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authorTycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>2015-06-13 09:02:48 -0600
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2015-07-15 11:52:52 -0700
commit13c4a90119d28cfcb6b5bdd820c233b86c2b0237 (patch)
tree346f17735ab2f32c0bba28c1f3b1e5757ae955ea
parent8225d3853f34f6cf9caff15d8c385a528e0d7cb1 (diff)
seccomp: add ptrace options for suspend/resume
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes with seccomp enabled. One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task. This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed. Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the filters resumed as well. v2 changes: * require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed * drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch * change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs. v3 changes: * get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere * report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly used v4 changes: * get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace directly v5 changes: * check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com> CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> [kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ptrace.h1
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h6
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c13
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c8
4 files changed, 26 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 987a73a40ef8..061265f92876 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#define PT_TRACE_SECCOMP PT_EVENT_FLAG(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
#define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
+#define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
/* single stepping state bits (used on ARM and PA-RISC) */
#define PT_SINGLESTEP_BIT 31
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
index cf1019e15f5b..a7a697986614 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -89,9 +89,11 @@ struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args {
#define PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)
/* eventless options */
-#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
+#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
+#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21)
-#define PTRACE_O_MASK (0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL)
+#define PTRACE_O_MASK (\
+ 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index c8e0e050a36a..787320de68e0 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -556,6 +556,19 @@ static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
+ if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
+ !config_enabled(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (seccomp_mode(&current->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+ current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
/* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
flags = child->ptrace;
flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 980fd26da22e..645e42d6fa4d 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -590,6 +590,10 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+ if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return;
+
if (mode == 0)
return;
else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
@@ -691,6 +695,10 @@ u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
+
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */