1 files changed, 112 insertions, 30 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index c76e0f5dcc93..a256a4664826 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  */
 
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
@@ -24,6 +25,12 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 	"unknown",
 	"send",
@@ -66,6 +73,37 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 	"unknown",
 };
 
+static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			    struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen);
+
+	if (!addr || len <= 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str);
+	} else if (addr->sun_path[0]) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str);
+		if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1))
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1,
+					 &addr->sun_path[1]);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			       const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	const struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+	if (u && u->addr)
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, u->addr->name, u->addr->len);
+	else
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0);
+}
 
 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
@@ -73,12 +111,12 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
 
-	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+	if (address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family])
 		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
-				 address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+				 address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-				 sa->u.net->family);
+				 ad->common.u.net->family);
 	if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
 		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
 				 sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
@@ -98,6 +136,23 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 		}
 	}
+	if (ad->common.u.net->family == PF_UNIX) {
+		if ((ad->request & ~NET_PEER_MASK) && ad->net.addr)
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+					ad->net.addrlen);
+		else
+			audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", ad->common.u.net->sk);
+		if (ad->request & NET_PEER_MASK) {
+			if (ad->net.addr)
+				audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+						unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+						ad->net.addrlen);
+			else
+				audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+						   ad->net.peer_sk);
+		}
+	}
 	if (ad->peer) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
 		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
@@ -106,9 +161,9 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 }
 
 /* standard permission lookup pattern - supports early bailout */
-static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
-		    unsigned int state, u32 request,
-		    struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
+		aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+		struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct aa_perms perms;
 
@@ -140,31 +195,53 @@ static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
 	return p;
 }
 
-/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
+static aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_be16(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+					  u16 data)
+{
+	__be16 buffer = cpu_to_be16(data);
+
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_match_to_prot - match the af, type, protocol triplet
+ * @policy: policy being matched
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @request: permissions being requested, ignored if @p == NULL
+ * @af: socket address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: socket protocol
+ * @p: output - pointer to permission associated with match
+ * @info: output - pointer to string describing failure
+ *
+ * RETURNS: state match stopped in.
+ *
+ * If @(p) is assigned a value the returned state will be the
+ * corresponding state. Will not set @p on failure or if match completes
+ * only if an early match occurs
+ */
 aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
-			    u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol,
+			    u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol,
 			    struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
 {
-	__be16 buffer;
-
-	buffer = cpu_to_be16(family);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)af);
 	if (!state) {
 		*info = "failed af match";
-		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+		return state;
 	}
-	buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)type);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
-	if (!state)
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)type);
+	if (state) {
+		if (p)
+			*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+		if (!p || !*p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)protocol);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed protocol match";
+		}
+	} else {
 		*info = "failed type match";
-	*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
-	if (!*p) {
-		buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)protocol);
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
-					 2);
-		if (!state)
-			*info = "failed protocol match";
 	}
+
 	return state;
 }
 
@@ -182,20 +259,21 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
 	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
 
-	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
+		return 0;
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules);
 	if (!state)
 		return 0;
-
 	state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, request, family, type,
 				 protocol, &p, &ad->info);
-	return do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad);
+	return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad);
 }
 
 int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
 	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, subj_cred, NULL, family, type, protocol);
 
 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
 			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
@@ -215,7 +293,7 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 
 	if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
 		struct aa_profile *profile;
-		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
 
 		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
 		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
@@ -243,12 +321,16 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
 
 
 int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
-		      const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
 {
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 	AA_BUG(!sock);
 	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
 	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
 }
 
@@ -313,7 +395,7 @@ int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
 			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, NULL, sk);
 
 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
 				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,