + * case, we can derive new bounds if the u64 range overlaps + * with only one end of the s64 range. + * + * In the following example, the u64 range overlaps only with + * positive portion of the s64 range. + * + * 0 U64_MAX + * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | + * |----------------------------|----------------------------| + * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxx| + * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 + * + * We can thus derive the following new s64 and u64 ranges. + * + * 0 U64_MAX + * | [xxxxxx u64 range xxxxx] | + * |----------------------------|----------------------------| + * | [xxxxxx s64 range xxxxx] | + * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 + * + * If they overlap in two places, we can't derive anything + * because reg_state can't represent two ranges per numeric + * domain. + * + * 0 U64_MAX + * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | + * |----------------------------|----------------------------| + * |xxxxx s64 range xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxx| + * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 + * + * The first condition below corresponds to the first diagram + * above. + */ + if (reg->umax_value < (u64)reg->smin_value) { + reg->smin_value = (s64)reg->umin_value; + reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, reg->smax_value); + } else if ((u64)reg->smax_value < reg->umin_value) { + /* This second condition considers the case where the u64 range + * overlaps with the negative portion of the s64 range: + * + * 0 U64_MAX + * | [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx u64 range xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] | + * |----------------------------|----------------------------| + * |xxxxxxxxx] [xxxxxxxxxxxx s64 range | + * 0 S64_MAX S64_MIN -1 + */ + reg->smax_value = (s64)reg->umax_value; + reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, reg->smin_value); + } } } @@ -2481,20 +2606,6 @@ static void __reg_deduce_mixed_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, new_smin); reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, new_smax); - /* if s32 can be treated as valid u32 range, we can use it as well */ - if ((u32)reg->s32_min_value <= (u32)reg->s32_max_value) { - /* s32 -> u64 tightening */ - new_umin = (reg->umin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | (u32)reg->s32_min_value; - new_umax = (reg->umax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | (u32)reg->s32_max_value; - reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->umin_value, new_umin); - reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->umax_value, new_umax); - /* s32 -> s64 tightening */ - new_smin = (reg->smin_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | (u32)reg->s32_min_value; - new_smax = (reg->smax_value & ~0xffffffffULL) | (u32)reg->s32_max_value; - reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value, new_smin); - reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value, new_smax); - } - /* Here we would like to handle a special case after sign extending load, * when upper bits for a 64-bit range are all 1s or all 0s. * @@ -2561,6 +2672,7 @@ static void reg_bounds_sync(struct bpf_reg_state *reg) /* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */ __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); + __reg_deduce_bounds(reg); /* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */ __reg_bound_offset(reg); /* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds @@ -2607,13 +2719,13 @@ static int reg_bounds_sanity_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return 0; out: - verbose(env, "REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (%s): %s u64=[%#llx, %#llx] " - "s64=[%#llx, %#llx] u32=[%#x, %#x] s32=[%#x, %#x] var_off=(%#llx, %#llx)\n", - ctx, msg, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value, - reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value, - reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_max_value, - reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_max_value, - reg->var_off.value, reg->var_off.mask); + verifier_bug(env, "REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (%s): %s u64=[%#llx, %#llx] " + "s64=[%#llx, %#llx] u32=[%#x, %#x] s32=[%#x, %#x] var_off=(%#llx, %#llx)", + ctx, msg, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value, + reg->smin_value, reg->smax_value, + reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_max_value, + reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_max_value, + reg->var_off.value, reg->var_off.mask); if (env->test_reg_invariants) return -EFAULT; __mark_reg_unbounded(reg); @@ -2723,22 +2835,33 @@ static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __mark_reg_not_init(env, regs + regno); } -static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, - enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, - struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, - enum bpf_type_flag flag) +static int mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, + enum bpf_reg_type reg_type, + struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, + enum bpf_type_flag flag) { - if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { + switch (reg_type) { + case SCALAR_VALUE: mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno); - return; + return 0; + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); + regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; + regs[regno].btf = btf; + regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; + if (type_may_be_null(flag)) + regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; + return 0; + case PTR_TO_MEM: + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); + regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_MEM | flag; + regs[regno].mem_size = 0; + return 0; + default: + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected reg_type %d in %s\n", reg_type, __func__); + return -EFAULT; } - mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, regno); - regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; - regs[regno].btf = btf; - regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; - if (type_may_be_null(flag)) - regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; } #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) @@ -2787,9 +2910,9 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem; struct bpf_func_state *frame; - elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL); + elem = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!elem) - goto err; + return NULL; elem->insn_idx = insn_idx; elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx; @@ -2801,35 +2924,24 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_async_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "The sequence of %d jumps is too complex for async cb.\n", env->stack_size); - goto err; + return NULL; } /* Unlike push_stack() do not copy_verifier_state(). * The caller state doesn't matter. * This is async callback. It starts in a fresh stack. * Initialize it similar to do_check_common(). - * But we do need to make sure to not clobber insn_hist, so we keep - * chaining insn_hist_start/insn_hist_end indices as for a normal - * child state. */ elem->st.branches = 1; elem->st.in_sleepable = is_sleepable; - elem->st.insn_hist_start = env->cur_state->insn_hist_end; - elem->st.insn_hist_end = elem->st.insn_hist_start; - frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL); + frame = kzalloc(sizeof(*frame), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!frame) - goto err; + return NULL; init_func_state(env, frame, BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */, 0 /* frameno within this callchain */, subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); elem->st.frame[0] = frame; return &elem->st; -err: - free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); - env->cur_state = NULL; - /* pop all elements and return */ - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); - return NULL; } @@ -3167,7 +3279,7 @@ static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) return -EINVAL; } - tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL); + tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!tab) return -ENOMEM; prog_aux->kfunc_tab = tab; @@ -3183,7 +3295,7 @@ static int add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, s16 offset) return 0; if (!btf_tab && offset) { - btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL); + btf_tab = kzalloc(sizeof(*btf_tab), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!btf_tab) return -ENOMEM; prog_aux->kfunc_btf_tab = btf_tab; @@ -3843,10 +3955,11 @@ static void linked_regs_unpack(u64 val, struct linked_regs *s) } /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */ -static int push_insn_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, - int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs) +static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, + int insn_flags, u64 linked_regs) { - struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *p; + u32 cnt = cur->jmp_history_cnt; + struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *p; size_t alloc_size; /* combine instruction flags if we already recorded this instruction */ @@ -3866,32 +3979,29 @@ static int push_insn_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_s return 0; } - if (cur->insn_hist_end + 1 > env->insn_hist_cap) { - alloc_size = size_mul(cur->insn_hist_end + 1, sizeof(*p)); - p = kvrealloc(env->insn_hist, alloc_size, GFP_USER); - if (!p) - return -ENOMEM; - env->insn_hist = p; - env->insn_hist_cap = alloc_size / sizeof(*p); - } + cnt++; + alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p))); + p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!p) + return -ENOMEM; + cur->jmp_history = p; - p = &env->insn_hist[cur->insn_hist_end]; + p = &cur->jmp_history[cnt - 1]; p->idx = env->insn_idx; p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; p->flags = insn_flags; p->linked_regs = linked_regs; - - cur->insn_hist_end++; + cur->jmp_history_cnt = cnt; env->cur_hist_ent = p; return 0; } -static struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *get_insn_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - u32 hist_start, u32 hist_end, int insn_idx) +static struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *get_jmp_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, + u32 hist_end, int insn_idx) { - if (hist_end > hist_start && env->insn_hist[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) - return &env->insn_hist[hist_end - 1]; + if (hist_end > 0 && st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) + return &st->jmp_history[hist_end - 1]; return NULL; } @@ -3908,26 +4018,25 @@ static struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *get_insn_hist_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env * * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and * first instruction of given state. */ -static int get_prev_insn_idx(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_verifier_state *st, - int insn_idx, u32 hist_start, u32 *hist_endp) +static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i, + u32 *history) { - u32 hist_end = *hist_endp; - u32 cnt = hist_end - hist_start; + u32 cnt = *history; - if (insn_idx == st->first_insn_idx) { + if (i == st->first_insn_idx) { if (cnt == 0) return -ENOENT; - if (cnt == 1 && env->insn_hist[hist_start].idx == insn_idx) + if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i) return -ENOENT; } - if (cnt && env->insn_hist[hist_end - 1].idx == insn_idx) { - (*hist_endp)--; - return env->insn_hist[hist_end - 1].prev_idx; + if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) { + i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx; + (*history)--; } else { - return insn_idx - 1; + i--; } + return i; } static const char *disasm_kfunc_name(void *data, const struct bpf_insn *insn) @@ -4108,7 +4217,7 @@ static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) /* If any register R in hist->linked_regs is marked as precise in bt, * do bt_set_frame_{reg,slot}(bt, R) for all registers in hist->linked_regs. */ -static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *hist) +static void bt_sync_linked_regs(struct backtrack_state *bt, struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist) { struct linked_regs linked_regs; bool some_precise = false; @@ -4153,7 +4262,7 @@ static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); * - *was* processed previously during backtracking. */ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, - struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt) + struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist, struct backtrack_state *bt) { struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + idx; u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); @@ -4448,7 +4557,7 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, * . if (scalar cond K|scalar) * . helper_call(.., scalar, ...) where ARG_CONST is expected * backtrack through the verifier states and mark all registers and - * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar regisers + * stack slots with spilled constants that these scalar registers * should be precise. * . during state pruning two registers (or spilled stack slots) * are equivalent if both are not precise. @@ -4571,7 +4680,7 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ * SCALARS, as well as any other registers and slots that contribute to * a tracked state of given registers/stack slots, depending on specific BPF * assembly instructions (see backtrack_insns() for exact instruction handling - * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded insn_hist and is able to + * logic). This backtracking relies on recorded jmp_history and is able to * traverse entire chain of parent states. This process ends only when all the * necessary registers/slots and their transitive dependencies are marked as * precise. @@ -4651,23 +4760,27 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ * mark_all_scalars_imprecise() to hopefully get more permissive and generic * finalized states which help in short circuiting more future states. */ -static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) +static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state, + int regno, + bool *changed) { + struct bpf_verifier_state *st = starting_state; struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; - struct bpf_verifier_state *st = env->cur_state; int first_idx = st->first_insn_idx; - int last_idx = env->insn_idx; + int last_idx = starting_state->insn_idx; int subseq_idx = -1; struct bpf_func_state *func; + bool tmp, skip_first = true; struct bpf_reg_state *reg; - bool skip_first = true; int i, fr, err; if (!env->bpf_capable) return 0; + changed = changed ?: &tmp; /* set frame number from which we are starting to backtrack */ - bt_init(bt, env->cur_state->curframe); + bt_init(bt, starting_state->curframe); /* Do sanity checks against current state of register and/or stack * slot, but don't set precise flag in current state, as precision @@ -4677,7 +4790,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) if (regno >= 0) { reg = &func->regs[regno]; if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "backtracing misuse"); + verifier_bug(env, "backtracking misuse"); return -EFAULT; } bt_set_reg(bt, regno); @@ -4688,9 +4801,8 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) for (;;) { DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); - u32 hist_start = st->insn_hist_start; - u32 hist_end = st->insn_hist_end; - struct bpf_insn_hist_entry *hist; + u32 history = st->jmp_history_cnt; + struct bpf_jmp_history_entry *hist; if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { verbose(env, "mark_precise: frame%d: last_idx %d first_idx %d subseq_idx %d \n", @@ -4712,8 +4824,10 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i]; bt_clear_reg(bt, i); - if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) + if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { reg->precise = true; + *changed = true; + } } return 0; } @@ -4728,11 +4842,11 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) err = 0; skip_first = false; } else { - hist = get_insn_hist_entry(env, hist_start, hist_end, i); + hist = get_jmp_hist_entry(st, history, i); err = backtrack_insn(env, i, subseq_idx, hist, bt); } if (err == -ENOTSUPP) { - mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); bt_reset(bt); return 0; } else if (err) { @@ -4745,7 +4859,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) */ return 0; subseq_idx = i; - i = get_prev_insn_idx(env, st, i, hist_start, &hist_end); + i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history); if (i == -ENOENT) break; if (i >= env->prog->len) { @@ -4772,10 +4886,12 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); continue; } - if (reg->precise) + if (reg->precise) { bt_clear_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); - else + } else { reg->precise = true; + *changed = true; + } } bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); @@ -4790,10 +4906,12 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) continue; } reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; - if (reg->precise) + if (reg->precise) { bt_clear_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); - else + } else { reg->precise = true; + *changed = true; + } } if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { fmt_reg_mask(env->tmp_str_buf, TMP_STR_BUF_LEN, @@ -4820,7 +4938,7 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) * fallback to marking all precise */ if (!bt_empty(bt)) { - mark_all_scalars_precise(env, env->cur_state); + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, starting_state); bt_reset(bt); } @@ -4829,15 +4947,16 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) int mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, env->cur_state, regno, NULL); } /* mark_chain_precision_batch() assumes that env->bt is set in the caller to * desired reg and stack masks across all relevant frames */ -static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +static int mark_chain_precision_batch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_verifier_state *starting_state) { - return __mark_chain_precision(env, -1); + return __mark_chain_precision(env, starting_state, -1, NULL); } static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -5026,7 +5145,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } if (sanitize) - env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].sanitize_stack_spill = true; + env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].nospec_result = true; } err = destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot(env, state, spi); @@ -5109,7 +5228,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } if (insn_flags) - return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); + return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); return 0; } @@ -5416,7 +5535,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */ } if (insn_flags) - return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); + return push_jmp_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); return 0; } @@ -5896,6 +6015,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx]; int class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); struct bpf_reg_state *val_reg; + int ret; /* Things we already checked for in check_map_access and caller: * - Reject cases where variable offset may touch kptr @@ -5929,8 +6049,11 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, /* We can simply mark the value_regno receiving the pointer * value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type. */ - mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf, - kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field)); + ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, + kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, + btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field)); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } else if (class == BPF_STX) { val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && @@ -7143,7 +7266,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (env->ops->btf_struct_access && !type_is_alloc(reg->type) && atype == BPF_WRITE) { if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: reg->btf must be kernel btf\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "reg->btf must be kernel btf"); return -EFAULT; } ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, reg, off, size); @@ -7159,7 +7282,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) && !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg->ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -7229,8 +7352,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, clear_trusted_flags(&flag); } - if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) - mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); + if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { + ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } return 0; } @@ -7284,13 +7410,19 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* Simulate access to a PTR_TO_BTF_ID */ memset(&map_reg, 0, sizeof(map_reg)); - mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); + ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, &map_reg, 0, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, + btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, &map_reg, off, size, atype, &btf_id, &flag, NULL); if (ret < 0) return ret; - if (value_regno >= 0) - mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); + if (value_regno >= 0) { + ret = mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_vmlinux, btf_id, flag); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } return 0; } @@ -7474,6 +7606,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn } } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM) { bool rdonly_mem = type_is_rdonly_mem(reg->type); + bool rdonly_untrusted = rdonly_mem && (reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED); if (type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, @@ -7493,8 +7626,13 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn return -EACCES; } - err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, - reg->mem_size, false); + /* + * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe + * instructions, hence no need to check bounds in that case. + */ + if (!rdonly_untrusted) + err = check_mem_region_access(env, regno, off, size, + reg->mem_size, false); if (!err && value_regno >= 0 && (t == BPF_READ || rdonly_mem)) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) { @@ -8521,7 +8659,7 @@ static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*): */ if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "misconfigured dynptr helper type flags"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -8887,8 +9025,8 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, if (cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE && cur_iter->iter.state != BPF_ITER_STATE_DRAINED) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected iterator state %d (%s)\n", - cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected iterator state %d (%s)", + cur_iter->iter.state, iter_state_str(cur_iter->iter.state)); return -EFAULT; } @@ -8898,7 +9036,7 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, */ if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx || !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) { - verbose(env, "bug: bad parent state for iter next call"); + verifier_bug(env, "bad parent state for iter next call"); return -EFAULT; } /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip @@ -8957,8 +9095,8 @@ static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { if (!meta->map_ptr) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n"); - return -EACCES; + verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type"); + return -EFAULT; } switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) { @@ -9104,7 +9242,7 @@ static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, compatible = compatible_reg_types[base_type(arg_type)]; if (!compatible) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unsupported arg type %d\n", arg_type); + verifier_bug(env, "unsupported arg type %d", arg_type); return -EFAULT; } @@ -9186,7 +9324,7 @@ found: if (!arg_btf_id) { if (!compatible->btf_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing arg compatible BTF ID\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "missing arg compatible BTF ID"); return -EFAULT; } arg_btf_id = compatible->btf_id; @@ -9218,7 +9356,7 @@ found: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_ALLOC: if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC"); return -EFAULT; } /* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ @@ -9233,7 +9371,7 @@ found: /* Handled by helper specific checks */ break; default: - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "invalid PTR_TO_BTF_ID register for type match"); return -EFAULT; } return 0; @@ -9494,7 +9632,7 @@ static int get_constant_map_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * to prevent pruning on it. */ bt_set_frame_slot(&env->bt, key->frameno, spi); - err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env); + err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env, env->cur_state); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -9591,7 +9729,7 @@ skip_type_check: return -EINVAL; } if (meta->release_regno) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one release argument\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "more than one release argument"); return -EFAULT; } meta->release_regno = regno; @@ -9599,10 +9737,10 @@ skip_type_check: if (reg->ref_obj_id && base_type(arg_type) != ARG_KPTR_XCHG_DEST) { if (meta->ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", + verbose(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", regno, reg->ref_obj_id, meta->ref_obj_id); - return -EFAULT; + return -EACCES; } meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; } @@ -9645,8 +9783,8 @@ skip_type_check: * we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); - return -EACCES; + verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key"); + return -EFAULT; } key_size = meta->map_ptr->key_size; err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL); @@ -9672,8 +9810,8 @@ skip_type_check: */ if (!meta->map_ptr) { /* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */ - verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); - return -EACCES; + verifier_bug(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value"); + return -EFAULT; } meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT; err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map_ptr->value_size, @@ -9702,7 +9840,7 @@ skip_type_check: if (err) return err; } else { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "spin lock arg on unexpected helper"); return -EFAULT; } break; @@ -10283,7 +10421,7 @@ static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int calls } caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; - callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); + callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!callee) return -ENOMEM; state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; @@ -10338,6 +10476,12 @@ static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, bpf_log(log, "R%d is not a scalar\n", regno); return -EINVAL; } + } else if (arg->arg_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) { + /* + * Anything is allowed for untrusted arguments, as these are + * read-only and probe read instructions would protect against + * invalid memory access. + */ } else