Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm

Pull ARM udpates from Russell King:

 - Improve Kconfig help text for Cortex A8 and Cortex A9 errata

 - Kconfig spelling and grammar fixes

 - Allow kernel-mode VFP/Neon in softirq context

 - Use Neon in softirq context

 - Implement AES-CTR/GHASH version of GCM

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
  ARM: 9289/1: Allow pre-ARMv5 builds with ld.lld 16.0.0 and newer
  ARM: 9288/1: Kconfigs: fix spelling & grammar
  ARM: 9286/1: crypto: Implement fused AES-CTR/GHASH version of GCM
  ARM: 9285/1: remove meaningless arch/arm/mach-rda/Makefile
  ARM: 9283/1: permit non-nested kernel mode NEON in softirq context
  ARM: 9282/1: vfp: Manipulate task VFP state with softirqs disabled
  ARM: 9281/1: improve Cortex A8/A9 errata help text

14 files changed, 855 insertions, 48 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 9f85cc34be7d..e24a9820e12f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -344,14 +344,16 @@ comment "CPU Core family selection"
 config ARCH_MULTI_V4
 	bool "ARMv4 based platforms (FA526, StrongARM)"
 	depends on !ARCH_MULTI_V6_V7
-	depends on !LD_IS_LLD
+	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/50764
+	depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 160000
 	select ARCH_MULTI_V4_V5
 	select CPU_FA526 if !(CPU_SA110 || CPU_SA1100)
 
 config ARCH_MULTI_V4T
 	bool "ARMv4T based platforms (ARM720T, ARM920T, ...)"
 	depends on !ARCH_MULTI_V6_V7
-	depends on !LD_IS_LLD
+	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/50764
+	depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 160000
 	select ARCH_MULTI_V4_V5
 	select CPU_ARM920T if !(CPU_ARM7TDMI || CPU_ARM720T || \
 		CPU_ARM740T || CPU_ARM9TDMI || CPU_ARM922T || \
@@ -656,7 +658,9 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_458693
 	  hazard might then cause a processor deadlock. The workaround enables
 	  the L1 caching of the NEON accesses and disables the PLD instruction
 	  in the ACTLR register. Note that setting specific bits in the ACTLR
-	  register may not be available in non-secure mode.
+	  register may not be available in non-secure mode and thus is not
+	  available on a multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by the
+	  bootloader instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_460075
 	bool "ARM errata: Data written to the L2 cache can be overwritten with stale data"
@@ -669,7 +673,9 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_460075
 	  and overwritten with stale memory contents from external memory. The
 	  workaround disables the write-allocate mode for the L2 cache via the
 	  ACTLR register. Note that setting specific bits in the ACTLR register
-	  may not be available in non-secure mode.
+	  may not be available in non-secure mode and thus is not available on
+	  a multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by the bootloader
+	  instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_742230
 	bool "ARM errata: DMB operation may be faulty"
@@ -682,7 +688,10 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_742230
 	  ordering of the two writes. This workaround sets a specific bit in
 	  the diagnostic register of the Cortex-A9 which causes the DMB
 	  instruction to behave as a DSB, ensuring the correct behaviour of
-	  the two writes.
+	  the two writes. Note that setting specific bits in the diagnostics
+	  register may not be available in non-secure mode and thus is not
+	  available on a multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by the
+	  bootloader instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_742231
 	bool "ARM errata: Incorrect hazard handling in the SCU may lead to data corruption"
@@ -697,7 +706,10 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_742231
 	  replaced from one of the CPUs at the same time as another CPU is
 	  accessing it. This workaround sets specific bits in the diagnostic
 	  register of the Cortex-A9 which reduces the linefill issuing
-	  capabilities of the processor.
+	  capabilities of the processor. Note that setting specific bits in the
+	  diagnostics register may not be available in non-secure mode and thus
+	  is not available on a multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by
+	  the bootloader instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_643719
 	bool "ARM errata: LoUIS bit field in CLIDR register is incorrect"
@@ -734,7 +746,9 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_743622
 	  register of the Cortex-A9 which disables the Store Buffer
 	  optimisation, preventing the defect from occurring. This has no
 	  visible impact on the overall performance or power consumption of the
-	  processor.
+	  processor. Note that setting specific bits in the diagnostics register
+	  may not be available in non-secure mode and thus is not available on a
+	  multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by the bootloader instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_751472
 	bool "ARM errata: Interrupted ICIALLUIS may prevent completion of broadcasted operation"
@@ -746,6 +760,10 @@ config ARM_ERRATA_751472
 	  completion of a following broadcasted operation if the second
 	  operation is received by a CPU before the ICIALLUIS has completed,
 	  potentially leading to corrupted entries in the cache or TLB.
+	  Note that setting specific bits in the diagnostics register may
+	  not be available in non-secure mode and thus is not available on
+	  a multiplatform kernel. This should be applied by the bootloader
+	  instead.
 
