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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"As usual, many cleanups. The below blurbiage describes 42 patchsets.
21 of those are partially or fully cleanup work. "cleans up",
"cleanup", "maintainability", "rationalizes", etc.
I never knew the MM code was so dirty.
"mm: ksm: prevent KSM from breaking merging of new VMAs" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
addresses an issue with KSM's PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE mode: newly
mapped VMAs were not eligible for merging with existing adjacent
VMAs.
"mm/damon: introduce DAMON_STAT for simple and practical access monitoring" (SeongJae Park)
adds a new kernel module which simplifies the setup and usage of
DAMON in production environments.
"stop passing a writeback_control to swap/shmem writeout" (Christoph Hellwig)
is a cleanup to the writeback code which removes a couple of
pointers from struct writeback_control.
"drivers/base/node.c: optimization and cleanups" (Donet Tom)
contains largely uncorrelated cleanups to the NUMA node setup and
management code.
"mm: userfaultfd: assorted fixes and cleanups" (Tal Zussman)
does some maintenance work on the userfaultfd code.
"Readahead tweaks for larger folios" (Ryan Roberts)
implements some tuneups for pagecache readahead when it is reading
into order>0 folios.
"selftests/mm: Tweaks to the cow test" (Mark Brown)
provides some cleanups and consistency improvements to the
selftests code.
"Optimize mremap() for large folios" (Dev Jain)
does that. A 37% reduction in execution time was measured in a
memset+mremap+munmap microbenchmark.
"Remove zero_user()" (Matthew Wilcox)
expunges zero_user() in favor of the more modern memzero_page().
"mm/huge_memory: vmf_insert_folio_*() and vmf_insert_pfn_pud() fixes" (David Hildenbrand)
addresses some warts which David noticed in the huge page code.
These were not known to be causing any issues at this time.
"mm/damon: use alloc_migrate_target() for DAMOS_MIGRATE_{HOT,COLD" (SeongJae Park)
provides some cleanup and consolidation work in DAMON.
"use vm_flags_t consistently" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
uses vm_flags_t in places where we were inappropriately using other
types.
"mm/memfd: Reserve hugetlb folios before allocation" (Vivek Kasireddy)
increases the reliability of large page allocation in the memfd
code.
"mm: Remove pXX_devmap page table bit and pfn_t type" (Alistair Popple)
removes several now-unneeded PFN_* flags.
"mm/damon: decouple sysfs from core" (SeongJae Park)
implememnts some cleanup and maintainability work in the DAMON
sysfs layer.
"madvise cleanup" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
does quite a lot of cleanup/maintenance work in the madvise() code.
"madvise anon_name cleanups" (Vlastimil Babka)
provides additional cleanups on top or Lorenzo's effort.
"Implement numa node notifier" (Oscar Salvador)
creates a standalone notifier for NUMA node memory state changes.
Previously these were lumped under the more general memory
on/offline notifier.
"Make MIGRATE_ISOLATE a standalone bit" (Zi Yan)
cleans up the pageblock isolation code and fixes a potential issue
which doesn't seem to cause any problems in practice.
"selftests/damon: add python and drgn based DAMON sysfs functionality tests" (SeongJae Park)
adds additional drgn- and python-based DAMON selftests which are
more comprehensive than the existing selftest suite.
"Misc rework on hugetlb faulting path" (Oscar Salvador)
fixes a rather obscure deadlock in the hugetlb fault code and
follows that fix with a series of cleanups.
"cma: factor out allocation logic from __cma_declare_contiguous_nid" (Mike Rapoport)
rationalizes and cleans up the highmem-specific code in the CMA
allocator.
"mm/migration: rework movable_ops page migration (part 1)" (David Hildenbrand)
provides cleanups and future-preparedness to the migration code.
"mm/damon: add trace events for auto-tuned monitoring intervals and DAMOS quota" (SeongJae Park)
adds some tracepoints to some DAMON auto-tuning code.
"mm/damon: fix misc bugs in DAMON modules" (SeongJae Park)
does that.
"mm/damon: misc cleanups" (SeongJae Park)
also does what it claims.
"mm: folio_pte_batch() improvements" (David Hildenbrand)
cleans up the large folio PTE batching code.
