diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700 |
commit | 2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e (patch) | |
tree | 6a09ce761173a966718f9009514dcc90bd9947b7 /fs/namespace.c | |
parent | 9064171268d838b8f283fe111ef086b9479d059a (diff) | |
parent | 87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f (diff) |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman:
"The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user
namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one
namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with
the mount namespace.
The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes.
Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted
ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem
vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
yama: Better permission check for ptraceme
pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init.
scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namespace.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namespace.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 50ca17d3cb45..d581e45c0a9f 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -798,6 +798,10 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root, } mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_WRITE_HOLD; + /* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */ + if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) + mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + atomic_inc(&sb->s_active); mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb; mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root); @@ -1713,6 +1717,9 @@ static int change_mount_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int ms_flags) if (readonly_request == __mnt_is_readonly(mnt)) return 0; + if (mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) + return -EPERM; + if (readonly_request) error = mnt_make_readonly(real_mount(mnt)); else @@ -2339,7 +2346,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns, /* First pass: copy the tree topology */ copy_flags = CL_COPY_ALL | CL_EXPIRE; if (user_ns != mnt_ns->user_ns) - copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE; + copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE | CL_UNPRIVILEGED; new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags); if (IS_ERR(new)) { up_write(&namespace_sem); @@ -2732,6 +2739,51 @@ bool our_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt) return check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)); } +bool current_chrooted(void) +{ + /* Does the current process have a non-standard root */ + struct path ns_root; + struct path fs_root; + bool chrooted; + + /* Find the namespace root */ + ns_root.mnt = ¤t->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root->mnt; + ns_root.dentry = ns_root.mnt->mnt_root; + path_get(&ns_root); + while (d_mountpoint(ns_root.dentry) && follow_down_one(&ns_root)) + ; + + get_fs_root(current->fs, &fs_root); + + chrooted = !path_equal(&fs_root, &ns_root); + + path_put(&fs_root); + path_put(&ns_root); + + return chrooted; +} + +void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns) +{ + struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns; + struct mount *mnt; + + down_read(&namespace_sem); + list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) { + switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) { + case SYSFS_MAGIC: + userns->may_mount_sysfs = true; + break; + case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC: + userns->may_mount_proc = true; + break; + } + if (userns->may_mount_sysfs && userns->may_mount_proc) + break; + } + up_read(&namespace_sem); +} + static void *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task) { struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL; |