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authorDave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>2019-01-30 21:58:24 +0000
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2019-02-01 15:00:55 -0800
commitfedf201e12960bd2fab0596422851b20a8d80d20 (patch)
tree00a207c24e46e289b44e67d0f5ffe5dfd846da3e /net/tls
parenta2ef9b6a22bd22841bde53e52cc50476fb4d1a5d (diff)
net: tls: Refactor control message handling on recv
For TLS 1.3, the control message is encrypted. Handle control message checks after decryption. Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/tls')
-rw-r--r--net/tls/tls_sw.c88
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 7b6386f4c685..34f3523f668e 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1421,16 +1421,15 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
}
+ rxm->offset += tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size;
+ rxm->full_len -= tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
+ tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx);
+ ctx->decrypted = true;
+ ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
} else {
*zc = false;
}
- rxm->offset += tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size;
- rxm->full_len -= tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
- tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx);
- ctx->decrypted = true;
- ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
-
return err;
}
@@ -1609,6 +1608,25 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
+
+ if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
+ ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
+ zc = true;
+
+ err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
+ &chunk, &zc, ctx->async_capable);
+ if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ goto recv_end;
+ }
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ async = true;
+ num_async++;
+ goto pick_next_record;
+ }
+
if (!cmsg) {
int cerr;
@@ -1626,40 +1644,22 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
goto recv_end;
}
- to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
-
- if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek)
- zc = true;
-
- err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
- &chunk, &zc, ctx->async_capable);
- if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
- goto recv_end;
- }
-
- if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
- async = true;
- num_async++;
- goto pick_next_record;
- } else {
- if (!zc) {
- if (rxm->full_len > len) {
- retain_skb = true;
- chunk = len;
- } else {
- chunk = rxm->full_len;
- }
+ if (!zc) {
+ if (rxm->full_len > len) {
+ retain_skb = true;
+ chunk = len;
+ } else {
+ chunk = rxm->full_len;
+ }
- err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
- msg, chunk);
- if (err < 0)
- goto recv_end;
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
+ msg, chunk);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto recv_end;
- if (!is_peek) {
- rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
- rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
- }
+ if (!is_peek) {
+ rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
+ rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
}
}
@@ -1759,15 +1759,15 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
if (!skb)
goto splice_read_end;
- /* splice does not support reading control messages */
- if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
- err = -ENOTSUPP;
- goto splice_read_end;
- }
-
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
+ /* splice does not support reading control messages */
+ if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+ err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ goto splice_read_end;
+ }
+
if (err < 0) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto splice_read_end;