 config ARM_ERRATA_754322
 	bool "ARM errata: possible faulty MMU translations following an ASID switch"
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
index 86f423143185..b407b7b9b715 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1206,8 +1206,8 @@ choice
 		depends on MACH_STM32MP157
 		select DEBUG_STM32_UART
 		help
-		  Say Y here if you want kernel low-level debugging support
-		  on STM32MP1 based platforms, wich default UART is wired on
+		  Say Y here if you want kernel low-level debugging support on
+		  STM32MP1-based platforms, where the default UART is wired to
 		  UART4, but another UART instance can be selected by modifying
 		  CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PHYS and CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_VIRT.
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index 265c2c89e73a..485a439e22ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -209,7 +209,6 @@ machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_OMAP2PLUS)	+= omap2
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ORION5X)		+= orion5x
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_PXA)		+= pxa
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_QCOM)		+= qcom
-machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RDA)		+= rda
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_REALTEK)		+= realtek
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_ROCKCHIP)		+= rockchip
 machine-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RPC)		+= rpc
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
index 7b2b7d043d9b..847b7a003356 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ config CRYPTO_CURVE25519_NEON
 config CRYPTO_GHASH_ARM_CE
 	tristate "Hash functions: GHASH (PMULL/NEON/ARMv8 Crypto Extensions)"
 	depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
+	select CRYPTO_AEAD
 	select CRYPTO_HASH
 	select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_GF128MUL
 	help
 	  GCM GHASH function (NIST SP800-38D)
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S
index 9f51e3fa4526..858c0d66798b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-core.S
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
 /*
  * Accelerated GHASH implementation with NEON/ARMv8 vmull.p8/64 instructions.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Linaro Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2017 Linaro Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC. <ardb@google.com>
  */
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@
 	t2q		.req	q7
 	t3q		.req	q8
 	t4q		.req	q9
-	T2		.req	q9
+	XH2		.req	q9
 
 	s1l		.req	d20
 	s1h		.req	d21
@@ -80,7 +81,7 @@
 
 	XL2		.req	q5
 	XM2		.req	q6
-	XH2		.req	q7
+	T2		.req	q7
 	T3		.req	q8
 
 	XL2_L		.req	d10
@@ -192,9 +193,10 @@
 	vshr.u64	XL, XL, #1
 	.endm
 
-	.macro		ghash_update, pn
+	.macro		ghash_update, pn, enc, aggregate=1, head=1
 	vld1.64		{XL}, [r1]
 
+	.if		\head
 	/* do the head block first, if supplied */
 	ldr		ip, [sp]
 	teq		ip, #0
@@ -202,13 +204,32 @@
 	vld1.64		{T1}, [ip]
 	teq		r0, #0
 	b		3f
+	.endif
 
 0:	.ifc		\pn, p64
+	.if		\aggregate
 	tst		r0, #3			// skip until #blocks is a
 	bne		2f			// round multiple of 4
 
 	vld1.8		{XL2-XM2}, [r2]!
-1:	vld1.8		{T3-T2}, [r2]!
+1:	vld1.8		{T2-T3}, [r2]!
+
+	.ifnb		\enc
+	\enc\()_4x	XL2, XM2, T2, T3
+
+	add		ip, r3, #16
+	vld1.64		{HH}, [ip, :128]!
+	vld1.64		{HH3-HH4}, [ip, :128]
+
+	veor		SHASH2_p64, SHASH_L, SHASH_H
+	veor		SHASH2_H, HH_L, HH_H
+	veor		HH34_L, HH3_L, HH3_H
+	veor		HH34_H, HH4_L, HH4_H
+
+	vmov.i8		MASK, #0xe1
+	vshl.u64	MASK, MASK, #57
+	.endif
+
 	vrev64.8	XL2, XL2
 	vrev64.8	XM2, XM2
 
@@ -218,8 +239,8 @@
 	veor		XL2_H, XL2_H, XL_L
 	veor		XL, XL, T1
 
-	vrev64.8	T3, T3
-	vrev64.8	T1, T2
+	vrev64.8	T1, T3
+	vrev64.8	T3, T2
 
 	vmull.p64	XH, HH4_H, XL_H			// a1 * b1
 	veor		XL2_H, XL2_H, XL_H
@@ -267,14 +288,22 @@
 
 	b		1b
 	.endif
+	.endif
+
+2:	vld1.8		{T1}, [r2]!
+
+	.ifnb		\enc
+	\enc\()_1x	T1
+	veor		SHASH2_p64, SHASH_L, SHASH_H
+	vmov.i8		MASK, #0xe1
+	vshl.u64	MASK, MASK, #57
+	.endif
 
