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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2010-10-21 12:41:19 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2010-10-21 12:41:19 -0700
commita8fe1500986c32b46b36118aa250f6badca11bfc (patch)
treed5517e16e633fa0c54248f27b5921e8ac4e4a459
parent94ebd235c493f43681f609b0e02733337053e8f0 (diff)
parentf0d3d9894e43fc68d47948e2c6f03e32da88b799 (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (26 commits) selinux: include vmalloc.h for vmalloc_user secmark: fix config problem when CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK is not set selinux: implement mmap on /selinux/policy SELinux: allow userspace to read policy back out of the kernel SELinux: drop useless (and incorrect) AVTAB_MAX_SIZE SELinux: deterministic ordering of range transition rules kernel: roundup should only reference arguments once kernel: rounddown helper function secmark: export secctx, drop secmark in procfs conntrack: export lsm context rather than internal secid via netlink security: secid_to_secctx returns len when data is NULL secmark: make secmark object handling generic secmark: do not return early if there was no error AppArmor: Ensure the size of the copy is < the buffer allocated to hold it TOMOYO: Print URL information before panic(). security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler() tpm: change 'tpm_suspend_pcr' to be module parameter selinux: fix up style problem on /selinux/status selinux: change to new flag variable selinux: really fix dependency causing parallel compile failure. ...
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c22
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kernel.h13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h10
-rw-r--r--include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h12
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h45
-rw-r--r--include/linux/selinux.h63
-rw-r--r--kernel/cpuset.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched.c4
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c28
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c44
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c28
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/xt_CT.c1
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c35
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/.gitignore1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c17
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c5
-rw-r--r--security/security.c35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c49
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c28
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c195
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/Makefile9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c46
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c123
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c81
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c861
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h20
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c63
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/status.c126
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c8
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c17
38 files changed, 1805 insertions, 246 deletions
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
index 2340f11dc29c..9a526ba6f257 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
- retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL);
+ retval = security_task_setscheduler(p)
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 05ad4a17a28f..7c4133582dba 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -47,6 +47,16 @@ enum tpm_duration {
#define TPM_MAX_PROTECTED_ORDINAL 12
#define TPM_PROTECTED_ORDINAL_MASK 0xFF
+/*
+ * Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
+ * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
+ * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
+ */
+static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
+module_param_named(suspend_pcr, tpm_suspend_pcr, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(suspend_pcr,
+ "PCR to use for dummy writes to faciltate flush on suspend.");
+
static LIST_HEAD(tpm_chip_list);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(driver_lock);
static DECLARE_BITMAP(dev_mask, TPM_NUM_DEVICES);
@@ -1077,18 +1087,6 @@ static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
};
-/* Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
- * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
- * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
- */
-static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
-static int __init tpm_suspend_setup(char *str)
-{
- get_option(&str, &tpm_suspend_pcr);
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("tpm_suspend_pcr=", tpm_suspend_setup);
-
/*
* We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
* so that it can be restored.
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index 2b0a35e6bc69..1759ba5adce8 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -58,7 +58,18 @@ extern const char linux_proc_banner[];
#define FIELD_SIZEOF(t, f) (sizeof(((t*)0)->f))
#define DIV_ROUND_UP(n,d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d))
-#define roundup(x, y) ((((x) + ((y) - 1)) / (y)) * (y))
+#define roundup(x, y) ( \
+{ \
+ typeof(y) __y = y; \
+ (((x) + (__y - 1)) / __y) * __y; \
+} \
+)
+#define rounddown(x, y) ( \
+{ \
+ typeof(x) __x = (x); \
+ __x - (__x % (y)); \
+} \
+)
#define DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(x, divisor)( \
{ \
typeof(divisor) __divisor = divisor; \
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h b/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h
index 9ed534c991b9..70cd0603911c 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/nfnetlink_conntrack.h
@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@ enum ctattr_type {
CTA_TUPLE_MASTER,
CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG,
CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_REPLY,
- CTA_SECMARK,
+ CTA_SECMARK, /* obsolete */
CTA_ZONE,
+ CTA_SECCTX,
__CTA_MAX
};
#define CTA_MAX (__CTA_MAX - 1)
@@ -172,4 +173,11 @@ enum ctattr_help {
};
#define CTA_HELP_MAX (__CTA_HELP_MAX - 1)
+enum ctattr_secctx {
+ CTA_SECCTX_UNSPEC,
+ CTA_SECCTX_NAME,
+ __CTA_SECCTX_MAX
+};
+#define CTA_SECCTX_MAX (__CTA_SECCTX_MAX - 1)
+
#endif /* _IPCONNTRACK_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
index 6fcd3448b186..989092bd6274 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h
@@ -11,18 +11,12 @@
* packets are being marked for.
