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Currently the SHA-224 and SHA-256 library functions can be mixed
arbitrarily, even in ways that are incorrect, for example using
sha224_init() and sha256_final(). This is because they operate on the
same structure, sha256_state.
Introduce stronger typing, as I did for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
Also as I did for SHA-384 and SHA-512, use the names *_ctx instead of
*_state. The *_ctx names have the following small benefits:
- They're shorter.
- They avoid an ambiguity with the compression function state.
- They're consistent with the well-known OpenSSL API.
- Users usually name the variable 'sctx' anyway, which suggests that
*_ctx would be the more natural name for the actual struct.
Therefore: update the SHA-224 and SHA-256 APIs, implementation, and
calling code accordingly.
In the new structs, also strongly-type the compression function state.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630160645.3198-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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tpm2_start_auth_session() does not mask TPM RC correctly from the callers:
[ 28.766528] tpm tpm0: A TPM error (2307) occurred start auth session
Process TPM RCs inside tpm2_start_auth_session(), and map them to POSIX
error codes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Z_NgdRHuTKP6JK--@gondor.apana.org.au/
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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TPM2 sessions have been flushed lazily since commit df745e25098dc ("tpm:
Lazily flush the auth session"). If /dev/tpm{rm}0 is not accessed
in-between two in-kernel calls, it is possible that a TPM2 session is
re-started before the previous one has been completed.
This causes a spurios warning in a legit run-time condition, which is also
correctly addressed with a fast return path:
[ 2.944047] tpm tpm0: auth session is active
Address the issue by changing dev_warn_once() call to a dev_dbg_once()
call.
[jarkko: Rewrote the commit message, and instead of dropping converted
to a debug message.]
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Set the TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP on the driver so that the ibmvtpm driver now
uses tpm2_auto_startup and tpm1_auto_startup like many other drivers do.
Remove tpm_get_timeouts, tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl, and tpm2_sessions_init
calls from it since these will all be called in tpm2_auto_startup and
tpm1_auto_startup.
The exporting of the tpm2_session_init symbol was only necessary while the
ibmvtpm driver was calling this function. Since this is not the case
anymore, remove this symbol from being exported.
What is new for the ibmvtpm driver is that now tpm2_do_selftest and
tpm1_do_selftest will be called that send commands to the TPM to perform
or continue its selftest. However, the firmware should already have sent
these commands so that the TPM will not do much work at this time.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The earlier bug fix misplaced the error-label when dealing with the
tpm2_create_primary() return value, which the original completely ignored.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.org>
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1087331
Fixes: cc7d8594342a ("tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The initial HMAC session feature added TPM bus encryption and/or integrity
protection to various in-kernel TPM operations. This can cause performance
bottlenecks with IMA, as it heavily utilizes PCR extend operations.
In order to mitigate this performance issue, introduce a kernel
command-line parameter to the TPM driver for disabling the integrity
protection for PCR extend operations (i.e. TPM2_PCR_Extend).
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20241015193916.59964-1-zohar@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 6519fea6fd37 ("tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend()")
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Move the allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that this
field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not.
Instead of flushing and reloading the auth session for every transaction
separately, keep the session open unless /dev/tpm0 is used.
Reported-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219229
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()")
Tested-by: Pengyu Ma <mapengyu@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Do not continue on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes")
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Do not continue tpm2_sessions_init() further if the null key pair creation
fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation")
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h;
might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include
that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header.
auto-generated by the following:
for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do
sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i
done
git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h
git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild
sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
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Commit 08d08e2e9f0a ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to
initialize session support") adds call to tpm2_sessions_init() in ibmvtpm,
which could be built as a module. However, tpm2_sessions_init() wasn't
exported, causing libmvtpm to fail to build as a module:
ERROR: modpost: "tpm2_sessions_init" [drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.ko] undefined!
Export tpm2_sessions_init() to resolve the issue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408051735.ZJkAPQ3b-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: 08d08e2e9f0a ("tpm: ibmvtpm: Call tpm2_sessions_init() to initialize session support")
Signed-off-by: Kexy Biscuit <kexybiscuit@aosc.io>
Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai <jeffbai@aosc.io>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Dereference auth after NULL check in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response().