-2:	vld1.64		{T1}, [r2]!
 	subs		r0, r0, #1
 
 3:	/* multiply XL by SHASH in GF(2^128) */
-#ifndef CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
 	vrev64.8	T1, T1
-#endif
+
 	vext.8		IN1, T1, T1, #8
 	veor		T1_L, T1_L, XL_H
 	veor		XL, XL, IN1
@@ -293,9 +322,6 @@
 	veor		XL, XL, T1
 
 	bne		0b
-
-	vst1.64		{XL}, [r1]
-	bx		lr
 	.endm
 
 	/*
@@ -316,6 +342,9 @@ ENTRY(pmull_ghash_update_p64)
 	vshl.u64	MASK, MASK, #57
 
 	ghash_update	p64
+	vst1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+
+	bx		lr
 ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update_p64)
 
 ENTRY(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
@@ -336,4 +365,331 @@ ENTRY(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
 	vmov.i64	k48, #0xffffffffffff
 
 	ghash_update	p8
+	vst1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+
+	bx		lr
 ENDPROC(pmull_ghash_update_p8)
+
+	e0		.req	q9
+	e1		.req	q10
+	e2		.req	q11
+	e3		.req	q12
+	e0l		.req	d18
+	e0h		.req	d19
+	e2l		.req	d22
+	e2h		.req	d23
+	e3l		.req	d24
+	e3h		.req	d25
+	ctr		.req	q13
+	ctr0		.req	d26
+	ctr1		.req	d27
+
+	ek0		.req	q14
+	ek1		.req	q15
+
+	.macro		round, rk:req, regs:vararg
+	.irp		r, \regs
+	aese.8		\r, \rk
+	aesmc.8		\r, \r
+	.endr
+	.endm
+
+	.macro		aes_encrypt, rkp, rounds, regs:vararg
+	vld1.8		{ek0-ek1}, [\rkp, :128]!
+	cmp		\rounds, #12
+	blt		.L\@			// AES-128
+
+	round		ek0, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek0}, [\rkp, :128]!
+	round		ek1, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek1}, [\rkp, :128]!
+
+	beq		.L\@			// AES-192
+
+	round		ek0, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek0}, [\rkp, :128]!
+	round		ek1, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek1}, [\rkp, :128]!
+
+.L\@:	.rept		4
+	round		ek0, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek0}, [\rkp, :128]!
+	round		ek1, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek1}, [\rkp, :128]!
+	.endr
+
+	round		ek0, \regs
+	vld1.8		{ek0}, [\rkp, :128]
+
+	.irp		r, \regs
+	aese.8		\r, ek1
+	.endr
+	.irp		r, \regs
+	veor		\r, \r, ek0
+	.endr
+	.endm
+
+pmull_aes_encrypt:
+	add		ip, r5, #4
+	vld1.8		{ctr0}, [r5]		// load 12 byte IV
+	vld1.8		{ctr1}, [ip]
+	rev		r8, r7
+	vext.8		ctr1, ctr1, ctr1, #4
+	add		r7, r7, #1
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], r8
+	vmov		e0, ctr
+
+	add		ip, r3, #64
+	aes_encrypt	ip, r6, e0
+	bx		lr
+ENDPROC(pmull_aes_encrypt)
+
+pmull_aes_encrypt_4x:
+	add		ip, r5, #4
+	vld1.8		{ctr0}, [r5]
+	vld1.8		{ctr1}, [ip]
+	rev		r8, r7
+	vext.8		ctr1, ctr1, ctr1, #4
+	add		r7, r7, #1
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], r8
+	rev		ip, r7
+	vmov		e0, ctr
+	add		r7, r7, #1
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], ip
+	rev		r8, r7
+	vmov		e1, ctr
+	add		r7, r7, #1
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], r8
+	rev		ip, r7
+	vmov		e2, ctr
+	add		r7, r7, #1
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], ip
+	vmov		e3, ctr
+
+	add		ip, r3, #64
+	aes_encrypt	ip, r6, e0, e1, e2, e3
+	bx		lr
+ENDPROC(pmull_aes_encrypt_4x)
+
+pmull_aes_encrypt_final:
+	add		ip, r5, #4
+	vld1.8		{ctr0}, [r5]
+	vld1.8		{ctr1}, [ip]
+	rev		r8, r7
+	vext.8		ctr1, ctr1, ctr1, #4
+	mov		r7, #1 << 24		// BE #1 for the tag
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], r8
+	vmov		e0, ctr
+	vmov.32		ctr1[1], r7
+	vmov		e1, ctr
+
+	add		ip, r3, #64
+	aes_encrypt	ip, r6, e0, e1
+	bx		lr
+ENDPROC(pmull_aes_encrypt_final)
+
+	.macro		enc_1x, in0
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt
+	veor		\in0, \in0, e0
+	vst1.8		{\in0}, [r4]!
+	.endm
+
+	.macro		dec_1x, in0
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt
+	veor		e0, e0, \in0
+	vst1.8		{e0}, [r4]!
+	.endm
+
+	.macro		enc_4x, in0, in1, in2, in3
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt_4x
+
+	veor		\in0, \in0, e0
+	veor		\in1, \in1, e1
+	veor		\in2, \in2, e2
+	veor		\in3, \in3, e3
+
+	vst1.8		{\in0-\in1}, [r4]!
+	vst1.8		{\in2-\in3}, [r4]!
+	.endm
+
+	.macro		dec_4x, in0, in1, in2, in3
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt_4x
+
+	veor		e0, e0, \in0
+	veor		e1, e1, \in1
+	veor		e2, e2, \in2
+	veor		e3, e3, \in3
+
+	vst1.8		{e0-e1}, [r4]!
+	vst1.8		{e2-e3}, [r4]!
+	.endm
+
+	/*
+	 * void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], const char *src,
+	 *			  struct gcm_key const *k, char *dst,
+	 *			  char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter)
+	 */
+ENTRY(pmull_gcm_encrypt)
+	push		{r4-r8, lr}
+	ldrd		r4, r5, [sp, #24]
