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authorPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>2019-10-23 12:23:33 +0200
committerThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2019-10-28 08:36:59 +0100
commite1d38b63acd843cfdd4222bf19a26700fd5c699e (patch)
tree628b58426dbd6b25dc4200409ac19a3e079ba4e8
parent6608b45ac5ecb56f9e171252229c39580cc85f0f (diff)
kvm/x86: Export MDS_NO=0 to guests when TSX is enabled
Export the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0 to guests on TSX Async Abort(TAA) affected hosts that have TSX enabled and updated microcode. This is required so that the guests don't complain, "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode" when the host has the updated microcode to clear CPU buffers. Microcode update also adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. Guests can't do this check themselves when the ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL bit is not exported to the guests. In this case export MDS_NO=0 to the guests. When guests have CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1, they deploy MDS mitigation which also mitigates TAA. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c19
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ff395f812719..32d70ca2a7fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1298,6 +1298,25 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+ /*
+ * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+ * - TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+ * - Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+ * the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+ * that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+ * mitigation and don't complain:
+ *
+ * "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+ *
+ * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+ * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
return data;
}