*/
#define SECMARK_MODE_SEL 0x01 /* SELinux */
-#define SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX 256
-
-struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info {
- __u32 selsid;
- char selctx[SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX];
-};
+#define SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX 256
struct xt_secmark_target_info {
__u8 mode;
- union {
- struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info sel;
- } u;
+ __u32 secid;
+ char secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX];
};
#endif /*_XT_SECMARK_H_target */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a22219afff09..b8246a8df7d2 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
-extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
extern int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
extern int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file);
@@ -959,6 +959,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
* @inet_conn_established:
* Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
+ * @secmark_relabel_packet:
+ * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to the given secid
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
+ * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
+ * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
* @req_classify_flow:
* Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
* @tun_dev_create:
@@ -1279,9 +1285,13 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
* @secid_to_secctx:
- * Convert secid to security context.
+ * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of
+ * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
+ * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
+ * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the secdata.
* @secid contains the security ID.
* @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
+ * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
* @secctx_to_secid:
* Convert security context to secid.
* @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
@@ -1501,8 +1511,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_setrlimit) (struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim);
- int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
- struct sched_param *lp);
+ int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct *p,
@@ -1594,6 +1603,9 @@ struct security_operations {
struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*secmark_relabel_packet) (u32 secid);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_inc) (void);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_dec) (void);
void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
void (*tun_dev_post_create)(struct sock *sk);
@@ -1752,8 +1764,7 @@ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
- int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
@@ -2320,11 +2331,9 @@ static inline int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
- int policy,
- struct sched_param *lp)
+static inline int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ return cap_task_setscheduler(p);
}
static inline int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -2551,6 +2560,9 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req);
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb);
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid);
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
int security_tun_dev_create(void);
void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk);
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk);
@@ -2705,6 +2717,19 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
}
+static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+}
+
static inline int security_tun_dev_create(void)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 82e0f26a1299..44f459612690 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -21,74 +21,11 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
- * selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
- * @str: the security context string to be mapped
- * @sid: ID value returned via this.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, with the SID stored in sid. A value
- * of zero for sid indicates no SID could be determined (but no error
- * occurred).
- */
-int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission - secmark permission check
- * @sid: SECMARK ID value to be applied to network packet
- *
- * Returns 0 if the current task is allowed to set the SECMARK label of
- * packets with the supplied security ID. Note that it is implicit that
- * the packet is always being relabeled from the default unlabeled value,
- * and that the access control decision is made in the AVC.
- */
-int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_secmark_refcount_inc - increments the secmark use counter
- *
- * SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
- * when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets. This
- * function incements this reference count to indicate that a new SECMARK
- * target has been configured.
- */
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
-
-/**
- * selinux_secmark_refcount_dec - decrements the secmark use counter
- *
- * SELinux keeps track of the current SECMARK targets in use so it knows
- * when to apply SECMARK label access checks to network packets. This
- * function decements this reference count to indicate that one of the
- * existing SECMARK targets has been removed/flushed.
- */
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
-
-/**
* selinux_is_enabled - is SELinux enabled?