+	ldrd		r6, r7, [sp, #32]
+
+	vld1.64		{SHASH}, [r3]
+
+	ghash_update	p64, enc, head=0
+	vst1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+
+	pop		{r4-r8, pc}
+ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_encrypt)
+
+	/*
+	 * void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], const char *src,
+	 *			  struct gcm_key const *k, char *dst,
+	 *			  char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter)
+	 */
+ENTRY(pmull_gcm_decrypt)
+	push		{r4-r8, lr}
+	ldrd		r4, r5, [sp, #24]
+	ldrd		r6, r7, [sp, #32]
+
+	vld1.64		{SHASH}, [r3]
+
+	ghash_update	p64, dec, head=0
+	vst1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+
+	pop		{r4-r8, pc}
+ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_decrypt)
+
+	/*
+	 * void pmull_gcm_enc_final(int bytes, u64 dg[], char *tag,
+	 *			    struct gcm_key const *k, char *head,
+	 *			    char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter)
+	 */
+ENTRY(pmull_gcm_enc_final)
+	push		{r4-r8, lr}
+	ldrd		r4, r5, [sp, #24]
+	ldrd		r6, r7, [sp, #32]
+
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt_final
+
+	cmp		r0, #0
+	beq		.Lenc_final
+
+	mov_l		ip, .Lpermute
+	sub		r4, r4, #16
+	add		r8, ip, r0
+	add		ip, ip, #32
+	add		r4, r4, r0
+	sub		ip, ip, r0
+
+	vld1.8		{e3}, [r8]		// permute vector for key stream
+	vld1.8		{e2}, [ip]		// permute vector for ghash input
+
+	vtbl.8		e3l, {e0}, e3l
+	vtbl.8		e3h, {e0}, e3h
+
+	vld1.8		{e0}, [r4]		// encrypt tail block
+	veor		e0, e0, e3
+	vst1.8		{e0}, [r4]
+
+	vtbl.8		T1_L, {e0}, e2l
+	vtbl.8		T1_H, {e0}, e2h
+
+	vld1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+.Lenc_final:
+	vld1.64		{SHASH}, [r3, :128]
+	vmov.i8		MASK, #0xe1
+	veor		SHASH2_p64, SHASH_L, SHASH_H
+	vshl.u64	MASK, MASK, #57
+	mov		r0, #1
+	bne		3f			// process head block first
+	ghash_update	p64, aggregate=0, head=0
+
+	vrev64.8	XL, XL
+	vext.8		XL, XL, XL, #8
+	veor		XL, XL, e1
+
+	sub		r2, r2, #16		// rewind src pointer
+	vst1.8		{XL}, [r2]		// store tag
+
+	pop		{r4-r8, pc}
+ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_enc_final)
+
+	/*
+	 * int pmull_gcm_dec_final(int bytes, u64 dg[], char *tag,
+	 *			   struct gcm_key const *k, char *head,
+	 *			   char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter,
+	 *			   const char *otag, int authsize)
+	 */
+ENTRY(pmull_gcm_dec_final)
+	push		{r4-r8, lr}
+	ldrd		r4, r5, [sp, #24]
+	ldrd		r6, r7, [sp, #32]
+
+	bl		pmull_aes_encrypt_final
+
+	cmp		r0, #0
+	beq		.Ldec_final
+
+	mov_l		ip, .Lpermute
+	sub		r4, r4, #16
+	add		r8, ip, r0
+	add		ip, ip, #32
+	add		r4, r4, r0
+	sub		ip, ip, r0
+
+	vld1.8		{e3}, [r8]		// permute vector for key stream
+	vld1.8		{e2}, [ip]		// permute vector for ghash input
+
+	vtbl.8		e3l, {e0}, e3l
+	vtbl.8		e3h, {e0}, e3h
+
+	vld1.8		{e0}, [r4]
+
+	vtbl.8		T1_L, {e0}, e2l
+	vtbl.8		T1_H, {e0}, e2h
+
+	veor		e0, e0, e3
+	vst1.8		{e0}, [r4]
+
+	vld1.64		{XL}, [r1]
+.Ldec_final:
+	vld1.64		{SHASH}, [r3]
+	vmov.i8		MASK, #0xe1
+	veor		SHASH2_p64, SHASH_L, SHASH_H
+	vshl.u64	MASK, MASK, #57
+	mov		r0, #1
+	bne		3f			// process head block first
+	ghash_update	p64, aggregate=0, head=0
+
+	vrev64.8	XL, XL
+	vext.8		XL, XL, XL, #8
+	veor		XL, XL, e1
+
+	mov_l		ip, .Lpermute
+	ldrd		r2, r3, [sp, #40]	// otag and authsize
+	vld1.8		{T1}, [r2]
+	add		ip, ip, r3
+	vceq.i8		T1, T1, XL		// compare tags
+	vmvn		T1, T1			// 0 for eq, -1 for ne
+
+	vld1.8		{e0}, [ip]
+	vtbl.8		XL_L, {T1}, e0l		// keep authsize bytes only
+	vtbl.8		XL_H, {T1}, e0h
+
+	vpmin.s8	XL_L, XL_L, XL_H	// take the minimum s8 across the vector
+	vpmin.s8	XL_L, XL_L, XL_L
+	vmov.32		r0, XL_L[0]		// fail if != 0x0
+
+	pop		{r4-r8, pc}
+ENDPROC(pmull_gcm_dec_final)
+
+	.section	".rodata", "a", %progbits
+	.align		5
+.Lpermute:
+	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
+	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
+	.byte		0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
+	.byte		0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f
+	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
+	.byte		0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
index f13401f3e669..3ddf05b4234d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/ghash-ce-glue.c
@@ -2,36 +2,53 @@
 /*
  * Accelerated GHASH implementation with ARMv8 vmull.p64 instructions.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2018 Linaro Ltd. <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 - 2018 Linaro Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC.
  */
 