"mm/damon/vaddr: Allow interleaving in migrate_{hot,cold} actions" (SeongJae Park)
facilitates dynamic alteration of DAMON's inter-node allocation
policy.
"Remove unmap_and_put_page()" (Vishal Moola)
provides a couple of page->folio conversions.
"mm: per-node proactive reclaim" (Davidlohr Bueso)
implements a per-node control of proactive reclaim - beyond the
current memcg-based implementation.
"mm/damon: remove damon_callback" (SeongJae Park)
replaces the damon_callback interface with a more general and
powerful damon_call()+damos_walk() interface.
"mm/mremap: permit mremap() move of multiple VMAs" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
implements a number of mremap cleanups (of course) in preparation
for adding new mremap() functionality: newly permit the remapping
of multiple VMAs when the user is specifying MREMAP_FIXED. It still
excludes some specialized situations where this cannot be performed
reliably.
"drop hugetlb_free_pgd_range()" (Anthony Yznaga)
switches some sparc hugetlb code over to the generic version and
removes the thus-unneeded hugetlb_free_pgd_range().
"mm/damon/sysfs: support periodic and automated stats update" (SeongJae Park)
augments the present userspace-requested update of DAMON sysfs
monitoring files. Automatic update is now provided, along with a
tunable to control the update interval.
"Some randome fixes and cleanups to swapfile" (Kemeng Shi)
does what is claims.
"mm: introduce snapshot_page" (Luiz Capitulino and David Hildenbrand)
provides (and uses) a means by which debug-style functions can grab
a copy of a pageframe and inspect it locklessly without tripping
over the races inherent in operating on the live pageframe
directly.
"use per-vma locks for /proc/pid/maps reads" (Suren Baghdasaryan)
addresses the large contention issues which can be triggered by
reads from that procfs file. Latencies are reduced by more than
half in some situations. The series also introduces several new
selftests for the /proc/pid/maps interface.
"__folio_split() clean up" (Zi Yan)
cleans up __folio_split()!
"Optimize mprotect() for large folios" (Dev Jain)
provides some quite large (>3x) speedups to mprotect() when dealing
with large folios.
"selftests/mm: reuse FORCE_READ to replace "asm volatile("" : "+r" (XXX));" and some cleanup" (wang lian)
does some cleanup work in the selftests code.
"tools/testing: expand mremap testing" (Lorenzo Stoakes)
extends the mremap() selftest in several ways, including adding
more checking of Lorenzo's recently added "permit mremap() move of
multiple VMAs" feature.
"selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test all parameters" (SeongJae Park)
extends the DAMON sysfs interface selftest so that it tests all
possible user-requested parameters. Rather than the present minimal
subset"
* tag 'mm-stable-2025-07-30-15-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (370 commits)
MAINTAINERS: add missing headers to mempory policy & migration section
MAINTAINERS: add missing file to cgroup section
MAINTAINERS: add MM MISC section, add missing files to MISC and CORE
MAINTAINERS: add missing zsmalloc file
MAINTAINERS: add missing files to page alloc section
MAINTAINERS: add missing shrinker files
MAINTAINERS: move memremap.[ch] to hotplug section
MAINTAINERS: add missing mm_slot.h file THP section
MAINTAINERS: add missing interval_tree.c to memory mapping section
MAINTAINERS: add missing percpu-internal.h file to per-cpu section
mm/page_alloc: remove trace_mm_alloc_contig_migrate_range_info()
selftests/damon: introduce _common.sh to host shared function
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test runtime reduction of DAMON parameters
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test non-default parameters runtime commit
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMON context commit assertion
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize monitoring attributes commit assertion
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMOS schemes commit assertion
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test DAMOS filters commitment
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: generalize DAMOS scheme commit assertion
selftests/damon/sysfs.py: test DAMOS destinations commitment
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cpu update from Ingo Molnar:
"Add user-space CPUID faulting support for AMD CPUs"
* tag 'x86-cpu-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/CPU/AMD: Add CPUID faulting support
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Implement support for embedding EFI SBAT data (Secure Boot Advanced
Targeting: a secure boot image revocation facility) on x86 (Vitaly
Kuznetsov)
- Move the efi_enter_virtual_mode() initialization call from the
generic init code to x86 init code (Alexander Shishkin)
* tag 'x86-boot-2025-07-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86
x86/efi: Move runtime service initialization to arch/x86
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 microcode loader update from Borislav Petkov:
- Switch the microcode loader from using the fake platform device to
the new simple faux bus
* tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/microcode: Move away from using a fake platform device
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Untangle the Retbleed from the ITS mitigation on Intel. Allow for ITS
to enable stuffing independently from Retbleed, do some cleanups to
simplify and streamline the code
- Simplify SRSO and make mitigation types selection more versatile
depending on the Retbleed mitigation selection. Simplify code some
- Add the second part of the attack vector controls which provide a lot
friendlier user interface to the speculation mitigations than
selecting each one by one as it is now.