*/
bool selinux_is_enabled(void);
#else
-static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
{
return false;
diff --git a/kernel/cpuset.c b/kernel/cpuset.c
index b23c0979bbe7..51b143e2a07a 100644
--- a/kernel/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cpuset.c
@@ -1397,7 +1397,7 @@ static int cpuset_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cont,
if (tsk->flags & PF_THREAD_BOUND)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = security_task_setscheduler(tsk, 0, NULL);
+ ret = security_task_setscheduler(tsk);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (threadgroup) {
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ static int cpuset_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cont,
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &tsk->thread_group, thread_group) {
- ret = security_task_setscheduler(c, 0, NULL);
+ ret = security_task_setscheduler(c);
if (ret) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c
index dc85ceb90832..df6579d9b4df 100644
--- a/kernel/sched.c
+++ b/kernel/sched.c
@@ -4645,7 +4645,7 @@ recheck:
}
if (user) {
- retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, policy, param);
+ retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
@@ -4887,7 +4887,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
- retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, 0, NULL);
+ retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
index 244f7cb08d68..37f8adb68c79 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
@@ -87,6 +88,29 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
rcu_read_unlock();
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 len;
+ char *secctx;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+
+ security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *hash = v;
@@ -148,10 +172,8 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
goto release;
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- if (seq_printf(s, "secmark=%u ", ct->secmark))
+ if (ct_show_secctx(s, ct))
goto release;
-#endif
if (seq_printf(s, "use=%u\n", atomic_read(&ct->ct_general.use)))
goto release;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 5bae1cd15eea..146476c6441a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/rculist_nulls.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
@@ -245,16 +246,31 @@ nla_put_failure:
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
static inline int
-ctnetlink_dump_secmark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
- NLA_PUT_BE32(skb, CTA_SECMARK, htonl(ct->secmark));
- return 0;
+ struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
+ int len, ret;
+ char *secctx;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = -1;
+ nest_secctx = nla_nest_start(skb, CTA_SECCTX | NLA_F_NESTED);
+ if (!nest_secctx)
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ NLA_PUT_STRING(skb, CTA_SECCTX_NAME, secctx);
+ nla_nest_end(skb, nest_secctx);
+ ret = 0;
nla_put_failure:
- return -1;
+ security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ return ret;
}
#else
-#define ctnetlink_dump_secmark(a, b) (0)
+#define ctnetlink_dump_secctx(a, b) (0)
#endif
#define master_tuple(ct) &(ct->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple)
@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@ ctnetlink_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid, u32 seq,
ctnetlink_dump_protoinfo(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_mark(skb, ct) < 0 ||
- ctnetlink_dump_secmark(skb, ct) < 0 ||
+ ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_id(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_use(skb, ct) < 0 ||
ctnetlink_dump_master(skb, ct) < 0 ||
@@ -437,6 +453,17 @@ ctnetlink_counters_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ctnetlink_nlmsg_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+
+ return sizeof(char) * len;
+}
+#endif
+
static inline size_t
ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
@@ -453,7 +480,8 @@ ctnetlink_nlmsg_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
+ nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_HELP */
+ nla_total_size(NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN) /* CTA_HELP_NAME */
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- + nla_total_size(sizeof(u_int32_t)) /* CTA_SECMARK */
+ + nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_SECCTX */
+ + nla_total_size(ctnetlink_nlmsg_secctx_size(ct)) /* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED
+ 2 * nla_total_size(0) /* CTA_NAT_SEQ_ADJ_ORIG|REPL */
@@ -556,7 +584,7 @@ ctnetlink_conntrack_event(unsigned int events, struct nf_ct_event *item)
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
if ((events & (1 << IPCT_SECMARK) || ct->secmark)
- && ctnetlink_dump_secmark(skb, ct) < 0)
+ && ctnetlink_dump_secctx(skb, ct) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
#endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index eb973fcd67ab..0fb65705b44b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
@@ -108,6 +109,29 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
rcu_read_unlock();
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
+static int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u32 len;
+ char *secctx;
+
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = seq_printf(s, "secctx=%s ", secctx);
+
+ security_release_secctx(secctx, len);
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline int ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
/* return 0 on success, 1 in case of error */
static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
@@ -168,10 +192,8 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
goto release;
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
- if (seq_printf(s, "secmark=%u ", ct->secmark))
+ if (ct_show_secctx(s, ct))
goto release;
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
if (seq_printf(s, "zone=%u ", nf_ct_zone(ct)))
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c b/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c
index 0cb6053f02fd..782e51986a6f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6/ip6_tables.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