 #include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/neon.h>
 #include <asm/simd.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
 #include <crypto/cryptd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/gf128mul.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("GHASH hash function using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ghash");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("gcm(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rfc4106(gcm(aes))");
 
 #define GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE	16
 #define GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE	16
 
+#define RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE	4
+
 struct ghash_key {
 	be128	k;
 	u64	h[][2];
 };
 
+struct gcm_key {
+	u64	h[4][2];
+	u32	rk[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+	int	rounds;
+	u8	nonce[];	// for RFC4106 nonce
+};
+
 struct ghash_desc_ctx {
 	u64 digest[GHASH_DIGEST_SIZE/sizeof(u64)];
 	u8 buf[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
@@ -344,6 +361,393 @@ static struct ahash_alg ghash_async_alg = {
 	},
 };
 
+
+void pmull_gcm_encrypt(int blocks, u64 dg[], const char *src,
+		       struct gcm_key const *k, char *dst,
+		       const char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter);
+
+void pmull_gcm_enc_final(int blocks, u64 dg[], char *tag,
+			 struct gcm_key const *k, char *head,
+			 const char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter);
+
+void pmull_gcm_decrypt(int bytes, u64 dg[], const char *src,
+		       struct gcm_key const *k, char *dst,
+		       const char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter);
+
+int pmull_gcm_dec_final(int bytes, u64 dg[], char *tag,
+			struct gcm_key const *k, char *head,
+			const char *iv, int rounds, u32 counter,
+			const char *otag, int authsize);
+
+static int gcm_aes_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *inkey,
+			  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx;
+	be128 h, k;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = aes_expandkey(&aes_ctx, inkey, keylen);
+	if (ret)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	aes_encrypt(&aes_ctx, (u8 *)&k, (u8[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]){});
+
+	memcpy(ctx->rk, aes_ctx.key_enc, sizeof(ctx->rk));
+	ctx->rounds = 6 + keylen / 4;
+
+	memzero_explicit(&aes_ctx, sizeof(aes_ctx));
+
+	ghash_reflect(ctx->h[0], &k);
+
+	h = k;
+	gf128mul_lle(&h, &k);
+	ghash_reflect(ctx->h[1], &h);
+
+	gf128mul_lle(&h, &k);
+	ghash_reflect(ctx->h[2], &h);
+
+	gf128mul_lle(&h, &k);
+	ghash_reflect(ctx->h[3], &h);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	return crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authsize);
+}
+
+static void gcm_update_mac(u64 dg[], const u8 *src, int count, u8 buf[],
+			   int *buf_count, struct gcm_key *ctx)
+{
+	if (*buf_count > 0) {
+		int buf_added = min(count, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - *buf_count);
+
+		memcpy(&buf[*buf_count], src, buf_added);
+
+		*buf_count += buf_added;
+		src += buf_added;
+		count -= buf_added;
+	}
+
+	if (count >= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE || *buf_count == GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		int blocks = count / GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		pmull_ghash_update_p64(blocks, dg, src, ctx->h,
+				       *buf_count ? buf : NULL);
+
+		src += blocks * GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		count %= GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		*buf_count = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (count > 0) {
+		memcpy(buf, src, count);
+		*buf_count = count;
+	}
+}
+
+static void gcm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u64 dg[], u32 len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	u8 buf[GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	struct scatter_walk walk;
+	int buf_count = 0;
+
+	scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src);
+
+	do {
+		u32 n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
+		u8 *p;
+
+		if (!n) {
+			scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_next(walk.sg));
+			n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
+		}
+
+		p = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
+		gcm_update_mac(dg, p, n, buf, &buf_count, ctx);
+		scatterwalk_unmap(p);
+
+		if (unlikely(len / SZ_4K > (len - n) / SZ_4K)) {
+			kernel_neon_end();
+			kernel_neon_begin();
+		}
+
+		len -= n;
+		scatterwalk_advance(&walk, n);
+		scatterwalk_done(&walk, 0, len);
+	} while (len);
+
+	if (buf_count) {
+		memset(&buf[buf_count], 0, GHASH_BLOCK_SIZE - buf_count);
+		pmull_ghash_update_p64(1, dg, buf, ctx->h, NULL);
+	}
+}
+
+static int gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req, const u8 *iv, u32 assoclen)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u32 counter = 2;
+	u64 dg[2] = {};
+	be128 lengths;
+	const u8 *src;
+	u8 *tag, *dst;
+	int tail, err;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!may_use_simd()))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	kernel_neon_begin();
+
+	if (assoclen)
+		gcm_calculate_auth_mac(req, dg, assoclen);
+
+	src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+	dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+
+	while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		int nblocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		pmull_gcm_encrypt(nblocks, dg, src, ctx, dst, iv,
+				  ctx->rounds, counter);
+		counter += nblocks;
+
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) {
+			src += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			dst += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		kernel_neon_end();
+
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
+					 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+		dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+	}
+
+
+	lengths.a = cpu_to_be64(assoclen * 8);
+	lengths.b = cpu_to_be64(req->cryptlen * 8);
+
+	tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
+	tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Bounce via a buffer unless we are encrypting in place and src/dst
+	 * are not pointing to the start of the walk buffer. In that case, we
+	 * can do a NEON load/xor/store sequence in place as long as we move
