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authorIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>2016-12-02 16:35:09 +0100
committerIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>2016-12-12 23:09:21 +0100
commit5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 (patch)
treec1ae131badc84a83b8df5746b5ce93bebfc2da39
parent5418d0a2c859abca2e59d7db36ba477ee4a3ebc6 (diff)
libceph: verify authorize reply on connect
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b), the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks. The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(), ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never invoked by the the messenger. AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph: negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol"). The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill it in the next commit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/messenger.c13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c
index a5502898ea33..2efb335deada 100644
--- a/net/ceph/messenger.c
+++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c
@@ -2027,6 +2027,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con)
dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag);
+ if (con->auth_reply_buf) {
+ /*
+ * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer()
+ * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply().
+ * See get_connect_authorizer().
+ */
+ ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply";
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
switch (con->in_reply.tag) {
case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES:
pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch,"