Otherwise, unless tpm2_sessions_init() was called, a call can cause NULL
dereference, when TCG_TPM2_HMAC is enabled.
[jarkko: adjusted the commit message.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 7ca110f2679b ("tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <gehao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause
a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in
tpm2_*_auth_session().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Rename and document TPM2_OA_TMPL, as originally requested in the patch
set review, but left unaddressed without any appropriate reasoning. The
new name is TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY, has a documentation and is local only to
tpm2-sessions.c.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/ddbeb8111f48a8ddb0b8fca248dff6cc9d7079b2.camel@HansenPartnership.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CZCKTWU6ZCC9.2UTEQPEVICYHL@suppilovahvero/
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Update tpm2_load_context() to return -EINVAL on integrity failures and
use this as a signal when loading the NULL context that something
might be wrong. If the signal fails, check the name of the NULL
primary against the one stored in the chip data and if there is a
mismatch disable the TPM because it is likely to have suffered a reset
attack.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The final pieces of the HMAC API are for manipulating the session area
of the command. To add an authentication HMAC session
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() is called where tpm2_append_auth() would
go. If a non empty password is passed in, this is correctly added to
the HMAC to prove knowledge of it without revealing it. Note that if
the session is only used to encrypt or decrypt parameters (no
authentication) then tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt() must be used
instead. This functions identically to tpm_buf_append_hmac_session()
when TPM_BUS_SECURITY is enabled, but differently when it isn't,
because effectively nothing is appended to the session area.
Next the parameters should be filled in for the command and finally
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() is called immediately prior to transmitting
the command which computes the correct HMAC and places it in the
command at the session location in the tpm buffer
Finally, after tpm_transmit_cmd() is called,
tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() is called to check that the returned
HMAC matched and collect the new state for the next use of the
session, if any.
The features of the session are controlled by the session attributes
set in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(). If TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION is
not specified, the session will be flushed and the tpm2_auth structure
freed in tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(); otherwise the session may be
used again. Parameter encryption is specified by or'ing the flag
TPM2_SA_DECRYPT and response encryption by or'ing the flag
TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT. the various encryptions will be taken care of by
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() and tpm_buf_check_hmac_response()
respectively.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> # crypto API parts
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add tpm2_append_name() for appending to the handle area of the TPM
command. When TPM_BUS_SECURITY is enabled and HMAC sessions are in
use this adds the standard u32 handle to the buffer but additionally
records the name of the object which must be used as part of the HMAC
computation. The name of certain object types (volatile and permanent
handles and NV indexes) is a hash of the public area of the object.
Since this hash is not known ahead of time, it must be requested from
the TPM using TPM2_ReadPublic() (which cannot be HMAC protected, but
if an interposer lies about it, the HMAC check will fail and the
problem will be detected).
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> # crypto API parts
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add session based HMAC authentication plus parameter decryption and
response encryption using AES. The basic design is to segregate all
the nasty crypto, hash and hmac code into tpm2-sessions.c and export a
usable API. The API first of all starts off by gaining a session with
tpm2_start_auth_session() which initiates a session with the TPM and
allocates an opaque tpm2_auth structure to handle the session
parameters. The design is that session use will be single threaded
from start to finish under the ops lock, so the tpm2_auth structure is
stored in struct tpm2_chip to simpify the externally visible API.
The session can be ended with tpm2_end_auth_session() which is
designed only to be used in error legs. Ordinarily the further
session API (future patches) will end or continue the session
appropriately without having to call this.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> # crypto API parts
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The TCG mandates two Key derivation functions called KDFa and KDFe
used to derive keys from seeds and elliptic curve points respectively.
The definitions for these functions are found in the TPM 2.0 Library
Specification Part 1 - Architecture Guide
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/
Implement a cut down version of each of these functions sufficient to
support the key derivation needs of HMAC sessions.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The session handling code uses a "salted" session, meaning a session
whose salt is encrypted to the public part of another TPM key so an
observer cannot obtain it (and thus deduce the session keys). This
patch creates and context saves in the tpm_chip area the primary key
of the NULL hierarchy for this purpose.
[jarkko@kernel.org: fixed documentation errors]
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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