+	 * the plain/ciphertext and keystream to the start of the register. If
+	 * not, do a memcpy() to the end of the buffer so we can reuse the same
+	 * logic.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(tail && (tail == walk.nbytes || src != dst)))
+		src = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - tail, src, tail);
+
+	pmull_gcm_enc_final(tail, dg, tag, ctx, (u8 *)src, iv,
+			    ctx->rounds, counter);
+	kernel_neon_end();
+
+	if (unlikely(tail && src != dst))
+		memcpy(dst, src, tail);
+
+	if (walk.nbytes) {
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* copy authtag to end of dst */
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(tag, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
+				 crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req, const u8 *iv, u32 assoclen)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
+	struct skcipher_walk walk;
+	u8 otag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+	u32 counter = 2;
+	u64 dg[2] = {};
+	be128 lengths;
+	const u8 *src;
+	u8 *tag, *dst;
+	int tail, err, ret;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!may_use_simd()))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	scatterwalk_map_and_copy(otag, req->src,
+				 req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize,
+				 authsize, 0);
+
+	err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
+
+	kernel_neon_begin();
+
+	if (assoclen)
+		gcm_calculate_auth_mac(req, dg, assoclen);
+
+	src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+	dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+
+	while (walk.nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		int nblocks = walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+		pmull_gcm_decrypt(nblocks, dg, src, ctx, dst, iv,
+				  ctx->rounds, counter);
+		counter += nblocks;
+
+		if (walk.nbytes == walk.total) {
+			src += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			dst += nblocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		kernel_neon_end();
+
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk,
+					 walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		src = walk.src.virt.addr;
+		dst = walk.dst.virt.addr;
+
+		kernel_neon_begin();
+	}
+
+	lengths.a = cpu_to_be64(assoclen * 8);
+	lengths.b = cpu_to_be64((req->cryptlen - authsize) * 8);
+
+	tag = (u8 *)&lengths;
+	tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+	if (unlikely(tail && (tail == walk.nbytes || src != dst)))
+		src = memcpy(buf + sizeof(buf) - tail, src, tail);
+
+	ret = pmull_gcm_dec_final(tail, dg, tag, ctx, (u8 *)src, iv,
+				  ctx->rounds, counter, otag, authsize);
+	kernel_neon_end();
+
+	if (unlikely(tail && src != dst))
+		memcpy(dst, src, tail);
+
+	if (walk.nbytes) {
+		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return ret ? -EBADMSG : 0;
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_encrypt(req, req->iv, req->assoclen);
+}
+
+static int gcm_aes_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return gcm_decrypt(req, req->iv, req->assoclen);
+}
+
+static int rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *inkey,
+			  unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	int err;
+
+	keylen -= RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE;
+	err = gcm_aes_setkey(tfm, inkey, keylen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	memcpy(ctx->nonce, inkey + keylen, RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int rfc4106_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	return crypto_rfc4106_check_authsize(authsize);
+}
+
+static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE];
+
+	memcpy(iv, ctx->nonce, RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(iv + RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE, req->iv, GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE);
+
+	return crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen) ?:
+	       gcm_encrypt(req, iv, req->assoclen - GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct gcm_key *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
+	u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE];
+
+	memcpy(iv, ctx->nonce, RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(iv + RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE, req->iv, GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE);
+
+	return crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(req->assoclen) ?:
+	       gcm_decrypt(req, iv, req->assoclen - GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE);
+}
+
+static struct aead_alg gcm_aes_algs[] = {{
+	.ivsize			= GCM_AES_IV_SIZE,
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.maxauthsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			= gcm_aes_setkey,
+	.setauthsize		= gcm_aes_setauthsize,
+	.encrypt		= gcm_aes_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		= gcm_aes_decrypt,
+
+	.base.cra_name		= "gcm(aes)",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "gcm-aes-ce",
+	.base.cra_priority	= 400,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct gcm_key),
+	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+}, {
+	.ivsize			= GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE,
+	.chunksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.maxauthsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.setkey			= rfc4106_setkey,
+	.setauthsize		= rfc4106_setauthsize,
+	.encrypt		= rfc4106_encrypt,
+	.decrypt		= rfc4106_decrypt,
+
+	.base.cra_name		= "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+	.base.cra_driver_name	= "rfc4106-gcm-aes-ce",
+	.base.cra_priority	= 400,
+	.base.cra_blocksize	= 1,
+	.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct gcm_key) + RFC4106_NONCE_SIZE,
+	.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
+}};
+
 static int __init ghash_ce_mod_init(void)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -352,13 +756,17 @@ static int __init ghash_ce_mod_init(void)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	if (elf_hwcap2 & HWCAP2_PMULL) {
+		err = crypto_register_aeads(gcm_aes_algs,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_aes_algs));
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		ghash_alg.base.cra_ctxsize += 3 * sizeof(u64[2]);
 		static_branch_enable(&use_p64);
 	}
 