if (arg->arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, ARG_DONTCARE); if (ret < 0) @@ -10860,8 +11004,8 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) return -EINVAL; } if (!calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { - verbose(env, "BUG: in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback\n", - *insn_idx, callee->callsite); + verifier_bug(env, "in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback", + *insn_idx, callee->callsite); return -EFAULT; } } else { @@ -10968,8 +11112,8 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, return 0; if (map == NULL) { - verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "expected map for helper call"); + return -EFAULT; } /* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions @@ -11007,7 +11151,7 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) return 0; if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) { - verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); + verbose(env, "expected prog array map for tail call"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -11150,7 +11294,7 @@ static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return -ENOTSUPP; } -static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; } @@ -11260,9 +11404,8 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */ changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(func_id); if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { - verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n", - func_id_name(func_id), func_id); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d: r1 != ctx", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); + return -EFAULT; } memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta)); @@ -11270,8 +11413,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id); if (err) { - verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", - func_id_name(func_id), func_id); + verifier_bug(env, "incorrect func proto %s#%d", func_id_name(func_id), func_id); return err; } @@ -11344,7 +11486,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn */ if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) { if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released"); return -EFAULT; } err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]); @@ -11461,23 +11603,23 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn if (meta.dynptr_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.dynptr_id already set\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "meta.dynptr_id already set"); return -EFAULT; } if (meta.ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: meta.ref_obj_id already set\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "meta.ref_obj_id already set"); return -EFAULT; } id = dynptr_id(env, reg); if (id < 0) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); return id; } ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg); if (ref_obj_id < 0) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr ref_obj_id"); return ref_obj_id; } @@ -11562,9 +11704,8 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */ if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) { - verbose(env, - "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected null map_ptr"); + return -EFAULT; } if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && @@ -11654,10 +11795,9 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn } } else { if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error:"); - verbose(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type\n", - func_id_name(func_id)); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "func %s has non-overwritten BPF_PTR_POISON return type", + func_id_name(func_id)); + return -EFAULT; } ret_btf = btf_vmlinux; ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id; @@ -11682,8 +11822,8 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; if (helper_multiple_ref_obj_use(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once\n", - func_id_name(func_id), func_id); + verifier_bug(env, "func %s#%d sets ref_obj_id more than once", + func_id_name(func_id), func_id); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12395,7 +12535,7 @@ static int process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) kfunc_class = IRQ_LOCK_KFUNC; } else { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown irq flags kfunc\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "unknown irq flags kfunc"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12436,12 +12576,12 @@ static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg); if (!env->cur_state->active_locks) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "%s w/o active lock", __func__); return -EFAULT; } if (type_flag(reg->type) & NON_OWN_REF) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NON_OWN_REF already set\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "NON_OWN_REF already set"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12460,8 +12600,7 @@ static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_o int i; if (!ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id is zero for " - "owning -> non-owning conversion\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "ref_obj_id is zero for owning -> non-owning conversion"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12481,7 +12620,7 @@ static int ref_convert_owning_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 ref_o return 0; } - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref state missing for ref_obj_id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "ref state missing for ref_obj_id"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12543,7 +12682,7 @@ static int check_reg_allocation_locked(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ ptr = reg->btf; break; default: - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reg type for lock check\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "unknown reg type for lock check"); return -EFAULT; } id = reg->id; @@ -12704,7 +12843,7 @@ __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 head_off; if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12735,7 +12874,7 @@ __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_root(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } if (*head_field) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: repeating %s arg\n", head_type_name); + verifier_bug(env, "repeating %s arg", head_type_name); return -EFAULT; } *head_field = field; @@ -12772,7 +12911,7 @@ __process_kf_arg_ptr_to_graph_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 node_off; if (meta->btf != btf_vmlinux) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected btf mismatch in kfunc call"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -12900,7 +13039,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (is_kfunc_arg_prog(btf, &args[i])) { /* Used to reject repeated use of __prog. */ if (meta->arg_prog) { - verbose(env, "Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc"); return -EFAULT; } meta->arg_prog = true; @@ -12916,7 +13055,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (is_kfunc_arg_constant(meta->btf, &args[i])) { if (meta->arg_constant.found) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); return -EFAULT; } if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { @@ -12968,9 +13107,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (reg->ref_obj_id) { if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u\n", - regno, reg->ref_obj_id, - meta->ref_obj_id); + verifier_bug(env, "more than one arg with ref_obj_id R%d %u %u", + regno, reg->ref_obj_id, + meta->ref_obj_id); return -EFAULT; } meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; @@ -13050,7 +13189,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RES_SPIN_LOCK: break; default: - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + verifier_bug(env, "unknown kfunc arg type %d", kf_arg_type); return -EFAULT; } @@ -13119,14 +13258,14 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ enum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta->initialized_dynptr.type; if (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr type for parent of clone\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr type for parent of clone"); return -EFAULT; } dynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type); clone_ref_obj_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.ref_obj_id; if (dynptr_type_refcounted(parent_type) && !clone_ref_obj_id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: missing ref obj id for parent of clone\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "missing ref obj id for parent of clone"); return -EFAULT; } } @@ -13139,7 +13278,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ int id = dynptr_id(env, reg); if (id < 0) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: failed to obtain dynptr id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "failed to obtain dynptr id"); return id; } meta->initialized_dynptr.id = id; @@ -13275,7 +13414,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size(meta->btf, size_arg, size_reg)) { if (meta->arg_constant.found) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one constant argument permitted\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "only one constant argument permitted"); return -EFAULT; } if (!tnum_is_const(size_reg->var_off)) { @@ -13307,7 +13446,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ rec = reg_btf_record(reg); if (!rec) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: Couldn't find btf_record\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "Couldn't find btf_record"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -13541,16 +13680,24 @@ static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_ca regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->ret_btf_id; } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rdonly_cast]) { ret_t = btf_type_by_id(desc_btf, meta->arg_constant.value); - if (!ret_t || !btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { + if (!ret_t) { + verbose(env, "Unknown type ID %lld passed to kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast\n", + meta->arg_constant.value); + return -EINVAL; + } else if (btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) { + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; + regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; + } else if (btf_type_is_void(ret_t)) { + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = 0; + } else { verbose(env, - "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct\n"); + "kfunc bpf_rdonly_cast type ID argument must be of a struct or void\n"); return -EINVAL; } - - mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); - regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; - regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = desc_btf; - regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta->arg_constant.value; } else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice] || meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr]) { enum bpf_type_flag type_flag = get_dynptr_type_flag(meta->initialized_dynptr.type); @@ -13558,7 +13705,7 @@ static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_ca mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); if (!meta->arg_constant.found) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "bpf_dynptr_slice(_rdwr) no constant size"); return -EFAULT; } @@ -13578,7 +13725,7 @@ static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_ca } if (!meta->initialized_dynptr.id) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no dynptr id\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "no dynptr id"); return -EFAULT; } regs[BPF_REG_0].dynptr_id = meta->initialized_dynptr.id; @@ -14018,7 +14165,9 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, static bool can_skip_alu_sanitation(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_insn *insn) { - return env->bypass_spec_v1 || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K; + return env->bypass_spec_v1 || + BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K || + cur_aux(env)->nospec; } static int update_alu_sanitation_state(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux, @@ -14218,10 +14367,9 @@ static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case REASON_STACK: verbose(env, "R%d could not be pushed for speculative verification, %s\n", dst, err); - break; + return -ENOMEM; default: - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unknown reason (%d)\n", - reason); + verifier_bug(env, "unknown reason (%d)", reason); break; } @@ -14288,7 +14436,7 @@ static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } break; default: - break; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } return 0; @@ -14315,7 +14463,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; - int ret; + int ret, bounds_ret; dst_reg = ®s[dst]; @@ -14347,6 +14495,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } + /* + * Accesses to untrusted PTR_TO_MEM are done through probe + * instructions, hence no need to track offsets. + */ + if (base_type(ptr_reg->type) == PTR_TO_MEM && (ptr_reg->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) + return 0; + switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { case PTR_TO_CTX: case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: @@ -14515,11 +14670,19 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type)) return -EINVAL; reg_bounds_sync(dst_reg); - if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) - return -EACCES; + bounds_ret = sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg); + if (bounds_ret == -EACCES) + return bounds_ret; if (sanitize_needed(opcode)) { ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg, dst_reg, &info, true); + if (verifier_bug_if(!can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn) + && !env->cur_state->speculative + && bounds_ret + && !ret, + env, "Pointer type unsupported by sanitize_check_bounds() not rejected by retrieve_ptr_limit() as required")) { + return -EFAULT; + } if (ret < 0) return sanitize_err(env, insn, ret, off_reg, dst_reg); } @@ -14534,14 +14697,25 @@ static void scalar32_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; + u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; + u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; + bool min_overflow, max_overflow; if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smin) || check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smax)) { *dst_smin = S32_MIN; *dst_smax = S32_MAX; } - if (check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->u32_min_value, dst_umin) || - check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->u32_max_value, dst_umax)) { + + /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then + * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = + * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set + * the output bounds to unbounded. + */ + min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); + max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); + + if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { *dst_umin = 0; *dst_umax = U32_MAX; } @@ -14554,14 +14728,25 @@ static void scalar_min_max_add(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; + u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; + u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; + bool min_overflow, max_overflow; if (check_add_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smin) || check_add_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smax)) { *dst_smin = S64_MIN; *dst_smax = S64_MAX; } - if (check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, src_reg->umin_value, dst_umin) || - check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, src_reg->umax_value, dst_umax)) { + + /* If either all additions overflow or no additions overflow, then + * it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin + src_umin, dst_umax = + * dst_umax + src_umax. Otherwise (some additions overflow), set + * the output bounds to unbounded. + */ + min_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umin, umin_val, dst_umin); + max_overflow = check_add_overflow(*dst_umax, umax_val, dst_umax); + + if (!min_overflow && max_overflow) { *dst_umin = 0; *dst_umax = U64_MAX; } @@ -14572,8 +14757,11 @@ static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, { s32 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->s32_min_value; s32 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->s32_max_value; + u32 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->u32_min_value; + u32 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->u32_max_value; u32 umin_val = src_reg->u32_min_value; u32 umax_val = src_reg->u32_max_value; + bool min_underflow, max_underflow; if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->s32_max_value, dst_smin) || check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->s32_min_value, dst_smax)) { @@ -14581,14 +14769,18 @@ static void scalar32_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *dst_smin = S32_MIN; *dst_smax = S32_MAX; } - if (dst_reg->u32_min_value < umax_val) { - /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ - dst_reg->u32_min_value = 0; - dst_reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX; - } else { - /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ - dst_reg->u32_min_value -= umax_val; - dst_reg->u32_max_value -= umin_val; + + /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions + * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, + * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions + * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. + */ + min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); + max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); + + if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { + *dst_umin = 0; + *dst_umax = U32_MAX; } } @@ -14597,8 +14789,11 @@ static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, { s64 *dst_smin = &dst_reg->smin_value; s64 *dst_smax = &dst_reg->smax_value; + u64 *dst_umin = &dst_reg->umin_value; + u64 *dst_umax = &dst_reg->umax_value; u64 umin_val = src_reg->umin_value; u64 umax_val = src_reg->umax_value; + bool min_underflow, max_underflow; if (check_sub_overflow(*dst_smin, src_reg->smax_value, dst_smin) || check_sub_overflow(*dst_smax, src_reg->smin_value, dst_smax)) { @@ -14606,14 +14801,18 @@ static void scalar_min_max_sub(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *dst_smin = S64_MIN; *dst_smax = S64_MAX; } - if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) { - /* Overflow possible, we know nothing */ - dst_reg->umin_value = 0; - dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX; - } else { - /* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */ - dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val; - dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val; + + /* If either all subtractions underflow or no subtractions + * underflow, it is okay to set: dst_umin = dst_umin - src_umax, + * dst_umax = dst_umax - src_umin. Otherwise (some subtractions + * underflow), set the output bounds to unbounded. + */ + min_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umin, umax_val, dst_umin); + max_underflow = check_sub_overflow(*dst_umax, umin_val, dst_umax); + + if (min_underflow && !max_underflow) { + *dst_umin = 0; + *dst_umax = U64_MAX; } } @@ -15075,6 +15274,7 @@ static bool is_safe_to_compute_dst_reg_range(struct bpf_insn *insn, switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) { case BPF_ADD: case BPF_SUB: + case BPF_NEG: case BPF_AND: case BPF_XOR: case BPF_OR: @@ -15143,6 +15343,13 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &src_reg); dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); break; + case BPF_NEG: + env->fake_reg[0] = *dst_reg; + __mark_reg_known(dst_reg, 0); + scalar32_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); + scalar_min_max_sub(dst_reg, &env->fake_reg[0]); + dst_reg->var_off = tnum_neg(env->fake_reg[0].var_off); + break; case BPF_MUL: dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off); scalar32_min_max_mul(dst_reg, &src_reg); @@ -15282,12 +15489,12 @@ static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) { print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) { print_verifier_state(env, vstate, vstate->curframe, true); verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n"); - return -EINVAL; + return -EFAULT; } err = adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg); if (err) @@ -15366,7 +15573,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } /* check dest operand */ - err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); + if (opcode == BPF_NEG) { + err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK); + err = err ?: adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, + ®s[insn->dst_reg], + regs[insn->dst_reg]); + } else { + err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP); + } if (err) return err; @@ -16033,6 +16247,10 @@ static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32)) break; val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32); + /* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant + * violations if we're on a dead branch. + */ + __mark_reg_unbounded(reg1); if (is_jmp32) { t = tnum_and(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(~val)); reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t); @@ -16477,7 +16695,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } if (insn_flags) { - err = push_insn_history(env, this_branch, insn_flags, 0); + err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, insn_flags, 0); if (err) return err; } @@ -16535,7 +16753,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && dst_reg->id) collect_linked_regs(this_branch, dst_reg->id, &linked_regs); if (linked_regs.cnt > 1) { - err = push_insn_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs)); + err = push_jmp_history(env, this_branch, 0, linked_regs_pack(&linked_regs)); if (err) return err; } @@ -16690,7 +16908,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id; break; default: - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "pseudo btf id: unexpected dst reg type"); return -EFAULT; } return 0; @@ -16732,8 +16950,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; } else { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "unexpected src reg value for ldimm64"); + return -EFAULT; } return 0; @@ -16779,8 +16997,8 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "gen_ld_abs is null"); + return -EFAULT; } if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 || @@ -17190,7 +17408,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) /* forward- or cross-edge */ insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e; } else { - verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "insn state internal bug"); return -EFAULT; } return DONE_EXPLORING; @@ -17610,17 +17828,18 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int *insn_stack, *insn_state, *insn_postorder; int ex_insn_beg, i, ret = 0; - insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); + insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!insn_state) return -ENOMEM; - insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); + insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!insn_stack) { kvfree(insn_state); return -ENOMEM; } - insn_postorder = env->cfg.insn_postorder = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL); + insn_postorder = env->cfg.insn_postorder = + kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!insn_postorder) { kvfree(insn_state); kvfree(insn_stack); @@ -17650,7 +17869,7 @@ walk_cfg: break; default: if (ret > 0) { - verbose(env, "visit_insn internal bug\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "visit_insn internal bug"); ret = -EFAULT; } goto err_free; @@ -17658,7 +17877,7 @@ walk_cfg: } if (env->cfg.cur_stack < 0) { - verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "pop stack internal bug"); ret = -EFAULT; goto err_free; } @@ -17754,7 +17973,7 @@ static int check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); min_size = min_t(u32, krec_size, urec_size); - krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!krecord) return -ENOMEM; @@ -17854,7 +18073,7 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel); krecord = prog->aux->func_info; - info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!info_aux) return -ENOMEM; @@ -17940,7 +18159,7 @@ static int check_btf_line(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * pass in a smaller bpf_line_info object. */ linfo = kvcalloc(nr_linfo, sizeof(struct bpf_line_info), - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!linfo) return -ENOMEM; @@ -18263,10 +18482,6 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, { int i; - if (st->frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) - /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ - return; - for (i = 0; i <= st->curframe; i++) clean_func_state(env, st->frame[i]); } @@ -18274,7 +18489,7 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* the parentage chains form a tree. * the verifier states are added to state lists at given insn and * pushed into state stack for future exploration. - * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifer states + * when the verifier reaches bpf_exit insn some of the verifier states * stored in the state lists have their final liveness state already, * but a lot of states will get revised from liveness point of view when * the verifier explores other branches. @@ -18306,7 +18521,6 @@ static void clean_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) { - struct bpf_verifier_state *loop_entry; struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; struct list_head *pos, *head; @@ -18315,12 +18529,14 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn, sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); if (sl->state.branches) continue; - loop_entry = get_loop_entry(env, &sl->state); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(loop_entry) && loop_entry->branches) - continue; if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn || !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur)) continue; + if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) + /* all regs in this state in all frames were already marked */ + continue; + if (incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state)) + continue; clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state); } } @@ -18767,9 +18983,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * and all frame states need to be equivalent */ for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) { - insn_idx = i == old->curframe - ? env->insn_idx - : old->frame[i + 1]->callsite; + insn_idx = frame_insn_idx(old, i); if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite) return false; if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], insn_idx, exact)) @@ -18816,12 +19030,15 @@ static int propagate_liveness_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, - struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent) + struct bpf_verifier_state *vparent, + bool *changed) { struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg, *parent_reg; struct bpf_func_state *state, *parent; int i, frame, err = 0; + bool tmp = false; + changed = changed ?: &tmp; if (vparent->curframe != vstate->curframe) { WARN(1, "propagate_live: parent frame %d current frame %d\n", vparent->curframe, vstate->curframe); @@ -18840,6 +19057,7 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, &parent_reg[i]); if (err < 0) return err; + *changed |= err > 0; if (err == REG_LIVE_READ64) mark_insn_zext(env, &parent_reg[i]); } @@ -18851,6 +19069,7 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, state_reg = &state->stack[i].spilled_ptr; err = propagate_liveness_reg(env, state_reg, parent_reg); + *changed |= err > 0; if (err < 0) return err; } @@ -18862,7 +19081,9 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * propagate them into the current state */ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - const struct bpf_verifier_state *old) + const struct bpf_verifier_state *old, + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, + bool *changed) { struct bpf_reg_state *state_reg; struct bpf_func_state *state; @@ -18910,13 +19131,53 @@ static int propagate_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "\n"); } - err = mark_chain_precision_batch(env); + err = __mark_chain_precision(env, cur, -1, changed); if (err < 0) return err; return 0; } +#define MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS 64 + +/* Propagate read and precision marks from visit->backedges[*].state->equal_state + * to corresponding parent states of visit->backedges[*].state until fixed point is reached, + * then free visit->backedges. + * After execution of this function incomplete_read_marks() will return false + * for all states corresponding to @visit->callchain. + */ +static int propagate_backedges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_scc_visit *visit) +{ + struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; + struct bpf_verifier_state *st; + bool changed; + int i, err; + + i = 0; + do { + if (i++ > MAX_BACKEDGE_ITERS) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "%s: too many iterations\n", __func__); + for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) + mark_all_scalars_precise(env, &backedge->state); + break; + } + changed = false; + for (backedge = visit->backedges; backedge; backedge = backedge->next) { + st = &backedge->state; + err = propagate_liveness(env, st->equal_state, st, &changed); + if (err) + return err; + err = propagate_precision(env, st->equal_state, st, &changed); + if (err) + return err; + } + } while (changed); + + free_backedges(visit); + return 0; +} + static bool states_maybe_looping(struct bpf_verifier_state *old, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur) { @@ -18944,7 +19205,7 @@ static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) * terminology) calls specially: as opposed to bounded BPF loops, it *expects* * states to match, which otherwise would look like an infinite loop. So while * iter_next() calls are taken care of, we still need to be careful and - * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "ininite loop", when + * prevent erroneous and too eager declaration of "infinite loop", when * iterators are involved. * * Here's a situation in pseudo-BPF assembly form: @@ -18986,7 +19247,7 @@ static bool is_iter_next_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) * * This approach allows to keep infinite loop heuristic even in the face of * active iterator. E.g., C snippet below is and will be detected as - * inifintely looping: + * infinitely looping: * * struct bpf_iter_num it; * int *p, x; @@ -19026,14 +19287,14 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) { struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl; struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; - struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new, *loop_entry; + struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new; + bool force_new_state, add_new_state, loop; int i, j, n, err, states_cnt = 0; - bool force_new_state, add_new_state, force_exact; struct list_head *pos, *tmp, *head; force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) || /* Avoid accumulating infinitely long jmp history */ - cur->insn_hist_end - cur->insn_hist_start > 40; + cur->jmp_history_cnt > 40; /* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1 @@ -19050,6 +19311,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) clean_live_states(env, insn_idx, cur); + loop = false; head = explored_state(env, insn_idx); list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, head) { sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); @@ -19129,7 +19391,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value); iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) { - update_loop_entry(env, cur, &sl->state); + loop = true; goto hit; } } @@ -19138,7 +19400,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) if (is_may_goto_insn_at(env, insn_idx)) { if (sl->state.may_goto_depth != cur->may_goto_depth && states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, RANGE_WITHIN)) { - update_loop_entry(env, cur, &sl->state); + loop = true; goto hit; } } @@ -19180,38 +19442,9 @@ skip_inf_loop_check: add_new_state = false; goto miss; } - /* If sl->state is a part of a loop and this loop's entry is a part of - * current verification path then states have to be compared exactly. - * 'force_exact' is needed to catch the following case: - * - * initial Here state 'succ' was processed first, - * | it was eventually tracked to produce a - * V state identical to 'hdr'. - * .---------> hdr All branches from 'succ' had been explored - * | | and thus 'succ' has its .branches == 0. - * | V - * | .------... Suppose states 'cur' and 'succ' correspond - * | | | to the same instruction + callsites. - * | V V In such case it is necessary to check - * | ... ... if 'succ' and 'cur' are states_equal(). - * | | | If 'succ' and 'cur' are a part of the - * | V V same loop exact flag has to be set. - * | succ <- cur To check if that is the case, verify - * | | if loop entry of 'succ' is in current - * | V DFS path. - * | ... - * | | - * '----' - * - * Additional details are in the comment before get_loop_entry(). - */ - loop_entry = get_loop_entry(env, &sl->state); - if (IS_ERR(loop_entry)) - return PTR_ERR(loop_entry); - force_exact = loop_entry && loop_entry->branches > 0; - if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, force_exact ? RANGE_WITHIN : NOT_EXACT)) { - if (force_exact) - update_loop_entry(env, cur, loop_entry); + /* See comments for mark_all_regs_read_and_precise() */ + loop = incomplete_read_marks(env, &sl->state); + if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, loop ? RANGE_WITHIN : NOT_EXACT)) { hit: sl->hit_cnt++; /* reached equivalent register/stack state, @@ -19224,7 +19457,7 @@ hit: * they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning * this state and will pop a new one. */ - err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur); + err = propagate_liveness(env, &sl->state, cur, NULL); /* if previous state reached the exit with precision and * current state is equivalent to it (except precision marks) @@ -19232,10 +19465,98 @@ hit: * the current state. */ if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) - err = err ? : push_insn_history(env, cur, 0, 0); - err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state); + err = err ? : push_jmp_history(env, cur, 0, 0); + err = err ? : propagate_precision(env, &sl->state, cur, NULL); if (err) return err; + /* When processing iterator based loops above propagate_liveness and + * propagate_precision calls are not sufficient to transfer all relevant + * read and precision marks. E.g. consider the following case: + * + * .-> A --. Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C. + * | | | Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A. + * | v v At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A + * '-- B C has not received any read or precision marks from C. + * Thus, marks propagated from A to B are incomplete. + * + * The verifier mitigates this by performing the following steps: + * + * - Prior to the main verification pass, strongly connected components + * (SCCs) are computed over the program's control flow graph, + * intraprocedurally. + * + * - During the main verification pass, `maybe_enter_scc()` checks + * whether the current verifier state is entering an SCC. If so, an + * instance of a `bpf_scc_visit` object is created, and the state + * entering the SCC is recorded as the entry state. + * + * - This instance is associated not with the SCC itself, but with a + * `bpf_scc_callchain`: a tuple consisting of the call sites leading to + * the SCC and the SCC id. See `compute_scc_callchain()`. + * + * - When a verification path encounters a `states_equal(..., + * RANGE_WITHIN)` condition, there exists a call chain describing the + * current state and a corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance. A copy + * of the current state is created and added to + * `bpf_scc_visit->backedges`. + * + * - When a verification path terminates, `maybe_exit_scc()` is called + * from `update_branch_counts()`. For states with `branches == 0`, it + * checks whether the state is the entry state of any `bpf_scc_visit` + * instance. If it is, this indicates that all paths originating from + * this SCC visit have been explored. `propagate_backedges()` is then + * called, which propagates read and precision marks through the + * backedges until a fixed point is reached. + * (In the earlier example, this would propagate marks from A to B, + * from C to A, and then again from A to B.) + * + * A note on callchains + * -------------------- + * + * Consider the following example: + * + * void foo() { loop { ... SCC#1 ... } } + * void main() { + * A: foo(); + * B: ... + * C: foo(); + * } + * + * Here, there are two distinct callchains leading to SCC#1: + * - (A, SCC#1) + * - (C, SCC#1) + * + * Each callchain identifies a separate `bpf_scc_visit` instance that + * accumulates backedge states. The `propagate_{liveness,precision}()` + * functions traverse the parent state of each backedge state, which + * means these parent states must remain valid (i.e., not freed) while + * the corresponding `bpf_scc_visit` instance exists. + * + * Associating `bpf_scc_visit` instances directly with SCCs instead of + * callchains would break this invariant: + * - States explored during `C: foo()` would contribute backedges to + * SCC#1, but SCC#1 would only be exited once the exploration of + * `A: foo()` completes. + * - By that time, the states explored between `A: foo()` and `C: foo()` + * (i.e., `B: ...`) may have already been freed, causing the parent + * links for states from `C: foo()` to become invalid. + */ + if (loop) { + struct bpf_scc_backedge *backedge; + + backedge = kzalloc(sizeof(*backedge), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!backedge) + return -ENOMEM; + err = copy_verifier_state(&backedge->state, cur); + backedge->state.equal_state = &sl->state; + backedge->state.insn_idx = insn_idx; + err = err ?: add_scc_backedge(env, &sl->state, backedge); + if (err) { + free_verifier_state(&backedge->state, false); + kvfree(backedge); + return err; + } + } return 1; } miss: @@ -19287,7 +19608,7 @@ miss: * When looping the sl->state.branches will be > 0 and this state * will not be considered for equivalence until branches == 0. */ - new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); + new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!new_sl) return -ENOMEM; env->total_states++; @@ -19309,13 +19630,20 @@ miss: return err; } new->insn_idx = insn_idx; - WARN_ONCE(new->branches != 1, - "BUG is_state_visited:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d\n", new->branches, insn_idx); + verifier_bug_if(new->branches != 1, env, + "%s:branches_to_explore=%d insn %d", + __func__, new->branches, insn_idx); + err = maybe_enter_scc(env, new); + if (err) { + free_verifier_state(new, false); + kvfree(new_sl); + return err; + } cur->parent = new; cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx; - cur->insn_hist_start = cur->insn_hist_end; cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1; + clear_jmp_history(cur); list_add(&new_sl->node, head); /* connect new state to parentage chain. Current frame needs all @@ -19387,10 +19715,27 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); } +static bool is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + switch (base_type(type)) { + case PTR_TO_MEM: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +static bool is_ptr_to_mem(enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_MEM; +} + static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type type, bool allow_trust_mismatch) { enum bpf_reg_type *prev_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type; + enum bpf_reg_type merged_type; if (*prev_type == NOT_INIT) { /* Saw a valid insn @@ -19407,15 +19752,24 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ * Reject it. */ if (allow_trust_mismatch && - base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && - base_type(*prev_type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { + is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(type) && + is_ptr_to_mem_or_btf_id(*prev_type)) { /* * Have to support a use case when one path through * the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another * is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX. + * Same behavior of MEM_RDONLY flag. */ - *prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED; + if (is_ptr_to_mem(type) || is_ptr_to_mem(*prev_type)) + merged_type = PTR_TO_MEM; + else + merged_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; + if ((type & PTR_UNTRUSTED) || (*prev_type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)) + merged_type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; + if ((type & MEM_RDONLY) || (*prev_type & MEM_RDONLY)) + merged_type |= MEM_RDONLY; + *prev_type = merged_type; } else { verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); return -EINVAL; @@ -19425,20 +19779,224 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ return 0; } +enum { + PROCESS_BPF_EXIT = 1 +}; + +static int process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + bool *do_print_state, + bool exception_exit) +{ + /* We must do check_reference_leak here before + * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when + * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback function, + * for which reference_state must match caller reference + * state when it exits. + */ + int err = check_resource_leak(env, exception_exit, + !env->cur_state->curframe, + "BPF_EXIT instruction in main prog"); + if (err) + return err; + + /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit which is + * being skipped is that it frees bpf_func_state. + * Typically, process_bpf_exit will only be hit with + * outermost exit. copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will + * handle freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over + * from not processing all nested function exits. We + * also skip return code checks as they are not needed + * for exceptional exits. + */ + if (exception_exit) + return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; + + if (env->cur_state->curframe) { + /* exit from nested function */ + err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); + if (err) + return err; + *do_print_state = true; + return 0; + } + + err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0, "R0"); + if (err) + return err; + return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT; +} + +static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state) +{ + int err; + struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[env->insn_idx]; + u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); + + if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { + err = check_alu_op(env, insn); + if (err) + return err; + + } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { + bool is_ldsx = BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX; + + /* Check for reserved fields is already done in + * resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(). + */ + err = check_load_mem(env, insn, false, is_ldsx, true, "ldx"); + if (err) + return err; + } else if (class == BPF_STX) { + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { + err = check_atomic(env, insn); + if (err) + return err; + env->insn_idx++; + return 0; + } + + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { + verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + err = check_store_reg(env, insn, false); + if (err) + return err; + } else if (class == BPF_ST) { + enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; + + if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || + insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { + verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* check src operand */ + err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); + if (err) + return err; + + dst_reg_type = cur_regs(env)[insn->dst_reg].type; + + /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ + err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, + insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), + BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); + if (err) + return err; + + err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); + if (err) + return err; + } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { + u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + + env->jmps_processed++; + if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || + (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && + insn->off != 0) || + (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && + insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && + insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || + insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || class == BPF_JMP32) { + verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { + if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && + insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || + (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && + (insn->off != 0 || !kfunc_spin_allowed(insn->imm)))) { + verbose(env, + "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { + err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); + } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { + err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); + if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn)) + return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, true); + } else { + err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); + } + if (err) + return err; + + mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); + } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || + insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || + insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || + (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || + (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { + verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (class == BPF_JMP) + env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; + else + env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; + return 0; + } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { + if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || + insn->imm != 0 || + insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || + insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || + class == BPF_JMP32) { + verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + return process_bpf_exit_full(env, do_print_state, false); + } else { + err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); + if (err) + return err; + } + } else if (class == BPF_LD) { + u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); + + if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { + err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); + if (err) + return err; + + } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { + err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); + if (err) + return err; + + env->insn_idx++; + sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); + } else { + verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); + return -EINVAL; + } + + env->insn_idx++; + return 0; +} + static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2); struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; - struct bpf_reg_state *regs; int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; bool do_print_state = false; int prev_insn_idx = -1; for (;;) { - bool exception_exit = false; struct bpf_insn *insn; - u8 class; + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux; int err; /* reset current history entry on each new instruction */ @@ -19452,7 +20010,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; - class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); + insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx]; if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { verbose(env, @@ -19462,6 +20020,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx; + state->insn_idx = env->insn_idx; if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx); @@ -19483,7 +20042,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) { - err = push_insn_history(env, state, 0, 0); + err = push_jmp_history(env, state, 0, 0); if (err) return err; } @@ -19522,215 +20081,67 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; } - regs = cur_regs(env); sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx; - if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) { - err = check_alu_op(env, insn); - if (err) - return err; - - } else if (class == BPF_LDX) { - bool is_ldsx = BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX; + /* Reduce verification complexity by stopping speculative path + * verification when a nospec is encountered. + */ + if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec) + goto process_bpf_exit; - /* Check for reserved fields is already done in - * resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(). + err = do_check_insn(env, &do_print_state); + if (error_recoverable_with_nospec(err) && state->speculative) { + /* Prevent this speculative path from ever reaching the + * insn that would have been unsafe to execute. */ - err = check_load_mem(env, insn, false, is_ldsx, true, - "ldx"); - if (err) - return err; - } else if (class == BPF_STX) { - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC) { - err = check_atomic(env, insn); - if (err) - return err; - env->insn_idx++; - continue; - } - - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0) { - verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - err = check_store_reg(env, insn, false); - if (err) - return err; - } else if (class == BPF_ST) { - enum bpf_reg_type dst_reg_type; - - if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || - insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) { - verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - /* check src operand */ - err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP); - if (err) - return err; - - dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type; - - /* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */ - err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, - insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), - BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false); - if (err) - return err; - - err = save_aux_ptr_type(env, dst_reg_type, false); + insn_aux->nospec = true; + /* If it was an ADD/SUB insn, potentially remove any + * markings for alu sanitization. + */ + insn_aux->alu_state = 0; + goto process_bpf_exit; + } else if (err < 0) { + return err; + } else if (err == PROCESS_BPF_EXIT) { + goto process_bpf_exit; + } + WARN_ON_ONCE(err); + + if (state->speculative && insn_aux->nospec_result) { + /* If we are on a path that performed a jump-op, this + * may skip a nospec patched-in after the jump. This can + * currently never happen because nospec_result is only + * used for the write-ops + * `*(size*)(dst_reg+off)=src_reg|imm32` which must + * never skip the following insn. Still, add a warning + * to document this in case nospec_result is used + * elsewhere in the future. + * + * All non-branch instructions have a single + * fall-through edge. For these, nospec_result should + * already work. + */ + if (verifier_bug_if(BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP || + BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32, env, + "speculation barrier after jump instruction may not have the desired effect")) + return -EFAULT; +process_bpf_exit: + mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); + err = update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); if (err) return err; - } else if (class == BPF_JMP || class == BPF_JMP32) { - u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); - - env->jmps_processed++; - if (opcode == BPF_CALL) { - if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || - (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL - && insn->off != 0) || - (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 && - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL && - insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) || - insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || - class == BPF_JMP32) { - verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (env->cur_state->active_locks) { - if ((insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_0 && insn->imm != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) || - (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL && - (insn->off != 0 || !kfunc_spin_allowed(insn->imm)))) { - verbose(env, "function calls are not allowed while holding a lock\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - } - if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) { - err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); - } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { - err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); - if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn)) { - exception_exit = true; - goto process_bpf_exit_full; - } - } else { - err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); - } - if (err) - return err; - - mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0); - } else if (opcode == BPF_JA) { - if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || - insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || - insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || - (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) || - (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) { - verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (class == BPF_JMP) - env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1; - else - env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1; - continue; - - } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { - if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K || - insn->imm != 0 || - insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || - insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || - class == BPF_JMP32) { - verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } -process_bpf_exit_full: - /* We must do check_reference_leak here before - * prepare_func_exit to handle the case when - * state->curframe > 0, it may be a callback - * function, for which reference_state must - * match caller reference state when it exits. - */ - err = check_resource_leak(env, exception_exit, !env->cur_state->curframe, - "BPF_EXIT instruction in main prog"); - if (err) - return err; - - /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit - * which is being skipped is that it frees - * bpf_func_state. Typically, process_bpf_exit - * will only be hit with outermost exit. - * copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will handle - * freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over - * from not processing all nested function - * exits. We also skip return code checks as - * they are not needed for exceptional exits. - */ - if (exception_exit) - goto process_bpf_exit; - - if (state->curframe) { - /* exit from nested function */ - err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); - if (err) - return err; - do_print_state = true; - continue; - } - - err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0, "R0"); - if (err) - return err; -process_bpf_exit: - mark_verifier_state_scratched(env); - update_branch_counts(env, env->cur_state); - err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, - &env->insn_idx, pop_log); - if (err < 0) { - if (err != -ENOENT) - return err; - break; - } else { - if (verifier_bug_if(env->cur_state->loop_entry, env, - "broken loop detection")) - return -EFAULT; - do_print_state = true; - continue; - } - } else { - err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx); - if (err) - return err; - } - } else if (class == BPF_LD) { - u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code); - - if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) { - err = check_ld_abs(env, insn); - if (err) - return err; - - } else if (mode == BPF_IMM) { - err = check_ld_imm(env, insn); - if (err) + err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &env->insn_idx, + pop_log); + if (err < 0) { + if (err != -ENOENT) return err; - - env->insn_idx++; - sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env); + break; } else { - verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n"); - return -EINVAL; + do_print_state = true; + continue; } - } else { - verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class); - return -EINVAL; } - - env->insn_idx++; } return 0; @@ -20682,7 +21093,10 @@ static int opt_remove_nops(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const union bpf_attr *attr) { - struct bpf_insn *patch, zext_patch[2], rnd_hi32_patch[4]; + struct bpf_insn *patch; + /* use env->insn_buf as two independent buffers */ + struct bpf_insn *zext_patch = env->insn_buf; + struct bpf_insn *rnd_hi32_patch = &env->insn_buf[2]; struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; int i, patch_len, delta = 0, len = env->prog->len; struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; @@ -20801,8 +21215,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) epilogue_cnt = ops->gen_epilogue(epilogue_buf, env->prog, -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8)); if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "epilogue is too long"); + return -EFAULT; } else if (epilogue_cnt) { /* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */ cnt = 0; @@ -20824,14 +21238,14 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) { if (!ops->gen_prologue) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "gen_prologue is null"); + return -EFAULT; } cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, env->prog); if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "prologue is too long"); + return -EFAULT; } else if (cnt) { new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) @@ -20858,6 +21272,28 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; u8 mode; + if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].alu_state); + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; + + *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); + *patch++ = *insn; + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + /* This can not be easily merged with the + * nospec_result-case, because an insn may require a + * nospec before and after itself. Therefore also do not + * 'continue' here but potentially apply further + * patching to insn. *insn should equal patch[1] now. + */ + } + if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || @@ -20907,14 +21343,16 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } if (type == BPF_WRITE && - env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) { - struct bpf_insn patch[] = { - *insn, - BPF_ST_NOSPEC(), - }; + env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].nospec_result) { + /* nospec_result is only used to mitigate Spectre v4 and + * to limit verification-time for Spectre v1. + */ + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; - cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch); - new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt); + *patch++ = *insn; + *patch++ = BPF_ST_NOSPEC(); + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) return -ENOMEM; @@ -20949,6 +21387,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * for this case. */ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: + case PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED: if (type == BPF_READ) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | @@ -20987,8 +21426,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) u8 size_code; if (type == BPF_WRITE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx access misconfigured"); + return -EFAULT; } size_code = BPF_H; @@ -21006,16 +21445,16 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) &target_size); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE || (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "error during ctx access conversion"); + return -EFAULT; } if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) { u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset( off, size, size_default) * 8; if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "narrow ctx load misconfigured"); + return -EFAULT; } if (ctx_field_size <= 4) { if (shift) @@ -21445,8 +21884,8 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, */ desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off); if (!desc) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u\n", - insn->imm); + verifier_bug(env, "kernel function descriptor not found for func_id %u", + insn->imm); return -EFAULT; } @@ -21461,8 +21900,8 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size; if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", - insn_idx); + verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", + insn_idx); return -EFAULT; } @@ -21478,15 +21917,15 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) }; if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", - insn_idx); + verifier_bug(env, "NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", + insn_idx); return -EFAULT; } if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] && !kptr_struct_meta) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", - insn_idx); + verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", + insn_idx); return -EFAULT; } @@ -21508,8 +21947,8 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, } if (!kptr_struct_meta) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n", - insn_idx); + verifier_bug(env, "kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d", + insn_idx); return -EFAULT; } @@ -21543,7 +21982,7 @@ static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *pat /* We only reserve one slot for hidden subprogs in subprog_info. */ if (env->hidden_subprog_cnt) { - verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one hidden subprog supported\n"); + verifier_bug(env, "only one hidden subprog supported"); return -EFAULT; } /* We're not patching any existing instruction, just appending the new @@ -21583,13 +22022,12 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) u16 stack_depth_extra = 0; if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) { - struct bpf_insn patch[] = { - env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1], - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - }; + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; - ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, patch, ARRAY_SIZE(patch)); + *patch++ = env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1]; + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1); + *patch++ = BPF_EXIT_INSN(); + ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, insn_buf, patch - insn_buf); if (ret < 0) return ret; prog = env->prog; @@ -21625,20 +22063,18 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->off == 1 && insn->imm == -1) { bool is64 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64; bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; - struct bpf_insn *patchlet; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_sdiv[] = { - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | - BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, - 0, 0, 0), - }; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_smod[] = { - BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0), - }; + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; - patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_sdiv : chk_and_smod; - cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_sdiv) : ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_smod); + if (isdiv) + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | + BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, + 0, 0, 0); + else + *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); - new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) return -ENOMEM; @@ -21657,83 +22093,79 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) bool isdiv = BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_DIV; bool is_sdiv = isdiv && insn->off == 1; bool is_smod = !isdiv && insn->off == 1; - struct bpf_insn *patchlet; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_div[] = { - /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, - 0, 2, 0), - BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), - *insn, - }; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_mod[] = { - /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, - 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0), - *insn, - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), - BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), - }; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_sdiv[] = { + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; + + if (is_sdiv) { /* [R,W]x sdiv 0 -> 0 * LLONG_MIN sdiv -1 -> LLONG_MIN * INT_MIN sdiv -1 -> INT_MIN */ - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | - BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 0, 1), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 4, 1), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 1, 0), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | - BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, - 0, 0, 0), + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | + BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 4, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 1, 0); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | + BPF_MOV | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, + 0, 0, 0); /* BPF_NEG(LLONG_MIN) == -LLONG_MIN == LLONG_MIN */ - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | - BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, - 0, 0, 0), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), - *insn, - }; - struct bpf_insn chk_and_smod[] = { + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | + BPF_NEG | BPF_K, insn->dst_reg, + 0, 0, 0); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = *insn; + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + } else if (is_smod) { /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ /* [R,W]x mod -1 -> 0 */ - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | - BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 0, 1), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 3, 1), - BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | - BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, - 0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1), - BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), - *insn, - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1), - BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg), - }; - - if (is_sdiv) { - patchlet = chk_and_sdiv; - cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_sdiv); - } else if (is_smod) { - patchlet = chk_and_smod; - cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_smod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_ALU64 : BPF_ALU) | + BPF_ADD | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JGT | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 3, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, BPF_REG_AX, + 0, 3 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = *insn; + + if (!is64) { + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); + } + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + } else if (isdiv) { + /* [R,W]x div 0 -> 0 */ + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JNE | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, + 0, 2, 0); + *patch++ = BPF_ALU32_REG(BPF_XOR, insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = *insn; + cnt = patch - insn_buf; } else { - patchlet = isdiv ? chk_and_div : chk_and_mod; - cnt = isdiv ? ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_div) : - ARRAY_SIZE(chk_and_mod) - (is64 ? 2 : 0); + /* [R,W]x mod 0 -> [R,W]x */ + *patch++ = BPF_RAW_INSN((is64 ? BPF_JMP : BPF_JMP32) | + BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, insn->src_reg, + 0, 1 + (is64 ? 