summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2021-03-23 08:32:59 +0100
committerDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2021-04-16 23:51:21 +0200
commit9601148392520e2e134936e76788fc2a6371e7be (patch)
tree4b12106c68f6229ce8292b94ad12e790e4ec756d
parentafd0be7299533bb2e2b09104399d8a467ecbd2c5 (diff)
bpf: Use correct permission flag for mixed signed bounds arithmetic
We forbid adding unknown scalars with mixed signed bounds due to the spectre v1 masking mitigation. Hence this also needs bypass_spec_v1 flag instead of allow_ptr_leaks. Fixes: 2c78ee898d8f ("bpf: Implement CAP_BPF") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3a738724a380..2ede4b850230 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6085,7 +6085,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
- if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
+ if (!env->env->bypass_spec_v1 && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
return -EACCES;