index 23b2d6c486b5..9faf5e050b79 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.h>
@@ -39,9 +39,8 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
switch (mode) {
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
- secmark = info->u.sel.selsid;
+ secmark = info->secid;
break;
-
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -50,33 +49,33 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
return XT_CONTINUE;
}
-static int checkentry_selinux(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
+static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)
{
int err;
- struct xt_secmark_target_selinux_info *sel = &info->u.sel;
- sel->selctx[SECMARK_SELCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+ info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX - 1] = '\0';
+ info->secid = 0;
- err = selinux_string_to_sid(sel->selctx, &sel->selsid);
+ err = security_secctx_to_secid(info->secctx, strlen(info->secctx),
+ &info->secid);
if (err) {
if (err == -EINVAL)
- pr_info("invalid SELinux context \'%s\'\n",
- sel->selctx);
+ pr_info("invalid security context \'%s\'\n", info->secctx);
return err;
}
- if (!sel->selsid) {
- pr_info("unable to map SELinux context \'%s\'\n", sel->selctx);
+ if (!info->secid) {
+ pr_info("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n", info->secctx);
return -ENOENT;
}
- err = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(sel->selsid);
+ err = security_secmark_relabel_packet(info->secid);
if (err) {
pr_info("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n");
return err;
}
- selinux_secmark_refcount_inc();
+ security_secmark_refcount_inc();
return 0;
}
@@ -100,16 +99,16 @@ static int secmark_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)
switch (info->mode) {
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
- err = checkentry_selinux(info);
- if (err <= 0)
- return err;
break;
-
default:
pr_info("invalid mode: %hu\n", info->mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ err = checkentry_lsm(info);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
if (!mode)
mode = info->mode;
return 0;
@@ -119,7 +118,7 @@ static void secmark_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par)
{
switch (mode) {
case SECMARK_MODE_SEL:
- selinux_secmark_refcount_dec();
+ security_secmark_refcount_dec();
}
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 0a0a99f3b083..4d995aeaebc0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@
#
af_names.h
capability_names.h
+rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 7320331b44ab..544ff5837cb6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
* aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
* @op: operation doing the user buffer copy
* @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from (NOT NULL)
- * @alloc_size: size of user buffer
+ * @alloc_size: size of user buffer (REQUIRES: @alloc_size >= @copy_size)
* @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer
* @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL)
*
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(int op, const char __user *userbuf,
{
char *data;
+ BUG_ON(copy_size > alloc_size);
+
if (*pos != 0)
/* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 95a6599a37bb..30ae00fbecd5 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -677,7 +677,18 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
+static int cap_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static void cap_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void cap_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+}
static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
@@ -777,7 +788,8 @@ static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ *secid = 0;
+ return 0;
}
static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
@@ -1018,6 +1030,9 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_relabel_packet);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 9d172e6e330c..5e632b4857e4 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -719,14 +719,11 @@ static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
/**
* cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
* @p: The task to affect
- * @policy: The policy to effect
- * @lp: The parameters to the scheduling policy
*
* Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
-int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
- struct sched_param *lp)
+int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
return cap_safe_nice(p);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c53949f17d9e..b50f472061a4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -89,20 +89,12 @@ __setup("security=", choose_lsm);
* Return true if:
* -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
* -or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
- * choose an alternate LSM at boot time,
- * -or there is no default LSM set and the user didn't specify a
- * specific LSM and we're the first to ask for registration permission,
- * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded.
+ * choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
* Otherwise, return false.
*/
int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
{
- if (!*chosen_lsm)
- strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
- else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
+ return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm);
}
/**
@@ -786,10 +778,9 @@ int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
}
-int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p,
- int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p);
}
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1145,6 +1136,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
}
+int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
+{
+ return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+ security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
+
+void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+ security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
{
return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 58d80f3bd6f6..ad5cd76ec231 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -2,25 +2,20 @@
# Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree.