Instead, the selection of whole attack vectors which are relevant to
the system in use can be done and protection against only those
vectors is enabled, thus giving back some performance to the users
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA
x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS
x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug
x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support
cpu: Define attack vectors
...
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Resolve overlapping context conflict between this upstream fix:
d8010d4ba43e ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")
And this pending commit in tip:x86/cpu:
65f55a301766 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Add CPUID faulting support")
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Update Kirill's email address
- Allow hugetlb PMD sharing only on 64-bit as it doesn't make a whole
lotta sense on 32-bit
- Add fixes for a misconfigured AMD Zen2 client which wasn't even
supposed to run Linux
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.16_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
MAINTAINERS: Update Kirill Shutemov's email address for TDX
x86/mm: Disable hugetlb page table sharing on 32-bit
x86/CPU/AMD: Disable INVLPGB on Zen2
x86/rdrand: Disable RDSEED on AMD Cyan Skillfish
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Print the status of enabled attack vectors and SMT mitigation status in the
boot log for easier reporting and debugging. This information will also be
available through sysfs.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-21-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine which TSA mitigation to use.
[ bp: Simplify the condition in the select function for better
readability. ]
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250709155844.3279471-1-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if ITS mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-19-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if SRSO mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-18-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if L1TF mitigation is required.
Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-17-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2 mitigation is
required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-16-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if BHI mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-15-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v2_user mitigation is
required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-14-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if retbleed mitigation is
required.
Disable SMT if cross-thread protection is desired and STIBP is not
available.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-13-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if spectre_v1 mitigation is
required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-12-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if GDS mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-11-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if SRBDS mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-10-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if RFDS mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-9-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vectors controls to determine if MMIO mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-8-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if TAA mitigation is required.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-7-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Use attack vector controls to determine if MDS mitigation is required.
The global mitigations=off command now simply disables all attack vectors
so explicit checking of mitigations=off is no longer needed.
If cross-thread attack mitigations are required, disable SMT.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-6-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Add a function which defines which vulnerabilities should be mitigated
based on the selected attack vector controls. The selections here are
based on the individual characteristics of each vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250707183316.1349127-5-david.kaplan@amd.com
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In future we intend to change the vm_flags_t type, so it isn't correct for
architecture and driver code to assume it is unsigned long. Correct this
assumption across the board.
Overall, this patch does not introduce any functional change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b6eb1894abc5555ece80bb08af5c022ef780c8bc.1750274467.git.lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> [arm64]
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Pick up TSA changes from mainline so that attack vectors work can
continue ontop.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
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Downloading firmware needs a device to hang off of, and so a platform device
seemed like the simplest way to do this. Now that we have a faux device
interface, use that instead as this "microcode device" is not anything
resembling a platform device at all.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/2025070121-omission-small-9308@gregkh
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AMD Cyan Skillfish (Family 17h, Model 47h, Stepping 0h) has an issue
that causes system oopses and panics when performing TLB flush using
INVLPGB.
However, the problem is that that machine has misconfigured CPUID and
should not report the INVLPGB bit in the first place. So zap the
kernel's representation of the flag so that nothing gets confused.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 767ae437a32d ("x86/mm: Add INVLPGB feature and Kconfig entry")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Paulyshka <me@mixaill.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1ebe845b-322b-4929-9093-b41074e9e939@mixaill.net
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AMD Cyan Skillfish (Family 17h, Model 47h, Stepping 0h) has an error that
causes RDSEED to always return 0xffffffff, while RDRAND works correctly.
Mask the RDSEED cap for this CPU so that both /proc/cpuinfo and direct CPUID
read report RDSEED as unavailable.
[ bp: Move to amd.c, massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Paulyshka <me@mixaill.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250524145319.209075-1-me@mixaill.net
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull CPU speculation fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"Add the mitigation logic for Transient Scheduler Attacks (TSA)
TSA are new aspeculative side channel attacks related to the execution
timing of instructions under specific microarchitectural conditions.
In some cases, an attacker may be able to use this timing information
to infer data from other contexts, resulting in information leakage.
Add the usual controls of the mitigation and integrate it into the
existing speculation bugs infrastructure in the kernel"
* tag 'tsa_x86_bugs_for_6.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/process: Move the buffer clearing before MONITOR
x86/microcode/AMD: Add TSA microcode SHAs
KVM: SVM: Advertise TSA CPUID bits to guests
x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation
x86/bugs: Rename MDS machinery to something more generic
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RAS fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Do not remove the MCE sysfs hierarchy if thresholding sysfs nodes
init fails due to new/unknown banks present, which in itself is not
fatal anyway; add default names for new banks
- Make sure MCE polling settings are honored after CMCI storms
- Make sure MCE threshold limit is reset after the thresholding
interrupt has been serviced
- Clean up properly and disable CMCI banks on shutdown so that a
second/kexec-ed kernel can rediscover those banks again
* tag 'ras_urgent_for_v6.16_rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mce: Make sure CMCI banks are cleared during shutdown on Intel
x86/mce/amd: Fix threshold limit reset
x86/mce/amd: Add default names for MCA banks and blocks
x86/mce: Ensure user polling settings are honored when restarting timer
x86/mce: Don't remove sysfs if thresholding sysfs init fails
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86
Pull x86 platform drivers fixes from Ilpo Järvinen:
"Mostly a few lines fixed here and there except amd/isp4 which improves
swnodes relationships but that is a new driver not in any stable
kernels yet. The think-lmi driver changes also look relatively large
but there are just many fixes to it.
The i2c/piix4 change is a effectively a revert of the commit
7e173eb82ae9 ("i2c: piix4: Make CONFIG_I2C_PIIX4 dependent on
CONFIG_X86") but that required moving the header out from arch/x86
under include/linux/platform_data/
Summary:
- amd/isp4: Improve swnode graph (new driver exception)
- asus-nb-wmi: Use duo keyboard quirk for Zenbook Duo UX8406CA
- dell-lis3lv02d: Add Latitude 5500 accelerometer address
- dell-wmi-sysman: Fix WMI data block retrieval and class dev unreg
- hp-bioscfg: Fix class device unregistration
- i2c: piix4: Re-enable on non-x86 + move FCH header under platform_data/
- intel/hid: Wildcat Lake support
- mellanox:
- mlxbf-pmc: Fix duplicate event ID
- mlxbf-tmfifo: Fix vring_desc.len assignment
- mlxreg-lc: Fix bit-not-set logic check
- nvsw-sn2201: Fix bus number in error message & spelling errors
- portwell-ec: Move watchdog device under correct platform hierarchy
- think-lmi: Error handling fixes (sysfs, kset, kobject, class dev unreg)
- thinkpad_acpi: Handle HKEY 0x1402 event (2025 Thinkpads)
- wmi: Fix WMI event enablement"
* tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.16-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86: (22 commits)
platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix sysfs group cleanup
platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix kobject cleanup
platform/x86: think-lmi: Create ksets consecutively
platform/mellanox: mlxreg-lc: Fix logic error in power state check
i2c: Re-enable piix4 driver on non-x86
Move FCH header to a location accessible by all archs
platform/x86/intel/hid: Add Wildcat Lake support
platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Fix class device unregistration
platform/x86: think-lmi: Fix class device unregistration
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: Fix class device unregistration
platform/x86: Update swnode graph for amd isp4
platform/x86: dell-wmi-sysman: Fix WMI data block retrieval in sysfs callbacks
platform/x86: wmi: Update documentation of WCxx/WExx ACPI methods
platform/x86: wmi: Fix WMI event enablement
platform/mellanox: nvsw-sn2201: Fix bus number in adapter error message
platform/mellanox: Fix spelling and comment clarity in Mellanox drivers
platform/mellanox: mlxbf-pmc: Fix duplicate event ID for CACHE_DATA1
platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: handle HKEY 0x1402 event
platform/x86: asus-nb-wmi: add DMI quirk for ASUS Zenbook Duo UX8406CA
platform/x86: dell-lis3lv02d: Add Latitude 5500
...
