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authorPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2022-10-10 12:31:21 -0400
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2022-11-04 23:25:30 -0400
commitb10b9c342f7571f287fd422be5d5c0beb26ba974 (patch)
treee2afb492a670ba89d761a4f94d875cf0a171b17e
parent610b17b05c5c682fbb8fefedae1aacaab412eac3 (diff)
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook. There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h4
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h11
-rw-r--r--net/core/sock.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c29
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c13
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c19
8 files changed, 44 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ec119da1d89b..6abde829b6e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_setsockopt, struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_shutdown, struct socket *sock, int how)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_sock_rcv_skb, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getpeersec_stream, struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+ sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_getpeersec_dgram, struct socket *sock,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, sk_alloc_security, struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 9a7e69aff3d1..2831efebde69 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -949,8 +949,8 @@
* SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
* socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
* @sock is the local socket.
- * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
- * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
+ * @optval memory where the security state is to be copied.
+ * @optlen memory where the module should copy the actual length
* of the security state.
* @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
* by the caller.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ca1b7109c0db..0e419c595cee 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sockptr.h>
struct linux_binprm;
struct cred;
@@ -1411,8 +1412,8 @@ int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
+ sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len);
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk);
@@ -1548,8 +1549,10 @@ static inline int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ sockptr_t optval,
+ sockptr_t optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index a3ba0358c77c..c9c6af85d9c0 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -1793,7 +1793,8 @@ int sk_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
break;
case SO_PEERSEC:
- return security_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval.user, optlen.user, len);
+ return security_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock,
+ optval, optlen, len);
case SO_MARK:
v.val = sk->sk_mark;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f56070270c69..89e84ef54e8e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1103,11 +1103,10 @@ static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen,
+ sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
unsigned int len)
{
- char *name;
+ char *name = NULL;
int slen, error = 0;
struct aa_label *label;
struct aa_label *peer;
@@ -1124,23 +1123,21 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
if (slen < 0) {
error = -ENOMEM;
- } else {
- if (slen > len) {
- error = -ERANGE;
- } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
- error = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- if (put_user(slen, optlen))
- error = -EFAULT;
-out:
- kfree(name);
-
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (slen > len) {
+ error = -ERANGE;
+ goto done_len;
}
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, name, slen))
+ error = -EFAULT;
+done_len:
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
+ error = -EFAULT;
done:
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
+ kfree(name);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 79d82cb6e469..f27c885ee98d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2267,11 +2267,11 @@ int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
-int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval,
+ sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len)
{
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
- optval, optlen, len);
+ optval, optlen, len);
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f553c370397e..0bdddeba90a6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5119,11 +5119,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int err = 0;
- char *scontext;
+ char *scontext = NULL;
u32 scontext_len;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -5139,17 +5140,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
&scontext_len);
if (err)
return err;
-
if (scontext_len > len) {
err = -ERANGE;
goto out_len;
}
- if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
err = -EFAULT;
-
out_len:
- if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
err = -EFAULT;
kfree(scontext);
return err;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b6306d71c908..2bd7fadf7fb4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4006,12 +4006,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
* returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
*/
static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+ sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
+ unsigned int len)
{
struct socket_smack *ssp;
char *rcp = "";
- int slen = 1;
+ u32 slen = 1;
int rc = 0;
ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
@@ -4019,15 +4019,16 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
}
-
- if (slen > len)
+ if (slen > len) {
rc = -ERANGE;
- else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
- rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_len;
+ }
- if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, rcp, slen))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+out_len:
+ if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
rc = -EFAULT;
-
return rc;
}