#
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
-
-selinux-y := avc.o \
- hooks.o \
- selinuxfs.o \
- netlink.o \
- nlmsgtab.o \
- netif.o \
- netnode.o \
- netport.o \
- exports.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
+
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o exports.o \
+ ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
+ ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
+ccflags-y := -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
-$(obj)/avc.o: $(obj)/flask.h
+$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
quiet_cmd_flask = GEN $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
cmd_flask = scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders $(obj)/flask.h $(obj)/av_permissions.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index c0a454aee1e0..90664385dead 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -11,58 +11,9 @@
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/ipc.h>
-#include <asm/atomic.h>
#include "security.h"
-#include "objsec.h"
-
-/* SECMARK reference count */
-extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-
-int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_context_to_sid(str, strlen(str), sid);
- else {
- *sid = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
-
-int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
- u32 tsid;
-
- __tsec = current_security();
- tsid = __tsec->sid;
-
- return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission);
-
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
- atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_inc);
-
-void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
- atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4796ddd4e721..d9154cf90ae1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3354,11 +3354,11 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -4279,6 +4279,27 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
+static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+ u32 tsid;
+
+ __tsec = current_security();
+ tsid = __tsec->sid;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
+{
+ atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
+static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
+{
+ atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
+}
+
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
{
@@ -5533,6 +5554,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
.inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
.inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
+ .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
+ .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
+ .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
.req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
.tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
.tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index b4c9eb4bd6f9..8858d2b2d4b6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
"check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
"compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
- "setcheckreqprot", NULL } },
+ "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", NULL } },
{ "process",
{ "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
"sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 1f7c2491d3dc..671273eb1115 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
#include "flask.h"
#define SECSID_NULL 0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
@@ -82,6 +83,8 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
int security_mls_enabled(void);
int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(void);
int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -191,5 +194,25 @@ static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
+/*
+ * status notifier using mmap interface
+ */
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+
+#define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION 1
+struct selinux_kernel_status {
+ u32 version; /* version number of thie structure */
+ u32 sequence; /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
+ u32 enforcing; /* current setting of enforcing mode */
+ u32 policyload; /* times of policy reloaded */
+ u32 deny_unknown; /* current setting of deny_unknown */
+ /*
+ * The version > 0 supports above members.
+ */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 79a1bb635662..87e0556bae70 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ static int *bool_pending_values;
static struct dentry *class_dir;
static unsigned long last_class_ino;
+static char policy_opened;
+
/* global data for policy capabilities */
static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
@@ -110,6 +112,8 @@ enum sel_inos {
SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
+ SEL_STATUS, /* export current status using mmap() */
+ SEL_POLICY, /* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
};
@@ -171,6 +175,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (selinux_enforcing)
avc_ss_reset(0);
selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+ selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
}
length = count;
out:
@@ -205,6 +210,59 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+
+ if (!status)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ filp->private_data = status;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_status(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos,
+ page_address(status),
+ sizeof(struct selinux_kernel_status));
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct page *status = filp->private_data;
+ unsigned long size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
+ BUG_ON(!status);
+
+ /* only allows one page from the head */
+ if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+ /* disallow writable mapping */
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+ return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
+ page_to_pfn(status),
+ size, vma->vm_page_prot);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_status_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_handle_status,
+ .read = sel_read_handle_status,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_handle_status,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -296,6 +354,141 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
+struct policy_load_memory {
+ size_t len;
+ void *data;
+};
+
+static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -EBUSY;
+ if (policy_opened)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ plm = kzalloc(sizeof(*plm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plm)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+ mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+ }
+
+ rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ policy_opened = 1;
+
+ filp->private_data = plm;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ if (plm)
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+
+ BUG_ON(!plm);
+
+ policy_opened = 0;
+
+ vfree(plm->data);
+ kfree(plm);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+
+ ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__READ_POLICY);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ struct policy_load_memory *plm = vma->vm_file->private_data;
+ unsigned long offset;
+ struct page *page;
+
+ if (vmf->flags & (FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE | FAULT_FLAG_WRITE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ offset = vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (offset >= roundup(plm->len, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ page = vmalloc_to_page(plm->data + offset);
+ get_page(page);
+
+ vmf->page = page;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct vm_operations_struct sel_mmap_policy_ops = {
+ .fault = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+ .page_mkwrite = sel_mmap_policy_fault,
+};
+
+int sel_mmap_policy(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
+ /* do not allow mprotect to make mapping writable */
+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_RESERVED;
+ vma->vm_ops = &sel_mmap_policy_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
+ .open = sel_open_policy,
+ .read = sel_read_policy,
+ .mmap = sel_mmap_policy,
+ .release = sel_release_policy,
+};
+
static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -1612,6 +1805,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR},
/* last one */ {""}
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index 15d4e62917de..000000000000
--- a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Makefile for building the SELinux security server as part of the kernel tree.