0 : 1), 0); + *patch++ = *insn; + + if (!is64) { + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_REG(insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg); + } + cnt = patch - insn_buf; } - new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patchlet, cnt); + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); if (!new_prog) return -ENOMEM; @@ -21747,7 +22179,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) { - struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); if (!uaddress_limit) @@ -21779,8 +22211,8 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for ld_abs", cnt); + return -EFAULT; } new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); @@ -21798,7 +22230,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) { const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X; const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X; - struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; + struct bpf_insn *patch = insn_buf; bool issrc, isneg, isimm; u32 off_reg; @@ -22115,8 +22547,8 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP) goto patch_map_ops_generic; if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "%d insns generated for map lookup", cnt); + return -EFAULT; } new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, @@ -22403,9 +22835,9 @@ patch_call_imm: * programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions */ if (!fn->func) { - verbose(env, - "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n", - func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); + verifier_bug(env, + "not inlined functions %s#%d is missing func", + func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); return -EFAULT; } insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base; @@ -22475,8 +22907,8 @@ next_insn: if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { - verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); - return -EINVAL; + verifier_bug(env, "poke tab is misconfigured"); + return -EFAULT; } ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux); @@ -22666,7 +23098,12 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl; struct list_head *head, *pos, *tmp; - int i; + struct bpf_scc_info *info; + int i, j; + + free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); + env->cur_state = NULL; + while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); list_for_each_safe(pos, tmp, &env->free_list) { sl = container_of(pos, struct bpf_verifier_state_list, node); @@ -22675,6 +23112,14 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } INIT_LIST_HEAD(&env->free_list); + for (i = 0; i < env->scc_cnt; ++i) { + info = env->scc_info[i]; + for (j = 0; j < info->num_visits; j++) + free_backedges(&info->visits[j]); + kvfree(info); + env->scc_info[i] = NULL; + } + if (!env->explored_states) return; @@ -22702,13 +23147,13 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) env->prev_linfo = NULL; env->pass_cnt++; - state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL); + state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!state) return -ENOMEM; state->curframe = 0; state->speculative = false; state->branches = 1; - state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL); + state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!state->frame[0]) { kfree(state); return -ENOMEM; @@ -22759,11 +23204,12 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) __mark_dynptr_reg(reg, BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL, true, ++env->id_gen); } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM) { reg->type = PTR_TO_MEM; - if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) - reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; + reg->type |= arg->arg_type & + (PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED | MEM_RDONLY); mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, i); reg->mem_size = arg->mem_size; - reg->id = ++env->id_gen; + if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) + reg->id = ++env->id_gen; } else if (base_type(arg->arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { reg->type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID; if (arg->arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) @@ -22780,8 +23226,8 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) /* caller can pass either PTR_TO_ARENA or SCALAR */ mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i); } else { - WARN_ONCE(1, "BUG: unhandled arg#%d type %d\n", - i - BPF_REG_1, arg->arg_type); + verifier_bug(env, "unhandled arg#%d type %d", + i - BPF_REG_1, arg->arg_type); ret = -EFAULT; goto out; } @@ -22811,14 +23257,6 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) ret = do_check(env); out: - /* check for NULL is necessary, since cur_state can be freed inside - * do_check() under memory pressure. - */ - if (env->cur_state) { - free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true); - env->cur_state = NULL; - } - while (!pop_stack(env, NULL, NULL, false)); if (!ret && pop_log) bpf_vlog_reset(&env->log, 0); free_states(env); @@ -22934,7 +23372,7 @@ static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) int bpf_prog_ctx_arg_info_init(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *info, u32 cnt) { - prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = kmemdup_array(info, cnt, sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + prog->aux->ctx_arg_info = kmemdup_array(info, cnt, sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); prog->aux->ctx_arg_info_size = cnt; return prog->aux->ctx_arg_info ? 0 : -ENOMEM; @@ -23543,11 +23981,14 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return ret; } else if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && btf_id_set_contains(&btf_id_deny, btf_id)) { + verbose(env, "Attaching tracing programs to function '%s' is rejected.\n", + tgt_info.tgt_name); return -EINVAL; } else if ((prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_FEXIT || prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_MODIFY_RETURN) && btf_id_set_contains(&noreturn_deny, btf_id)) { - verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions is rejected.\n"); + verbose(env, "Attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn function '%s' is rejected.\n", + tgt_info.tgt_name); return -EINVAL; } @@ -23676,6 +24117,7 @@ static bool can_jump(struct bpf_insn *insn) case BPF_JSLT: case BPF_JSLE: case BPF_JCOND: + case BPF_JSET: return true; } @@ -23878,7 +24320,7 @@ static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * - repeat the computation while {in,out} fields changes for * any instruction. */ - state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL); + state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!state) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -23916,6 +24358,10 @@ static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) { verbose(env, "Live regs before insn:\n"); for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; ++i) { + if (env->insn_aux_data[i].scc) + verbose(env, "%3d ", env->insn_aux_data[i].scc); + else + verbose(env, " "); verbose(env, "%3d: ", i); for (j = BPF_REG_0; j < BPF_REG_10; ++j) if (insn_aux[i].live_regs_before & BIT(j)) @@ -23937,6 +24383,185 @@ out: return err; } +/* + * Compute strongly connected components (SCCs) on the CFG. + * Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in env->insn_aux[*].scc. + * If instruction is a sole member of its SCC and there are no self edges, + * assign it SCC number of zero. + * Uses a non-recursive adaptation of Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation. + */ +static int compute_scc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + const u32 NOT_ON_STACK = U32_MAX; + + struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = env->insn_aux_data; + const u32 insn_cnt = env->prog->len; + int stack_sz, dfs_sz, err = 0; + u32 *stack, *pre, *low, *dfs; + u32 succ_cnt, i, j, t, w; + u32 next_preorder_num; + u32 next_scc_id; + bool assign_scc; + u32 succ[2]; + + next_preorder_num = 1; + next_scc_id = 1; + /* + * - 'stack' accumulates vertices in DFS order, see invariant comment below; + * - 'pre[t] == p' => preorder number of vertex 't' is 'p'; + * - 'low[t] == n' => smallest preorder number of the vertex reachable from 't' is 'n'; + * - 'dfs' DFS traversal stack, used to emulate explicit recursion. + */ + stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + pre = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + low = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + dfs = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(*dfs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!stack || !pre || !low || !dfs) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } + /* + * References: + * [1] R. Tarjan "Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms" + * [2] D. J. Pearce "A Space-Efficient Algorithm for Finding Strongly Connected Components" + * + * The algorithm maintains the following invariant: + * - suppose there is a path 'u' ~> 'v', such that 'pre[v] < pre[u]'; + * - then, vertex 'u' remains on stack while vertex 'v' is on stack. + * + * Consequently: + * - If 'low[v] < pre[v]', there is a path from 'v' to some vertex 'u', + * such that 'pre[u] == low[v]'; vertex 'u' is currently on the stack, + * and thus there is an SCC (loop) containing both 'u' and 'v'. + * - If 'low[v] == pre[v]', loops containing 'v' have been explored, + * and 'v' can be considered the root of some SCC. + * + * Here is a pseudo-code for an explicitly recursive version of the algorithm: + * + * NOT_ON_STACK = insn_cnt + 1 + * pre = [0] * insn_cnt + * low = [0] * insn_cnt + * scc = [0] * insn_cnt + * stack = [] + * + * next_preorder_num = 1 + * next_scc_id = 1 + * + * def recur(w): + * nonlocal next_preorder_num + * nonlocal next_scc_id + * + * pre[w] = next_preorder_num + * low[w] = next_preorder_num + * next_preorder_num += 1 + * stack.append(w) + * for s in successors(w): + * # Note: for classic algorithm the block below should look as: + * # + * # if pre[s] == 0: + * # recur(s) + * # low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) + * # elif low[s] != NOT_ON_STACK: + * # low[w] = min(low[w], pre[s]) + * # + * # But replacing both 'min' instructions with 'low[w] = min(low[w], low[s])' + * # does not break the invariant and makes itartive version of the algorithm + * # simpler. See 'Algorithm #3' from [2]. + * + * # 's' not yet visited + * if pre[s] == 0: + * recur(s) + * # if 's' is on stack, pick lowest reachable preorder number from it; + * # if 's' is not on stack 'low[s] == NOT_ON_STACK > low[w]', + * # so 'min' would be a noop. + * low[w] = min(low[w], low[s]) + * + * if low[w] == pre[w]: + * # 'w' is the root of an SCC, pop all vertices + * # below 'w' on stack and assign same SCC to them. + * while True: + * t = stack.pop() + * low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK + * scc[t] = next_scc_id + * if t == w: + * break + * next_scc_id += 1 + * + * for i in range(0, insn_cnt): + * if pre[i] == 0: + * recur(i) + * + * Below implementation replaces explicit recursion with array 'dfs'. + */ + for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) { + if (pre[i]) + continue; + stack_sz = 0; + dfs_sz = 1; + dfs[0] = i; +dfs_continue: + while (dfs_sz) { + w = dfs[dfs_sz - 1]; + if (pre[w] == 0) { + low[w] = next_preorder_num; + pre[w] = next_preorder_num; + next_preorder_num++; + stack[stack_sz++] = w; + } + /* Visit 'w' successors */ + succ_cnt = insn_successors(env->prog, w, succ); + for (j = 0; j < succ_cnt; ++j) { + if (pre[succ[j]]) { + low[w] = min(low[w], low[succ[j]]); + } else { + dfs[dfs_sz++] = succ[j]; + goto dfs_continue; + } + } + /* + * Preserve the invariant: if some vertex above in the stack + * is reachable from 'w', keep 'w' on the stack. + */ + if (low[w] < pre[w]) { + dfs_sz--; + goto dfs_continue; + } + /* + * Assign SCC number only if component has two or more elements, + * or if component has a self reference. + */ + assign_scc = stack[stack_sz - 1] != w; + for (j = 0; j < succ_cnt; ++j) { + if (succ[j] == w) { + assign_scc = true; + break; + } + } + /* Pop component elements from stack */ + do { + t = stack[--stack_sz]; + low[t] = NOT_ON_STACK; + if (assign_scc) + aux[t].scc = next_scc_id; + } while (t != w); + if (assign_scc) + next_scc_id++; + dfs_sz--; + } + } + env->scc_info = kvcalloc(next_scc_id, sizeof(*env->scc_info), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!env->scc_info) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto exit; + } +exit: + kvfree(stack); + kvfree(pre); + kvfree(low); + kvfree(dfs); + return err; +} + int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u32 uattr_size) { u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); @@ -23945,6 +24570,8 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3 u32 log_true_size; bool is_priv; + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(enum bpf_features); + /* no program is valid */ if (ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_verifier_ops) == 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -23952,7 +24579,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3 /* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small, * allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called */ - env = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL); + env = kvzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!env) return -ENOMEM; @@ -24015,7 +24642,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3 env->explored_states = kvcalloc(state_htab_size(env), sizeof(struct list_head), - GFP_USER); + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); ret = -ENOMEM; if (!env->explored_states) goto skip_full_check; @@ -24058,6 +24685,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3 if (ret) goto skip_full_check; + ret = compute_scc(env); + if (ret < 0) + goto skip_full_check; + ret = compute_live_registers(env); if (ret < 0) goto skip_full_check; @@ -24142,7 +24773,7 @@ skip_full_check: /* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */ env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt, sizeof(env->used_maps[0]), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) { ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -24157,7 +24788,7 @@ skip_full_check: /* if program passed verifier, update used_btfs in bpf_prog_aux */ env->prog->aux->used_btfs = kmalloc_array(env->used_btf_cnt, sizeof(env->used_btfs[0]), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!env->prog->aux->used_btfs) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto err_release_maps; @@ -24198,9 +24829,9 @@ err_unlock: if (!is_priv) mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); vfree(env->insn_aux_data); - kvfree(env->insn_hist); err_free_env: kvfree(env->cfg.insn_postorder); + kvfree(env->scc_info); kvfree(env); return ret; } |