 	err = crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
 	if (err)
-		return err;
+		goto err_aead;
 	err = crypto_register_ahash(&ghash_async_alg);
 	if (err)
 		goto err_shash;
@@ -367,6 +775,10 @@ static int __init ghash_ce_mod_init(void)
 
 err_shash:
 	crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg);
+err_aead:
+	if (elf_hwcap2 & HWCAP2_PMULL)
+		crypto_unregister_aeads(gcm_aes_algs,
+					ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_aes_algs));
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -374,6 +786,9 @@ static void __exit ghash_ce_mod_exit(void)
 {
 	crypto_unregister_ahash(&ghash_async_alg);
 	crypto_unregister_shash(&ghash_alg);
+	if (elf_hwcap2 & HWCAP2_PMULL)
+		crypto_unregister_aeads(gcm_aes_algs,
+					ARRAY_SIZE(gcm_aes_algs));
 }
 
 module_init(ghash_ce_mod_init);
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 28e18f79c300..06b48ce23e1c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -236,21 +236,26 @@ THUMB(	fpreg	.req	r7	)
 	sub	\tmp, \tmp, #1			@ decrement it
 	str	\tmp, [\ti, #TI_PREEMPT]
 	.endm
-
-	.macro	dec_preempt_count_ti, ti, tmp
-	get_thread_info \ti
-	dec_preempt_count \ti, \tmp
-	.endm
 #else
 	.macro	inc_preempt_count, ti, tmp
 	.endm
 
 	.macro	dec_preempt_count, ti, tmp
 	.endm
+#endif
+
+	.macro	local_bh_disable, ti, tmp
+	ldr	\tmp, [\ti, #TI_PREEMPT]
+	add	\tmp, \tmp, #SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET
+	str	\tmp, [\ti, #TI_PREEMPT]
+	.endm
 