-#
-
-EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
-obj-y := ss.o
-
-ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 929480c6c430..a3dd9faa19c0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
if (shift > 2)
shift = shift - 2;
nslot = 1 << shift;
- if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_SIZE)
- nslot = MAX_AVTAB_SIZE;
+ if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+ nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
mask = nslot - 1;
h->htable = kcalloc(nslot, sizeof(*(h->htable)), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -501,6 +501,48 @@ bad:
goto out;
}
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+{
+ __le16 buf16[4];
+ __le32 buf32[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+ buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+ buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+ buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+ rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+ for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
void avtab_cache_init(void)
{
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index cd4f734e2749..dff0c75345c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -71,6 +71,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
void *p);
int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key,
struct avtab_datum *datum);
@@ -85,7 +87,6 @@ void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
-#define MAX_AVTAB_SIZE MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index c91e150c3087..655fe1c6cc69 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -490,6 +490,129 @@ err:
return rc;
}
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
+ struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ struct cond_av_list *cur_list;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next)
+ len++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur_list->node, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+ struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ struct cond_expr *cur_expr;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ int rc;
+ u32 len = 0;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next)
+ len++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->bool);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->true_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->false_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
+{
+ struct cond_node *cur;
+ u32 len;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = cond_write_node(p, cur, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
*/
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index 53ddb013ae57..3f209c635295 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 04b6145d767f..d42951fcbe87 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "policydb.h"
+#define BITS_PER_U64 (sizeof(u64) * 8)
+
int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
@@ -363,10 +365,10 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- if (mapunit != sizeof(u64) * 8) {
+ if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
"match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n",
- mapunit, sizeof(u64) * 8, e->highbit);
+ mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
goto bad;
}
@@ -446,3 +448,78 @@ bad:
ebitmap_destroy(e);
goto out;
}
+
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+ u32 count;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u64 map;
+ int bit, last_bit, last_startbit, rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+ count = 0;
+ last_bit = 0;
+ last_startbit = -1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ count++;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = INT_MIN;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* this is the very first bit */
+ if (!map) {
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* set up for the next node */
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ }
+ /* write the last node */
+ if (map) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index f283b4367f54..1f4e93c2ae86 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 3a29704be8ce..94f630d93a5c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "policydb.h"
#include "conditional.h"
#include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
#define _DEBUG_HASHES
@@ -185,9 +186,19 @@ static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
- return (key1->source_type != key2->source_type ||
- key1->target_type != key2->target_type ||
- key1->target_class != key2->target_class);
+ int v;
+
+ v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
+
+ return v;
}
/*
@@ -1624,11 +1635,11 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
{
- struct type_datum *upper, *type;
+ struct type_datum *upper;
struct policydb *p = datap;
int depth = 0;
- upper = type = datum;
+ upper = datum;
while (upper->bounds) {
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
@@ -2306,3 +2317,843 @@ bad:
policydb_destroy(p);
goto out;
}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items;
+ int rc, eq;
+
+ eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+ if (eq)
+ items = 2;
+ else
+ items = 3;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+ if (!eq)
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (!eq) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_trans *tr;
+ u32 buf[3];
+ size_t nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ nel = 0;
+ for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (tr = r; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(tr->type);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(tr->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ u32 buf[2];
+ size_t nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ nel = 0;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table->nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ __le32 buf[6];
+ u32 ncons;
+ size_t len, len2;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ if (cladatum->comkey)
+ len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+ else
+ len2 = 0;
+
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+ if (cladatum->permissions.table)
+ buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table->nel);
+ else
+ buf[4] = 0;
+ buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (cladatum->comkey) {
+ rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* write out the validatetrans rule */
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct role_datum *role = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf)/sizeof(buf[0])));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+ size_t items, len;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+ u32 properties = 0;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+ if (typdatum->attribute)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+ } else {
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+ BUG_ON(items > (sizeof(buf) / sizeof(buf[0])));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum,
+ void *datap) =
+{
+ common_write,
+ class_write,
+ role_write,
+ type_write,
+ user_write,
+ cond_write_bool,
+ sens_write,
+ cat_write,
+};
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j, rc;
+ size_t nel, len;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+ nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6:
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ size_t len;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = 0;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_count(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ int *cnt = ptr;
+ *cnt = *cnt + 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ struct range_trans *rt = key;
+ struct mls_range *r = data;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ size_t nel;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.p = p;
+ pd.fp = fp;
+
+ /* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
+ nel = 0;
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_count, &nel);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* actually write all of the entries */
