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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-02-21 12:49:56 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-02-21 12:49:56 -0800
commitc9341ee0af4df0af8b727873ef851227345defed (patch)
tree81a48ed068936afd58a1cb9b6cb65f6e16dcb343 /security/apparmor/capability.c
parent7a771ceac771d009f7203c40b256b0608d7ea2f8 (diff)
parent61841be6358c03e864ad4c386c9a102edbba9cb8 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes - add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs - SELinux cgroupfs labeling support - SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user namespaces - improved TPM 2.0 support" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits) tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis() KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key() sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr tpm: silence an array overflow warning tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c26
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 1101c6f64bb7..ed0a3e6b8022 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
* audit_caps - audit a capability
* @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL)
* @cap: capability tested
+ @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
* @error: error code returned by test
*
* Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
@@ -62,17 +64,16 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
*
* Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure
*/
-static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit,
+ int error)
{
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
- struct common_audit_data sa;
- struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
- sa.aad = &aad;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
sa.u.cap = cap;
- sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
- sa.aad->error = error;
+ aad(&sa)->error = error;
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)
+ aad(&sa)->info = "optional: no audit";
if (likely(!error)) {
/* test if auditing is being forced */
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error)
}
put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
- return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb);
+ return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, audit_cb);
}
/**
@@ -133,11 +134,10 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit)
{
int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
- if (!audit) {
- if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
- return complain_error(error);
- return error;
+ if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) {
+ if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return error;
}
- return audit_caps(profile, cap, error);
+ return audit_caps(profile, cap, audit, error);
}