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A new header fch.h was created to store registers used by different AMD
drivers. This header was included by i2c-piix4 in
commit 624b0d5696a8 ("i2c: piix4, x86/platform: Move the SB800 PIIX4 FCH
definitions to <asm/amd/fch.h>"). To prevent compile failures on non-x86
archs i2c-piix4 was set to only compile on x86 by commit 7e173eb82ae9717
("i2c: piix4: Make CONFIG_I2C_PIIX4 dependent on CONFIG_X86").
This was not a good decision because loongarch and mips both actually
support i2c-piix4 and set it enabled in the defconfig.
Move the header to a location accessible by all architectures.
Fixes: 624b0d5696a89 ("i2c: piix4, x86/platform: Move the SB800 PIIX4 FCH definitions to <asm/amd/fch.h>")
Suggested-by: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610205817.3912944-1-superm1@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
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CMCI banks are not cleared during shutdown on Intel CPUs. As a side effect,
when a kexec is performed, CPUs coming back online are unable to
rediscover/claim these occupied banks which breaks MCE reporting.
Clear the CPU ownership during shutdown via cmci_clear() so the banks can
be reclaimed and MCE reporting will become functional once more.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Reported-by: Aijay Adams <aijay@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: JP Kobryn <inwardvessel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250627174935.95194-1-inwardvessel@gmail.com
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The MCA threshold limit must be reset after servicing the interrupt.
Currently, the restart function doesn't have an explicit check for this. It
makes some assumptions based on the current limit and what's in the registers.
These assumptions don't always hold, so the limit won't be reset in some
cases.
Make the reset condition explicit. Either an interrupt/overflow has occurred
or the bank is being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-4-236dd74f645f@amd.com
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Ensure that sysfs init doesn't fail for new/unrecognized bank types or if
a bank has additional blocks available.
Most MCA banks have a single thresholding block, so the block takes the same
name as the bank.
Unified Memory Controllers (UMCs) are a special case where there are two
blocks and each has a unique name.
However, the microarchitecture allows for five blocks. Any new MCA bank types
with more than one block will be missing names for the extra blocks. The MCE
sysfs will fail to initialize in this case.
Fixes: 87a6d4091bd7 ("x86/mce/AMD: Update sysfs bank names for SMCA systems")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-3-236dd74f645f@amd.com
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Users can disable MCA polling by setting the "ignore_ce" parameter or by
setting "check_interval=0". This tells the kernel to *not* start the MCE
timer on a CPU.
If the user did not disable CMCI, then storms can occur. When these
happen, the MCE timer will be started with a fixed interval. After the
storm subsides, the timer's next interval is set to check_interval.
This disregards the user's input through "ignore_ce" and
"check_interval". Furthermore, if "check_interval=0", then the new timer
will run faster than expected.
Create a new helper to check these conditions and use it when a CMCI
storm ends.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7eae17c4add5 ("x86/mce: Add per-bank CMCI storm mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-2-236dd74f645f@amd.com
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Currently, the MCE subsystem sysfs interface will be removed if the
thresholding sysfs interface fails to be created. A common failure is due to
new MCA bank types that are not recognized and don't have a short name set.
The MCA thresholding feature is optional and should not break the common MCE
sysfs interface. Also, new MCA bank types are occasionally introduced, and
updates will be needed to recognize them. But likewise, this should not break
the common sysfs interface.
Keep the MCE sysfs interface regardless of the status of the thresholding
sysfs interface.
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250624-wip-mca-updates-v4-1-236dd74f645f@amd.com
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SRSO microcode only exists for Zen3/Zen4 CPUs. For those CPUs, the microcode
is required for any mitigation other than Safe-RET to be effective. Safe-RET
can still protect user->kernel and guest->host attacks without microcode.
