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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-11-02 10:04:26 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-11-02 10:04:26 -0700
commitd81f50bd34646d8373b989e55180c0fc9af94e0b (patch)
treea72b051a41717a7b8bacd7cf61965ff0e0dfa4ed
parentc2aa1a444cab2c673650ada80a7dffc4345ce2e6 (diff)
parent566f52ece7bd1099d20dfe2f6f0801896643cf8f (diff)
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen: "Features/Improvements: - replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep - add base support for secmark labeling and matching Cleanups: - clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space - remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack - fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy - fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm Bug fixes: - add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering - fix an error code in __aa_create_ns() - don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks - fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat - check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask - fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query - fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policy apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check apparmor: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy apparmor: Parse secmark policy apparmor: Add a wildcard secid apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptrace access check apparmor: Fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/cred.h2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/net.h10
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/secid.h3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lib.c6
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c130
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/net.c83
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c61
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/secid.c3
12 files changed, 291 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index e09fe4d7307c..8963203319ea 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
if (error)
return error;
- parent = aa_get_ns(dir->i_private);
+ parent = aa_get_ns(dir->i_private);
/* rmdir calls the generic securityfs functions to remove files
* from the apparmor dir. It is up to the apparmor ns locking
* to avoid races.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 4285943f7260..d0afed9ebd0e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ static void update_file_ctx(struct aa_file_ctx *fctx, struct aa_label *label,
/* update caching of label on file_ctx */
spin_lock(&fctx->lock);
old = rcu_dereference_protected(fctx->label,
- spin_is_locked(&fctx->lock));
+ lockdep_is_held(&fctx->lock));
l = aa_label_merge(old, label, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (l) {
if (l != old) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
index e287b7d0d4be..265ae6641a06 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
{
struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+ might_sleep();
+
if (label_is_stale(label)) {
label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index ec7228e857a9..7334ac966d01 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
__e; \
})
+struct aa_secmark {
+ u8 audit;
+ u8 deny;
+ u32 secid;
+ char *label;
+};
+
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
@@ -103,4 +110,7 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock);
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+ u32 secid, struct sock *sk);
+
#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index ab64c6b5db5a..8e6707c837be 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+ int secmark_count;
+ struct aa_secmark *secmark;
+
struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
unsigned char *hash;
char *dirname;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index dee6fa3b6081..fa2062711b63 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ struct aa_label;
/* secid value that will not be allocated */
#define AA_SECID_INVALID 0
+/* secid value that matches any other secid */
+#define AA_SECID_WILDCARD 1
+
struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 974affe50531..76491e7f4177 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -90,10 +90,12 @@ const char *aa_splitn_fqname(const char *fqname, size_t n, const char **ns_name,
const char *end = fqname + n;
const char *name = skipn_spaces(fqname, n);
- if (!name)
- return NULL;
*ns_name = NULL;
*ns_len = 0;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return NULL;
+
if (name[0] == ':') {
char *split = strnchr(&name[1], end - &name[1], ':');
*ns_name = skipn_spaces(&name[1], end - &name[1]);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index aa35939443c4..42446a216f3b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -114,13 +116,13 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
int error;
- tracer = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ tracer = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
(mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ
: AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
aa_put_label(tracee);
- end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
return error;
}
@@ -130,11 +132,11 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
int error;
- tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+ tracee = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
aa_put_label(tracer);
- end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
+ __end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
return error;
}
@@ -1020,6 +1022,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
/**
* apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
*
@@ -1030,8 +1033,15 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return 0;
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return 0;
+
+ return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE,
+ skb->secmark, sk);
}
+#endif
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
@@ -1126,6 +1136,20 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return 0;
+
+ return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT,
+ skb->secmark, sk);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1177,12 +1201,17 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
+#endif
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
@@ -1538,6 +1567,97 @@ static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) && defined(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
+ struct sock *sk;
+
+ if (!skb->secmark)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+ if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
+ skb->secmark, sk))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+
+}
+
+static unsigned int apparmor_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
+}
+
+static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ return apparmor_ip_postroute(priv, skb, state);
+}
+
+static const struct nf_hook_ops apparmor_nf_ops[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = apparmor_ipv4_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ {
+ .hook = apparmor_ipv6_postroute,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#endif
+};
+
+static int __net_init apparmor_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit apparmor_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+ nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, apparmor_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations apparmor_net_ops = {
+ .init = apparmor_nf_register,
+ .exit = apparmor_nf_unregister,
+};
+
+static int __init apparmor_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&apparmor_net_ops);
+ if (err)
+ panic("Apparmor: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+__initcall(apparmor_nf_ip_init);
+#endif
+
static int __init apparmor_init(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index bb24cfa0a164..c07fde444792 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/secid.h"
#include "net_names.h"
@@ -146,17 +147,20 @@ int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+ int error = 0;
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sk);
- if (unconfined(label))
- return 0;
+ if (!unconfined(label)) {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
- return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
- aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+ error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
+ }
+
+ return error;
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
@@ -185,3 +189,70 @@ int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
+{
+ struct aa_label *label;
+
+ if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
+ secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
+ secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(label))
+ return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+ secmark->secid = label->secid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+ if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
+ if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
+ ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
+ profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
+ if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
+ perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+ else
+ perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+
+ if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
+ perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
+ u32 secid, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
+ &sa, sk));
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 1590e2de4e84..df9c5890a878 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -231,6 +231,9 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
kzfree(profile->xattrs[i]);
kzfree(profile->xattrs);
+ for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++)
+ kzfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
+ kzfree(profile->secmark);
kzfree(profile->dirname);
aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 21cb384d712a..379682e2a8d5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -292,6 +292,19 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_u8(struct aa_ext *e, u8 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U8, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u8)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = get_unaligned((u8 *)e->pos);
+ e->pos += sizeof(u8);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -529,6 +542,49 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ void *pos = e->pos;
+ int i, size;
+
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "secmark")) {
+ size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+
+ profile->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!profile->secmark)
+ goto fail;
+
+ profile->secmark_count = size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].audit, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].deny, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->secmark[i].label, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+fail:
+ if (profile->secmark) {
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ kfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
+ kfree(profile->secmark);
+ profile->secmark_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ e->pos = pos;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
{
void *pos = e->pos;
@@ -727,6 +783,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
goto fail;
}
+ if (!unpack_secmark(e, profile)) {
+ info = "failed to unpack profile secmark rules";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
info = "failed to unpack policydb";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 4ccec1bcf6f5..05373d9a3d6a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@
* secids - do not pin labels with a refcount. They rely on the label
* properly updating/freeing them
*/
-
-#define AA_FIRST_SECID 1
+#define AA_FIRST_SECID 2
static DEFINE_IDR(aa_secids);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(secid_lock);