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i, num_syms;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 config;
+ size_t len;
+ struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+ /*
+ * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+ * to simplify the writer. There are other tests dropped
+ * since we assume this throughout the writer code. Be
+ * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+ */
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+ " Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ config = 0;
+ if (p->mls_enabled)
+ config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+ "version %d", p->policyvers);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ num_syms = info->sym_num;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.fp = fp;
+ pd.p = p;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table->nel);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = cond_write_list(p, p->cond_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_trans_write(p->role_tr, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = range_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+ BUG_ON(!e);
+ rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 310e94442cb8..95d3d7de361e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@ struct policydb {
struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+ /* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+ size_t len;
+
unsigned int policyvers;
unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
@@ -270,6 +273,7 @@ extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
@@ -290,6 +294,11 @@ struct policy_file {
size_t len;
};
+struct policy_data {
+ struct policydb *p;
+ void *fp;
+};
+
static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
{
if (bytes > fp->len)
@@ -301,6 +310,17 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
return 0;
}
+static inline int put_entry(void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ size_t len = bytes * num;
+
+ memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+ fp->data += len;
+ fp->len -= len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9ea2feca3cd4..223c1ff6ef23 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include "flask.h"
@@ -991,7 +992,8 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
{
char *scontextp;
- *scontext = NULL;
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
*scontext_len = 0;
if (context->len) {
@@ -1008,6 +1010,9 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+
/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp)
@@ -1047,7 +1052,8 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
struct context *context;
int rc = 0;
- *scontext = NULL;
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
*scontext_len = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
@@ -1055,6 +1061,8 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
char *scontextp;
*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+ if (!scontext)
+ goto out;
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1769,6 +1777,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
return rc;
}
+ policydb.len = len;
rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
&current_mapping,
&current_mapping_size);
@@ -1791,6 +1800,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
selinux_complete_init();
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
return 0;
@@ -1804,6 +1814,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc)
return rc;
+ newpolicydb.len = len;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
@@ -1870,6 +1881,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
@@ -1883,6 +1895,17 @@ err:
}
+size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ len = policydb.len;
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
/**
* security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
* @protocol: protocol number
@@ -2374,6 +2397,7 @@ out:
if (!rc) {
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
}
return rc;
@@ -3129,3 +3153,38 @@ netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_file fp;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = security_policydb_len();
+
+ *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fp.data = *data;
+ fp.len = *len;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
+ return 0;
+
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d982365f9d1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+static struct page *selinux_status_page;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+ struct page *result = NULL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+ if (!selinux_status_page) {
+ selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+
+ if (selinux_status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+ status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+ status->sequence = 0;
+ status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+ /*
+ * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+ * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+ * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+ * So, application can know it was updated.
+ */
+ status->policyload = 0;
+ status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+ }
+ }
+ result = selinux_status_page;
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+ if (selinux_status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+ status->sequence++;
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ status->enforcing = enforcing;
+
+ smp_wmb();
+ status->sequence++;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+{
+ struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
+
+ mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+ if (selinux_status_page) {
+ status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+ status->sequence++;
+ smp_wmb();
+
+ status->policyload = seqno;
+ status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+ smp_wmb();
+ status->sequence++;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c448d57ae2b7..bc39f4067af6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1281,12 +1281,11 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
*
* Return 0 if read access is permitted
*/
-static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
- struct sched_param *lp)
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
if (rc == 0)
rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
@@ -3005,7 +3004,8 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- *secdata = sp;
+ if (secdata)
+ *secdata = sp;
*seclen = strlen(sp);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index c668b447c725..7556315c1978 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -768,8 +768,10 @@ static bool tomoyo_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */
memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r));
head->r.print_this_domain_only = true;
- head->r.eof = !domain;
- head->r.domain = &domain->list;
+ if (domain)
+ head->r.domain = &domain->list;
+ else
+ head->r.eof = 1;
tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
if (domain && domain->is_deleted)
tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
@@ -2051,13 +2053,22 @@ void tomoyo_check_profile(void)
const u8 profile = domain->profile;
if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile])
continue;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "You need to define profile %u before using it.\n",
+ profile);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ "
+ "for more information.\n");
panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
profile, domain->domainname->name);
}
tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
- if (tomoyo_profile_version != 20090903)
+ if (tomoyo_profile_version != 20090903) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "You need to install userland programs for "
+ "TOMOYO 2.3 and initialize policy configuration.\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ "
+ "for more information.\n");
panic("Profile version %u is not supported.\n",
tomoyo_profile_version);
+ }
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.3.0\n");
printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
}