Clarify this in the code and ensure that SRSO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED is
selected for any mitigation besides Safe-RET if the required microcode isn't
present.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250625155805.600376-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
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If spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb then this mitigates retbleed as well. This
is relevant for AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs which are vulnerable to both bugs.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
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AMD Zen1 and Zen2 CPUs with SMT disabled are not vulnerable to SRSO.
Instead of overloading the X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO bit to indicate this,
define a separate mitigation to make the code cleaner.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625155805.600376-2-david.kaplan@amd.com
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Initialize DR7 by writing its architectural reset value to always set
bit 10, which is reserved to '1', when "clearing" DR7 so as not to
trigger unanticipated behavior if said bit is ever unreserved, e.g. as
a feature enabling flag with inverted polarity.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250620231504.2676902-3-xin%40zytor.com
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Initialize DR6 by writing its architectural reset value to avoid
incorrectly zeroing DR6 to clear DR6.BLD at boot time, which leads
to a false bus lock detected warning.
The Intel SDM says:
1) Certain debug exceptions may clear bits 0-3 of DR6.
2) BLD induced #DB clears DR6.BLD and any other debug exception
doesn't modify DR6.BLD.
3) RTM induced #DB clears DR6.RTM and any other debug exception
sets DR6.RTM.
To avoid confusion in identifying debug exceptions, debug handlers
should set DR6.BLD and DR6.RTM, and clear other DR6 bits before
returning.
The DR6 architectural reset value 0xFFFF0FF0, already defined as
macro DR6_RESERVED, satisfies these requirements, so just use it to
reinitialize DR6 whenever needed.
Since clear_all_debug_regs() no longer zeros all debug registers,
rename it to initialize_debug_regs() to better reflect its current
behavior.
Since debug_read_clear_dr6() no longer clears DR6, rename it to
debug_read_reset_dr6() to better reflect its current behavior.
Fixes: ebb1064e7c2e9 ("x86/traps: Handle #DB for bus lock")
Reported-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/06e68373-a92b-472e-8fd9-ba548119770c@intel.com/
Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250620231504.2676902-2-xin%40zytor.com
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After a recent restructuring of the ITS mitigation, RSB stuffing can no longer
be enabled in eIBRS+Retpoline mode. Before ITS, retbleed mitigation only
allowed stuffing when eIBRS was not enabled. This was perfectly fine since
eIBRS mitigates retbleed.
However, RSB stuffing mitigation for ITS is still needed with eIBRS. The
restructuring solely relies on retbleed to deploy stuffing, and does not allow
it when eIBRS is enabled. This behavior is different from what was before the
restructuring. Fix it by allowing stuffing in eIBRS+retpoline mode also.
Fixes: 61ab72c2c6bf ("x86/bugs: Restructure ITS mitigation")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250519235101.2vm6sc5txyoykb2r@desk/
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-7-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Allow ITS to enable stuffing independent of retbleed. The dependency is only
on retpoline. It is a valid case for retbleed to be mitigated by eIBRS while
ITS deploys stuffing at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-6-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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In preparation to allow ITS to also enable stuffing aka Call Depth
Tracking (CDT) independently of retbleed, introduce a helper
cdt_possible().
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-5-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Prepare to apply stuffing mitigation in its_apply_mitigation(). This is
currently only done via retbleed mitigation. Also using switch/case
makes it evident that mitigation mode like VMEXIT_ONLY doesn't need any
special handling.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-4-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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The purpose of the warning is to prevent an unexpected change to the return
thunk mitigation. However, there are legitimate cases where the return
thunk is intentionally set more than once. For example, ITS and SRSO both
can set the return thunk after retbleed has set it. In both the cases
retbleed is still mitigated.
Replace the warning with an info about the active return thunk.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-3-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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Simplify the nested checks, remove redundant print and comment.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-2-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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The retbleed select function leaves the mitigation to AUTO in some cases.
Moreover, the update function can also set the mitigation to AUTO. This
is inconsistent with other mitigations and requires explicit handling of
AUTO at the end of update step.
Make sure a mitigation gets selected in the select step, and do not change
it to AUTO in the update step. When no mitigation can be selected leave it
to NONE, which is what AUTO was getting changed to in the end.
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250611-eibrs-fix-v4-1-5ff86cac6c61@linux.intel.com
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