diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-02-21 12:49:56 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-02-21 12:49:56 -0800 |
commit | c9341ee0af4df0af8b727873ef851227345defed (patch) | |
tree | 81a48ed068936afd58a1cb9b6cb65f6e16dcb343 /security/apparmor/capability.c | |
parent | 7a771ceac771d009f7203c40b256b0608d7ea2f8 (diff) | |
parent | 61841be6358c03e864ad4c386c9a102edbba9cb8 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
- major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes
- add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs
- SELinux cgroupfs labeling support
- SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user
namespaces
- improved TPM 2.0 support"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits)
tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static
tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend
tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable
tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description
tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis()
KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data
KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()
sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl
selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs
selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr
tpm: silence an array overflow warning
tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t
tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log
tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log
tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks
tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks
tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted
tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function
tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer
tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/capability.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/capability.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 1101c6f64bb7..ed0a3e6b8022 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "include/apparmor.h" #include "include/capability.h" @@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * audit_caps - audit a capability * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability tested + @audit: whether an audit record should be generated * @error: error code returned by test * * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching @@ -62,17 +64,16 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure */ -static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error) +static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, + int error) { struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - struct common_audit_data sa; - struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; - sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; - sa.aad = &aad; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); sa.u.cap = cap; - sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE; - sa.aad->error = error; + aad(&sa)->error = error; + if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) + aad(&sa)->info = "optional: no audit"; if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ @@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error) } put_cpu_var(audit_cache); - return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa, audit_cb); } /** @@ -133,11 +134,10 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit) { int error = profile_capable(profile, cap); - if (!audit) { - if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) - return complain_error(error); - return error; + if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { + if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + return error; } - return audit_caps(profile, cap, error); + return audit_caps(profile, cap, audit, error); } |