-	.macro	dec_preempt_count_ti, ti, tmp
+	.macro	local_bh_enable_ti, ti, tmp
+	get_thread_info \ti
+	ldr	\tmp, [\ti, #TI_PREEMPT]
+	sub	\tmp, \tmp, #SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET
+	str	\tmp, [\ti, #TI_PREEMPT]
 	.endm
-#endif
 
 #define USERL(l, x...)				\
 9999:	x;					\
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/simd.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/simd.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..82191dbd7e78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/simd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+
+static __must_check inline bool may_use_simd(void)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) && !in_hardirq();
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 2c8d76fd7c66..38121c59cbc2 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ int main(void)
   DEFINE(VFP_CPU,		offsetof(union vfp_state, hard.cpu));
 #endif
 #endif
+  DEFINE(SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET,SOFTIRQ_DISABLE_OFFSET);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_THUMBEE
   DEFINE(TI_THUMBEE_STATE,	offsetof(struct thread_info, thumbee_state));
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-rda/Makefile b/arch/arm/mach-rda/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index f126d00ecd53..000000000000
--- a/arch/arm/mach-rda/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-obj- += dummy.o
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index fc439c2c16f8..c5bbae86f725 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ config SWP_EMULATE
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
 choice
-	prompt "CPU Endianess"
+	prompt "CPU Endianness"
 	default CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
 
 config CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/entry.S b/arch/arm/vfp/entry.S
index 27b0a1f27fbd..9a89264cdcc0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vfp/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/entry.S
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 @  IRQs enabled.
 @
 ENTRY(do_vfp)
-	inc_preempt_count r10, r4
+	local_bh_disable r10, r4
  	ldr	r4, .LCvfp
 	ldr	r11, [r10, #TI_CPU]	@ CPU number
 	add	r10, r10, #TI_VFPSTATE	@ r10 = workspace
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ ENTRY(do_vfp)
 ENDPROC(do_vfp)
 
 ENTRY(vfp_null_entry)
-	dec_preempt_count_ti r10, r4
+	local_bh_enable_ti r10, r4
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(vfp_null_entry)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S b/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S
index 6f7926c9c179..26c4f61ecfa3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfphw.S
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ vfp_hw_state_valid:
 					@ else it's one 32-bit instruction, so
 					@ always subtract 4 from the following
 					@ instruction address.
-	dec_preempt_count_ti r10, r4
+	local_bh_enable_ti r10, r4
 	ret	r9			@ we think we have handled things
 
 
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ skip:
 	@ not recognised by VFP
 
 	DBGSTR	"not VFP"
-	dec_preempt_count_ti r10, r4
+	local_bh_enable_ti r10, r4
 	ret	lr
 
 process_exception:
diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
index 281110423871..01bc48d73847 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ void VFP_bounce(u32 trigger, u32 fpexc, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (exceptions)
 		vfp_raise_exceptions(exceptions, trigger, orig_fpscr, regs);
  exit:
-	preempt_enable();
+	local_bh_enable();
 }
 
 static void vfp_enable(void *unused)
@@ -517,6 +517,8 @@ void vfp_sync_hwstate(struct thread_info *thread)
 {
 	unsigned int cpu = get_cpu();
 
+	local_bh_disable();
+
 	if (vfp_state_in_hw(cpu, thread)) {
 		u32 fpexc = fmrx(FPEXC);
 
@@ -528,6 +530,7 @@ void vfp_sync_hwstate(struct thread_info *thread)
 		fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
 	}
 
+	local_bh_enable();
 	put_cpu();
 }
 
@@ -717,13 +720,15 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void)
 	unsigned int cpu;
 	u32 fpexc;
 
+	local_bh_disable();
+
 	/*
-	 * Kernel mode NEON is only allowed outside of interrupt context
-	 * with preemption disabled. This will make sure that the kernel
-	 * mode NEON register contents never need to be preserved.
+	 * Kernel mode NEON is only allowed outside of hardirq context with
+	 * preemption and softirq processing disabled. This will make sure that
+	 * the kernel mode NEON register contents never need to be preserved.
 	 */
-	BUG_ON(in_interrupt());
-	cpu = get_cpu();
+	BUG_ON(in_hardirq());
+	cpu = __smp_processor_id();
 
 	fpexc = fmrx(FPEXC) | FPEXC_EN;
 	fmxr(FPEXC, fpexc);
@@ -746,7 +751,7 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void)
 {
 	/* Disable the NEON/VFP unit. */
 	fmxr(FPEXC, fmrx(FPEXC) & ~FPEXC_EN);
-	put_cpu();
+	local_bh_enable();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_neon_end);